The Wages of American Political Decay
美国政治衰败的代价
原文：The American Interest https://tinyurl.com/ycm9at68
译文：观察者
https://www.guancha.cn/FuLangXiSi-FuShan/2020_05_18_550714.shtml
作者：Francis Fukuyama
译者：凯莉
In human history, national emergencies, whether caused by war, invasion,
financial crisis, or an epidemic, have often been the occasions for major
political reform. Political systems get “stuck” in situations where they
desperately need reform, but are trapped in institutional arrangements that
do not permit them to solve their problems. It takes a huge external shock to
get people to recognize they have a common problem, and that extraordinary
measures will be required to get out of it.
在人类历史上，无论是由战争、侵略、金融危机还是流行病引起的国家紧急状态，往往都
是进行重大政治改革的时候。当政治体制亟须改革时，它们却被卡住了，制度安排的羁绊
不允许它们解决自身问题。要让人们认识到他们面对一个共同的问题的话，需要巨大的外
部冲击，且需要采取非常措施才能摆脱困局。
This is what happened during the Great Depression. The latter began in 1929
with the stock market crash. Many Americans continued to believe in the
nostrums espoused by leaders like Herbert Hoover—that the country needed
fiscal austerity and sound money to start growing again—until the banking
crisis of 1931, which drove unemployment rates above 20 percent, and sparked
business failures across the land. The direct result was the election of
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, along with Democratic majorities in both houses
of Congress, which then allowed the New Deal to lay the foundations of the
modern American welfare state.
大萧条时期就发生了这样的情况。1929年，大萧条始于股市崩盘。许多美国人仍然相信赫
伯特‧胡佛等领导人所信奉的“灵丹妙药”——美国需要财政紧缩和稳健的货币来重启增
长——直到1931年爆发银行业危机。这场危机导致失业率超过20%，还导致全国各地的企
业倒闭。直接结果是1932年富兰克林‧罗斯福当选总统，民主党在参众两院获得多数席位
，这也促使罗斯福新政为美国现代福利国家奠定了基础。
Something similar could happen in 2020. Trump’s efforts to downplay the
crisis and his failure to take early protective measures like expanded
testing have led to huge numbers of deaths and what looks to be a coming
depression on a scale of the 1930s. At a moment when international
cooperation was needed to meet a pandemic that didn’t respect national
boundaries, the United States has stepped away from any semblance of global
leadership. A rational response to the crisis would be to throw the current
team out and replace it with a more responsible and reassuring leadership,
both domestically and internationally. The decks might then be clear for
longer-term policy reforms, like the creation of a genuine universal health
care system, reform of the inequities of our electoral system, and new
international institutions to deal with future crises.
类似的事情可能会在2020年发生。川普努力淡化这场危机，且未能尽早采取保护措施比如
扩大检测，导致了大量死亡以及即将到来的经济萧条，其规模堪比1930年代。当国际需要
合作应对一场不区分国界的大流行时，美国连表面上的全球领导地位都已放弃。要理性应
对这场危机，就得把当前的领导团队换成更负责任、更让人放心的领导，无论是在国内层
面还是国际层面。到那时，长期政策改革的形势可能会明朗起来，比如建立真正的全民医
疗体系，改革我们选举制度的不平等，建立新的国际制度来应对未来的危机。
But while we may hope that this optimistic scenario may indeed play out,
there are many reasons to think that it will not. Our problems are rooted in
two structural conditions we find ourselves in, something that I have
elsewhere described as political decay.
尽管我们可以期望这种乐观情况真的能实现，但有很多理由让我们相信它不会实现。我们
的问题根源于我们所经历的的两种结构性失衡，我曾经在其它场合称之为政治衰败。
The first condition is the American system of checks and balances that
distributes powers very broadly between the branches of government, and among
the different levels (federal, state, and local) in a highly diverse society.
These checks on power make tyranny less likely, but they also make the most
routine decision-making very difficult. Many of our institutional rules like
the Electoral College are laid out in the Constitution, which is extremely
difficult to amend when compared to other democratic constitutions.
第一个失衡是美国的制衡制度。在高度多样化的社会中，在政府各部门之间以及不同级别
（联邦、州和地方）之间广泛分配权力。这些对权力的制约使出现暴政的可能性降低，但
也使最日常的决策变得非常困难。我们的许多制度规定都写入了《宪法》，比如选举团制
度。与其他民主宪法相比，我们的规定极难修改。
This system of checks and balances was not an insuperable obstacle to
decision-making through much of the 20th century, but it has become one due
to the second structural condition, which is the extraordinarily high degree
of political polarization that has emerged over the past two decades. This
polarization has many causes, beginning with the Southern realignment
beginning in the 1960s that sent many white voters into the Republican Party
and minorities into the Democratic, as well as the emerging social divisions
between large urban agglomerations and more rural areas. When combined with
our system of checks and balances, polarization has led to political stasis
where even things like annual budgets could not be passed by Congress.
20世纪的大部分时候，这种制衡制度对决策而言并不是不可踰越的障碍。但因为第二个失
衡，即过去20年出现的高度政治极化，这种制度成为了不可踰越的障碍。这种极化有许多
原因，从20世纪60年代的美国南部政党重组开始，许多白人选民转向共和党，少数族裔进
入民主党，而且大城市群和更多农村地区之间开始出现社会分裂。加上我们的政治制衡制
度，两极分化已经引发过政治停摆，甚至连年度预算法案在国会无法通过这样的事也会发
生。
This inability to get things done has in certain ways been a good thing in
recent years. There are many actions that Donald Trump has threatened, like
blocking Muslims from entering the United States, or building his border
wall, that have been stopped by the courts or Congress. In the current
COVID-19 crisis, American federalism has permitted governors of states like
California or New York to take action in the absence of leadership from
Washington.
近年来，从某种角度来说这种无法做成一些事反而是好事。许多川普总统威胁说要采取的
行动，如禁止穆斯林入境美国，或修建他的边境墙，已被法院或国会阻止。在当前的新冠
肺炎疫情危机中，美国联邦制允许加州或纽约州等州州长可以不听命于华盛顿方面领导单
独采取行动。
In a perfect world, this unprecedented pandemic would have been an occasion
for Americans to put aside their differences and rally around the flag, as
the “pandemic as war” metaphors suggest. There was indeed bipartisan
cooperation in passing the $2 trillion COVID-19 relief act. But overall, the
pandemic has served to deepen polarization, and that is likely to get worse
as time goes on.
在理想的世界里，这场前所未有的大流行本来可以是美国人抛开分歧、团结在旗帜周围的
机会，正如“疫情如战争”所比喻的那样。在通过2万亿美元的新冠肺炎疫情救济法案上
，确实有两党合作。但总体而言，这场大流行已经加深了政治极化，随着时间的推移，情
况可能会更糟。
From the beginning, there was a sharp partisan divide in how to interpret
events. President Trump spent January and February minimizing the importance
of the epidemic, claiming that it was under control and that it would
disappear quickly. In this he was simply echoing legions of conservative
commentators who decried the fake media panic and maintained that COVID-19
was no worse than the flu. Even when Trump pivoted to taking the disease
seriously in mid-March, conservatives continued to attack public health
experts like Anthony Fauci. As the economy deteriorated, they started to
argue for a quick lifting of stay-at-home orders and a return to work.
Liberals took the opposite position, emphasizing the need for medical
expertise and pushing for stronger government interventions in ramping up
testing, medical supplies, and the like.
从一开始对各种事件的诠释上就存在着尖锐的党派分歧。川普总统在1月、2月一直试图将
疫情的重要性淡化至最低，还声称疫情已经得到控制，病毒会迅速消失。在这一点上，他
只是呼应了大批保守派评论员，他们谴责媒体制造恐慌，并坚持认为新冠肺炎病毒并不比
流感可怕。即使川普在三月中旬转而开始严肃对待这种疾病，保守派仍继续攻击像安东尼
‧福奇这样的公共卫生专家。随着经济的恶化，他们开始主张迅速解除“居家令”、重返
工作岗位。自由派持相反的立场，他们强调专业医学知识的必要性，并推动政府加强对扩
大检测和医疗物资等事宜的干预。
The ground of the argument has now shifted to the manner and timing of the
lifting of restrictions. Conservatives in many states have begun to mobilize
to protest their state’s lockdown orders in a manner reminiscent of the
early days of the Tea Party, which grew in reaction to the 2008 financial
crisis. Liberals, while not denying the importance of restoring the economy,
have tended to urge continuing caution. President Trump made an extraordinary
pivot from saying on one day that he wanted governors to make their own
decisions as to when and how to reopen their states, to encouraging
protesters to in effect disobey their governors if they felt the rules were
too strict.
目前争论的方向转为解除隔离的方式和时间。许多州的保守派已经开始动员起来，抗议他
们所在州的封锁令，这让人想起茶党早期时在2008年金融危机的应对期间逐渐壮大。自由
派人士虽然不否认恢复经济的重要性，但倾向于敦促人们继续保持谨慎。川普总统的说法
发生了巨大转变，有一天他还在说希望各位州长自己决定何时以及如何重新开放他们所在
的州；后来又说如果大家觉得规矩太严，鼓励抗议者以实际行动违背他们州长的命令，
There are many things we still don’t know about the disease, beginning with
the degree of social distancing needed to keep infections under control over
the long run. In a less polarized world, we should be making empirical
judgments about this. If infection rates suddenly started to go up in states
like Florida or countries like Sweden that didn’t order early lockdowns, or
if people attending an anti-lockdown rally fell victim to COVID-19 in large
numbers, then we would have more information about the causal relationship
between policies and outcomes. The converse is also true: If states or
countries opening up early don’t see a sudden rise in new infections, we may
decide we erred on the side of excessive caution.
关于这种疾病，我们不知道的事情还有很多，首当其冲就是从长远来看到底要保持多远的
社交距离才能把握好疫情防控。在一个不那么极化的世界里，我们应该根据实际经验对此
作出判断。如果没有尽早宣布封锁令——像佛罗里达这样的州，或像瑞典这样的国家，或
者参加反对锁措施的集会者大批感染新冠肺炎，那么我们可以清楚看到政策与结果之间的
因果关系。反之亦然：如果提前开放的某州或某国，没有出现新增病例突然上升，那么我
们可以说我们犯了过度谨慎的错。
But there are many reasons why new evidence will not be analyzed impartially,
with partisan politics standing at the top of the list. Existing divisions
were doubtless made worse by the fact that there will be an election in
November. The relaxed response of Trump and his supporters was driven by
fears that the epidemic and economic collapse would hurt his electoral
chances, while Democrats saw a huge vulnerability open up for the president.
Many people on both sides were making judgments about what they genuinely
believed to be in the public’s best interest. But those judgments have
increasingly come to be colored by another factor that belies rational
explanation, which is cultural identity.
但是，有很多原因说明新证据无法得到公正分析，因为目前党派政治是优先考虑要素。11
月即将举行总统大选，无疑会让当前的分歧进一步加剧。川普及其支持者之所以消极抗疫
主要是担心疫情和经济崩溃会缩窄他的赢面，而民主党人则在其中看到川普总统存在巨大
脆弱性。两党都有许多人在评判他们到底相信怎样才是最符合公众利益的。但是，这些判
断越来越受到另一个掩盖理性解释的因素所影响，那就是文化认同。
There is a quaint model of human cognition that is widely believed by many
economists and earnest reformers, in which human beings take in empirical
information about the world, make inferences from it, and come to preferences
and choices based on careful examination of those facts. If people seem to be
making wrong choices—for instance, if they are skeptical about climate
change or believe that COVID-19 mortality rates are overstated—the reason is
that they are receiving bad information (a.k.a. “fake news”), or that they
are poorly educated and don’t know how to critically analyze the information
they get.
有一种人类认知的古朴模式是许多经济学家和改革热忱者普遍认同的：人类凭经验了解这
个世界，从中做出推断；在仔细研究这些事实的基础上，得出偏好和选择。如果人们似乎
做出错误的选择——比如他们对气候变化持怀疑态度，或者认为新冠肺炎的死亡率被夸大
了——原因是他们在接收不良信息（又称“假新闻”），或者他们受教育程度低，不知如
何对他们获取的信息进行批判分析。
Both of these are obviously big problems. The internet is awash in bad
information, conspiracy theories, and Russian bots seeking to manipulate
people’s views. The ability to critically analyze online information varies
by age, with young people having grown up to be more skeptical of what they
see on the internet than their grandparents who have had less experience.
这两个问题显然都是大问题。互联网上充斥着不良信息、阴谋论以及试图操纵人们观点的
俄罗斯电脑机器人。对网络信息的能力批判分析因年龄而异，年轻人比他们祖父母辈的互
联网使用经验更多，对网上所看到的内容更具怀疑精神。
But the problem with human cognition goes far deeper than this. Jonathan
Haidt and other social psychologists have shown how people tend to begin with
moral or political outcomes that they prefer, and to use their cognitive
skills to defend those positions. This is where cultural identity comes into
play: Where you stand on COVID-19 depends not on facts but on whether you see
yourself as red or blue, and the desire to be part of that identity overrides
even personal self-interest in health or safety. We have already seen a
milder form of this in the opposition of working-class voters in the South to
Obamacare, despite the fact that they were among the biggest beneficiaries of
the program. Today, it takes the form of risking your life to take part in an
anti-shutdown rally.
但是人类认知的问题远不止于此。乔纳森‧海德（Jonathan Haidt）和其他社会心理学家
已经说明，人们倾向于首先相信他们喜欢的道德或政治结果，并运用他们的认知技能来捍
卫这些立场。这就是文化认同发挥作用的地方：在新冠肺炎疫情这个事情上的立场不取决
于事实，而取决于你认为自己属于红色还是蓝色阵营，而且加入这种身份认同的欲望甚至
凌驾于个人健康或安全方面的自身利益之上。在南方工人阶级选民对奥巴马医改方案的反
对中，我们已经看到一种较为温和的表现形式，尽管这些人是该方案最大受益者之一。当
前它的表现形式则是：冒着生命危险参加反对封锁措施的集会。
In this kind of atmosphere, providing better facts or encouraging better
media literacy does not necessarily improve decision-making. Indeed, there
are studies that show that with highly partisan people, having more facts and
education actually makes them more partisan, because they are able to marshal
more information to defend positions they believed to be true to begin with.
This is why fact-checking organizations like Snopes have been preaching to
the choir, with little impact on people who really want to believe
alternative narratives.
在这种气氛下，提供更好的事实或倡导更高的媒体素养并不一定能改善决策。事实上有研
究表明，党派性很强的人掌握更多事实依据、教育程度更高，这实际上使他们更具党派色
彩，因为他们能够调动更多的信息来捍卫他们最初坚信的立场。这就是为什么像Snopes这
样的事实核查机构一直在向唱诗班布道，但实际上对那些打心底想相信其它叙事的人影响
甚微。
Demonstrating causality in social behavior has always been difficult, even
for social scientists armed with high-powered statistical techniques. Many
conservatives continue to argue even today that the epidemic has “only”
killed some tens of thousands of people, which is comparable to other flu
mortality rates and not worth the economic damage caused by shutdowns. Many
states are finding they don’t need as many ventilators as they thought, and
are shipping them to other jurisdictions. Public health experts respond that
the number of mortalities and infections would have been far higher had the
shutdowns not happened, and hospitals became overwhelmed with patients. The
problem is that you cannot prove a counterfactual, given the many other
factors that may also explain the outcome. And in particular you cannot prove
it to a committed partisan who wants to interpret outcomes in a certain way.
揭示社会行为的因果关系一直都是难点，即使对于拥有高能统计技术的社会科学家也是如
此。直到今天，许多保守派人士今天还在争辩说疫情“仅仅”造成数万人死亡，和其它流
感的死亡率相当，因为采取封锁措施而造成经济损失并不值得。许多州发现他们不需要他
们想像的那么多呼吸机，于是正把它们运送到其它行政辖区。公共卫生专家回应说，如果
没有采取封锁措施，那么死亡和感染病例数会更高，而各大医院其实已经不堪重负。问题
是，你无法证明与当前事实相反的情况，因为有很多其它因素或许也能解释该结果。尤其
是，你无法向那些希望以特定方式来诠释结果的忠诚党派人士证明这一点。
There are many reasons to think that the polarization will deepen as the
crisis evolves. Americans are shifting rapidly from concern about the disease
to concern about their jobs. At this point, it looks as if there will not be
a sudden moment when things snap back to pre-COVID-19 times, but rather a
prolonged period of experimentation, openings, and re-infections. This will
generate huge arguments over how to interpret this experience in every state.
Economic disputes over the government’s extraordinary response to the
pandemic, from the Fed’s flooding of the economy with liquidity to the
support pledged to businesses and workers, will start to displace arguments
over public health. Policymakers will undertake huge discretionary choices
with regard to who gets help and who does not. Transparency and
accountability in this process are critical if money is to be distributed
impartially, but this is an administration that has not been particularly
known for either. All of this creates grounds for bitter partisan litigation
and ill-will stretching indefinitely into the future.
有许多理由让我们相信，随着危机的发展，极化会不断加深。美国人担心疫情正迅速转为
担心工作。目前来看，情况似乎不会突然回到新冠肺炎疫情之前的样子，而会是一个漫长
的过程：试验、封锁解除和第二波感染。这将促发有关如何解释各州情况的巨大争论。围
绕政府在这场大流行中不寻常响应的争论，将从公共卫生层面转向经济层面，包括美联储
向经济猛注流动性，承诺向企业和工人予以补贴。有关谁得到帮助、谁得不到帮助，政策
制定者将承担巨大的自由裁量权。如果要公平分配资金，这一过程中的透明度和问责制至
关重要，但这届政府始终都没怎么体现这两个方面。这些都为激烈的党派诉讼和恶意无限
期地延续到未来创造了温床。
The long-term consequences of the dual health and economic crises are
impossible to foresee. No one after Sept. 11 foresaw the way that the Middle
East would ultimately be transformed; nor did anyone anticipate that the 2008
financial crisis would give birth to global populism. Conspiracy theories
were rife in the United States well before the crisis; as the stress and pain
deepen, it is easy to imagine that new political movements and even religions
will be spawned as a result.
公共卫生和经济双重危机的长期后果是无法预见的。“9‧11”事件后，没有人预见到中
东最终会被彻底改变，也没有人预料到2008年的金融危机会孕育全球民粹主义。阴谋论在
危机前就在美国盛行；随着压力加重、痛苦加深，很容易想像新的政治运动甚至新宗教会
因此产生。
It is entirely possible that the Democrats will come roaring back in November
as voters tire of the current administration. But even if they do, they will
inherit a country on its knees and bitterly divided along identity lines. In
the good times prior to the crisis, the Trump Administration had built up a
level of national debt not seen since the 2008 crisis, which has now suddenly
been tripled. It is not just the next administration, but the next
generation, that will have to live under this burden. The left wing of the
Democratic Party was considering huge increases in taxes to pay for ambitious
new social programs like free college tuition and Medicare for all. These
increases will now have to be directed at paying back the liabilities
incurred in a single year fighting COVID-19.
由于选民对本届政府的厌倦，民主党完全有可能在11月卷土重来。但是，即使他们这样做
，他们也会继承一个屈膝的并沿着身份切割线严重分裂的国家。在这次危机之前情况不错
的时候，川普政府累积了自2008年危机以来从未有过的国债水平，现在突然增加了两倍。
不仅下届政府，而且下一代，将不得不生活在这一重担之下。民主党的左翼正在考虑大幅
增加税收，以支付新的雄心勃勃的社会福利项目，如免除大学学费、全民医疗保险。这些
增加的税收现在不得不用于偿还在抗击新冠肺炎的这一年内发生的负债。
If one looks at the different degrees of success of countries around the
world fighting the pandemic, two factors emerge as critical. The first is the
degree of state capacity at their disposal, which has to do with the numbers
of health workers, emergency responders, infrastructure, and available
resources. The second critical factor has to do with the degree of trust that
citizens have in their government. All countries need to rely on a high
degree of voluntary compliance with the state’s rules, whether they are
democratic or authoritarian. They are in big trouble if they have to rely on
coercive enforcement, something American governors need to keep in mind.
Germany and South Korea are democracies where this degree of trust exists,
and they have outperformed many of their neighbors as a result.
如果你比较一下世界各国在抗击大流行方面取得成功的不同程度，那么有两个因素将显得
至关重要。首先是他们所能支配的国家能力的程度，这与卫生工作者、应急人员、基础设
施和现有资源的数量有关。第二个关键因素与公民对政府的信任程度有关。无论是民主还
是威权国家，都得依靠高度自觉遵守国家规定。如果它们必须依靠强制执法，就会遇到很
大的麻烦，这是美国州长需要牢记的。德国和韩国是存在这种信任程度的民主国家，所以
它们的表现好过许多邻国。
The United States has a tremendous amount of state capacity, at federal,
state, and local levels, even if a lot of it is being underutilized right
now. What it does not have, unfortunately, is a high level of social or
political trust. The bitter polarization that has overtaken the country
remains America’s biggest weakness, something that has been gleefully
exploited by opponents like Russia. This polarization has increased
dramatically during the Trump administration, and shows no sign of abating
despite the common threat faced by all Americans. While one can imagine
better and worse futures a year out, the United States will not be able to
address its long-term problems unless the fundamental divide over cultural
identities is somehow overcome.
美国在联邦、州和地方各级拥有巨大的国家能力，即使现在很多国家能力未得到充分利用
。不幸的是，它缺乏高度的社会或政治信任。目前占据着整个美国的极化现象仍然是美国
最大的弱点，俄罗斯等对手一直幸灾乐祸地利用着这一点。在川普政府执政期间，这种极
化在快速加剧。尽管全体美国人面临着共同威胁，但这种极化丝毫没有减弱的迹象。即便
人们可以想像一年之后情况会变好或变坏，但美国将无法解决其长期问题，除非文化认同
的根本分歧以某种方式得到克服。