【2017 心智哲学研究所春季系列演讲】
意识与认知：哲学与科学的跨领域观点
【主讲人】Sascha Fink
（德国马德堡大学哲学-神经科学-认知学程 助理教授）
【讲题】经验的私密性
时间：2017年2月21日星期二，下午2:00~4:00
地点：阳明大学第二教学大楼4楼243教室（电梯请按5楼）
报名网址：https://goo.gl/forms/WNrcV0l9E8Mue5gJ2
简介：
传统上，我们认为自己的感官经验是无法共享的，自己的感觉和经验，只有自己能感受，
其他人无法触及，这是意识的“私密性”。由于此特性，以科学（客观的）方法研究（主
观、私密的）意识，面临各种困境。Sascha Fink（德国马德堡大学哲学-神经科学-认知学
程）以哲学的观点，探讨意识的私密性，如何为意识的科学解套。
Abstract
According to a traditional view, some parts of our mental life are hidden
from others, the phenomenal aspects being probably the best candidate: I can
know first-hand what my dream was like, but I can keep others from knowing
about my dreams. All that anybody else but me can claim about my dreams is
second-hand, relying on testimony, or is inferred by some fallible theory or
supported by some more or less reliable evidence. Several prominent
neuroscientists (Edelman & Tononi 2000, Frith 2007, Kosslyn & Ochsner 1994,
Palmers 2003, Seth 2010) believe that the privacy of phenomenal experiences
raises methodological issues for researching consciousness and limits its
scope: Either a science of consciousness cannot be strongly objective, or is
limited only to the structural aspects of experiences, or fails to uphold
scientific anarchism. In this talk, I analyze which notion of privacy would
be necessary to raise such a strong problem. However, I am skeptical that we
have reason to believe that phenomenality is private in such a strong sense.
Conceptual and empirical arguments show that phenomenality is not public. But
not everything that is not public is directly private. So I illustrate a
possibility how phenomenality in the actual world can be neither public nor
private. In such a "Conscious Clubs", different subjects may share first-hand
access to the same phenomenal token. If accepted, any argument for limiting the
scope of consciousness studies based on some alleged privacy fails.
＊本场演讲将以英语进行
欢迎对心灵哲学、意识研究以及哲学的跨领域探讨感兴趣的朋友们一起来共襄盛举！