课程名称︰财政学
课程性质︰经济系选修
课程教师︰李显峰
开课学院：社会科学院
开课系所︰经济系
考试日期（年月日）︰2013.11.05
考试时限（分钟）：150分钟
是否需发放奖励金：是
（如未明确表示，则不予发放）
试题 :
Public Finance 财政学 MidTerm Exam 期中考试题 李显峰 2013.11.05
Note注意: 须附推理说明计算过程，若只列出正确答案，不予计分。试题计有5题，试
题纸计2页。若干数字答案可能不为整数。
1.(15%)Does the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Ecomonics imply a minimal
government? Does the government have to intervene directly in markets in order
to move the economy to the welfare-maximizing point in a Edgeworth Box Model?
If society determines that the current distribution of resources is unfair,
does it need to interfere with market prices and impair efficiency?
2.(20%)Assume that the demand curve for milk is given by Q^D = 100 - 2P, where
P is unit price and Q is the quantity demanded per year. Please answer:
(1)With the connivance of some politicians, the dairy farmers are able to form
and maintain a cartel. What is the cartel price, and how many units of milk are
purchased? [Hint: the marginal revenue curve MR is given by MR = 50 - Q. The
marginal cost curve of the cartel is given by MC = 20 + Q/4.]
(2)What are the economic rents associated with the cartel?
(3)Suppose that in order to maintain the cartel, the dairy farmers simply give
lump-sum campaign contributions tp the relevant politicians. What is the
maximum contribution they would be willing to make? What is the deadweight loss
of the cartel?
(4)Suppose that instead of lump-sum contributions to politicians, the dairy
farmers hire lobbyists and lawyers to make their case in Parliament. How does
this change your estimate of hte deadweight loss associated with this rent-
seeking activity?
3.(25%)请问：(1)次佳理论(theory of the second best)是否修订柏瑞图效率境界
(Pareto optimality)的经济一般均衡条件？(10%)
(2)若全社会只有一家公营事业及一家民营事业，分别都只生产一项商品。若公营事业
采取独占定价方式(monopoly pricing)，并且政府对民营事业课征定额税(a unit tax)，
另公营事业及民营事业的边际成本都成正斜率形状(递增)，且二家事业的产品互为替代品
(substitutes)，请依据次佳理论绘图说明社会福利水准将提高或降低？(15%)
4.(20%)Suppose that two firms emit a certain pollutant. The marginal cost of
reducing pollution for each firm is as follows: MC_1 = 300 e_1 and
MC_2 = 100 e_2 , where e_1 and e_2 are the amount (in tons) of emissions
reduced by the first and second firms, respecttively. Assume that in the
absence of government intervention, Firm 1 generates 100 units of emissions
and Firm 2 generates 80 units of emissions.
(1)Suppose regulators decide to reduce total pollution by 40 units. In order
to be cose effective, how much should each firm cut its pollution?
(2)What emissions fee should be impose to achieve the cost-effective outcome?
How much would each firm pay in taxes?
(3)Suppose that instead of an emissions fee, the regulatory agency introduces
a tradable permit system and issues 140 permits, each of which allows the
emission of one ton of pollution. Firm 1 uses its political influence to
convince the regulatory agency to issue 100 permits to itself and only 40
permits to Firm 2. How many, if any, permits are traded between the firms?
What is the minimum amount of money that must be paid (total) for these
permits? By how many tons does each firm end up reducing its pollution?
5.(20%)In a democratic society, which criteria should be satisfied by
"ethically acceptable" (伦理上可接受的) for a collective decision-making rule?
According to Arrow's analysis, is it possible or impossible generally that a
democratic society is welfare function exist or not? Why?
(2)How to improve or enhance Arrow's analysis to find a consistent
decision-making? For example, with median voter theorem or else.
完 卷