Why Is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy?
为什么美国外交政策如此糟糕？
原文：Foreign Policy https://tinyurl.com/wdfgotd
STEPHEN M. WALT
哈佛大学国际关系教授
In my last column, I described the “brain-dead” qualities of the Trump
administration’s approach to the Middle East and especially Iran. In
particular, I stressed that the administration had no real strategy—if by
that term one means a set of clear objectives, combined with a coherent plan
of action to achieve them that takes the anticipated reactions of others into
account.
在我的上一专栏中，我描述了川普政府对中东，尤其是伊朗采取行动的“脑残”特质。我
特别强调，政府没有真正的战略。战略在这里指的是一个明确的目标，再加上为实现这些
目标而制定的一致行动计划，其中包括要考虑到其他人的预期反应。
What we have instead is brute force coercion, divorced from clear objectives
and implemented by an ignorant president with poor impulse control. After
nearly three years in office, President Donald Trump has managed to increase
the risk of war, push Iran to gradually restart its nuclear program, provoke
Iraq into asking the United States to prepare to leave, raise serious doubts
about U.S. judgment and reliability, alarm allies in Europe, and make Russia
and China look like fonts of wisdom and order. The Trump administration has
made it clear that it thinks assassinating foreign officials is a legitimate
tool of foreign policy and that war criminals should be lionized, a move that
nasty governments are likely to welcome and imitate.
相反，我们所采用的是暴力高压的手段，与明确的目标背道而驰，并由冲动、控制力薄弱
且无知总统批准实施。任职近三年后，川普成功地增大了战争风险，推动伊朗逐步重启核
计画，促使伊拉克要求美国准备撤军，让世界对美国的判断力和可靠性提出了严重怀疑，
且令欧洲盟友感到惊恐，使俄罗斯和中国看起来更代表智慧和秩序。川普政府已经明确表
川普政府已经明确表示，它认为暗杀外国官员是外交政策的合法工具，应该让战争罪犯更
出名，这一举动可能让那些令人讨厌的国家也因此而模仿。
Unfortunately, this strategic myopia goes well beyond the Middle East.
遗憾的是，这种战略上的短视远远不止于中东。
Take, for example, the far more important issue of China. To its credit, the
Trump administration recognizes that China is the only possible peer
competitor that the United States is likely to face for many decades. This
realization is no great feat of genius, however. Reasonable people can
disagree about the magnitude of the China challenge, but only a blind person
could miss the worrisome implications of China’s rise.
以中国这个更为重要的议题为例。值得赞扬的是，川普政府认识到中国是美国数十年来可
能面临的唯一竞争者。然而，这种认识并不是什么天才的洞见。任何理性人都可以对中国
造成的挑战持不同意见，但只有盲人才会错过中国崛起带来的令美国人担忧的影响。
If you thought strategically, you’d start looking for ways to limit Chinese
influence at the least cost and risk to the United States itself. You’d
understand that the United States cannot halt or reverse Chinese economic
growth (and certainly not without hurting itself), but you’d work hard to
keep as many countries as possible on its side on the issues that matter,
including advanced technology. In fact, you’d get serious about trying to
prevent China from achieving a dominant position in potentially game-changing
technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence. You’d be
focused laserlike on maintaining a solid diplomatic position in Asia, and
over time, you’d be looking for ways to drive a wedge between China and
Russia, too. And you’d try hard not to get distracted by secondary issues
and waste time, attention, political capital, or resources on them.
如果你从战略上考虑，你就会开始寻找方法，以最小的成本和风险，限制中国对美国自身
的影响。你会明白，美国不能阻止或逆转中国的经济增长（除非同时伤害自己），但你会
努力让尽可能多的国家在重要问题上站在自己这一边，其中包括先进技术。事实上，你会
认真地试图阻止中国在诸如量子计算和人工智能等可能改变游戏规则的技术中取得主导地
位。你会专注于在亚洲保持稳固的外交地位，随着时间的推移，你也会寻找在中国和俄罗
斯之间制造隔阂的方法。你会努力避免被次要问题分心，浪费时间、注意力、政治资本或
资源。
What has the United States done instead?
美国做了什么呢？
For starters, Trump abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a slap in the
face to the 11 Asia-Pacific countries that had worked hard to reach an
agreement that would have provided some modest economic benefits and kept
them more closely linked to the U.S. economy. Then Trump launched his own
trade war with China. But instead of lining up other key economic powers, he
threatened or waged trade wars with most of them, too. Instead of presenting
China with a united front, the United States has been facing China more or
less alone, with substantially reduced leverage. The predictable result: a
face-saving trade compromise that rolls back the clock and no progress on the
real bones of contention with Beijing.
首先，川普放弃了跨太平洋伙伴关系 (TPP)，这是搧了11个努力达成协议的亚太国家一记
耳光。这些国家本来可以提供适度的经济利益，并与美国经济保持更紧密的联系。然后川
普与中国展开了自己的贸易战。但他并未与其他关键经济大国结盟，反而是威胁或与其中
大多数国家发动贸易战。美国并没有向中国展示统一战线，而是或多或少地独自面对中国
，大大降低了杠杆。可预见的结果是：一个满足面子的贸易妥协，拖延了一些时间，但在
与北京的真正竞争中没有进展。
Next, Trump began his reality show approach to North Korea: at first
threatening “fire and fury” and then getting bamboozled by Kim Jong Un’s
empty promises at their initial meeting. The result: no breakthrough in U.S.
relations with North Korea, no halt to its nuclear program, and, across Asia,
diminished confidence in U.S. judgment.
接下来，川普开始了他对朝鲜的真人秀方式：起初威胁“怒火加交”，然后在第一次会议
上被金正恩的空洞承诺所迷惑。结果是：美国与朝鲜的关系没有取得突破，朝鲜的核计画
没有停止，亚洲各国对美国的判断力失去信心。
Meanwhile, Trump has spent most of the past three years gratuitously
insulting key U.S. allies in Europe and threatening to pull the country out
of NATO. Surprise, surprise: When U.S. officials then tried to convince
America’s allies not to buy Chinese technology—and especially Huawei 5G
digital equipment—they got the brushoff from governments that were now in no
mood to do Trump any favors. Chinese diplomats seeking to preserve Huawei’s
position have been quick to take advantage of Trump’s repeated blunders,
telling European officials that they are more committed to multilateralism
and technological openness than the United States is and highlighting their
support for the Paris climate agreement (another deal that Trump foolishly
abandoned). According to Julianne Smith of the German Marshall Fund of the
United States: “The Chinese have started brazenly claiming that it is China,
not the United States, that shares more values with Europe. [They] also
frequently remind European audiences that unlike the United States, China
believes in climate change and multilateralism, a message that is especially
powerful in a place like Germany.”
与此同时，川普在过去三年的大部分时间里毫无理由地侮辱了美国在欧洲的主要盟友，并
威胁要退出北约。令人惊讶的是：当美国官员试图说服美国的盟友不要购买中国的技术，
特别是华为的5G数字设备时，他们遭到了该政府的抵制，这些政府现在没有心情帮川普任
何忙。寻求保住华为地位的中国外交官迅速利用川普的一再失误，告诉欧洲官员他们比美
国更致力于多边主义和技术开放，并强调他们支持巴黎气候协议（这是被川普愚蠢放弃的
另一项协议）。据美国的德国马歇尔基金会的朱莉安·史密斯说：“中国人开始毫不掩饰
地宣称与欧洲分享更多价值的是中国，而不是美国。（他们）还经常提醒欧洲听众，中国
与美国不同，相信气候变化和多边主义，这一信息在德国这样的地方尤其有说服力。”
Now consider this: At a moment when the U.S. State Department is in free
fall, China is upping its game. China now has more embassies, consulates, and
other diplomatic posts than the United States does and in an era where the
future alignment of a number of important countries could be up for grabs.
According to former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns: “We’ve
entered an era in which diplomacy matters more than ever, on an intensely
competitive international landscape. … China realizes that and is rapidly
expanding its diplomatic capacity. The U.S., by contrast, seems intent on
unilateral diplomatic disarmament.” As I’ve noted before, any hope of
balancing China in Asia requires the United States to preserve solid ties to
an unwieldy coalition of Asian states, and that will require knowledgeable,
sophisticated, patient, and dedicated diplomacy as least as much as credible
military forces.
现在考虑一下：在美国国务院处于自由落体状态时，中国正在提升自己的博奕地位。中国
现在拥有比美国更多的大使馆、领事馆和其他外交职位，不久的未来，一些重要国家的结
盟可能会被抢占。据美国前副国务卿威廉·伯恩斯说：“我们已经进入了一个外交比以往
任何时候都更重要的时代，在激烈竞争的国际格局中。中国认识到这一点，并正在迅速扩
大其外交能力。相比之下，美国似乎有意进行单方面的外交撤守。”正如我之前所指出的
那样，任何想要平衡中国在亚洲的实力的想法，都需要美国与一个庞大的亚洲国家联盟保
持牢固的联系，而这将需要知识渊博、老练、耐心和专注的外交，至少需要可信的军事力
量。
Lastly, instead of conducting a measured and gradual disengagement from the
Middle East, and returning to the balance-of-power approach that the United
States employed successfully from World War II to the end of the Cold War,
Trump has allowed local client states, wealthy donors, and hawkish advisors
to drag him back into a pointless confrontation with Iran. One can only
imagine the knowing smiles of foreign-policy mavens in Beijing as they watch
the United States stumble toward yet another quagmire of its own making.
最后，川普没有进行有节制的逐步脱离中东，并回到美国从二战到冷战结束间成功采用的
权力平衡方针，反而是让当地附庸国、富有的捐助者和鹰派顾问将他拖回到与伊朗毫无意
义的对抗中。人们只能想像当看到美国陷入另一个自己制造的泥潭时，北京外交政策专家
们会露出怎样的微笑。
In short, despite recognizing that the China challenge was the most important
item on America’s foreign-policy agenda—with the possible exception of
climate change itself—Trump and company have pursued a series of policies
that almost seem tailor-made to give China as many advantages as possible.
简言之，尽管认识到中国的挑战是美国外交政策议程上除了气候变化最重要的项目，川普
团队仍然采取了一系列政策，这些政策似乎都是为了给中国尽可能多的优势而量身定做的
。
But that’s not the bad news. Though the Trump administration may have taken
the “no strategy” approach to a new level, this problem has been apparent
for some time. Bill Clinton thought the United States could expand NATO
eastward, contain Iraq and Iran simultaneously, bring China into the World
Trade Organization prematurely, and promote hyperglobalization with abandon
yet never face serious negative consequences. George W. Bush believed ending
tyranny and evil forever should be the central goal of U.S. foreign policy
and thought the U.S. military could quickly transform the Middle East into a
sea of pro-American democracies. Clinton was luckier than Bush, insofar as
the negative consequences of his actions did not emerge until after he had
left office, but neither president’s actions left the United States in a
stronger global position.
但这早已不是新闻。尽管川普政府可能已经将“无战略”方针提高到了一个新的水平，这
一问题已经出现了一段时间。比尔·克林顿认为美国可以向东扩张北约，同时遏制伊拉克
和伊朗，过早地将中国纳入世界贸易组织，并促进过度全球化，但永远不会面临严重的负
面后果。乔治·W·布什认为，永久地消灭暴政和邪恶应该是美国外交政策的中心目标，
并认为美军可以迅速把中东变成一片亲美民主的海洋。克林顿比布什更幸运，因为他的行
为的负面后果直到卸任后才出现，但两位总统的行为都没有让美国处于更强大的全球地位
。
Barack Obama had a more realistic view of U.S. power and placed more weight
on diplomacy, but he did little to reduce America’s military involvement
overseas and fully backed the energetic use of U.S. military power. Obama
sent more troops to Afghanistan in 2009, supported regime change in Libya and
Syria, and expanded targeted killings of suspected terrorists with drones or
special operations forces. His administration failed to anticipate Russia’s
reaction to Western efforts to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union and
NATO, and he proved unable to unite the country behind his approach to
climate change or Iran. Nor should we forget that in his last year in office,
the U.S. military dropped more than 26,000 bombs in seven different countries.
巴拉克·欧巴马对于美国的实力有着更为现实的看法，并且在外交上更加重视，但他在减
少美国在海外的军事介入方面做得很少，完全支持大力使用美国的军事实力。欧巴马2009
年向阿富汗增派部队，支持利比亚和叙利亚政权更迭，并扩大使用无人机或特种作战部队
定点清除恐怖嫌疑人。他的政府没能预料到俄罗斯对西方将乌克兰拉向欧盟和北约时的反
应，而且事实证明他无法让国家团结起来支持他的气候变化方针或对伊朗协议。我们也不
应该忘记，在他上任的最后一年，美军在七个不同的国家投下了超过2.6万枚炸弹。
What’s going on here? When did the United States get so bad at strategy?
Foreign policy is a challenging enterprise where uncertainties are rife and
mistakes are sometimes inevitable. But an inability to think strategically isn
’t hard-wired into American DNA. The Truman administration faced enormous
challenges in the aftermath of World War II, but it came up with containment,
the Marshall Plan, NATO, a set of bilateral alliances in Asia, and a set of
economic institutions that served the United States and its allies well for
decades. Similarly, the first Bush administration (1989-1993) managed the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the peaceful reunification of Germany, and the
first Gulf War with considerable subtlety, expertise, and restraint. Neither
administration was perfect, but their handling of complex and novel
circumstances showed a sure grasp of what was most important and the ability
to elicit the responses they wanted from both allies and adversaries. In
other words, they were good at strategy.
这是怎么回事？美国什么时候变得如此不善于制订战略？外交政策是一项具有挑战性的事
业，其中充满了不确定性，有时错误是不可避免的。美国并非从来没有过战略性思考。杜
鲁门政府在二战结束后面临巨大挑战，但该政府推出了在数十年里造福美国及其盟友的遏
制政策、马歇尔计画、北约、在亚洲的一系列双边联盟以及一系列经济机构。同样，老布
希政府以相当微妙、专业和克制的手法操控了苏联的解体、德国的和平统一和第一次海湾
战争。这两个政府都不完美，但他们对复杂而新颖的环境的处理表明，他们确实掌握了什
么是最重要的，并有能力从盟友和对手那里得到他们想要的反应。换句话说，他们擅长战
略。
Paradoxically, part of the problem today is the remarkable position of
primacy that the United States has enjoyed ever since the Cold War ended.
Because the United States is so powerful, wealthy, and secure, it is mostly
insulated from the consequences of its own actions. When it makes mistakes,
most of the costs are borne by others, and it hasn’t faced a peer competitor
that might be quick to take advantage of mistakes. The Iraq and Afghanistan
wars may ultimately cost more than $6 trillion and thousands of soldiers’
lives, but the lack of a draft limits public concerns about casualties, and
the United States is paying for all of these wars by borrowing the money
abroad, running up bigger deficits, and sticking future generations with the
bill.
矛盾的是，今天的问题之一是美国自冷战结束以来一直享有的显著首要地位。因为美国如
此强大、富有和安全，所以基本不受自身行为后果的影响。美国犯错的时候，付出大部分
代价的是其他国家，美国尚未遇到一个可以迅速利用错误的势均力敌的竞争对手。伊拉克
和阿富汗战争最终可能造成6兆美元以上的损失，以及成千上万的士兵生命，但志愿兵制
限制了公众对伤亡的担忧。美国正在通过向国外借钱、增加更大的赤字以及让子孙后代还
钱，来为所有这些战争买单。
This situation helps explain why few Americans are interested in what is
happening overseas or what the U.S. government is doing about it. According
to Diane Hessen, who has been conducting in-depth interviews with a panel of
500 Americans since 2016, “most voters don’t care much [about foreign
policy], and that’s a problem.” Other recent surveys have asked Americans
to list their top priorities, and foreign policy doesn’t even make the top
10. When most Americans can’t tell the difference between success and failure
—at least in terms of immediate, tangible consequences—then policymakers
will be under less pressure to come up with strategies that actually work and
posturing will take precedence over actual performance.
这种情况有助于解释为什么很少有美国人对海外发生的事情或者美国政府对此做了什么感
兴趣。据2016年以来对一个由500名美国人组成的小组进行深入访谈的戴安·海森说，“
大多数选民不太在乎（外交政策），这是个问题。”最近有调查要求美国人列出他们的首
要任务，外交政策甚至不能进入前10名。当大多数美国人无法分辨成功和失败之间的区别
时——即使只考虑立即而实际的后果——那么决策者就没有压力来制定出真正奏效的策略
，追求故作姿态将优先于实际表现。
And then there’s hubris. Americans have always seen themselves as a model
for others, and victory in the Cold War reinforced the belief that the United
States had the magic formula for success in the modern world. Moreover, they
also believed that almost everyone else around the world realized this and
couldn’t wait to follow their lead, join a U.S.-led world order, and
gradually become just like them. Convinced the tides of history were flowing
their way, U.S. leaders believed they were pushing on an open door. Who needs
a coherent, sophisticated, and carefully designed strategy when powerful
global trends were already pushing the world in the direction they wanted?
还有就是傲慢自大。美国人始终自视为他人的楷模，冷战的胜利更坚定了美国拥有现代世
界神奇成功公式的信念。他们还认为，世界各地所有人都迫不及待地要效仿他们，加入美
国领导的世界秩序，并且逐渐变得跟他们一样。美国领导人坚信他们符合历史潮流，认为
他们正在推动一扇敞开的大门。当强大的全球趋势已经在推动世界朝着他们希望的方向前
进时，谁还需要一项连贯、复杂和精心设计的战略？
Moreover, as Paul Pillar explains in his important book Why America
Misunderstands the World, the United States’ unusual historical experience,
geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance has
weakened its ability to fashion viable foreign-policy strategies. Devising an
effective foreign-policy strategy requires anticipating how others are likely
to react, but government officials—let alone the public at large—frequently
know very little about the countries whose actions they are trying to
influence. In addition, the enduring myth of the “melting pot”—which
portrays immigrants to the United States as readily embracing a new American
identity and merging seamlessly into the fabric of U.S. society—leads the
country to discount the power of nationalism, ethnicity, and other enduring
sources of local identity, which in turn leads it to underestimating the
difficulty of state- or nation-building in diverse societies. Certain of its
own rectitude and noble intentions, the United States is equally slow to
recognize that other societies might have valid reasons to question its
motives or to see it as dangerous. Taken together, these blind spots are a
serious obstacle to the development of effective foreign-policy strategy,
especially toward parts of the world whose historical experiences and
cultural elements are dramatically different from its own.
此外，正如保罗·皮勒在其重要著作《为什么美国误解世界中》所解释的那样，美国不寻
常的历史经验、地理上的孤立、庞大的国内市场和普遍的无知削弱了其制定可行外交政策
战略的能力。制定有效的外交政策战略需要预见到其他国家可能会做出何种反应，但政府
官员——更不用说广大公众了——对于他们试图影响哪些国家的行动知之甚少。此外，“
熔炉”的持久神话——将移民描绘成欣然接受新的美国身份并无缝地融入美国社会的结构
——导致该国低估了民族主义、种族和其他持久的地方身份来源的力量，这反过来又导致
它低估了在不同社会中建立国家的困难。同样地，由于某些自以为的正直高尚，美国拒绝
承认其他社会也有正当的理由质疑其动机或认为其危险。综合起来，这些盲点严重阻碍了
有效的外交政策战略的发展，特别是对那些历史经验和文化元素与自身截然不同的地区。
Key features of the U.S. democratic system also make it harder to devise and
implement a coherent foreign and national security policy, especially when
there is no clear and present danger to focus the mind and impose discipline
on foreign-policy debates. When most of the public is indifferent, the policy
process is more easily captured by domestic and foreign lobbies, especially
in an era when money plays such a central role in politics. Instead of a
genuine marketplace of ideas where competing policy prescriptions are
carefully and honestly debated, foreign policy becomes an arena dominated by
the loudest and best-funded voices or the preferences of a small set of
wealthy donors. And as I’ve noted before, the United States is probably more
vulnerable to foreign influence than any great power in modern history. If a
bunch of these special interest groups get at least some of what they want
(e.g., a bigger defense budget, more attention to human rights, rejection of
climate change agreements, unconditional support for certain client states,
etc.), the ability to develop an overall strategy to benefit the nation as a
whole will erode. At best, the United States ends up overcommitted; at worst,
it ends up pursuing policies that are mutually contradictory and therefore
self-defeating.
美国民主制度的特点也加大了制订和实施连贯外交与国安政策的难度，特别是在没有当下
而明确的危险来集中注意力并有纪律地辩论外交政策的情况下。当大多数公众漠不关心时
，政策流程更容易被国内外游说集团掌控，在金钱政治挂帅的时代尤其如此。外交政策已
不是一个认真、诚实地辩论，相互竞争政策处方的真正思想市场，而是一个由最大声、最
多钱支持的声音或被一小撮富豪的喜好所主宰的竞技场。正如我之前指出，美国可能比现
代史上的任何大国都更容易受到外国影响。如果这些特殊利益集团至少得到了他们想要的
一部分（例如，更大的国防预算，更多地关注人权，拒绝气候变化协议，无条件支持某些
附庸国家等），制定有利于整个国家总体战略的能力将受到侵蚀。最好的结果是美国无法
兑现承诺；最坏的情况是，它最终会推行相互矛盾从而弄巧成拙的政策。
Ideally, the institutions responsible for devising and conducting foreign
policy would also learn from experience over time. But as I’ve explored at
length elsewhere, there is little accountability in today’s foreign-policy
establishment. Bad ideas survive no matter how often they are disproved, and
people who get things wrong repeatedly routinely fail upward, while those who
get things right are often marginalized. Consider that the individuals and/or
groups that conceived, sold, and bungled the Iraq War remain respected
figures today, and some are considered eligible for future service. Consider
that the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and
Washington Post actually increased the number of regular columnists who
supported that war yet still do not feature anyone who correctly anticipated
that it would be a disaster. If those who devise bad strategies pay no price
and those who propose better alternatives go unrecognized, why should anyone
expect the country to do better?
理想的情况是，负责制定和执行外交政策的机构也会随着时间的推移吸取经验。但正如我
在其他地方详细探讨的那样，今天的外交政策体系中几乎没有问责制。糟糕的想法无论多
么频繁地被驳倒，都会存活下来，而那些把事情搞错的人一再地失败，那些把事情搞好的
人往往被边缘化。考虑到那些构思、兜售和搞砸伊拉克战争的个人或团体今天仍然是受人
尊敬的人物，有些人甚至被认为有资格在未来进政府当官。想想看，《华尔街日报》、《
纽约时报》和《华盛顿邮报》的专栏文章实际上增加了支持这场战争的定期专栏作家的数
量，但仍然没有任何人正确地预见到这将是一场灾难。如果那些制定坏战略的人不会付出
任何代价，而那些提出更好的替代方案的人却得不到承认，那么为什么我们应该期待国家
做得更好呢？
One is tempted to see these various failures as an inevitable consequence of
America’s gradual transformation from a republic into a global empire, a
powerful country that cannot stop interfering all over the world. The
Founding Fathers warned that a republic could not engage in more or less
constant warfare without becoming corrupted, and they were right. Five-star
general and former President Dwight D. Eisenhower understood it, too. To wage
war constantly requires powerful national security institutions, ever greater
government secrecy, and the gradual expansion of executive power. Checks and
balances erode, violations of domestic and international law are winked at,
the media becomes partly co-opted and complicit, dissidents are silenced or
marginalized, and presidents and their minions find it easier and easier to
lie to retain popularity or win support for the policies they favor. Once
public discourse is debased and unmoored from the real world, coming up with
strategies that will actually work in that world becomes nearly impossible.
有人把这些各种各样的失败，看作是美国从一个共和国逐渐转变为一个全球帝国的必然结
果，一个无法停止在世界各地干涉的强大国家。开国元勋们警告说，一个共和国不可能在
不腐败的情况下进行持续不断的战争，他们是对的。五星上将和前总统艾森豪威尔也明白
这一点。要不断发动战争，就需要强大的国家安全机构、越来越大的政府保密以及行政权
力的逐步扩大。制衡机制受到侵蚀，违反国内和国际法的行为被蒙蔽，部分媒体成为同谋
，持不同政见者被压制或边缘化，总统及其下属发现愈来愈容易用谎言来保持声望，或赢
得对他们政策的支持。一旦公共讨论被贬低并脱离了现实世界，人们不可能提出在这个世
界上真正起作用的策略。
As I said in my previous column, we have reached a point where foreign and
national security policy in the United States is more like performance art.
The results of U.S. actions don’t really matter—save to the soldiers,
sailors, aircrews, and diplomats it tasks with carrying them out. The only
thing U.S. leaders care about is how it plays on TV, on Twitter, or among an
electorate more interested in being entertained than enlightened or ably led.
Because the United States is still so powerful and secure, it can probably go
on this way for quite some time. Probably. But it can’t do so forever, and
it will continue to miss opportunities to make itself safer, more prosperous,
and to build a society that lives up to its nobler ideals.
正如我在上一篇专栏文章中所说，以现在的处境，美国的外交和国家安全政策更像是行为
艺术——把它的任务留给士兵、水手、空勤人员和外交官。美国领导人唯一关心的就是他
在电视上、推特上、在追求娱乐而不是出色领导的选民心中效果如何。由于美国仍然如此
强大且安全，它很可能还可以这样保持相当一段时间。但美国不可能永远这样，美国将继
续错失使自己变得更安全、更繁荣，并建立一个理想社会的良机。