Bolsonaro Placed a Losing Bet on Trump
波索纳洛下注川普下错了
原文：Foreign Policy
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/bolsonaro-losing-bet-trump-brazil-tariffs/
译文：观察者
https://www.guancha.cn/OliverStuenkel/2019_12_14_528374_s.shtml
Oliver Stuenkel
巴西瓦加斯基金会国际关系教授
Monday’s announcement of U.S. tariffs on Brazilian steel and aluminum
imports is yet one more reason China may be looking like a better partner.
美国周一宣布对巴西钢铝产品征收关税，使中国看起来像是巴西更好的伙伴。
U.S. President Donald Trump’s surprise announcement this week that he would
be imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Brazil is just the
latest in a series of disappointments for Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro,
who has staked a great deal on good relations with Trump. Beyond hurting
Bolsonaro’s reputation as having an in with the U.S. president, Trump’s
announcement will have significant effects on Brazil’s foreign policy and
trade relationships, regardless of whether the sanctions go through.
12月2日，美国总统川普出人意料地宣布他将对进口自巴西的钢铁、铝加征关税。这让原
本信心满满对川普押注的巴西总统雅伊尔‧波索纳洛在连续失望之后再次失望。无论是否
进行制裁，川普宣布加征关税，不仅损害了亲美的总统波索纳洛的声誉，而且极大影响了
巴西的外交政策和贸易关系。
As the most pro-American president in modern Brazilian history, Bolsonaro has
put establishing a strong alliance with the United States at the center of
his foreign policy from the start. On the campaign trail, the Brazilian
leader frequently promised to embrace Trump’s tough stance on China and even
visited Taiwan. Brazil’s Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo famously described
Trump as “Western civilization’s Hail Mary pass” and publicly fretted
about the influence of “Maoist China” in Latin America. After Bolsonaro
took office in January, to show the country’s near-automatic alignment with
the United States, Brazil pulled out of the United Nations migration pact,
and it has otherwise been a fierce U.S. ally in multilateral forums,
radically breaking with Brazilian diplomatic tradition. Two months later, at
the White House, Bolsonaro said he was convinced Trump would win reelection.
作为巴西现代史上最亲美的总统，波索纳洛从一开始就把与美国建立牢固联盟关系作为其
外交政策的重中之重。在竞选过程中，他不断承诺拥护川普对华强硬立场，甚至访问了台
湾。为人所周知的是巴西外交部长埃内斯托‧阿劳霍把川普称之为“西方民主的最后
一线希望”，而且公开表示他忧心于“毛主义的中国”对拉丁美洲的影响。波索纳洛今年
1月上台之后，为了显示同美国理所应当的盟友关系，巴西退出了联合国《移民问题全球
契约》，在各类多边论坛中始终自我展现为美国的坚定盟友，这些都与巴西的外交传统背
道而驰。两个月后，波索纳洛访美时表示他坚信川普会赢得连任。
But now all that effort seems for naught. After Trump’s tweets about the
tariffs, the Brazilian government struggled to adopt a cohesive response,
which suggests that it may not have had warning. Bolsonaro promised he would
speak to Paulo Guedes—Brazil’s minister of the economy, who had recently
met with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross—and possibly call Trump to
ask him to revert the decision. Considering Trump’s negotiation style, there
is indeed a chance a deal may be announced, allowing both sides to declare
victory. Yet at least some damage has been done—and Bolsonaro is likely only
more aware of the dangers of depending too much on Trump.Bolsonaro is likely
only more aware of the dangers of depending too much on Trump.
现在看来，之前的努力似乎都打了水漂。在川普发完加征关税的推文后，巴西政府勉强地
采取一致口径回应美国。很明显，巴西事先没有得到美方的警告。波索纳洛承诺将与刚刚
会见过美国商务部长威尔伯‧罗斯的巴西经济部长保罗‧格德斯谈话，并可能致电川普请
他改变主意。根据川普一贯的谈判风格，确实有可能达成让双方能对外宣称胜利的协议。
但目前两国关系已受到一定伤害，波索纳洛也会更加警惕过度依赖川普的风险。
To be sure, Bolsonaro’s strategy of aligning himself with Trump was always
unlikely to succeed, because it would be so difficult to provide tangible
benefits to the United States or key stakeholders in the Brazilian president’
s domestic coalition. For example, during their first meeting in Washington
in March, Trump was set to discuss two key geopolitical challenges for the
United States in the region: weakening Nicolas Maduro’s regime in Venezuela
and limiting Chinese influence in Latin America.
可以肯定的是，波索纳洛站队川普的策略不太可能取得成功，毕竟这很难为美国或者巴西
国内执政联盟的关键利益攸关方提供实际的好处。比如今年3月波索纳洛在华盛顿首次和
川普会见时，川普原计画要和他讨论美国在该地区的两个重大地缘政治挑战，一是削弱委
内瑞拉的尼古拉斯‧马杜罗政权，二是限制中国在拉美的影响力。
The enthusiastically pro-Trump faction in the Brazilian administration—
including the president, his sons, and the foreign minister—promised results
on both counts, but these promises have been repeatedly publicly contradicted
by the government’s military faction, led by Vice President Hamilton Mourao.
Not only has the vice president ruled out any Brazilian support for a
potential U.S. military engagement in Venezuela, but he has also directly
contradicted his boss’s promise to move away from China and closer to the
United States. In March, Mourao blocked Bolsonaro’s controversial plan to
move the Brazilian Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a move meant
to underline Brazil’s pro-Trump credentials. A month later, seeking to
balance the president’s pro-U.S. rhetoric, Mourao told Folha de Sao Paulo
that China was “not a threat, but a strategic partner.”
巴西政府的超级亲美派——包括波索纳洛本人和他的儿子，以及巴西外交部长——在以上
两个方面都予以承诺，但以副总统汉密尔顿‧莫朗为首的巴西军方势力一再公开提出异议
。莫朗不但排除了巴西支持美方在委内瑞拉潜在军事行动的可能性，而且直接与波索纳洛
疏远中国、亲近美国的承诺唱对台戏。今年3月，莫朗阻止了波索纳洛为凸显亲美立场而
将巴西驻以色列大使馆从特拉维夫迁至耶路撒冷这项具有争议的计画。过了一个月，为了
平衡总统的亲美言论，莫朗向《圣保罗页报》表示，中国“不是威胁，而是战略伙伴”。
At the same time, key factions in the Bolsonaro coalition saw their hopes
dashed that Trump would make any meaningful concessions to Brazil. Brazilian
farmers who had wanted a free trade agreement soon realized that Trump would
not allow them to directly compete with American farmers, a key constituency
for the U.S. president. The neoliberal faction of the Bolsonaro administration
—led by Guedes, the economy minister—was likewise disappointed that Trump
would not push harder for Brazil’s entry into the OECD, something seen as an
important seal of approval to attract more foreign investment. In a leaked
letter to OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría in August, the U.S. State
Department gave preference to Romania and Argentina’s accession, a move seen
as especially humiliating to a Brazilian audience given that Argentina’s
president-elect, Alberto Fernandez, would most likely care less about OECD
membership than Brazil’s Bolsonaro.
与此同时，波索纳洛执政联盟中的若干关键派系原本希望川普对巴西作出有意义的让步，
结果希望破灭了。巴西农民本来还指望美国和巴西能达成自贸协定，但他们很快意识到川
普不会允许他们跟自己的关键票仓——美国农民直接竞争。波索纳洛政府中以经济部长保
罗‧盖德斯为首的新自由主义派别也对川普感到失望，因为川普不会大力推动巴西加入经
济合作与发展组织，而这被视为巴西吸引更多外商投资的重要资质认证。美国国务院今年
八月写给经合组织秘书长安赫尔‧古里亚的信函被泄露，美国在其中对罗马尼亚和阿根廷
加入该组织表示支持。巴西人认为他们受到了莫大的侮辱，因为比起巴西总统波索纳洛，
阿根廷新任总统阿尔贝托‧费尔南德斯似乎没有那么在意是否加入经合组织。
Finally, after Bolsonaro agreed, in early September, to increase Brazil’s
tariff-free quota for ethanol imports, a move that directly benefited the
United States, the U.S. decision two months later not to lift a ban on
importing Brazilian beef strengthened the overall perception that Bolsonaro’
s bet on Trump hadn’t panned out. Trump’s decision to reinstate tariffs was
yet another humiliation for Brazil’s president.
波索纳洛于9月初同意提高乙醇进口免税配额，直接使美国受益。然而两个月后，美国却
决定不解除对巴西牛肉进口的禁令，使多数人意识到波索纳洛在川普身上下的赌注并没有
换来实惠。而川普恢复对巴西加征关税的决定更是对巴西总统的又一次羞辱。
The president’s son Eduardo Bolsonaro’s promise, made after the election in
late 2018, that the United States would soon become Brazil’s most important
trading partner—a position China has held since 2009—thus quickly turned
out to be wishful thinking. It also ignored the fact that China’s and Brazil
’s economies are, in many ways, far more compatible than Brazil’s and the
United States’. China is already the destination of around 28 percent of
Brazilian exports—a percentage that is increasing rapidly. Less than half
that figure—13.1 percent—goes to the United States. Brazil’s economy
depends on exports of natural resources and agricultural products. Unlike the
United States, which enjoys sufficient domestic production, China will
continue looking toward Brazilian commodities to feed its industries and
population.
2018年底巴西大选结束后，总统儿子爱德华多‧波索纳洛承诺美国将很快成为巴西最重要
的贸易合作伙伴——2009年至今一直是中国——现实很快证明这只是一厢情愿。而且这种
说法也忽略了一个事实，那就是中国和巴西的经济兼容性远远大于美国和巴西。目前，巴
西出口总量大约28%流向中国，这一数字还在不断上升；巴西对美出口不足对华出口的一
半，仅占出口总量的13.1%。巴西经济依赖自然资源和农产品出口。中国对巴西工业、农
业大宗商品有长期需求，这一点不同于国内产量充足的美国。
China has been deepening its influence in Latin America’s largest economy
even as Bolsonaro has accused it of wanting to “buy Brazil.” And
ultimately, China, the first target of Trump’s trade war, may be the biggest
beneficiary of the president’s new salvo against Brazilian exports. Already,
Chinese President Xi Jinping has started seeking to convince Brazil’s
president that China is a far more reliable partner than the United States.
In November, Xi raised the number of Brazilian meat plants that are allowed
export to China. The same month, two Chinese state oil companies were the
only foreign bidders in an otherwise disappointing oil auction in Brazil. The
bids came after Bolsonaro personally invited the Chinese to bid during a
visit to Beijing in October.
尽管波索纳洛曾指责中国要“买下巴西”，但中国对拉美最大经济体的影响力有增无减。
作为川普发起贸易战的头号目标，中国可能最终成为美国总统打击巴西出口的最大受益人
。目前，习近平主席已经开始让巴西总统明白，中国是比美国可靠得多的合作伙伴。11月
，中国新增了一批获得对华出口资质的巴西肉类工厂。同月，巴西石油项目进行招标，中
国国有石油企业（中石油和中海油）作为仅有的两个外资投标方，让此次竞标免于难堪。
这次竞标之前，波索纳洛曾于10月访问北京时亲自邀请中方参与投标。
China has also voiced support for Brazilian foreign policy.China has also
voiced support for Brazilian foreign policy. In September, after Brazil found
itself the target of a storm of global criticism over fires in the Amazon, Qu
Yuhui, from the Chinese Embassy in Brasília, gave an interview to one of
Brazil’s largest newspapers and voiced support for the country’s
environmental policies, a gesture Bolsonaro thanked Xi for during November’s
BRICS Summit in Brasília. And in what observers saw as a swipe at Trump,
Brazil’s president agreed to the final BRICS Summit Declaration, which
includes an emphatic defense of multilateralism and the Paris agreement on
climate change, which Bolsonaro had initially promised to abandon.
外交政策方面，中国也发声对巴西表示支持。9月因亚马孙雨林遭遇大火，巴西成为全球
舆论的众矢之的。中国驻巴西大使馆外交官瞿瑜辉接受巴西《环球报》采访时对该国的环
保政策予以肯定。11月巴西利亚举办金砖峰会时，波索纳洛总统特地就此向习主席致谢。
金砖国家领导人在本届峰会上发表了《巴西利亚宣言》，其中关于坚决拥护多边主义和《
巴黎气候变化协定》的内容最初并不受波索纳洛支持，但他还是同意了最终的版本，这被
观察人士视为波索纳洛对川普的有力反击。
Adopting rhetoric that would have been unthinkable during his first months in
office, when he was consistently critical of China, Bolsonaro recently said
that the two countries were “born to walk together” and that China was an “
ever greater part of Brazil’s future.” He even said Brazil would stay out
of the trade war between Washington and Beijing. With the United States
looking like a riskier bet, it is likely that Brazil-China ties will expand
further in the coming years.
在就任总统的头几个月里，波索纳洛不断批评中国，但近来他话锋突变，说中国和巴西是
“注定的同路人”，中国“对巴西的未来越来越重要”。他甚至表示，巴西在中美贸易战
中不会选边站队。随着下注美国越来越不靠谱，未来几年中巴关系可能将取得更多进展。
All this will complicate Washington’s broader geopolitical ambitions to
reduce China’s influence in the region, particularly when it comes to the
pressure it exerts on Brazil’s government to exclude the Chinese
telecommunications giant Huawei from the 5G bidding process, set to take
place next year. Leading U.S. policymakers have frequently warned Brazil
against allowing the Chinese telecommunications company to build an
ultra-fast 5G cellular network there, even saying that the United States
would have to reassess how much intelligence it could share with Brazil if
Huawei won the bidding process.
这将给美国更宏大的地缘政治战略带来麻烦。美国意图削弱中国在拉美地区的影响力，尤
其是通过向巴西政府施压希望它把中国通讯巨头华为排除在明年的5G网络招投标之外。美
国高层决策者不断警告巴西不要让华为在当地建设超高速5G移动网络；甚至表示，如果华
为在巴西中标，美国将重新评估与巴西的情报合作。
But, in no small part thanks to Trump’s recent announcement, Beijing is
quietly winning the geopolitical standoff between China and the United States
in Latin America.
但总而言之，很大程度上得益于川普近期宣布加征关税，中美两国在拉美地区的地缘政治
对峙中，中国的胜算在悄然攀升。