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mornlunar (Hav-A-Tampa)
2013-02-27 18:01:2605TAIPEI846
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文件索引 Reference ID 标题 Topic 建立日 Created 解密日 Released
Classification 出处使馆 Origin 翻译完成度
05TAIPEI846 2005年扁政府反核松动秘辛 2006-01-06 09:38 2011-08-
01:44 CONFIDENTIAL 美国在台协会 已完成
[编辑]标题
2005年扁政府反核松动秘辛 台湾:对于通用电力核能电厂之展望有所改善
[编辑]中文翻译
分类：AIT副主任葛天豪，理由：1.4 (B/D)
1。(c) 摘要。在2000年首度执政之陈政权承诺要封杀核四电厂(FNPP)，但却失败了。自那
时起，反核势力曾寻求其他方式以试图减低台湾对核电能源之依赖。直到2005年6月中旬，
那些反核努力随着执行“台湾非核家园”之政策勇往向前下，看似成功有望。陈水扁仰赖于
反核积极人士来确保2004年总统和立法院(LY)大选之得票。在选举过后以及京都议定书近期
之实行，陈政权正试图软化其强势反核立场。自民主进步党 (DPP)执政来的头一次，核电能
源的倡议开始获得支持。此一发展将会预示著争议性通用电力核四电厂最终完工所需之追加
经费和政治支持。摘要终。 核电能源在台湾之角色
2。(c) 核能电力目前是台湾最廉价之能源来源。政府能源专家表示让核四电厂上线，及避
免提前除役台湾的三座现有核能电厂，两者都很重要。没有来自四座核电厂之能源，台湾会
在2010年面临严重能源短缺。
3。(u) 尽管如此，对核能电力之通盘反对(及特定之反核四电厂建造)，已成为自民进党建
党以来之意识形态的关键部份。在陈水扁的第一届任期，及对2004年总统与立法委员选举之
竞选，陈总统都在迎合其反核的支持基础。该议题于2000年11月达到紧要关头，当为努力实
现其2000年总统竞选承诺时，新当选之陈水扁总统停建核四电厂。此举导致国民党罢免陈总
统、专案完工日期之重大延误、及专案成本增加(三千万美金)，并削弱对台湾整体之投资信
心。
4。最终在2001年2月，陈政权同意重启建厂。然而同一时间，如在 ref h中所报告，立法院
之民进党与国民党代表双方同意，即台湾将努力走向“非核”。为了该一目的，在陈的首届
任期期间，行政院(EY)通过了一项环境基本法案，承诺要让台湾变为“非核家园”(ref g)
并起草规章来将台湾之三座现役核能电厂，较原订日程提前七年除役(ref d)。此外，政府
官员及出版品运用极端之反核语气诸如宣称“在台湾有超过6百万人，因后院的核能定时炸
弹，而生活在安全阴影下” (“定时炸弹”意指台湾核能电厂)。
5。(u)在2005年1月，诺贝尔奖得主及台湾中研院长李远哲公开声明即陈政权之“非核家园
”政策可能需要延期至2050年，以便让台湾能符合依照京都议定书之排放要求。这标示著陈
总统自2000年上任以来，高层公众人物首度拥核之公开声明。李院长的声明反映出对于台湾
接受京都协定上之脆弱性的顾虑，其于2005年2月16日生效。
6。(c) 由于需要掌握2004年总统及立委选举选票，幕后加上京都议定书近期之实施，陈政
权正试图软化其强势反核立场。跟随李远哲之发起，多位行政院官员开始公开支持完成核四
电厂。谢阁揆(谢长廷)和经济部长何美玥并公开对此做出声明。如在 ref e中所注，谢阁揆
告诉AIT即他会亲自告诉有影响力之反核积极份子及前民主进步党(DPP)主席林义雄，即行政
院仍受与立法院于2001年2月协定之约束，需完成核四电厂专案(ref h)。
7。(c) 再者，如在ref i中所报导，何部长于2004年于幕后协助争取到临时经费，以维持核
四电厂之续存。于2005年2月14日，何部长再进一步并公开声明她个人对完成核四电厂之支
持。然而她也同时说明，即最后决策将需有更广泛之共识。为达成这种共识，何宣布行政院
计画于2005年6月举办一场国能源大会，以讨论台湾需要如何调整其能源组合，以符合乎其
京都协定之义务。(注。AIT在负责安排该大会之行政院能源委员会中的连络人，告诉AIT有
多位高阶政策制订人员，准备藉6月之国家能源大会，同时确认支持核四电厂完工，及重新
检讨较原订时程提前除役台湾之三座运作中的核电厂。注终.)。
8。(c) 最后，刚卸任之民进党副秘书长钟家滨，但仍为民进党内有力之新潮流派系的具有
影响力人物，近是告诉AIT即民进党于12月底做出明确决定，与反核积极人士分道扬镳。他
说资深官员决定，即与反对党掌控之立法院合作，比继续迎合该党之反核选民更为重要。
9。(u) 尽管这些近来举动显示出，陈水扁政府试图软化其反核立场，就该议题之一场主要
政治斗争很可能会浮现。在政府内外之反核积极人士，不太可能在此核心民进党议题上不战
而退。
10.林义雄，还有行政院研考会(RDEC)及行政院非核家园委员会主任委员叶菊兰。林义雄已ꘊ新上任之谢阁揆施压，要持续执行陈水扁之“非核家园”政策，而为此目的，他号召进行核
四公投。
11。注。林义雄据了解对其反核立场为狂热，而陈政权之反核政策，有一部份为试图安抚林
之结果。然而AIT POL和EST官员与林义雄在2月25日会面，并发现他是理性的。林说他不预
期政府会转变方向或举行核四公投，而只会就现行政策寻求自圆其说的解释。林抱怨说，没
有引用台湾的能源需求或环保考量，官方只会责怪美方施压续建核四电厂。AIT澄清即AIT对
核四电厂之注意，仅限于确保台湾遵守其与通用电力公司之签约义务。在此澄清后，林表示
他完全支持履行台湾对通用电力之签约义务。注终。
12。于2005年2月2日，林率领数十位积极人士所参加之，在立法院和行政院外的抗议，呼吁
谢长廷实现陈政权之承诺(将reftel G中所报导之基本环境法法制化)让台湾变为非核。行政
院研考会及非核家园委员会主委叶菊兰为与环保NGOS有关之前任教授。能源委员会连络人相
信，叶有负责为要求台湾成为非核之环境基本法添加条文。(评论。叶虽留任新内阁中，但
其影响力来自与阁揆游锡(方方土)之密切连系。其在谢阁揆下的影响力还不能确定。评论终
)
评论
13。民进党如何处理这些议题将会重新界定关键党纲。民进党掌握京都协定即将实施，做为
试图遮掩其对核电能源，在拥“绿”条件下，较为实际之考量的权宜之计。陈政权软化对核
电能源立场之作为，是否会转为最终完成核四电厂兴建之政治意愿及经费，尚有待观察。对
支持核电能源的稳固承诺，会导致损害部份之民进党传统的草根支持基础。未来几个月之台
湾的核电能源和京都政策，将会透露陈政权的第二任，会不会继续让政治挂帅，还是会更为
注重于稳当的经济政策。评论终。
[编辑] 新闻报导和网络讨论连结
维基解密披露 2005年扁政府反核松动秘辛
[编辑] 原文出处
http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05TAIPEI846.html
[编辑]英文原文
SUBJECT: TAIWAN: PROSPECTS FOR GE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IMPROVE
REF: A) 2004 TAIPEI 02862 B) 2004 TAIPEI 02475 C) 2004 TAIPEI 00450 D) 2005
TAIPEI 00892 E) 2005 TAIPEI 00555 F) 2005 TAIPEI 00490 G) 2002 TAIPEI 03912 H)
2001 TAIPEI 00477 I) 2004 TAIPEI 02861
Classified By: AIT Acting Director David Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)
¶1. (c) Summary. The first Chen Administration came into office in 2000
committed to killing the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP), but failed. Since
then, anti-nuclear forces have sought other ways to try to reduce Taiwan's
dependence on nuclear energy. Until mid-January 2005, those anti-nuclear
efforts appeared to be succeeding with policies to implement "Taiwan's Nuclear
Free Homeland" steaming forward. Chen relied on anti-nuclear activists to
secure votes for the 2004 Presidential and Legislative Yuan (LY) elections.
With the elections behind it and with the recent implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol, the Chen Administration is trying to moderate its strong anti-nuclear
stance. For the first time since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has
been in power, proponents of nuclear energy have begun to gain support. This
development could presage the supplemental funding and political support needed
to finally complete the controversial General Electric FNPP. End Summary.
Role of Nuclear Energy in Taiwan
¶2. (c) Nuclear power is by far Taiwan's cheapest source of energy. Energy
experts in the government say that it is critical both to bring the FNPP on
line and to avoid the early decommissioning of Taiwan's three existing nuclear
plants. Without energy generated by all four nuclear plants, Taiwan could face
critical energy shortages by 2010.
¶3. (u) Nonetheless, opposition to nuclear power in general (and the
construction of the FNPP in particular) has been a key part of the DPP's
ideology since the party's inception. Throughout Chen,s first Administration
and during the run up to both the 2004 Presidential and LY elections, President
Chen pandered to his anti-nuclear support base. The issue came to a head in
November 2000 when, in an effort to live up to a 2000 Presidential campaign
commitment, newly elected President Chen Shui-bian halted work at the FNPP.
That move led to an abortive KMT effort to recall President Chen, a significant
delay in the projected completion date, increased costs (USD 30 million) for
the project, and weakened investor confidence in Taiwan overall.
¶4. Ultimately, in February 2001, the Chen Administration agreed to resume
construction. At the same time, however, as reported in ref h, both DPP and KMT
members in the LY agreed that Taiwan would work to become "nuclear free." To
that end, during Chen,s first term, the Executive Yuan (EY) passed an
Environmental Basic law committing Taiwan to become a "nuclear free homeland"
(ref g) and drafted regulations to decommission each of Taiwan,s three
operating nuclear power plants seven years earlier than originally scheduled
(ref d). In addition, government officials and publications used extreme
anti-nuclear rhetoric such as the claim that "over 6 million people in Taiwan
are now living in the shadow of insecurity, because of the nuclear time bombs
in their back yards." (The "time bombs" refer to Taiwan nuclear power plants.)
Kyoto Protocol Paves Way for More Serious Nuclear Debate
¶5. (u) In January 2005, Nobel Prize Laureate and Taiwan Academia Sinica
President Lee Yuan-tseh publicly stated that the Chen Administration's "Nuclear
Free Homeland" policy might need to be postponed until 2050 in order for Taiwan
to meet emissions requirements under the Kyoto Protocol. This marked the first
pro-nuclear public statement by a high-level public figure since President Chen
took office in 2000. Lee's statement reflects growing concerns about Taiwan's
vulnerability to sanctions under the Kyoto Protocol, which went into effect on
February 16, 2005.
Post Elections Anti-nuke Lobby Loses Ground
¶6. (c) With the need to secure votes for the 2004 Presidential and
Legislative Yuan elections behind it coupled with the recent implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol, the Chen Administration is trying to moderate its strong
anti-nuclear stance. Following Lee Yuan-tseh's lead, several officials from the
EY have begun to openly support completion of the FNPP. Both Premier Frank
Hsieh (Hsieh Chang-ting) and Economic Minister Ho Mei-yueh have made public
statements to this effect. As noted in ref e, Premier Hsieh told AIT that he
would personally tell the influential anti-nuclear activist and former
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairman Lin I-hsiung that the EY remains
bound by its February 2001 agreement with the LY to complete the FNPP project
(ref h).
¶7. (c) Furthermore, as reported in ref i, Minister Ho helped secure
behind-the-scenes interim funding to keep the FNPP alive in September 2004. On
February 14, 2005, Minister Ho went further and publicly stated her personal
support for completing the FNPP. She concurrently noted, however, that the
final decision would require a broader consensus. In order to reach such a
consensus, Ho announced EY plans to hold a National Energy Conference in June
2005 to discuss how Taiwan might need to adjust its energy mix in order to meet
its Kyoto protocol obligations. (Note. AIT contacts in the EY,s Energy
Commission, which is responsible for organizing the conference, told AIT that
several high level policy makers intend to use the June National Energy
Conference both to affirm support for the completion of the FNPP and to repeal
current plans to decommission Taiwan's three operating nuclear plants earlier
than originally scheduled. End Note.)
¶8. (c) Finally, Chung Chia-bing, who was just replaced as DPP Deputy
Secretary General but remains an influential figure inside the DPP's powerful
New Tide faction, recently told AIT that the DPP made a conscious decision in
late December to break with anti-nuclear activists. He said senior officials
determined that working with the opposition-controlled LY was more important
than continuing to pander to the party's anti-nuclear constituency.
Battle May Be Yet To Come
¶9. (u) While these recent moves suggest indicate that the Chen Administration
is trying to moderate its anti-nuclear stance, a major political battle over
the issue is likely in the offing. Anti-nuclear activists both within and
outside the government are unlikely to concede on this core DPP issue without a
fight.
¶10. (c) Major figures that can be expected to continue to press the Chen
Administration to stay true to its anti-nuclear roots: former DPP Chairman and
anti-nuclear activist Lin I-hsiung and Chairman of the EY Research, Development
and Evaluation Commission (RDEC) and of the EY Nuclear Free Homeland
Commission, Yeh Jiunn-rong. Lin-I-hsiung is already pressuring newly appointed
Premier Frank Hsieh to continue implementing Chen,s "Nuclear Free Homeland"
polices and, toward that end, he has called for a referendum on the FNPP.
¶11. Note. Lin-I-hsiung is believed to be fervent in his anti-nuclear stance
and the Chen Adminstration's anti-nuclear policies are in part a result of
trying to appease Lin. However, AIT POL and EST Officers met with Lin on
February 25 and found him to be rational. Lin said he did not expect the
government to reverse its course or hold a referendum on FNPP, but simply
seeking a coherent explanation for the current policy. Lin complained that,
rather than citing Taiwan's energy requirements or environmental concerns,
officials simply blamed U.S. pressure for their decision to continue with the
construction of FNPP. AIT clarified that AIT's interest in the FNPP is limited
to ensuring that Taiwan lives up to its contractual obligations with General
Electric. After this clarification, Lin stated that he fully supports
fulfilling Taiwan's contractual obligations to General Electric. End Note.
¶12. On February 2, 2005, Lin led a protest attended by a few dozen activists
outside both the LY and EY urging the newly-installed Hsieh to realize the Chen
Administration's commitment (codified in its Basic Environmental Law as
reported in reftel G) to make Taiwan nuclear free. Chairman of the EY's RDEC
and Nuclear Free Homeland Commission, Yeh Jiunn-rong, is a former professor
linked to environmental NGOS. Energy Commission contacts believe Yeh is
responsible for adding provisions to the Environmental Basic Law that require
Taiwan to become nuclear free. (Comment. Although Yeh has been retained in the
new cabinet, his previous influence derived from close ties to former Premier
Yu Shyi-kun. His influence under Premier Hsieh remains yet to be determined.
End Comment.)
Comment
¶13. How the DPP handles these issues could redefine key party principles. The
DPP has seized on the Kyoto Protocol going into force as a convenient
opportunity to try to cloak its more practical considerations toward nuclear
energy in pro-"green" terms. Whether the Chen Administration efforts to
moderate its stand on nuclear energy will translate into the political will and
funding needed to finally complete construction of the FNPP remains to be seen.
A firm commitment to support nuclear energy could result in undermining some of
the DPP's traditional grassroots base of support. Taiwan's nuclear energy and
Kyoto policies over the next few months will reveal whether the second term
Chen Administration will continue to place politics first or has begun to place
more emphasis on sound economic policies. End Comment.