楼主:
jetalpha (月迷風影)
2016-04-23 14:53:19心得：
这是原作者对于原标题文章所做的回应，除了说明该文的照片来源之外，
也提供了另外的资料（如 George H. Kerr.的《Formosa Betrayed》，即葛超智的
《被出卖的台湾》），文后附有摘录Foreign Relations of the United States
1949 Volume IX, The Far East: China [Document 402]，提供给有兴趣的版友参考。
参考书目：
保卫大台湾的美援（1949 ~ 1957） 作者：林炳炎 出版社：三民书局
被出卖的台湾 作者：柯乔治 译者：陈荣成 出版社：前卫出版社
※ [本文转录自 Gossiping 看板 #1N6nW_TD ]
作者: Historia (历史本文) 看板: Gossiping
标题: Re: [爆卦] 美国曾考虑出兵推翻国民党
时间: Sat Apr 23 14:37:43 2016
帮巴哈的朋友回到Ptt上：
http://m.gamer.com.tw/home/creationDetail.php?sn=3167807
......=_=......
那只是我前几天拍照上传了一些我看到觉得很劲爆的解密档案而已.....
完全没想到会整个.....这么....“热烈”
用手机看脸书都还看到有人分享那篇......那甚至不是我正在写的相关长篇文章，也不是
一个完成品，就只是放出一点资料
书名是《保卫大台湾的美援》，三民书局买的到，写得非常好，不像一些党国学者，怎么
说，你如果翻阅大概上世纪中叶的中国人学者的论述，你会发现他们很难以精准的叙事或
者做精准的逻辑推论，不光是只有党国的愚民宣传，就算你觉得很中肯的也有这问题，表
示这是全面性的情况
党国意识形态就是那个年代的产物，举例说，当年“中国式的情报”如George H. Kerr.
在《Formosa Betrayed》所说，中国军人提供给美军的二战时台湾情报，竟然是他们自己
幻想地而且跟现实差很多，如说某某港口完全没船等，美军侦察机一看发现不得了那个港
口满满是船而且超活跃，甚至中国人还自己幻想出一个不存在的岛屿，甚至拿清朝时期对
台湾的认知来幻想情报 (如原住民控制区不再管辖范围等等)，这可是战争的情报部门喔
，表示当代中国人是缺乏精准叙事和思考、逻辑推论的能力。
更精确地举例，我前阵子买一本党国学者写的国际战略书籍，言词间没几句话就要“硬”
插入反西方阴谋论，那很明显欠缺足够依据，而且要说的话争议也很大，这样“缺乏足够
路径”却要“硬推”过去，就是有瑕疵的推断，那本书从头到尾都是这问题，我就丢垃圾
桶了，还不能退钱，气死，真的是垃圾书
党国愚民教育拥护者一定看那种与党国讲法不符的书籍很不爽，但至少我在该书里面没看
到上述党国学者的问题 (这也说明了党国年代，有些人可以靠关系进入学术界，才会有写
那种低能东西的人竟然是“学者”，而且还不是只有这个
那位转贴去PTT的先生好像忘了转贴我后半段关于"当年的"中华民国1945年后在台湾做的
“好事”导致1950年代的贫穷和饥荒、中华民国不具台湾主权的证据等部分......比如这
两段↓
中华民国在台湾的1945~1960年的“真实”所作所为，怎么掠夺压迫杀害台湾人，甚至跟
我们祖先打过全台血战，这些事情是只要是个人类都会感到极端愤怒的。(请注意我这里
特别强调“真实”，看我文章关于李国鼎部分你就懂了，这只是冰山一角)
我补充说，中华民国一直把台湾1950年代的极端贫困说是二战破坏，但根据美国当年驻台
副领事美国白人 George H. Kerr 所写的书籍《Formosa Betrayed》说，当时台湾基础设
施虽被破坏，但工厂等大多数保持良好，理当可以迅速重建起来。
真正导致台湾从战前亚洲先进之列 (要质疑来源的话这是美国人说的喔，
以及台湾学界最近也靠拢向这派) ，倒成1950年代的贫困事实上是中国民国在台湾的
劫掠压榨，比如大量拆卸工厂物资设备去上海变卖导致大量企业消失
(1930年代后台湾是日本前进南洋的“工业重镇”，如李国鼎1951年任职的台船公司就是
掠夺自日治时期的台湾船渠株式会社，请注意这是历史课本说不存在于当年台湾的
“重工业”)、掠夺所有民营企业也就是公营企业和党营企业来源，排挤台湾人就业，
因为只给“中国难民”任职，没看过甘蔗的中国人可以直接当糖厂厂长等，
这对当时台湾经济是毁灭性的；台湾二二八之前的史上最严重饥荒不是中华民国说的
二战破坏导致农作物歉收，而是中华民国强行运走所有米粮造成的，我这里的资料来源是
学界论文(page.101，注解处) 而非党国愚民宣传或小道消息，太多可怕的黑暗真相被埋
藏在中华民国的历史后，我看完这些后我的结论是，
中华民国的历史跟北韩是一样等级的，可能还超过。
书上的原文在这↓
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d402
[PPS 53]
United States Policy Toward Formosa and the Pescadores
美国国务院政策计划处主任Kennan向国务卿提出的PPS53计画书
《美国对台湾和澎湖政策》，这是要排除中华民国在台湾的统治
1. It now seems that there is little likelihood that the policy set forth in
NSC 37/1,82 37/283 and 37/584 will attain our major objective with respect to
Formosa and the Pescadores—the denial of the islands to the Communists
through their separation from Chinese mainland control. The situation in
Formosa and the Pescadores is
超长的 我省略很多
[Washington,] July 6, 1949.
[Annex]
Draft Memorandum Prepared in Policy Planning Staff
[Washington,] June 23, 1949.
A Possible Course of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Pescadores
Preliminary Comment
1. Any plan for the removal of the present authorities on Formosa and the
Pescadores immediately encounters two serious obstacles: (a) there are now
approximately 300,000 Chinese troops on the islands, who might resist such
action and (b) this Government is more or less committed to Chinese
sovereignty over the islands.
任何计画要移除现有福尔摩沙和澎湖统治当局，都会立即遭遇两种可能的障碍：(a) 那里
有大约30万中国大军在岛上，可能会抵抗这样的行动，还有(b)这个政府基本上是把中国
统治延伸到这些岛上。
2. It would now seem clear that the only reasonably sure chance of denying
Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists and insulating the islands from
mainland authority would lie in the removal of the present Nationalist
administrators from the islands and in the establishment of a provisional
international or U.S. regime which would invoke the principle of
self-determination for the islanders and would eventually, prior to a
Japanese peace settlement, conduct a plebiscite to determine the ultimate
disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Formosan separatism is the only
concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism.
3. There are two ways in which this change in regime could conceivably be
brought about.
a. One would be to induce other Far Eastern powers to take the lead
in initiating international action to achieve the above purpose. (For
purposes of illustration, I attach a paper outlining such a course of action,
drafted on the assumption that this was the course we would wish to pursue.)
b. The other would be to announce a temporary unilateral re-assertion
of authority over the islands on the grounds that subsequent events had
invalidated all the assumptions underlying the Cairo Declaration and that
U.S. intervention was required by the interests of stability in the Pacific
area as well as by the interests of the inhabitants of the islands.
2. This paper does not attempt to provide a solution to the first of these
obstacles. The answer to that question turns, in the last analysis, on
whether the National Military Establishment is able and willing, on much the
same principles which animated the British at Oran and Dakar, to provide the
requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist forces now
on the islands and to exert effective authority there for an interim period.
For these reasons, this plan cannot be implemented unless the NME indicates
such readiness and ability.
这份报告不对第一个障碍提供解答，那些答案根据最后的分析是 National Military
Establishment(国家军事机构，意思是这样，不知道台湾的正式翻译做什么)
能做且愿意的。在这样的原则
(发现真的太长了....看谁可以直接帮我翻译吧)
3. This paper does explore the possibilities for overcoming the political
obstacles which stand in our way and for providing a justifiable political
framework within which this Government might resort to a show of force or, if
necessary, an active exercise of force in bringing about an administration
independent of Chinese mainland control and enjoying solid anti-Communist
popular support.
4. The recommendations which follow are suggestive rather than definitive.
The general course of action being proposed here is so complex and full of
unpredictable elements that, if accepted, it should be implemented with
intelligent flexibility.
Course of Action
5. An inquiry should be instituted, along the lines of paragraph 2 above, as
to whether the NME is able and willing to provide the requisite force to
subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist troops now on the islands,
and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. While awaiting
a reply from the NME, we should:
a. unofficially, through an existing cut-out, sound out the Philippine
Government in guarded terms slanted to its own interests regarding the
proposed course of action set forth in paragraph 8 (The Filipinos are
naturally going to be most reluctant to place themselves out in front on this
score unless this Government gives them a greater sense of security against
external attack.);
(非正式的，试探菲律宾政府在这方面(我的注解：移除在台的中国人政权)的意向)
b. in no-wise committing this Government, indirectly approach the
Australian Government along the same lines;
(试探澳大利亚政府同样(我的注解：移除福尔摩沙的中国人政权)的事项)
c. even more cautiously and tentatively explore the attitude of the
Indian Government;(更小心且试探性的探究印度政府对此事的态度)
d. prepare a chapter in the White Paper on China dealing with Formosa,86
with particular emphasis being laid upon Chinese misrule of the islands since
VJ–Day (The White Paper, or at least the chapter on Formosa, should be
issued before action is taken along the lines laid down in paragraph 7.);
(在白皮书中增加福尔摩沙章节，强调中国人自从VJ-DAY后在岛上的暴政)
e. release for background purposes a small but steady stream of
information of this character and information regarding the Formosan
reemancipation movement.
(公布“福尔摩沙人再解放联盟”的资料作为讨论背景)
(我的注解：第一个台独建国团体)
6. If the reactions from all three Governments are negative, we should
reexamine this paper in the light of what has been learned.
7. If the reactions are affirmative and if the NME expresses a willingness to
make a show of force adequate to eliminate Nationalist troops from Formosa
and the Pescadores, and if necessary to apply it, we should forthwith
a. secretly and officially discuss with the Filipinos, Australians and,
if progress has been made with Nehru,87 the Indians, the questions which were
raised with them through informal contacts. We should state that if any one
or all of them would take the initiative in the matter we would be prepared
to support them and follow through on a practical basis. At this stage, the
British, Canadians and New Zealanders should be secretly advised of these
conversations;
b. If there is general concurrence among the Philippine, Australian and
Indian Governments that all or any one of them would raise the Formosan
question as an issue requiring the attention of the powers which defeated
Japan,＋ make our position clear along the lines set forth in the following
paragraph.
8. In our view the problem of Formosa and the Pescadores can be broken down
into two main components(福尔摩沙和澎湖问题可以被分解为两个成分): (a) the
need for a responsible and stable administration on the islands during the
present period (在这时期需要一个稳固且负责的统治当局) while they are awaiting
a stabilization of conditions in China and a final disposition at a Japanese
peace settlement (当他们仍在等待中国局势稳定以及最终处置的对日和约) , and (b)
the need for discovering what the desires of the islanders are with regard to
their future(岛民对自己未来的渴望必须被重视) so that a just and constructive
decision can be reached in the peace settlement on the basis of the
self-determination(民族自决) of the inhabitants of Formosa and the
Pescadores. We do not feel that we should take the initiative in seeking a
solution of these issues because (a) they are of more vital concern to the
Philippines and its neighbors than to us, (b) were we to do so, we would lay
ourselves open to charges of “Big Power intervention” and (c) our hands are
more or less tied by the commitments we made at Cairo and our actions in
facilitating Chinese assmption of control over the islands. While we are most
reluctant to take the lead in this question, we will vigorously and fully
support those states which will take action along the following lines:
a. Notification to all other powers at war with Japan that: The notifying
states view with grave anxiety the mounting threat of chaos and civil strife
spreading from the mainland of China to Formosa and the Pescadores(通知所有和
日本作战过的政权有关严重的焦虑，中国大陆的内战和混乱正在被散布到福尔摩沙和澎湖
列岛);
the Philippines recollect that it was only recently invaded and
ravaged from those islands; the notifying powers cannot view without
misgivings this new jeopardization of the security of all Southeast Asia;
they therefore propose that the powers which are still legally at war with
Japan should immediately concern themselves with the threatened turmoil in
this part of the Japanese Empire which is still awaiting final disposition at
a peace settlement; under Article 107 of the United Nations Charter,88 this
question is reserved for action by the powers which are at war with Japan.
The foregoing notification should be released for publication.
b. Either in the same notification or in a separate statement to be
issued simultaneously or shortly thereafter by all or any one of the
above-mentioned notifying governments, the proposal should be made that, in
view of the independent early history of Formosa and the Pescadores(福尔摩沙和
澎湖早期独立的历史),
of the shocking record of misrule during the past four
years by the Chinese (中国人过去四年来在岛上令人震惊的的暴政纪录) and of the
many pleas from repesentative Formosans for autonomy (以及许多典型的“福尔摩沙
人”的自治请求), the powers which defeated Japan should promptly request the
U.N. to conduct within one year a plebiscite(公民投票) regarding the ultimate
disposition of the islands in accordance with the principles of
self-determination(民族自决，整句意思为，击败日本的强权们应该迅速地要求联合国
在一年内按照“民族自决”的原则在岛上举办“公民投票”作为“最终处置”)(我的注解
：这就是党国中华民国最恨要判死刑的台独).
It should be further proposed that the U.N. be requested in conducting the plebiscite to place the following
alternatives before the inhabitants of the islands:(联合国应该进一步为岛上住民
举办这些选项的“公民投票”)
(1) Do you wish to be administered by (a) whatever government emerges
on the mainland of China or (b) the present Chinese authorities on the
island, or(你希望被“无论”中国大陆出现什么政府或现行岛上的中国人政权统治，“
或”)
(2) Do you wish another form of administration: (a) trusteeship under
the United Nations, (b) independence, (c) any other?(你希望被另一个统治机构：
(a)联合国托管 (b)独立 (c) 任何其他？)
These proposals should likewise be made public.
9. The day following the notification recommended in paragraph 8, this
Government should:
a. propose to the concerned governments (and announce publicly) that
representatives of the states at war with Japan meet within one week’s time
at Manila or Canberra to act on the notification (Objections may be raised to
this proposal on the basis of inconvenience. Having made it, however, we can
then acquiesce to a conference of Ambassadors in Washington or London.);
b. announce publicly our reaction to the notification:
(1) The final disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, parts of the
former Japanese Empire, awaits a decision at a peace settlement with Japan;
(台澎列岛的最终处置必须等到对日和约签订)
(2) Formosa and the Pescadores are at present under Chinese military
administration because the United States Government enabled the Chinese
authorities at the time of the Japanese surrender to assume control over the
islands, the decision to do this having flowed from the attitude expressed by
the President in the Cairo Declaration;(中国人在那里是因为开罗宣言，所以美国让
中国人去接受台澎列岛的日军投降)
(3) Subsequent events in China and in Formosa have not justified the
assumptions on which these actions were taken: Chinese administration(中国统治
当局) on the islands has been rapacious and oppressive(贪婪的暴政) and the
chaos and strife(混乱和伤害) which wracked and gutted China Proper now
threaten to engulf these islands;
(4) It was certainly not the intention of the American people, whose
forces liberated Formosa and the Pescadores at so great a cost in blood and
treasure (这并不是耗费大量鲜血和资金去解放福尔摩沙和澎湖的美国人民想看到的),
that the Cairo Declaration and this Government’s action in facilitating
Chinese control of the islands should have resulted in the creation of a
menace to the stability and security of Southeast Asia and in the suffering
which has been endured by the people of Formosa during the past four years;(开
罗宣言和“这个(美国)政府”允许中国人统治这些岛屿的结果，已经危及到东南亚的稳定
和安全，并且在过去四年里让福尔摩沙的人民受难)
(5) Hoping that the Chinese administration on the islands might turn
to more responsible and constructive policies, this Government has during the
past four years scrupulously refrained from giving publicity to conditions on
the islands and to the appeals for liberation made by representative
Formosans to this Government;(希望岛上的中国管理当局可以“转向”更负责任且建设
性的政策，“这个(美国)政府”在过去四年里一直审慎压抑公开岛上情况以及福尔摩沙人
对“这个(美国)政府”的解放要求)
(6) Confronted with further deterioration rather than improvement and
with the likelihood that the strife and misery on the Chinese mainland will
spread to Formosa and the Pescadores, this Government can no longer in good
conscience remain silent and inactive;(面对情况的恶化而不是改善，以及中国大陆
上的冲突和不幸将会扩散到福尔摩沙和澎湖的可能，本(美)政府在良心驱使下无法再保持
沉默和不作为。)
(7) In view of all the foregoing, this Government declares its
willingness to associate itself with the decision of the majority of the
concerned powers regarding (a) the occupation and administration of the
islands pending their disposition at a Japanese peace settlement and (b) the
future political status of the islands based upon the results of the proposed
plebiscite.(鉴于以上所有情况，“(美国)本政府”宣布决定联合多数对岛上与对日和约
完成前的占领和管理现状感到担忧的政权，这些岛屿的未来必须透过全民公投来决定。)
10. Simultaneously, we should prepare with utmost despatch and vigor to lay
the groundwork for the meeting of the concerned powers. We should attempt to
obtain an agreed position with all of them excepting the Russians and Chinese
regarding the change in the occupation and administration of the islands,
acquainting our friends of our willingness to carry the main weight of the
military phase of the operation. To minimize the unilateral appearance of
this operation, we should urge the Filipinos, Australians, Indians,
Pakistanis, Canadians and New Zealanders to make at least token forces
available for the military operation.(多国共同出兵来进行这个军事行动)
11. At the same time, we should seek the collaboration of the Filipinos in
providing all possible facilities for Formosan autonomy groups to make their
case known both on the islands and elsewhere through broadcasts,
publications, … and other channels.…
12. At the meeting of the concerned powers, we should endeavor to insure that
the change-over on the islands be undertaken two weeks from the convocation
of the meeting. Details regarding the forthcoming operation should be decided
upon at the meeting. If China and the U.S.S.R. are represented at the
conference, it will be necessary to conduct the work of the conference
outside of the formal conference sessions which should then be devoted only
to forcing through agreed positions at the most rapid possible pace.
13. As soon as decisions to that effect are reached at the conference, we
should establish naval and air patrols designed to prevent access to the
islands from the mainland. At the same time, we should do everything possible
to facilitate the flight elsewhere of undesirable Chinese political and
military elements now on the islands, including ships to speed the exodus.(在
会议中作成决定后，我们必须立刻动用海上和空中巡逻来阻止大陆对这些岛屿的侵入。同
时，我们必须动用可能的每件东西来遣送这岛上“不受欢迎的”中国官员和军队，包括船
只来迅速移送移民。)
14. At this time, we should despatch an emissary to the key personality on
the island, General Sun Li-jen. Because Sun, of all the generals on the
island, has the least hopes on the mainland and is the most likely to resist
a change imposed from without, he is capable of performing the desperate act
of resisting vigorously. It would be judicious to present him with an
opportunity for saving his position. He should be offered the alternative of
declaring himself in favor of the Formosan cause and participating in the new
occupation. If he accepts, we shall have made a major military gain in
dividing the Chinese forces now on the island.(说拉拢孙立人然后可以得到现成的
军队在福尔摩沙岛上，我晚点有空在翻译这段)
15. The Generalissimo(大元帅，应该是说蒋介石) should be informed that if he
wishes to remain on the island, he will be accorded the status of a political
refugee.(如果他愿意留在岛上，他可以获得政治难民身分)(美国对1945~1949年的中国来
台寻求庇护者都称为"refugee"，意思为难民)
16. During the take-over and the subsequent administration of the island, we
should avoid so far as possible a conspicuous role. We should always remember
that our aim is more to deny the islands to the Communists than to acquire
responsibility for them and that our influence can be far more effectively
exerted through indirect and discreet means rather than through unilateral
heavy-handed measures.
81 This memorandum, PPS 53, according to an attached chit, was canceled on
July 6; a note stated that the views of the Policy Planning Staff would be
submitted by Mr. Kennan in a personal memorandum; latter not found in
Department of State files.
82 January 19, p. 270.
83 February 3, p. 281.
84 March 1, p. 290.
* “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are staff of the opinion that any overt
military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time. In spite of
Formosa’s strategic importance, the current disparity between our military
strength and our many global obligations makes it inadvisable to undertake
the employment of armed force in Formosa, for this might, particularly in
view of the basic assumption that diplomatic and economic steps have failed,
lead to the necessity for relatively major effort there, thus making it
impossible then to meet more important emergencies elsewhere.” (NSC 37/3,
February 11, 1949.) [Footnote in the source text.]
85 National Military Establishment.
86 See Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 307; see also post, pp. 1365 ff.
87 Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.
＋ As used in this paper “the powers which defeated Japan” and “the powers
at war with Japan” refer only to those represented on the Far Eastern
Commission: US, UK, USSR, China, Philippines, Australia, Canada, India, New
Zealand, Netherlands, France—plus Pakistan and Burma. [Footnote in the
source text.]
88 Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031, 1053.
韩战救了蒋介石，却杀了福尔摩沙
日本人和美国人都说福尔摩沙岛上“农‘矿’资源丰富”，中华民国跟我们说台湾“资源
贫乏”而且缺乏“矿”产，我就问，台湾以前的金矿呢？都被国民党滥挖完了然后全分给
他们划分的上等人阶级“二战后中国移民”了吗？
这种“仇恨和对立”就是党国中华民国挑起的阿，二战后来台躲避战乱的人就类似现在叙
利亚躲到欧洲的难民一样，求的只是安身立命并融入当地社会
但党国中华民国的作法居然是把所有民营公司全掠夺一空，所有职位包括政府机关都只给
这些来躲避战乱的中国移民，然后还写一堆垃圾论文说当年躲避战乱的中国移民水准"远
比"原生台湾人高，可是台湾人教育普及度71%亚洲仅次于日本已达先进国家之列，开发程
度在亚洲也名列前茅，当时的中国呢？
1956/2/25中华民国美援会会议纪录
王蓬说：关于小型民营工业贷款计画，本人特别声明，这完全是美方主张办的，我方并不
愿意而又不能不办的。
江杓说：本人在担任工业委员会召集人以后，才知道有小工业贷款事情，贷款分台币和美
金两种，已经办了三年。本人感觉贷款办法不大妥当，曾问起美方为何将这款项交与商业
银行贷放，而不交政府办理。他们的理由是：1.我们的国家缺少对于发展小工业有兴趣而
放款的商业银行。2.当地银行孰悉当地情形，同时商业银行在贷款中要陪放20%血本有关
，故在审核时比工业委员会的审核更要严密。
本人站在工业委员会召集人的立场，认为上面讲的理由实在欠通：
1.工业委员会的技术人员，美方既然信任我们可以审核大的工业计划，为何小工业计画反
而不信任交由我们来省和，这种态度迹近侮辱。工业在台湾，不论大小，互相都有牵连，
例如电力的消费，原料的分配，彼此都有关系，并且都要顾到。商业银行内既无工程师，
工业委员会的代表从旁指导，他们并不知道工业委员会正在进行中的计画，凭什么他
们可以审核小工业计画，假如他们审定的一项小工业，其实已经包括在大工业计画之内，
将来大工业计划完成后，他们就难免在打倒之列，经营的果然失败了，贷出的款项也成了
问题，所以本人说是部妥当的。
2.美方认为工业委员会是由大陆来的人所主持的，审核小工业贷款时，不免要偏袒大陆方
面人士。
(这纪录收藏于近史所，不然《保卫大台湾的美援》书中也有)
从这些解密文件可以看到，美国当年对党国中华民国的要求，都是为台湾人民着想
然后这些在党国人士的眼中看来就是“美国很过分的干预他国事务”，并且成为他们反西
方的理由 (这段呼应我上面说的党国学者写的垃圾书，党国时代没逻辑不会推理的低能儿
都能当学者了，现在都还有党国学者的讲法说美国要除掉蒋介石是对他国多过分等等，在
巴哈我之前发的那串文也有这种回文)
具体地说，以固定价格计算之国民总生产，在日据时期以1936年为最高峰，战后直到1955
年才恢复该水准，在1960年只不过只较1936年多35％而已，而这期间台湾人口则约增加一
倍，故1960年的人均实质国民总生产仍较1936年少32％。(注24)在此期间，生产相对减退
，人口爆增，又有沈重的军事防卫支出需要，台湾确实面临严重的进口压力，当时最能换
取外汇的出口物资仍以糖及米为主。在1950年至1960年的十一年间，两者累计出口金额达
10亿美元，占同一期间累计出口总金额的68﹒9％;占同一期间累计进口总金额的44﹒4％
；占同一期间累计政府外汇进口(扣除美援进口及其他进口)总金额的79﹒3％。
引用自《‘马关条约一百年一台湾命运的回顾与展望’国际学术研讨会所发表的论文》
(米糖出口经济是日治时代奠基的)
我小时候看一堆电视剧演台湾人被日本人欺负的很惨，跑去问我阿公，我阿公跟我说那都
假的，当下我脑袋里像被雷劈到，第一次碰到那种无法理解的震撼感脑袋一片空白，但还
是隐约有种感觉，当局在丑化以前那个时代。
很好笑吧，党国中华民国到1960年代和至少之后几年都还让台湾人过著比日治时代更穷困
的生活，凭什么做一堆那种假的电视剧？真不要脸
党国中华民国一直到1960年都还在仰赖日治时代奠基的米糖出口经济，不是说自己发展台
湾经济多行？
(这篇看谁可以帮我把小屋连结放上ptt有人转贴的讨论串，他们说想看原文，我这里有原
文)