原文连结：http://goo.gl/tWt4g
译者前言
framing是在讲捕手如何靠着接球把坏球变成好球的技巧
比方说摸二哥就是其中好手
但是这个概念真的很不好翻，因此我想了一想把他翻成“接捕”
以便和接球啊捕球啊这些捕手的基本动作做个区分
这绝对不是最好的解答，但是用在翻译这一篇文章应该是够了
如果有兴趣可以去看看原文，因为他除了自己写之外，也有一些外部连结可以延伸阅读
这篇很长，分成上下两篇，祝大家台风天平安无事，天佑台湾
It's the day before a foul tip off the bat of Rajai Davis will fracture
Francisco Cervelli's hand, and the Yankees' still-intact starting catcher is
in excellent spirits. After spending almost all of 2012 in the minors, he's
happy to be back in the Yankees clubhouse. He's also happy to be off to a
good start with the bat, a start that's about to get better; in a few hours,
he'll take Mark Buehrle deep for his third home run of the season. But how
Cervelli hits is secondary, even to Cervelli."I've been focused on my defense,
and that's it," Cervelli says. "And I'm going to keep doing that no matter
what happens with my bat."
这天是洋基捕手Cervelli被蓝鸟Rajai Davis擦棒球打伤的前一天，Cervelli的精神超棒
。2012年几乎都泡在小联盟里，回到大联盟他真的很开心，另一件开心的事情是他开季打
击还不错。再过几个小时，他就要对Buehrle尻出本季第三轰了。不过Cervelli打得怎么
样是其次，就算是Cervelli自己，也是这么觉得的。他说：“我很专注在我的守备上，不
管我打击发生什么事，我还是一样会专心防守。”
A lot of eyebrows, and maybe a few middle fingers, were raised over the
winter, when the Yankees — the team with the catching legacy of Dickey,
Berra, Howard, Munson, and Posada, not to mention the $200 million–plus
payroll — entrusted their catching duties to Cervelli and backup catcher
Chris Stewart, a duo that entered the season with a combined .249/.315/.332
line in the big leagues. In the past, the Yankees would have dipped into the
free-agent market and signed someone with a bigger bat and a bigger name —
A.J. Pierzynski, perhaps, who was coming off a 27-homer season, or another
offense-first option like Mike Napoli, who signed with the rival Red Sox.
Both players agreed to one-year contracts, so they wouldn't have hampered the
Yankees' goal of getting under the $189 million luxury tax threshold for
2014.1
洋基去年冬天决定让Cervelli和替补的Chris Sterwart担纲捕手重责大任，他们两人过去
在大联盟的打击三围是.249/.315/.332，这让不少人挑起眉毛，甚至有人竖起中指。毕竟
这是一支出过Dickey、Berra、Howard、Munson和Posada的一代名捕的队伍啊，何况团队
薪资还超过两亿美金。以前的洋基会到自由市场上找支有名的大砲，比方说上一季还有27
轰的Pierzynski，又或许是打击不错的Napoli，而他最后跑去红袜了。这两个球员都会愿
意签一年约，并不妨碍洋基在2014年把薪资砍到1.89亿美金的豪华税门槛之下的计画。
Instead, they stuck with two players who are earning barely more than the
major league minimum. And they'll probably be better off. Cervelli and
Stewart can do more to help the Yankees win with a subtle shift of the glove
than Mariano Rivera can with his cutter, than Brett Gardner can in the
outfield, than Ichiro can with his arm and his base-running ability combined.
They have an ability that not only doesn't show up in the box score but
doesn't show up in advanced stats like UZR and WAR. Baseball teams have
always known it existed, but they haven't known what it was worth until now.
And one need only look at the lineup card to see how valuable the Yankees
believe it is.
不过呢，他们最终启用了这两个薪水比大联盟底薪高不了多少的捕手，而且他们表现得更
好。Cervelli和Stewart的接捕能帮助洋基赢得的比赛，比Rivera的卡特球还多，比
Gardner在外野的表现还多，比一朗的跑垒和臂力加起来还要多。这两位捕手有一种能力
，不只不会出现在分数盒里面，连UZR和WAR这种进阶数据都看不到。各个球队都知道这能
力，但是一直到现在，他们才了解其价值。看看洋基的阵容，就会知道洋基有多么相信这
价值了。
"They're both exceptional defenders," Yankees GM Brian Cashman said of
Cervelli and Stewart in a recent interview with Mike Ferrin on SiriusXM's MLB
Network Radio. "Tremendous pitch framers. We're big into that."
洋基总管Cashman在一个广播节目的访谈上说：“他们防守超棒，超会接捕。”
Take a look at these two pitches from 2012:
http://goo.gl/95527 Jose Molina 光芒时期
http://goo.gl/MTGo4 Ryan Doumit 双城时期
They're both four-seam fastballs thrown by right-handed pitchers to
left-handed hitters. They both pass through the strike zone 21 inches off the
ground, between 11.7 and 12.9 inches from the center of home plate. They both
hit their targets, so the catchers know where they're headed and have time to
prepare. And they're both called by the same umpire, Sam Holbrook.
这两个球都是右投手对左打者打所投出的四缝线速球，都在21英吋的高度通过好球带，离
本垒板中心11.7和12.9英吋远。这两球都是捕手要的位置，所以捕手老早就知道球的落点
，有充裕时间准备接球，连后面的主审都是同一位Sam Holbrook。
In fact, the two pitches are similar in just about every respect but their
outcomes. The top one, thrown by James Shields last July, is a strike, but
the bottom one, thrown by Liam Hendriks last June, is a ball.
事实上，这两球除了最后的结果之外，其他的一切都是如此相似。第一球，Shields去年
七月所投出的，是个好球；而第二球，Liam Hendriks去年六月所投出的，是个坏球。
We can't say for sure why only one was a strike; maybe Holbrook was just
feeling generous when the first pitch crossed the plate. But we do know one
important variable that differs between the two pitches — the catcher. The
pitch on the top was caught by the Rays' Jose Molina, one of baseball's best
receivers. The pitch on the bottom was caught by the Twins' Ryan Doumit, one
of the worst. And that may have made all the difference.
我们无法断定为什么只有第一球是好球，搞不好只是主审那天比较大方而已。不过我们确
定知道的是，这两球之间有一个重要的变异：捕手。第一球是光芒的Jose Molina，世界
上最好的捕手之一；而第二球是双城的Ryan Doumit，最差的之一。这个差别，可能就是
这两球结果截然不同的原因。
Focus on how catchers "frame" pitches to make them look more like strikes, or
talk to guys who are good at it, and the distinction between players like
Molina and Doumit starts to stand out. Depending on how they're caught, two
pitches that are almost identical on their way to the plate can look a lot
different once they get to the glove.
多注意捕手的“接捕”怎么产生更多好球，或是和那些善于接捕的人聊聊，Molina和
Doumit这些球员之间的差别就会慢慢浮现了。被接捕的方式不同，这两颗进垒路径几乎一
样的球在进手套的时候，看起来真的差很多。
Concentrate on the catchers in those clips. Molina sets up farther outside,
so even though the pitch to him is farther from the plate, he catches it in
the center of his body. Doumit has to reach for the ball, drawing attention
to its distance from the strike zone. The bases are empty in both clips,
giving the catchers the freedom to set up any way they want without worrying
about base runners. But only Molina goes down to one knee to present a lower,
more stable target. Doumit's head jerks sharply downward the instant after he
catches the pitch. Molina's remains still. And Doumit's glove, descending to
meet the pitch, dips even more after he catches it. This sends the ball
farther outside the zone and forces him to jerk the glove back up in an
exaggerated fashion. Molina's glove never gets any lower than it is when he
receives the pitch. He makes a much more subtle upward movement, and it takes
about half as much time for his glove to come to rest.
再看一次图档，只看捕手就好。Molina一开始就蹲得比较外面，所以即使这一球对他来说
离本垒远一点，他还是可以在身体的中间把球接进手套。Doumit得去追那颗球，凸显了球
和好球带的距离。这两球投出的时候，垒上都没有人，所以捕手没什么好分心的，可以在
最舒服的位置接球。Molina准备时单膝跪地，让他可以一开始就设定一个比较低，比较稳
定的目标。Doumit的头在球进手套之后顿了一下，Molina的头稳稳的没有动。Doumit把手
套往下探去接到球之后，又更往下沉了一点，这让球跑到更外角，要在使用捕手的尾劲乔
回来的时候就太过夸张了。Molina的手套自始至终都没有往下掉，他往上乔的时候动作是
很细微的，只花了一点点时间，手套就定住了。
These differences in technique don't only pop up on some pitches. They're
present for almost every pitch, as constant as a pitcher's motion or a
batter's stance. Go back to 2011, when Molina (top) was with Toronto and
Doumit (bottom) played for Pittsburgh. You'll see the same differences:
刚刚讲的这些技术差别可不是偶尔才出现，几乎每一球你都可以看到一样的差别，就好像
投球姿势或是打击动作一样固定。回到2011年，这张蓝鸟时期的Molina，还有海盗时期的
Doumit，同样的差别还是出现了。
http://goo.gl/lKaaW Molina蓝鸟时期
http://goo.gl/ECDCi Doumit海盗时期
Although the changes in camera angle and batter position make it difficult to
tell, these pitches are even closer together, according to PITCHf/x: 1.26
feet and 1.29 feet from the center of the strike zone, respectively. Both are
four-seamers on 0-1 counts called by umpire Mike Winters. Again, we see the
call go one way for Molina and the other for Doumit. And again, it's not
tough to tell why. Doumit's whole body leans toward the outside of the plate,
while Molina's stays almost perfectly still. Doumit raises and clenches his
right hand, creating a potential distraction for the umpire; Molina's right
hand remains tucked behind him. Doumit's head and glove again dip before his
pronounced pull. Molina times his reception to catch the ball with his glove
already on the rise.
虽然说摄影机角度和打者的姿势影响了我们的判断，但是2011年的这两球事实上更接近：
根据PITCHf/x，离本垒板中心1.26和1.29英呎。这两球投出的球数都是一个好球没有坏球
，主审都是Mike Winters。再一次地，只有Molina接的才是好球，再一次地，不难看出为
什么。Doumit的身体重心都往打者的方向跑了，而Molina不动如山。Doumit的右手抬起来
还握了个拳，可能对主审造成了一些干扰，而Molina的右手一直揣在他身体后面。老样子
，Doumit的头和手套在他把球乔回来之前已经先往下掉，而Molina算得很准，在接球的同
时，手套也微微地抬起来。
Once you train yourself to see it, it's almost impossible to stop seeing it.
Baseball is often described as a chess match between batter and pitcher. But
it's more like a chess match between batter and pitcher in which, once in a
while, the catcher grabs the board and moves someone's piece.
你一旦学会看得出这种差别，你就很难停下来不继续看了。常常有人形容棒球是一盘打者
和投手之间下的棋，但是其实更像是三不五时，在这盘棋局里，捕手忽然把棋盘拿起来，
动了几步。
§§§
In a September 2011 article titled "Spinning Yarn: Removing the Mask," Mike
Fast, then an analyst for Baseball Prospectus (and now an analyst for the
Houston Astros), attempted to determine what catcher receiving was worth. By
studying where strikes are typically called and establishing which pitchers
were getting more or fewer strikes than they "should" have, given where their
pitches crossed the plate, Fast was able to isolate the effect of the
catcher. He concluded that pitch framing can make a major impact, and it also
is more consistent from year to year than even reliable offensive metrics
like on-base percentage or slugging percentage. In other words, it's not
insignificant, and it's not just noise. It's a valuable skill that persists
from season to season.
2011年九月，当时在Baseball Prospectus的分析师Mike Fast（他现在在太空人系统里当
分析师）写了这篇文章 http://goo.gl/QvEmc，企图想要找出捕手接捕的价值。Fast研究
了什么位置的球通常会被判好球，并找出了哪些投手比他们所“应得”的拿到了更多或是
更少的好球，他最终得以将捕手的影响独立出来讨论。他的结论是，捕手的接捕真的有很
大的影响，而且这种能力以每一年来看，比常用的打击数据上垒率长打率之类的还要稳定
。换句话说，不容小觑。这可是一种每一季都保持如常的珍贵技巧。
Fast found that Molina, the best receiver, was worth 35 runs above average
per 120 games, and Doumit, the worst, was worth 26 runs below average. After
Houston hired Fast, another analyst named Max Marchi succeeded him at
Baseball Prospectus2 and brought with him a sophisticated model for framing
that accounted for most of the potentially confounding factors: the umpire,
the ballpark, the batter, the ball-strike count, and the pitch location and
type. According to Marchi, who has consulted for a major league club and
whose work has been mentioned by Rays manager Joe Maddon, Molina has saved
his teams 111 runs — or, using the standard 10-runs-to-a-win conversion,
about 11 wins — because of framing from 2008 to 2013. (The only other
catcher with a higher run total over that same time period, Brian McCann at
122, has caught more than twice as many pitches.) Doumit, on the other end of
the receiving spectrum, cost his teams 155 runs. That comes out to 0.50 runs
added by Molina and 0.55 runs subtracted by Doumit per 100 pitches, an
enormous difference.3 For comparative purposes, Barry Bonds's bat during the
2001-2004 seasons, when he basically broke baseball, was worth about 0.78
runs above average per game.
Fast发现，Jose Milina是最好的接捕者，靠着接捕，每120场比赛比捕手平均还要多守下
35分。Doumit是最差的，比平均还要低26分。Fast去了太空人之后，在Baseball
Prospectus接手他工作的Max Marchi使用了一个更复杂的模型，考虑了各种可能影响的因
素，包括裁判、球场、打者、好坏球数、进垒位置和球种。根据Marchi的模型，Monila从
2008年到2013年，光是用接捕，就为他的球队守住了111分，如果守住10分算是一场胜利
的话，那就是11胜了。（同样的时间，只有McCann守住的分数比他多，高达122分，但是
McCann接到的球比Molina多了一倍。）Doumit身处接捕光谱的另一侧，他在这段时间之内
花了球队155分。以每接一百球来计算，Molina帮球队增添了0.50分，Doumit让球队亏了
0.55分，差距真大。继续比较下去的话，Barry Bonds从2001年到2004年爆走的时候，他
的打击每一场比赛换算下来大约值得0.78分。
Granted, those run totals aren't typical. Molina and Doumit are outliers; no
one else comes close to costing his team as much per pitch as Doumit, and
only Brewers catcher Jonathan Lucroy has approached Molina levels of framing
effectiveness. (Lucroy has some advantages over Molina. He's 11 years younger
and has a better bat, which allows him to stay in the lineup. Since his debut
in 2010, he's saved almost twice as many runs due to framing as any other
catcher, aside from Molina.)
当然啦，这些分数并不是很典型。Molina和Doumit都是离群值，Doumit每一球给球队的损
失无人可望其项背，也只有酿酒人的Jonathan Lucroy在接捕效率上和Molina堪称同一等
级。（Lucroy有不少优点。他比Molina年轻11岁，打击也比较好，这让他可以保持定期出
赛。2010年在大联盟亮相后，他比联盟的任何其他捕手多用接捕守住了一倍以上的分数，
当然，除了Molina以外。）
Still, consider the implications. Giancarlo Stanton, one of the most coveted
young players in the game, was worth as much4 (in terms of Wins Above
Replacement) over the past two seasons as Molina's framing alone was worth in
a part-time role over the past five-plus, yet Molina's value, unlike
Stanton's, is largely overlooked. And that's without factoring in any value
Molina added by calling games, handling his pitching staff, and controlling
the running game. Best of all, Molina's done it all for an average of $1.5
million per season, in an era when a single win on the free-agent market
usually runs teams around $5 million. It's no surprise that Molina plays for
the Rays, low-payroll competitors who've found ways to make a dollar go
further than any other organization. Nor is it a coincidence that Molina, a
career backup catcher whom standard sabermetric stats peg as a
replacement-level player, became a first-time starter and appeared in a
career-high 102 games in his age-37 season, barely six months after Fast's
study appeared on Baseball Prospectus.
但还是要想想其中含意。联盟最让人流口水的年轻人之一Gincarlo Stanton在过去两年的
价值（用WAR来算）跟Molina在过去五年光光用接捕的价值是一样的，不过相较之下，
Molina的能力大大地被忽略了。我们都还没提到Molina控制全场、帮助投手和看管跑者的
能力耶。最棒的是，Molina做了这么多，他的年薪只有150万美金。Molina在光芒阵中也
不意外，这是一支团队薪资低，所以必须想尽办法让每一块钱都花得比其他人更加在刀口
上的球队。Fast发表了那篇文章六个月后，一路走来都是二号捕手的Molina开始在光芒打
上先发，并在37岁的2012球季打上生涯新高的102场比赛，也不是什么巧合。
Eleven wins sounds like too much for a single part-time pitch receiver to add
in just over five seasons, but think about how many opportunities to gain and
lose strikes there are over a 162-game schedule. A durable catcher can catch
around 10,000 called pitches in a single season. Many of those pitches are
clear-cut calls. But that still leaves hundreds, maybe thousands, of pitches
in the shadowy border region between ball and strike, where a good receiver
can perform the catching equivalent of turning water into wine. Even if an
extra strike doesn't send the batter back to the dugout, it puts him in a
less-favorable count and makes him less likely to do damage later in the
at-bat. Dan Turkenkopf, another former Baseball Prospectus staffer who was
recently hired by the Rays, put the average value of turning a single ball
into a strike at 0.13 runs. If you do that a few times per game, as Molina
does, the run total climbs quickly.
一个二号捕手，在五个球季中靠着接捕帮球队拿到11场胜利，听起来好像有点过头了，但
是想想看，一年有162场比赛，有多少好坏球的机会可以把握和错失啊。有档头的捕手一
年可以接到一万个左右没出棒的球，其中有很多都是明显的好球或坏球。但依然有几百个
，甚至上千个球是在好坏球的模糊地带，这也是善于接捕的球员点石成金的大好机会。即
便多一颗好球不代表着打者就此出局，但也让他球数落后，造成破坏的可能性也变小了。
前Baseball Prospectus分析师，现在在为光芒工作的Dan Turkenkoph把将坏球乔成好球
的价值定在0.13分，如果一场比赛可以做个几次，就像Molina一样，那总分就会爬得很快
了。
"If a catcher can perfect a great way of receiving the ball, and he gets the
ball maybe a half a ball outside — or even a ball outside — off the corners
consistently, I think he's worth his weight in gold," says Steve Yeager, a
15-year big league veteran and the Dodgers' catching coach. Molina is listed
at 250 pounds, so depending on the karat, his weight in gold would be worth
much more than he's making. But even a 24-karat Molina wouldn't go for as
much as Marchi's model suggests he's worth to a team.
“如果一个捕手可以精进于接捕，把好球带外半颗球，甚至一颗球的坏球变成好球的话，
我觉得这捕手的价值根本是等体重的黄金。”闯荡大联盟15年，现在在道奇担任捕手教练
的Steve Yeager如是说。Molina体重号称250磅，这个重量的纯金比他赚的钱多得多。但
就算是24K金的Molina，也比不上Marchi的模型当中他对球队的价值。
It's not as if receiving skills weren't valued when Yeager was playing; as
more than one person (OK, almost every person) I spoke to pointed out, the
word "catch" is right there in the name of the position. But it's easier to
discount a certain skill when there are no numbers attached to it. (Just try
to talk to the more dogmatic species of stathead about clubhouse chemistry.)
Before framing became a sabermetric buzzword, Molina's receiving skills were
known but nebulous. His offensive struggles, on the other hand, were easier
to see, and almost as easy to quantify. But now that we can count his
contributions on both sides of the ball, what he does on defense is
impossible to dismiss. The Rays, a team that's smart enough to see that, are
reaping the rewards (and so is Molina, though it's a little late for him to
cash in).
并不是说接捕的能力在Yeager的年代就不被重视。不只一个人（好啦，几乎是每个人）跟
我说，“捕”这个字再怎么说就是在捕手这两个字里面啊。但是呢，如果没有数据佐证，
某种能力的价值就很容易被打折扣（你只要试试看去跟那些比较偏激的数据派聊聊看团队
气氛就知道我意思了）。早在接捕能力成为棒球统计分析的热门话题之前，Molina多会接
球大家早就知道了，只是对于其含义还不是很了解。另一方面，他打击不好这件事情还蛮
显而易见的。但是我们现在在攻守两端都计算他的贡献，他在防守的表现根本无法忽视。
光芒聪明到看得到这一点，现在欢笑收割中。（当然Molina也是啦，只是现在这年纪要开
始赚大钱有点晚了。）
Jose's younger brother Yadier and retired older brother Bengie share(d) his
receiving skill to a lesser degree, and all three inspire awe from their
peers at the position. "I think the three Molinas, they come from another
planet," says Yankees catcher Francisco Cervelli. "I've never seen anything
like that in my life." But as many Molinas as there are, they're not a
renewable resource. At some point, the last Molina will retire, and if
receiving skills are still undervalued among major league catchers, a team
that could learn to teach framing efficiently at the lower levels, minting
Molina-like receivers while other teams are still running out Ryan Doumits,
might have its hands on a major market inefficiency.
摸家小弟Yadier和已经退休的大哥Bengie在接捕能力上也有一定程度的水准，这三兄弟在
同业之间备受推崇。Cervelli说：“摸家三兄弟跟本外星人，没看过这种的啦。”但是，
摸家就只有三兄弟，他们可不是再生能源可以一直冒出来。迟早摸家人会退休光，如果这
种接捕的能力依然被大联盟捕手低估的话，愿意从小联盟开始教球员有效接捕的球队，可
以慢慢栽培出这种摸式选手。当其他球队还在用Doumit之流的捕手时，他们就有机会得利
了。
Thanks to advances in technology and analysts like Fast and Marchi, we have a
much better sense than before of what a catcher with good receiving skills is
worth. We also know which big leaguers qualify as the best in the business.
What we don't know, necessarily, is where good framing catchers come from.
Are good receivers born or made? And if they're made, how do you make them?
多亏了现代科技和Fast以及Marchi这样的分析师，我们现在比以往更清楚一个善于接捕的
捕手的价值所在。我们也知道有哪些大联盟捕手善于此道。我们不知道的是，这些接捕能
力从何而来？是天生的还是可以训练的？如果是可以训练的，又要怎么做呢？