Luke Walton, Lame Duck
TAKING A GOOD LOOK AT THE FILM AND DATA TO ASSESS LUKE WALTON’S STAFF
看看一下的影片和数据来评估L.Walton以及整个团队。
The Lakers have underperformed the expectations the team and their fans had
this season. Luke Walton has been under fire as a result of that. Today, I
want to take a look at the performance of Luke and his staff in the ways we
should actually be assessing coaching staffs.
湖人本季的表现非常令人失望，也让L.Walton受到严重的抨击，我们今天就来检视L.Walto
n以及他的助教团。
I want to start out by saying that I haven’t been of the opinion that the
Lakers should fire Luke Walton. In my eyes, their last reasonable chance to
do that and have a chance to get a new staff, their principles, and their
sets in was during the All-Star Break. We’re likely riding this out with
Luke for the rest of the season, upon which time LA will have the chance to
terminate his contract and explore other options.
我认为本季L.Walton并不会被湖人解雇，因为已经错过时间点，我认为明星周时是最佳的
解雇时间，然后已经错过时间，湖人将会在本季结束之后，在评估对于L.Walton的选项。
The options they can look at during the offseason will be far wider and
better than the jobless options available today. LA can’t go grab an
assistant like Ettore Messina from the Spurs or John Beilein and his staff
from Michigan today. Any move made now will be from a smaller and worse
candidate pool. I’ll save options for who should replace Luke and his staff
for later on, once we have a better idea of who will be available. But I will
say that I am 100.00% of the opinion that Walton and his staff are among the
worst in the NBA and should be replaced this offseason.
在球季中能选择的不多，但休赛期能选择就多了，我认为L.Walton以及他的助教团是全NBA
最烂的，我也认为在休赛期这个团队是百分之百会被替换的。
That aside, let’s get into it.
EXCUSES / CONFOUNDING FACTORS 借口/外在因素
First, let’s get these out of the way. 厘清以下几件事情
‧No, Luke didn’t hand pick this roster.
‧No, Luke didn’t injure Lonzo Ball, LeBron James, Josh Hart, etc.
‧Luke hasn’t been the one starting trade rumors for seemingly every player on
the roster.
Those all make his job more difficult, but certainly don’t inhibit us from
assessing the performance of Luke Walton and his staff. And I don’t mean
with wins and losses.
这些都会使他的工作变得困难，但不影响我们对于L.Walton的评价。
We are where we are. Luke was dealt a poor hand. But good coaches still make
the most of what they’re given. A bad roster isn’t a unique issue. Injuries
happen. Over the last two seasons of the Lakers actually trying to win games,
they’ve had an average amount of games lost due to injuries, per
InStreetClothes. The situation is what it is. So what did they do about it?
L.Walton手上的牌并不好，但好的教练还是善用手上的这些牌打出应有的东西。球员名单
的坏并不是一个多大的问题。另外伤病问题，根据InStreetClothes，过去两个赛季湖人在
争取胜利，因为伤病左右球队胜负的关键。然而情况就是这样，但他们做了什么？
Here are the ways I’ll be looking at Luke Walton and his coaching staff
today:
1.Rotations
2.Scheme
3.Player development
4.Culture & Leadership
5.Relations with media and the front office
I won’t be looking at roster construction and trades. I won’t be looking at
prospect scouting. Neither of those two things relate to Luke and his staff.
我不会去看球队阵容的交易以及建设，我也不会去看球探报告，我认为这两件事与L.Walto
n以及助教团无关。
EXPECTATIONS FOR LUKE WALTON L.Walton的期望
Our expectations for Luke Walton were unrealistic. There is a certain murky
culture around coaches and accountability. We know every player and what they
do, but almost none of us could rattle off every member of their favorite team
’s coaching staff and the roles and responsibilities of each member.
我们对于L.Walton的期望是不现实的，教练团之间对于划分责任制这件事情有着模糊的界
线，我们了解每个球员以及他们能做的事情，但没人可以抨击他们每个成员的角色以及责
任。
The staffs are fine behind the scenes, but it makes speculation on our end as
media or fans much more difficult. The lack of understanding that breeds from
this cloudy profession leads to a lot of guessing. We saw that when Luke
Walton was hired from the Warriors to take over for the Lakers.
I directly interface with executives every day in my job. In my role I see
what they do, I have a decent sense of what they’re responsible for, and I
understand how to work with them to help achieve business success. I can even
repeat some of the common phrases or outline at a high level our strategies.
But if another firm were to hire me, I absolutely could not fulfill the roles
and responsibilities of those individuals I work with. I could do my job and
give you the human capital knowledge I provide today, because… ya know… that
’s what I was doing before. But I couldn’t set up a supply chain or any
number of the technical things my co-workers perform on a daily basis,
because my roles and responsibilities aren’t their roles and
responsibilities, and our KSAs (knowledge, skills, and abilities) are far
different.
Hiring Luke Walton, who by all accounts was a player development coach with
the Warriors, and expecting him to bring a skill set in Xs and Os that had
nothing to do with his job with the Dubs. I’m sure he could recite and draw
up several, but that’s a lot different from having the understanding to
teach an offense and adapt it in the ways necessitated by today’s highly
tactical NBA. I’d guess he could memorize and regurgitate some Xs and Os the
way I could with managerial accounting. I can spit it back up, but there’s
no way in hell I could teach it to people, or need to take my understanding
of the concepts and morph them to changing conditions. No way.
Sure, he can say ball movement is important and generally have the
egalitarian strategy down, but that’s about as deep as it’s gotten. The
schemes themselves are vastly different. The Warriors run the closest we have
in the NBA to a motion offense, with tons of set plays sprinkled in. And the
Warriors run probably the most sets and action in the NBA. They use strong
and weak side actions to get their players in positions to succeed,
constantly pressuring the defense and finding ways to get Steph Curry and
Klay Thompson wide open, which is the exact opposite of what every single
coach and team playing the Warriors want to allow.
I recently heard Coach Gibson Pyper mention on a podcast that he had about
130 set plays diagrammed from the Dubs and Steve Kerr’s offense. You may
know Coach Pyper as @HalfCourtHoops on Twitter, owner of the HalfCourtHoops
YouTube page, and the owner of The Basketball Playbook website. On his site,
he has a Kerr Warriors playbook breakdown for sale that includes: “Motion
Offense Clinic (45 Minutes), Motion Offense Concepts (1 Hour 45 Minutes),
Video Playbook (6 Hours), and a PDF Playbook (150 Pages).”
我最近从G.Pyper在广播节目上说到，勇士整的进攻战术大约有130个Set Play，他从一些
网站上可以看到把这些东西弄成一个Kerr Warriors Playbook拆成几个细节在贩售。
The Lakers’ offense is almost the antithesis of that, with probably less
than 30 sets that could be drawn up if you locked scheme fans in a room and
forced them to watch Laker film. It was so bad Walton’s first season that
when I was diagramming plays for 2K, I watched dozens of games and just could
not get to the number of sets they wanted from the Lakers, so I had to fit in
a handful of sets from my own playbook. And the magic number they were
looking for was 40 plays, not 130.
而湖人在进攻端战术可能少于30个Set Play，在L.Walton第一个赛季时，在2K游戏需要制
定球队战术时，湖人队的战术我看不到有多少战术，剩下的必须靠自己脑补在想出战术，
最后总共有40个Set Play战术，不是130个。
Coach Pyper doesn’t have a Walton playbook up for sale, and I don’t expect
that’ll change. I recently surveyed a handful of scheme experts to see if
what I’ve been seeing is what they see, and the Lakers routinely came up as
one of the worst teams schematically on offense. I’ll go into the Lakers’
offensive scheme in more detail later, but I wanted to set the stage and say
that what Luke has brought to LA from Golden State stops at the high level
talking points and general philosophies.
最近有针对湖人的进攻战术策画进行研究，稍后会有详细的介绍。
I’ve heard that Luke Walton’s brief stint as acting head coach of the
Warriors was the proof needed to say that he would be a great head coaching
option. There’s a lot wrong with that. And it doesn’t come down to wins and
losses (none of this does). What were his roles and responsibilities, and how
would they compare to his duties in LA? If they didn’t align, you’re not
learning much from what people would like to consider a Realistic Job Preview
(RJP) in HR talk.
我听说L.Walton在勇士短暂的担任代理总教练，给他证明自己的时候，但这有非常多的错
误，在这段期间中，L.Walton责任是什么？对于他现在湖人的职责相比呢？那么高层在对
于人力资源的应用就是个错误。
‧In that stint, Luke didn’t need to design an offense. One was in place. He
had to call out sets, but that’s far different from taking a roster and
designing 50+ set plays that align with their strengths and mitigate their
weaknesses. So the design component wasn’t there. The teaching component wasn
’t either. Just because someone can draw up some good Xs and Os doesn’t
mean they can teach the concepts and get players to understand, which is
vital for execution and adjusting as defensive coverages change. Luke wasn’t
challenged in that way.
在这段时间里，Walton并不需要设计进攻战术，他需要负责叫战术，并且球队阵容和其他
球队有一定的落差，所以战术设计、教导都不是L.Walton，所以L.Walton并没有遭受挑战
。
‧Rotations are another area he technically had charge of, but we didn’t see
much change. He didn’t need to put together that staff, which is an
essential part of head coaching.
轮替阵容则是他负责的区域，但我们并没有看到什么改变，而轮替阵容的安排就是总教练
的职责。
‧His in-game decision making was fine, but that is something that’s almost
never noticed unless it’s horrific. And looking back at those games, his
decision making wasn’t anything special. So while not a negative, not
burning games down isn’t the thing you point to for justification on hiring
a guy.
回顾L.Walton比赛中的决策并没有太大的问题，但没有burning games down。
‧Luke’s competencies relating to the media or front office, albeit a smaller
part of the job, wasn’t tested.
与媒体的应对只占工作极小的部分，但没有遇过什么考验。
‧Getting buy-in from players not just to work on the drill you’re having them
do, but buy into you and your philosophies when times get tough wasn’t
something Luke has to experience and test himself with either.
要受到球员信任，不能只靠平时训练，特别是Luke不曾在如此艰困的状况下试图让球员信
服他和他的带队哲学。
(感谢StephenChou指正)
So going into hiring Luke, we had a RJP that didn’t give us much, knowing he
did player development, and a career for the Lakers to go off of. That doesn’
t mean he wouldn’t be a good head coach, but it certainly wasn’t enough
from the outside to say he’d be a good one. You’d want to carefully vet him
as an option and compare with others, which they didn’t do. Luke was the
only candidate considered and interviewed. That’s poor HR.
从L.Walton担任代理总教练来断定他是否成为一个优秀教练是不够的，但也不意味着他不
会成为一个优秀的教练，湖人队在雇用时，没有仔细审查并与他人比较，L.Walton成为唯
一的总教练雇用人选的候选人，这个人力资源的使用是不好的。
Ideally, you gauge how strong he is with specific areas of coaching (like the
ones mentioned above). If you do hire him, you do all you can to put
assistants around him that fill his gaps. This isn’t John Beilein or any of
the hundreds of current head coaches who have staffs they have histories of
working with that they’d bring with them. This was taking one piece of a
puzzle and hoping it’d give you the same pretty picture that the full set
did in Golden State.
理想情况下，如果你雇用他，但你必须尽可能利用好的助教团，去填补他的弱项。
Luke’s assistants are an absolutely paramount part of his hire, as they
would be for any assistant who didn’t already have that group together. And
with all the influence and money the Lakers do have, and with there being no
coaching salary cap, they still compiled a group of assistants with minimal
experience. Hell, one of the hires they made came from being a youth
volleyball coach to being a Lakers assistant. That was a key miss, and we’ve
felt the negative consequences of having people like Jesse Mermuys in
positions they aren’t succeeding in.
助教团是绝对重要的一环，凭借著湖人的影响力以及资金，但湖人却没有善用，反而雇用
一群在NBA经验极少的助教团，还包括一位原本是排球青年队的教练J.Mermuys，这就是一
个关键的失败。
To summarize, Luke’s position wasn’t competed among a pool of candidates in
a way you’d want, the expectations for what he’d bring to the table were
off-base, and his assistant staff was put together in a way that is nothing
like what you’d expect for the second most valuable NBA franchise (at
$3.7B), and we’ve gotten out of the staff what was put into it.
With all of that in mind, most have been very patient with Walton and his
staff. It doesn’t hurt that the first season he was on board was one where
the Lakers were more incentivized to lose than to win, or the idea that he’s
been leading a roster devoid of established talent. The environment was such
that real evaluation of Walton’s staff was difficult for most and had tons
of excuses readily available. But almost three full seasons into their
tenure, it’s time to look at what his staff actually does, not wins and
losses, to grade them out.
从第一个赛季到现在，或许L.Walton在领导一个没有固定的阵容，因这样的环境，让大家
对于评估整个教练团是困难的，有着太多可用的借口，但任职三年多的来说，现在可以去
看看这些教练团实际上做了什么？
ROTATIONS 轮替阵容
You would find unhappy people for all 30 teams if you were to ask fans and
analysts about how their coaches handle rotations. It’s not a problem unique
to the Lakers.
你问所有的球队，没有人对于轮替阵容是满意的，这不是湖人才有的问题。
What is a bit different is the degree to which Luke Walton infuriates and
confuses those watching the games. Hockey-style lineups, playing Rajon Rondo
(who has been horrible for several weeks) for a 17 minute continuous stint vs
New Orleans, the lineups put on the court with none of Ingram/LeBron/Kuzma
that literally everyone but Luke Walton knows will give up a run. It’s bad,
and it’s happening very often.
例如在面对鹈鹕的比赛，已经放弃比赛，而放著R.Rondo连续打17分钟，而场上并没有已经
Ingram、LeBron、Kuzma，这是非常不好的，但经常发生。
To get a better sense of the frequency, I asked Laker fans on Twitter just
how often they’re left upset and confused about Walton’s rotations. The
results weren’t promising…
我就在Twitter上问，对于L.Walton的轮替阵容感到沮丧或者困惑的情况。
https://twitter.com/T1m_NBA/status/1099469745919873024
That’s 1,005 responses, with over 75% of respondents saying that they’re
left feeling that way about rotations for at least 60% of games they’ve
watched. 45% said at least 80% of games.
Feel free to check out Laker Twitter *checks notes* literally any game to see
this expanded upon more. Or look at what Laker Twitter looked like for the
past several years. The lack of growth in this area and pervasiveness of the
issue is immensely aggravating. I won’t spend much time on it here, but it’
s very clearly an issue and one that we’re constantly seeing, and have
consistently seen, for almost three full seasons.
SCHEME 比赛计画
To evaluate the team’s coaching staff, you’ll need to know who they are and
what they do. Here is some pertinent information in that regard:
Scheme
Offensive Coordinator: Jesse Mermuys 进攻策画者：J.Mermuys
Defensive Coordinator: Brian Keefe 防守策画者：B.Keefe
Optimization Data*
Offensive Optimization: Dead last among non-rookie active staffs
Defensive Optimization: Dead last among non-rookie active staffs
进攻跟防守的Optimization Data在全联盟都是排名倒数最后一名。
*Optimization data compares roster talent with roster performance to attempt
to gauge how well players are deployed and utilized by the coaching staff. It
attempts to look at how much coaches are getting out of the talent they’re
given.
Optimization data是用来评估联盟间每位教练的数据。
If you’d like to see optimization data for every coach since the 2013-14
season, check out our $5/month Data & Tools premium package.
如果要看从2013-14年的Optimization data需要付费。
OFFENSE – 13TH PERCENTILE OPTIMIZATION / F GRADE F等级
I want to first dispel the narrative that the Lakers can’t run plays because
they have LeBron James on their team. LeBron has played 15 full seasons in
the NBA in four different stints with teams. For the first seven seasons with
Cleveland, he ran plays. For the next four seasons with Miami, he ran plays.
That’s 73% of LeBron’s tenure in the NBA going into this season.
It’s the four most recent Cleveland seasons that have bred the idea that
LeBron can’t, or won’t, run set plays. Cleveland did, but did have a high
percentage of their offense that was primarily based around forcing a switch
and then attacking those mismatches with Kyrie, LeBron, or Love, with
shooters all around. It was a very legitimate strategy, and one that is very
similar to how the Rockets play (and they also mix sets in). They had the
personnel to do that. These Lakers do not.
I also want to note that the scheme issues I’ll share today aren’t new this
season or suddenly popped up when LeBron was added to the team. These have
been consistent every year under Jesse Mermuys. Only a handful of plays at
the start of the season, giving LA little chance to be strong offensively.
Then a slow morph into an incredibly rudimentary offense that high school and
college coaches all over the country would shake their heads at. Every year.
我今天要讲的问题，先撇除L.James加入球队后说发生的事情，而是在J.Mermuys每年都会
发生的事情，而他的基本进攻战术，都会让所有的高中、大学教练摇头。
In general, running sets is important because, if actually designed and
executed well, they create advantages for the offense through screening
actions that get open shots or get players a step on their defender going
downhill. You can do this with motion offense as well. It’s the use of “
actions,” the screening and purposeful movement of players, that generates
the advantage.
一般来说，如果再跑阵地战时，你能有一个好的设计以及执行，将会创造出不错的进攻优
势。
What we’ll often see with the Lakers are sets that use one action. One pin
down. One flare screen. One AI cut. But the often stop there. 79.1% of the
possessions I logged for a handful of games had no more than one action. That
’s bad. That’s really really bad. If you only try one attack before
devolving into isolation, you’re giving yourself less opportunities to cause
a mistake or compromise of the defense.
你常会看到湖人使用一个pin down、一个flare screen、一个AI cut，但就此打住球队战
术运转，在一百回合的进攻中大约会发生79.1%，这是非常非常糟糕的，就会演变成只能
由Isolation来尝试进攻，那么你就会造成自己失误的机率大增。
The following charter further details the percentage of plays with different
volumes of action (BLOB/SLOB plays not counted):
Actions Frequency
0 8.0%
1 71.1%
2 16.4%
3 3.2%
4 1.0%
5 0.3%
Very infrequently will the Lakers get easy buckets from set plays. They do a
good job with the couple lob sets they’ll run after timeouts, but there’s
not much else in this regard.
湖人在半场进攻很少得到easy buckets，但他们暂停过后的两人小组配合做得不错，但没
有执行得太多。
To get a better sense for the types of attacks the Lakers run, here’s a
breakdown from the 5 games I logged:
为了更好理解湖人的进攻战术，以下纪录五场比赛：
https://i.imgur.com/i4qFyTP.jpg
I logged 32 specific actions the Lakers ran, but grouped them together into
these six “action families.” The execution rate shows the percentage of the
time LA actually screened and ran off the screens properly. The success rate
shows the percentage of the time the action run yielded an advantage over the
defense. This also counts creating mismatches, or actions that set up an
ensuing action. And on the far right, I listed some specific actions that
fall within those families.
我记录32种进攻战术，但分为六大类，计算出每场比赛的使用率以及执行的成功率。在最
右边列出那些进攻战术分为哪一类。
I find a couple things interesting about that data. Almost every type of
action has a higher execution rate than success rate. Due to poor spacing and
lack of other attacking on the defense, it’s a lot easier to stop a Laker
pin down or handoff than it might be against other teams through your help
defense. We see this a ton with LA’s back screens, where the spacing and
location of the passer in relation to the potential lob receiver are so
messed up that there’s no chance for the action to actually yield points.
Jesse Mermuys’ offensive scheme has low action volume. It’s the lowest of
the 7 teams I’ve tracked, and I’d guess it’s among the lowest in the
league. So the design is clearly not strong. Even if executed at normal
levels, the poor design leaves the Lakers with a low ceiling for easy
offense. Players are left to “make stuff happen,” which is never optimal. It
’s fine late clock, but shouldn’t be the go-to offense with 15 seconds left
on the clock.
J.Mermuys的进攻规划非常的少，从我有关注的七支球队中是最少的，我猜大概也是全联盟
垫底。显然缺乏设计，且糟糕的设计也让湖人的上限降低，让球员只能等待make stuff ha
ppen，也让球队在进攻时间部属上有问题。
Let’s compare some Laker plays with what we see from other teams. Here’s a
simple horns set that gets a SG looking to attack downhill or a 3-point
attempt (depending on how the defense plays the handoff), with options to hit
a rolling 5-man, hit 4 slipping, or hit 3 coming off the staggered screens
for a 3-point look. That stagger removes the chance you’ll see any help
defense, making the dribble handoff much more effective. Simple yet solid.
接下来，利用湖人队的进攻部属来跟其他球队进行比较。
Denver Nuggets - Horns DHO Stagger featured in our latest Plays of the Week.
https://twitter.com/FastModel/status/1096227665110020096
Here’s a set from the Trail Blazers. No rocket science, but multiple scoring
options that work together to help what are already good players look even
better with easy shots. This very simple play is also from the horns
alignment, and uses a weak side flare screen to look to either remove help on
the primary action ball screen, or give you an open 3-pointer if the help
defense does come.
https://twitter.com/FastModel/status/1094317540694728705
And here’s a 76ers set that again gives the offense multiple opportunities
to score. The ball screen that low on the court (a “logo” ball screen)
prevents any help on the roll man, which LA could murder teams with by
finding McGee lobs.
https://twitter.com/FastModel/status/1094612154769117186
Now here’s what a Laker play might look like. A single action (a pin down in
this case), with nothing setting it up and nothing following it.
接下来是湖人队的进攻部属情况
https://i.imgur.com/J3aTXJy.jpg
Also, as seen in the chart above, the actions work less than half the time,
and are executed 56% of the time. Jesse Mermuys and Luke Walton struggle to
get their players to set fundamental screens and run the correct ways off of
screens. Such a large part of offense is execution, which is about focus and
understanding rather than talent. The reads, especially in a rudimentary
offense like what LA runs, are fairly easy. Go watch some Virginia, Michigan
State, Michigan, Davidson, Tennessee, Purdue, Wisconsin, or Virginia Tech
tape if you want to see some of the reads executed well from shooters
fading/curling/coming off screens straight.
It’s more about the teaching of concepts and drills to get players to
understand how to see what the defense it taking away and react to it in a
way that makes their own life easier and make themselves much more likely to
get and score on an open shot. The Lakers leave much to be desired when it
comes to offensive execution, and the fact that those errors have persisted
for three different rosters and for vets and young players alike makes it
clear it’s more on the unqualified coaching staff than the players.
关于这些战术的教导、观念、技巧，让球员知道面临什么防守时，该如何去应对出一个进
攻战术，让球队可以得到open shot的机会。在进攻的执行面，湖人有太多不足的地方，这
些错误，也显示出这些不合格的教练团们的问题。
But the offensive scheme isn’t all doom and gloom. There are a couple
concepts they do use well, such as their step up ball screens in their
secondary break, which either get a ball handler going downhill or get a
mismatch early in the shot clock. LA executed on those 79% of the time they
tried them, so there’s one of the few designed and executed actions the
Lakers add value to their offense through. I’d certainly love to see more in
terms of secondary breaks, since it’s a great way to attack before the
defense is set and there are certain actions that are even more effective in
those scenarios, but it’s a start.
Things also tend to go well on the rare occasions that Ingram is used off of
handoffs, cross screens, and back screens. I’d love to see more of those
types of actions to get him going downhill off of the catch, rather than off
of a live dribble (where he’s still less refined).
We have seen some new positive developments post-All-Star Break that aren’t
reflected in that data. The Lakers have discovered pin-in screens, and have
done a better job finding shooters off these types of flares for shots. They’
ve also been much better about making off-ball screeners threats to score if
the defense switches, through sealing their man and making themselves a
dump-off target.
Moving forward, I don’t expect the Lakers to suddenly make great strides
with their offensive scheme, barring some consultants being brought in. They’
ve run similar stuff for three years, and the quality of that offense has
stayed fairly consistent throughout.
对于未来我不认为，湖人在对于进攻战术的部属计画中有多大的进步，除非能有一些顾问
能加入他们。毕竟这些东西他们已经用了三年，且进攻的质量保持一致。
The lowest hanging fruit for improvement, however, would be to implement some
freelance motion on post ups and pick and roll plays. Right now everything is
stagnant in those scenarios. With some simple principles, players will know
where their options are and the team would be creating more pressure with
action rather than standing around or using one cut against a set defense.
Split cuts on post ups and weak side flare screens on pick and rolls should
be very doable, and would make a huge difference in creating extra scoring
opportunities that simultaneously remove the help defense dampening the
effectiveness of those primary actions LA runs.
然而目前最好改善的是，再进行Post Up以及P&R的执行中，做的细腻一些，让球员透过简
单的原则，球员知道他们的能传球的点在哪，而不是小组配合的人在打比赛，其他人站在
一旁看，让强边再进行挡拆时弱边的球员进行flare Screen，创造出得分机会。
In addition, it would behoove the team to have a more organized late-clock
offense. Once the shot clock gets to 8 seconds, if someone isn’t currently
attacking, get into a go-to action. If LeBron is on the court, maybe it’s a
Bron perimeter or mid-post iso. If he’s not, perhaps it’s a pick and roll
or a pin down. Something to get the ball in the hands of the right players
late in the clock so we don’t need to see Rondo or McGee late-clock iso
offense anymore.
此外在读秒阶段，如果LBJ在场上，当然是把球给LBJ进行Isolation，如果LBJ不在，那么
或许使用P&R或者Pin Down，让球转移到正确的球员手上去执行进攻，就不用在读秒阶段看
到Rondo或McGee在最后时刻在Isolation。
Until the Lakers pick it up here, they’ll have a ton of stress on individual
players to create plays. An off-day or injury from just one key guy can cause
greater issues in that kind of offense. But that failure to put players in
positions to succeed and Ingram being put in pick and rolls with stagnant
players off-ball or in a plethora of iso situations will instead be viewed as
Brandon Ingram just not being good.
如果未能把球员放在正确的位置，就会导致像B.Ingram陷入停滞不前的窘境。
Please, Jesse Mermuys. Please.
Side note: It’s fair to wonder what these promising young players would look
like if they weren’t operating in what our data considers to be the worst
environment for them to shine. We might see what appears to be a large jump
in development next season purely from a coaching change and average or
better scheme. Our player talent grades, which attempt to remove the impact
scheme and environment has, have the comparison between Celtics and Lakers
young players much closer than most realize.
DEFENSE – 17TH PERCENTILE OPTIMIZATION / F GRADE F等级
Brian Keefe runs the Laker defense. I wouldn’t say the scheme has been
anywhere near as poor as the offense, but it’s been pretty vanilla. I’ll
routinely see opposing teams use creative tactics to stymie Laker plays
(3-man switches, pre-rotating in anticipation of actions, etc.). The Lakers
don’t do that. The one creative tactic I’ve noticed LA using under Walton
has been when they put a player like Josh Hart on someone like Tarik Black or
Draymond Green defensively who can’t usually punish you in that mismatch.
That’s great, but you need to have more than that in your bag of tricks in
today’s NBA.
B.Keefe是负责湖人防守计画，但我不会说防守计画跟进攻计画一样差，但防守计画很vani
lla。我很常看到对手利用有创意的防守来阻碍湖人队的进攻play (三人换防、预先轮转等
方法），但湖人没这种东西。湖人有创意的防守我只有看到一个，是Walton拿Josh Hart这
类型的球员去防守像是T.Black或Draymond Green，即使对他们是错位，但他们也讨不到便
宜。这个很棒，但你需要有更多这样的东西才足以应付现在的NBA。
(感谢alankira与rex7152指正)
When I say LA’s defensive scheme is vanilla, it’s that lack of creativity
along with a standard game plan that results in making it quite cookie
cutter. The Lakers seemingly go into many of these matchups the way many of
us do in 2K, where our defensive coverages are whatever the defauts are and
we don’t change them based on who we play (I do, but nobody likes that guy
taking 10 minutes to switch things around when you want to play with friends).
This isn’t to say they always do this, but they apply the same game plan a
lot more than I’m used to, compared to what my high school and AAU teams
did, what the teams do at those levels I’ve consulted with, what the college
teams do I watch consistently, and from what I see other NBA teams do. I don’
t have any numbers for this, but LA definitely seems to be on the low end of
customization in this regard. Many times it works okay, sometimes it’s
horrific, and sometimes it’s the perfect strategy. Praising the staff for an
amazing game plan when the round peg finally meets the round hole isn’t the
approach I’d take.
LA has players with certain limitations, but they do little to work around
that and mix up coverages defensively, opponent by opponent. Even in-game,
they adjust very slow to opposing teams burning their same screen coverages
the same ways over and over again. You can’t win in the playoffs like that.
Luke and Brian need to figure this out, or LA will struggle in the postseason
defensively more than they have so far during the regular season. And in
2019, there’s virtually nothing teams can do that hasn’t been done before,
so it’s just a matter of having the right people on staff with the knowledge
and research to understand that rock beats scissors and scissors beats paper.
Overall, I’d say LA is probably a C- strategically and a D tactically on
defense. Then comes in execution. Many of LA’s defensive issues come down to
veterans not executing and lots of either blown help coverage or over
helping. Very fundamental issues, and ones that have seemed to get worse as
the year has gone on for the Rondos and McGees of the team.
Part of coaching is getting guys to go out there and play hard. And playing
hard isn’t just diving on the floor and boxing out (which LA doesn’t do
well at all), but focusing on defensive execution and doing the little
things. This is particularly the case on defense. When it comes down to it,
there’s little that separates NBA defenses from what we see in college or
high school. Icing screens is still not mainstream at those levels, but most
of the concepts are the same. At any level, it’s more about executing
fundamentals defensively than it is trying to mastermind sets the way it can
be on offense. This staff hasn’t been able to get that buy-in from capable
players to do those little things, and it hurts them on a daily basis.
(防守这段一起翻译)
湖人队现在既定的防守计画是非常非常基本的，湖人在面对各球队时并没有非常明确且应
对的防守计画，也让人看起来湖人的防守计画非常的呆板没有对策。教练的职责除了让球
员努力打球之外，对于场上的防守细节做的非常非常的差，当教练无法给予球员正确的防
守观念以及计画，这样只是在每天每天的伤害球员。
PLAYER DEVELOPMENT 球员发展
One area I’ve heard listed as a pro for Luke Walton and his staff has been
player development. In his first year or two, when the team realistically had
no chance to be a contender, this was the focus. So how well has he done in
this regard?
我听说L.Walton和他的助教团是有列出球员的发展方向，但球队在第一年跟第二年是在没
有竞争力的情况下，那这部分就显得非常重要，而他做得如何？
We’ve recently developed Player Development ratings for coaching staffs at
BBall Index. These ratings look at players who played under a coach for year
A and year B, then measure the growth in a particular talent area from A -> B
against the expected growth in that skill set, which is calculated from our
database of player growth from the 2013-14 season until today, and factors in
advanced position (Guard/Wing/Big) and age to calculate the expectation.
根据BBall Index对于教练制定球员发展的评级，考察A年与B年在同一个教练下，球员发展
的情况。
Here is how Luke Walton’s staff has graded out in each area, with grades
listed being a conversion of percentiles against the other coaching staffs
since 2013-14.
以下是L.Walton以及助教团在从2013-14年来对于球员发展的评级。
Talent Category Grade
Perimeter Defense A
Interior Defense A-
Post Play B+
Off-Ball Movement B
Finishing C
One on One D+
Roll Gravity D+
Perimeter Shooting F
Playmaking F
Offensive Rebounding F
Defensive Rebounding F
Overall, Walton’s staff grades out as a D- Offensively, an A Defensively,
and an A- Overall. The staffs rating out ahead of Luke’s are led by Rick
Carlisle, Brad Stevens, Alvin Gentry, and Fred Hoiberg. Right behind Luke’s
staff are those led by Gregg Popovich, J.B. Bickerstaff, and Steve Kerr.
整体来说Walton以及助教团得到的评价是D级进攻、A级防守，整体评价A。
(防守评价A让我有点疑问)
While player development coach turned head coach Luke Walton didn’t bring
the scheme we were hoping he would from the Warriors, his staff has developed
players fairly well overall, and especially defensively. His staff doesn’t
utilize his guys well to optimize that talent, but the talent is certainly
growing from year to year.
If you’d like to see player development data for every coach since the
2013-14 season in every category, check out our $5/month Data & Tools premium
package.
CULTURE & LEADERSHIP 球队文化&领导
We’ve now moved to the off-court portion of the analysis. The other area it
was expected that Luke would positively impact the Lakers was with his
Warriors-like approach to culture. Guys would be having fun, they’d have an
egalitarian method of play and playing time rewarded, and the team would play
hard behind their player coach of a leader.
Some of that has materialized. Some not as much. The players seem to have
fun. Or did earlier in the season. That’s definitely gone down recently, but
the locker room does generally seem to fit with what Walton wants.
LA comes to play hard on most days, but they do struggle with playing focused
and executing the basics. This piece of it, and particularly the defensive
buy-in to basic concepts that just require some focus and a little work, isn’
t constantly there.
Luke’s rotations and their relation to play also don’t seem aligned, with
players like Julius Randle being seemingly nitpicked and benched while
others, like Lance and Rondo this season, consistently not executing and not
facing any negative consequences from it. Game to game or in-game, the
execution by Luke of the egalitarian component doesn’t quite seem right.
Where Luke has done a decent job, especially under the circumstances, is how
little we hear about a fractured locker room. With as many 1-year guys and
trade rumors as we’ve had in his three years, it’s impressive how little we
hear about times like the voiced displeasure from some of the Laker veterans
a couple weeks back.
RELATIONS WITH MEDIA AND THE FRONT OFFICE 与媒体及高层的关系
The last piece if this breakdown is how Luke relates to the media and front
office. I’d say he’s been fine in both areas. He’s by no means become an
enemy of the media or created any hostility, and does a good job giving
positive answers and deflecting. Lots of coach speak and little substance,
for sure. But that’s the norm, not a criticism.
We don’t have much to go off of when it comes to Luke’s relationship with
the front office. A big part of that his how 99% of it is behind the scenes.
Part of it is that the front office isn’t one that we can assume is acting
logically.
我会说L.Walton在这两个关系应对的非常好，他不会成为媒体的敌人或制造敌意，能够在
应答上做的好。而与球队高层的关系，我们没啥好说的，我们得到的资讯有99都是场边的
花絮，我也不是高层的人，不是我们可以假设的地方。
LA’S PERFORMANCE AND PLAYOFF CHANCES 湖人队的表现以及晋级季后赛的机会
While the Lakers haven’t seen the current roster all healthy at the same
time, we did see the pre-trade roster healthy at the start of the season. And
that performance may have set expectations higher than they should have.
The Lakers had a 20-14 record before LeBron went down, good for a 48 win
pace. In reality, the team was playing much worse. Based on the luck-adjusted
data, which will attempt to suss out the variance and randomness that will
natural appear in the data (especially at a smaller sample like that), the
Lakers with LeBron for that stretch were performing to the level of a team
that’d be expected to be 16.9-17.1, on pace for 40.7 wins.
The difference between 48 wins and 41 wins last season would have been the
difference between a tie for the 4 seed in the West and the 11 seed. So while
LeBron James is undeniably a monster on the court, it’s very possible the
Lakers were already a bad team that were just being held together by perhaps
the greatest player to ever play the game.
Since that time, the Lakers have played like a 30-52 full-season team
according to the luck-adjusted data. They’re going to need to flip a hell of
a switch to make it to the playoffs. In the small sample since the All-Star
Break, they’ve played like a 43-39 full-season team. Based on BBall
Reference playoff odds, it looks like 45 wins makes the playoffs as the
eighth seed. That would require them to be winning at a 57-25 full-season
pace for the rest of the season, which is what the Warriors’ actual full
season record is projected to be on their site. The odds aren’t good at all,
and will require a completely different kind of performance from LA we haven’
t seen this season.
上赛季48胜与41胜的差距就是西区排名第4跟第11的差距，而目前看起来45胜成为西区第8
晋级季后赛的话，以现在湖人的战绩来说，需要在接下来的比赛中取得全胜。
TYING IT ALL TOGETHER
So where does that leave us? Walton seems to do okay to above average with
the lesser valued off-the court components. He’s done well with player
development, but offensively is lacking quite a bit. And the rotations and
scheme are major liabilities.
With the Lakers looking to compete, and do it through adding talent in free
agency, the focus should be on strengths in Walton’s staff’s two weakest
areas, rotations and scheme.
Those are the problems, but what are the solutions?
LA had a window of time this year where they could have moved on from Walton
and given a new staff some time to get their feet under them. That time has
passed. But that time will come again this offseason, and that’s when I
predict the Lakers will make a move. They have all the information they need
on Walton and his staff to reasonably predict future performance. Hiding
behind the roster not being fully healthy to say they can’t assess the staff
would be a gross misunderstanding of how to conduct performance management.
There was also a time this season to make assistant coach changes, and that
window may still be open. Coincidentally, the areas the Lakers need the most
growth are ones that can be improved by getting new assistants. That would
allow the consistency of having the same head coach to hopefully keep the
locker room together. That’s my pipe dream for the rest of this season, but
it’s also likely just a dream now that we’ve passed the All-Star Break,
which would have afforded LA a chance to install new offense.
I’ll break down coaching options in more detail at a later date, but the
candidates like Mark Jackson, Jason Kidd, and Ty Lue don’t look all that
appealing once their scheme film and optimization and development data is
broken down. The names that will ultimately end up being top contenders are
likely ones the Lakers can’t hire today. There’s a reason those candidates
don’t have coaching jobs today.
But gun to my head, I’d say the best options available today that would be
worth a deeper look are Stan Van Gundy, Jeff Van Gundy (I’m skeptical), and
Kevin McHale. Not great compared to the names I’m about to rattle off.
Among the college ranks, John Beilein, Mark Few, Bob McKillop, Bill Self,
Tony Bennett, Tom Izzo, Greg Gard, or Jay Wright would all be viable (if
interested).
If they were to get fired for some reason Alvin Gentry or Brett Brown are
both very good coaches with great data to back up their schemes and
leadership.
Even with just adding assistants to the current staff, defensive guru Luke
Yaklich or Brad Soderberg would be good options from college and likely
attainable if LA were to throw money at them. NBA assistants like Ettore
Messina would be worth a look as well. With any assistants, you’d want to do
a lot of extra vetting to understand who is responsible for what and what
their talent levels are in the core competencies of the job.
The odds are, someone among those 11 head coach options not currently
available will have interest during this offseason. I’d take any of them and
their staffs over Walton’s staff in a heartbeat, and it has nothing to do
with their wins and losses or coach speak in interviews. It’s about what the
key components of being a head basketball coach are, and how good each of
those candidates is at each of those competencies.
简单说就是在季中更换教练的时间或者补强助教团的时间已过，然而接下来只剩在休赛期
看湖人怎么处理总教练这个位置，或者是利用助教团去弥补起L.Walton的弱项。而提到总
教练人选有Mark Jason、Jason Kidd、Ty Lue，甚至是Stan Van Gundy、Jeff Van Gundy
、Kevin McHale。在NCAA中如果这些教练感兴趣的话有，John Beilein(Michigan)、Mark
Few(Gonzaga)、Bob McKillop(Davidson)、Bill Self(Kansas)、Tony Bennett(Virginia)
、Tom Izzo(Michigan State)，Greg Gard(Wisconsin)或Jay Wright(Villanova)。或者防
守大师Luke Yaklich、Brad Soderberg，或现在NBA其他球队的助理教练例如Ettore Messi
na，湖人队对于教练人选要有更大量的观察以及评估，了解他们各自的工作核心已经能力
。
来源：http://www.bball-index.com/luke-walton-lame-duck/