In War Against Coronavirus: Is China Foe—or Friend?
美国抗疫战争中，中国是敌是友？
原文：The National Interest https://tinyurl.com/stezn95
译文：观察者 https://www.guancha.cn/GrahamAlison/2020_04_01_544889_s.shtml
作者：Graham Allison
译者：朱曈菲
[导读]结构性冲突决定了中美必然是无情的敌人，但是应对新冠病毒需要双方成为亲密的
朋友。现实之下中美双方日益激烈的竞争成为了国际关系的基本特征。但是，行胜于言，
面对新冠病毒疫情的大考，中国已经成功控制了病毒的传播，得到了金融市场的押注。至
少在当下，美国的紧迫挑战并不是中国而是自己的失败。因此，美国需要在三个关键领域
与中国开展合作，这些领域包括数据、诊断及公共卫生措施、生物医学研究领域中的基础
研究和转化研究。本文于3月27日原载于美国国家利益网站。
For America to defeat the coronavirus and return to a version of life as it
was before this nightmare, should we identify China as an adversary against
whom to mobilize? Or alternatively, must we recognize it as a partner whose
cooperation is essential for our own victory? While the consensus in
Washington has moved sharply toward defining China as part of the problem,
the fact is that we cannot succeed in this war against coronavirus without
making China part of the solution.
为了让美国战胜冠状病毒并回到这场噩梦之前的生活，我们是应该把中国当作一个应群起
攻之的敌人？还是该承认它是一个合作伙伴，并且与其合作对我们的胜利至关重要？尽管
，华盛顿方面对中国的贡献嗤之以鼻，但事实是，如果不让中国参与进来，成为我们的解
决方案的一部分，我们就无法在这场抗击冠状病毒的战争中取得成功。
The increasingly ruthless rivalry between the U.S. and China will be a
defining feature of their relations as far as any eye can see. This is an
inescapable consequence of structural realities: however anyone tries to
disguise or deny it, a rapidly rising China really is threatening to displace
the U.S. from our position at the top of every pecking order. The question
is whether despite this reality, when confronting specific threats neither
can defeat by itself, statesmen can be wise enough to find ways for rivals to
simultaneously be partners.
目前，在所有人看来，美中之间日益残酷的竞争将是两国关系的一个决定性特征。这是结
构性现实里不可避免的后果：无论谁试图掩盖或否认这一点，一个快速崛起的中国确实有
可能取代美国在所有国家中的地位。问题在于， 在这样的背景下，当双方政治家面对具
体却又无法被单独解决的威胁时，他们是否有足够的智慧，找到让竞争对手同时成为合作
伙伴的方法。
Viruses carry no passports, have no ideology, and respect no borders. When
droplets from an infected patient who sneezes are inhaled by a healthy
individual, the biological impact is essentially identical whether the person
is American, Italian, or Chinese. When an outbreak becomes a pandemic
infecting citizens around the world, since no nation can hermetically seal
its borders, every country is at risk. The inescapable fact is that all 7.7
billion people alive today inhabit one small planet Earth. As President
Kennedy noted in explaining the necessity for coexistence with the Soviet
Union in facing mutual, existential nuclear danger: “We all breathe the same
air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.”
病毒没有护照，没有意识形态，不受国界限制。当一个健康的人从一个打喷嚏的病人身上
吸入飞沫时，无论这个人是美国人、意大利人还是中国人，其受到的生物影响基本上是相
同的。当疫情爆发成为全球范围内的流行病时，没有一个国家能够做到与世隔绝，每个国
家都面临着风险。今天， 77亿人共同生活在同一个小星球 —— 地球上，这是一个不可
避免的事实。正如肯尼迪总统在解释与苏联共存、共同面对核危机的必要性时所指出的那
样:“我们都呼吸著同样的空气。我们都珍惜孩子的未来。我们都是凡人。”
When a crisis strikes, the first question many ask is: Who is to be blamed?
当危机爆发时，许多人问的第一个问题是：谁应该受到指责？
If central casting were searching for a villain, China is fit for the role.
Where did the coronavirus first appear? In China. Who failed to nip the
crisis in the bud? Chinese authoritarianism has displayed all its ugly
features in suppressing initial reports, delaying transmission of bad news to
superiors, and dissembling. Despite the Chinese government’s best efforts to
re-write the narrative, it cannot disguise the fact that there is much in
this case for which China deserves blame.
如果剧组要找一个反派角色，中国倒是很适合：“ 冠状病毒最初出现在哪里？ 在中国。
谁没有把危机扼杀在萌芽状态？ 中国。中国威权主义展现丑陋的一面，压制报导，隐瞒
疫情。 尽管中国政府尽了最大的努力改写剧本，但它不能掩盖这样一个事实：在这种情
况下，中国应该受到很多指责。”
But the effort by many in Washington as well as the Blob to make this the
primary storyline is escapist—an attempt to duck responsibilities for their
own failures. President Trump insists on calling the pathogen the “Chinese
virus.” A leading Republican Senator fed social media conspiracy theorists
by suggesting that the virus had escaped from a Chinese bio-weapons lab.
但是，华盛顿的大官们把矛头对准中国是逃避现实的 —— 他们试图逃避为自己的失败承
担责任。川普总统坚称这种病菌为“中国病毒”，某共和党参议院拿病毒污名化中国等言
行，都助长了社交媒体上阴谋论者的气焰。
Adults should move on. The urgent challenge America faces in attempting to
defeat coronavirus is not China. It is our own failures to mobilize a
response proportionate to the threat. How many weeks after countries like
Singapore and South Korea began implementing emergency measures did the U.S.
government remain in denial? Who failed to prepare for the next pathogen
after we saw earlier versions of this movie with the MERS outbreak in 2012,
Swine Flu in 2009, and SARS in 2003? In a world where South Korea began
testing 10,000 citizens a day within weeks of patient zero—and can now do
20,000 a day—who is still floundering with one excuse after another?
大人们应该成熟点，往前进了。在试图战胜冠状病毒这方面，美国面临的紧迫挑战并不是
中国，而是我们自己未能调动起与威胁相匹配的反应。新加坡和韩国等国的紧急措施实施
已实行多周，但美国政府却还停留在否认的阶段。在2012年中东呼吸综合症(MERS)、2009
年猪流感和2003年非典(SARS)爆发之后，是谁没有为下一种病毒的到来做好准备？韩国在
零号病人出现后的几周内就践行了每天为1万名公民提供测试的承诺（而这个数字现在达
到了2万），在这个世界上，又是谁还在为接连不断的借口折腾?
To be clear, to insist that we face ugly facts about our own failures, and
recognize others’ successes, is not to imply any moral equivalence. Like
most Americans, as a matter of faith we begin with the conviction that
American democracy is basically good, and China’s Party-led authoritarianism
that denies its citizens certain rights we believe are their endowments from
the Creator bad.
明确地说，面对自己失败的丑陋事实，承认别人的成功，并不涉及任何道德层面。就像大
多数美国人一样，作为一个信仰问题，我们首先坚信美国民主基本上是好的，中国党领导
的独裁主义剥夺了公民的某些权利，而我们认为这些权利来自造物主的天赋。
But brute facts are hard to deny. After a month of costly delay, on January
20 China’s government publicly recognized the threat, announcing that the
virus could pass from human to human. Two weeks earlier, it had informed the
WHO about the illness, sequenced the genome, and posted that online so that
scientists around the world could begin the search for a vaccine. (A
Boston-based company, Moderna, heard the call and in less than two months
created a vaccine that has now entered the U.S. government’s testing
labyrinth.)
但我们很难否认残酷的事实。经过一个月的拖延代价，中国政府公开承认了这一威胁，并
于1月21日宣布病毒能人传人。两周前，它向世卫组织通报了这种疾病，对基因组进行了
测序，并将其张贴在网上，以便世界各地的科学家能够开始寻找疫苗。 （一家总部位于
波士顿的公司，现代制药公司听到了这一呼吁，在不到两个月的时间里，研制出了一种疫
苗，现在已经进入美国政府的测试阶段。）
Once it recognized the threat and its paramount leader declared the epidemic
“a crisis and big test,” on January 21 China mounted the most aggressive
war on a virus the world has ever seen. This included locking down Wuhan, a
city of 10 million where the virus first appeared. Days later, China drew a
cordon sanitaire around the population of more than 50 million people in the
province of Hubei. It installed mandatory testing checkpoints around the city
in residential neighborhoods and public transit points; converted hotels,
stadiums, and schools into makeshift medical centers; flooded the city with
thousands of construction workers along with cement mixers and trucks to
build new hospitals from the ground up at astonishing speed (one 1,000-bed
hospital was built in 10 days); and mobilized tens of thousands of PLA
personnel to distribute medical supplies and manage operations.
一旦中国认识到这一威胁，最高领导人宣布该疫情是“一场危机和重大考验”，1月21日
，中国发起了令世界瞩目的对抗病毒的激烈战争。这包括封锁了武汉 —— 这个有着1000
万人口的城市是病毒最开始出现的地方。几天后，中国在湖北省5000多万人口的周围拉起
了警戒线。它在城市周围的居民区和公共交通点设置了强制性的检测点，将旅馆、体育馆
和学校改造成临时医疗中心。中国还调动了成千上万的建筑工人、水泥搅拌车和卡车以惊
人的速度开始建造新的医院(10天内建成了一座有1000个床位的医院)，并动员了成千上万
的解放军人员负责分发医疗用品和管理运营。
Announcements from the Chinese government can never be taken at face value.
Its government has manipulated data and even the criteria for what counts as
a new case. Unquestionably, Beijing’s spinners have been hard at work
attempting to shape a narrative that disguises their failures in the first
phase of this undertaking. A Deputy Spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry
has had the audacity to puff a propagandized conspiracy theory that the U.S.
Army introduced the virus. But despite this noise, at this point, the
evidence from all sources suggests that these efforts have actually succeeded
in bending the curve of infections toward zero. American retailers including
Apple, Starbucks, and McDonalds are now open for business in China.
我们绝不能只看中国政府声明的表面。它的政府操纵了数据，甚至是改变检测标准。 毫
无疑问，北京一直在努力尝试塑造一个掩盖他们在这项事业的第一阶段失败的叙事。 中
国外交部一位副发言人厚颜无耻地大肆宣扬美国军队引入病毒的阴谋论。 尽管如此，目
前所有来源的证据都表明，这些努力实际上已经成功地控制住病毒在中国的传播，包括苹
果、星巴克和麦当劳在内的美国零售商现在都已重新在中国营业。
The imperative for the U.S. today is to do everything possible to stop
coronavirus from infecting millions of our fellow citizens, killing hundreds
of thousands, and crushing our society. If medical scientists in China are
able to develop anti-viral drugs that mitigate the impact on the infected,
should Americans import them? Imagine that in the next month or two Chinese
scientists invent a vaccine while American authorities insist they will not
have one approved for well over a year. Once it has been demonstrated to be
effective in Singapore or South Korea, would the reader wait for our FDA?
今天，美国的当务之急是尽一切可能阻止冠状病毒感染数百万同胞，杀死数十万人，摧毁
我们的社会。如果中国的医学家能够开发出抗病毒药物来减轻对感染者的影响，那么美国
应该进口吗？美国当局却坚称，他们在一年多的时间内不会批准任何疫苗。一旦中国研发
的疫苗在新加坡或韩国被证明是有效的，美国民众会怎么看待我们的食品及药物管理局（
FDA）？
Given the chorus of cries from hospitals across the US and first-line
responders for N-95 masks, if China were prepared to send millions of masks
to the US, as it did to Italy recently, should Americans welcome them? If
lessons China has learned in creating a diagnostic funnel—begin with
pervasive taking of temperatures, subjecting those with fevers to a CT scan,
and if an individual is still suspect taking a swab that is then analyzed
before declaring someone infected—have proved effective, should we refuse to
learn from that experience because of its origin?
鉴于美国各地医院和一线急救人员对N-95口罩的急切需求，如果中国准备向美国运送数百
万个口罩 —— 就像它最近援助意大利那样 —— 美国人应该欢迎它们吗？如果中国建立
的诊断经验——首先是普遍接受温度，然后对发烧患者进行CT扫瞄，如果一个人仍然怀疑
服用了一个拭子，然后再对其进行分析，然后才宣布感染——已经证明是有效的，我们是
否应该因为它的来源而拒绝学习这一经验?
But we should harbor no illusions. At the same time defeat of this pandemic
underlines a vital national interest neither the US nor China can secure
without the cooperation of the other, the performance—and non-performance—
of the two nations will have profound consequences for the larger rivalry for
leadership. From economic growth over the next 12 months, to its citizens’
confidence in their government, and each nation's standing around the world,
successes and failures in meeting a test that has captured the global mind
will matter hugely.
但我们不应对此抱任何幻想。与此同时，疫情突显出一种至关重要的国家利益—— 若没
有与对方的合作，美国和中国单方面都无法确保这种利益。两国的作为以及不作为，都将
对更大范围内领导权的争夺产生深远影响。从未来12个月的经济增长，到国民对政府的信
心，再到中美两国在世界各地的地位来看：能否成功应对这场全球瞩目的考验，对中美至
关重要。
Unfortunately, most of the commentary about this aspect of the crisis has
been mesmerized by China’s effort to manipulate the narrative. Of course,
China is vigorously selling its storyline and shading facts to show itself in
the best light. But preoccupation with the “narrative war” that focuses on
words rather than deeds misses the mountain behind the molehill.
不幸的是，关于危机这一方面的大多数评论都被中国操纵的叙事迷住了。当然，中国正在
大力出售其抗疫故事，遮掩黑暗面，以最好的方式展示自己。但是，我们的关注若只集中
在“宣传战”的言语而不是行为上，却是因小失大。
In real wars, dead bodies count. In economics, real growth produces more
stuff. In relations with other nations, the arrival of much-needed medical
equipment for which others are desperate drowns out any words.
在真正的战争中，死亡人数可以计算。在经济学中，实际的增长可以产生可见的效益。而
在与其他国家的关系中，绝望的人们对医疗设备的急需却淹没了其他所有言语。
Today, financial markets are betting that China has essentially succeeded in
the first battle in this long war. If after its sharp decline in the first
quarter, it now returns to robust economic growth, on the one hand, and the
U.S. teeters on the brink between an extended recession and a genuine
depression, on the other, the gap between the GDP of the U.S. and China will
grow. If an authoritarian government demonstrates competence in ensuring its
citizens' most basic human right—the right to life—as a democratic,
decentralized government flounders, objections to the measures China has used
to do so will sound to many like sour grapes.
今天，金融市场押注的是，中国基本上已经在这场旷日持久的战争中打赢了第一仗。在经
历了第一季度的大幅下滑后，如果中国经济恢复了强劲增长，而美国又在长期衰退和真正
的大萧条之间徘徊，那么美国和中国GDP之间的差距将会拉开(注：应指by PPP)。若中国
作为一个专制政府通过控制疫情证明了自己的能力，而所谓民主的、权力分散的美国政府
还仍在疫情里不断挣扎，那么美国对中国过去的反对态度，在许多人听来就像酸葡萄心理
。
Moreover, we should never forget the larger canvas. There China’s
meta-narrative is a story of its inevitable rise and America’s decline. A
nation that began the century with a GDP less than a quarter of America’s
has now overtaken the US to create an economy larger than ours. A military
that was forced to back down in the Taiwan straits crisis of 1996 when the
U.S. sent two carriers to the theater has over the past two decades built up
an arsenal of “carrier-killer” missiles that would force the U.S. to make
different choices today. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China
’s leadership was emboldened by its success in returning rapidly to rapid
growth as the US was stuck in secular stagnation. Unless the US can find a
way to rapidly meet the current coronavirus test, China could be tempted to
take greater risks, including forcibly bringing Taiwan under Beijing’s rule.
此外，我们不应该忘记更大的背景，那就是中国叙事里中国不可避免的崛起和美国的衰落
。本世纪初，中国的国内生产总值(GDP)还不到美国的四分之一，如今却已超过美国并创
造了比美国还要大的经济体。在1996年台湾海峡危机中，美国向战区派遣两艘航母，中国
军方被迫退缩。20年过去，他们建立了一个“航母杀手”导弹库，迫使美国今天改变战略
。在2008年金融危机使美国陷入长期停滞之际，中国成功地迅速恢复了快速增长，这让中
国更加感到自信和有底气。除非美国能找到迅速应对目前的冠状病毒检测的办法，否则中
国可能会在各种议题上更冒进，包括强行将台湾置于北京统治之下。
Opportunities for collaboration
合作的机会
Science’s search for knowledge about diseases, discovery of medicines to
treat them, and the development of protocols for prevention and healing are
inherently open, international undertakings. Biomedicine advances through
discoveries in laboratories all around the world. Research is inherently
collaborative, more than one-third of scientific articles published by
Americans today having at least one foreign co-author. A third of all
American doctorate degrees in STEM are earned by Chinese students.
探索疾病知识、发现治疗疾病的药物以及制定预防和治疗方案，本质上都是开放的国际事
业。生物医学的进步是通过世界各地实验室的发现而实现的，研究的本质是合作。今天，
美国人发表的三分之一以上的科学论文中，至少有一位外国合作者；美国三分之一的STEM
博士学位是由中国学生获得的。
So in the campaign to defeat coronavirus now, and build a foundation for
preventing a pandemic caused by new novel viruses in the future, where should
the US and China be engaging as partners? Three key areas cry out for
cooperation.
因此，在当前战胜冠状病毒的战役，以及为预防未来由新病毒引起的大流行奠定基础的过
程中，美国和中国应该在哪些方面发挥合作伙伴的作用呢？有三个关键领域需要合作。
The first is data—from genomic to epidemiologic. In attempting to assess
what we now confront and to consider responses, a central factor is
uncertainty: because it is a novel virus, we learn more about it daily as
more data are collected and analyzed. But a second factor is the scarcity of
quality data about what’s happening in various “laboratories” provided by
outbreaks in various countries. The need for trusted data from each country
is a reminder of the importance of agreeing on processes and transparency in
international organizations like the WHO.
合作的第一个领域首先是从基因组到流行病学的数据。面对新型病毒，只有收集和分析的
数据越来越多，我们对其的了解才会越来越多。在试图评估我们现在面临的问题并考虑应
对措施时，不确定性是核心因素。此外，缺乏由各疫情爆发国实验室提供的高质量数据是
第二个关键因素。每个国家都需要可信的数据，这就提醒了我们：在像世卫组织（WHO）
这样的国际组织中，程序一致和透明度非常重要。
When Chinese scientists quickly sequenced the novel coronavirus genome and
released it to the world, they enabled a massive global research effort. Two
weeks later, scientists at the NIH used the sequence to confirm the mechanism
by which the virus entered the cells of those it infected, a finding
reproduced by a Chinese lab the next day. Even the hunt for a vaccine
currently underway relied on an early release of the virus’s genome. When
the first vaccine trial began in America, as NIAID Director Anthony Fauci
observed, it was “the fastest that we have ever gotten from the time we got
the sequence to the time into a human.” What’s more, with genomic
information, scientists can compare infections and map the spread of a virus
meticulously in a way akin to constructing a family tree.
中国科学家很快对新的冠状病毒基因组进行了测序，并将其发布到世界各地，这使得一场
大规模的全球研究工作得以展开。两周后，美国国立卫生研究院（NIH）的科学家利用这
一序列，确认了病毒进入被感染者细胞的机制。次日，中国的一个实验室证实了这一发现
。即使是目前正在进行的寻找疫苗的工作也依赖于早期公布的病毒基因组。正如美国国家
过敏症和传染病研究所（NIAID）主任安东尼‧福奇（Anthony Fauci）所观察到的那样，
美国进行的第一次疫苗试验是 “我们从获得序列到进入人体的时间最快的一次”。更重
要的是，有了基因组信息，科学家就可以比较感染情况，并以类似于构建家谱的方式一丝
不苟地绘制病毒的传播图谱。
During an epidemic, rapid data-sharing during the initial outbreak enables
countries to better understand the virus’s behavior. Because the earliest
cases occurred in Wuhan, data collected by Chinese physicians gave rise to
the world’s first estimates of the virus’s transmissibility, enabling
epidemiologic models that served as the basis for responses by governments of
many countries. And because China bore the brunt of the initial deaths, it
provided the first set of data for global health experts to estimate the case
fatality rate and to create models to predict the scope, spread, and severity
of the disease, ensuring more robust policy responses.
疫情爆发初期迅速共享数据的行为使得各国能够更好地了解病毒。由于最早的病例发生在
武汉，中国医生收集的数据使世界首次得以预估病毒的传播能力。这使得流行病学模型成
为许多国家政府应对措施的基础。由于中国首当其冲地承受了死亡最初的冲击，它为全球
卫生专家提供了第一套数据。该数据被用以估计致死率，并通过创建模型来预测该病的范
围、传播和严重程度，从而确保了更有力的政策应对措施。
A second area of cooperation involves diagnostics and public health measures.
If China developed an efficient process for screening people that could be
industrially scaled and applied in airports, businesses, and schools, could
the United States adopt it? Conversely, if researchers develop and validate a
high-throughput diagnostic that proves to be cheaper, quicker, and more
accurate, would that not be shared? Of the $22 billion of medical equipment
the United States imports annually, much of which is essential for the
American health care system to respond to the skyrocketing number of COVID-19
cases domestically, about a quarter came from China before the tariff war.
合作的第二个领域涉及诊断和公共卫生措施。如果中国开发出一种有效的人员筛选程序，
可以在机场、企业和学校进行大规模的应用，那么美国能采用这种方法吗？相反，如果研
究人员开发并验证出一种更便宜、更快、更准确的高通量诊断方法，它该被共享吗？在美
国每年进口的220亿美元医疗设备中，约有四分之一来自关税战前的中国。这些设备对当
前美国医疗体系应对国内激增新冠肺炎病例至关重要。
The third area is biomedical research—basic and translational. To that end,
Harvard Medical School has recently announced a new collaboration with a
Chinese counterpart to defeat COVID-19. The leader of the Chinese partner is
Zhong Nanshan, the doctor also leading the Chinese government’s coronavirus
task force. In 2003 he was the first person to identify SARS. This
Harvard-Guangzhou Institute joint venture is seeking to understand the basic
biology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the ways it interacts with those it
infects to accelerate development of better diagnostics and treatments.
第三个领域是生物医学研究领域中的基础研究和转化研究。为此，哈佛医学院（Harvard
Medical School)最近宣布了一项与中国同行一起击败新冠病毒的新合作项目。中方合作
伙伴的负责人是钟南山，他也是中国政府冠状病毒工作组的负责人。2003年，他是第一个
发现SARS病毒的人。这家哈佛—广州研究所正试图了解SARS-CoV-2病毒的基础生物学以及
它与感染者相互作用的方式，以加速诊疗方法的发展。
In order to develop antivirals, for example, scientists need to understand
how the virus infects humans—and identifying the door the coronavirus uses
to enter host cells could provide clues for designing a lock. To produce
better diagnostics and monitor disease progression, they will need to
identify accurate biomarkers. Even in the quest to develop a vaccine, because
unbalanced immunity could result in a phenomenon called “antibody-dependent
enhancement,” where the defensive proteins in our bodies instead accelerate
the infection, there is an urgent need to define the precise “correlates of
immunity.”
例如，为了研发抗病毒药物，科学家们需要了解病毒是如何感染人类的。他们可以通过识
别冠状病毒进入宿主细胞的“门”而获得的线索来设计对应的“锁”。为了进行更好的诊
断并监测疾病的进展，科学家们需要识别准确的生物标记。在开发疫苗的过程中，由于不
平衡的免疫可能导致一种被称为“抗体依赖增强”（ antibody-dependent enhancement
）的现象（即我们体内的防御蛋白反而加速了感染），学界迫切需要定义精确的“免疫相
关物”。
As scientists repeatedly affirm, collaboration in research generally leads to
better outcomes. And in an era when no country maintains a monopoly on
scientific creativity, collaboration on an urgent topic like coronavirus
creates more gains than losses. As governments around the globe seek to
confront the pandemic, they should bear in mind that collection and
integration of data, sharing of reagents and tools will require intense
communication across continents.
如科学家们反复强调的那样，研究中的合作通常会带来更好的结果。在没有任何一个国家
可以垄断科学创新的时代，在冠状病毒这类紧迫课题上的合作利大于弊。在努力应对这一
疫情之际，全球各国政府应该牢记：收集和整合数据、共享试剂和工具将需要各大洲之间
的密切沟通。
In sum, instead of mutual demonization, thinking Americans and Chinese should
recognize that each nation needs the other to defeat this deadly enemy.
Partnership, even if only a limited partnership, is thus a strategic
necessity.
总之，与其相互妖魔化，中美都应该认识到，彼此都需要对方来击败病毒这个致命的敌人
。因此，伙伴关系，即使是有限的伙伴关系，在战略上也是必要的。
Can the US and China be ruthless rivals and intense partners at the same
time? Holding two seemingly contradictory ideas in our head simultaneously
will be difficult. But success in defeating this demon will require nothing
less.
美国和中国能在同一时间内既成为无情的对手，又成为亲密的伙伴吗？同时持有两个看似
矛盾的想法是很困难的。但是，要想成功地击败这个病毒，所需要的不过如此。