Fukuyama’s Inner Civic Republicanism
福山内心的公民共和主义
原文：The new Republic
https://tinyurl.com/resd8nt
https://tinyurl.com/t7qk82z
作者：Win McCormack
译文：观察者
https://www.guancha.cn/WinMcCormack/2020_01_18_532077_s.shtml
In his recently published study Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the
Politics of Resentment, Francis Fukuyama wants to modify his best-known
thesis, published first as a 1989 essay, “The End of History?,” then as a
book-length treatment in 1992, The End of History and the Last Man. The word
“end,” he now says, was not meant in the sense of “termination,” but
rather signified “target” or “objective”; similarly, “history” was
referencing the process of “development” or “modernization,” not recorded
time. Marx had argued that, in his own interpretive scheme, the historical
process would culminate in a communist utopia; Fukuyama says that in his
end-of-history thesis he was supplying a more moderate and measured gloss on
Marx, employing instead Hegel’s version of the dialectic’s endpoint: a “
liberal state linked with a market economy.”
弗朗西斯·福山在最近发表的研究著作《身份:对尊严的需求和怨恨的政治》中，希望修
改他最著名的论文，这篇论文首先发表于1989年的论文《历史的终结》，然后在1992年发
表为一本长达一本书的著作《历史的终结与最后之人》。他现在说， “终结” 一词指的
并非 “终止” ，而是 “目标” 或“客观”；与之，“历史”指的是“发展”或“现代
化”的过程，而不是被记录的时间。马克思主张，在他自己的解释方案中，历史进程将在
共产主义乌托邦中达到顶峰；福山说，在他的历史终结论题中，他在马克思的论述上提供
了更温和、更有条理的解释，取而代之的是黑格尔对辩证法终点的解释版:“与市场经济
相联系的自由国家”。
There is much wrong here. To begin with, Hegel was not an advocate of liberal
democratic capitalism. He critiqued both political and economic liberalism
for promoting a selfish individualism inimical to community, his highest
political ideal. Fukuyama was working from the idiosyncratic reading of Hegel
supplied by Alexandre Kojeve, a Russian émigré who conducted a series of
legendary seminars on the subject in Paris in the 1930s. According to Shadia
Drury, a chronicler of the intellectual roots of modern neoconservatism,
Kojeve’s Hegelian teachings—which also strongly referenced the Nietzschean
idea of the Superman—proved very influential in the development of postwar
existentialism and postmodernism.
这里错漏较大。首先，黑格尔不是自由民主的资本主义的倡导者。对于政治自由主义和经
济自由主义，他均持批判态度，认为二者宣扬一种自私的个人主义，不利于他的最高政治
理想——“社群”。福山的作品取材于亚历山大·科耶夫对黑格尔的独特解读。科耶夫是
俄罗斯移民，他于20世纪30年代在巴黎举办了一系列相关主题的著名研讨会。现代新保守
主义思想根源的编年史家沙迪亚·德鲁里认为，科耶夫的黑格尔教义——也强烈引用了尼
采的超人思想——对战后存在主义和后现代主义的发展产生了巨大的影响。
In The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama argues that liberal
capitalist democracy satisfies what Plato contended were the three basic
needs of the soul: The rational side of capitalism facilitates the desiring
part’s appetite for material goods, while the liberal-democratic political
order confers on its citizens the dignity of political equality and
individual rights. But Fukuyama vacillates throughout on how great a threat
aspiring Supermen in the Nietzschean mold might pose to the peace at the end
of history. In The End of History and the Last Man, he actually singles out
Donald Trump as a successful capitalist who might still seek affirmation
beyond mere financial accomplishment, and might conceivably pose a danger to
the nation if he were to choose to enter politics.
福山在《历史的终结和最后之人》一书中指出，自由资本主义民主满足了柏拉图所主张的
灵魂的三个基本需求: 资本主义理性的一面促进了渴望获得物质财富的一方的欲望，而自
由民主的政治秩序赋予了其公民政治平等和个人权利的尊严。但是，对于尼采模式下，有
抱负的超人会对历史末期的和平造成多大的威胁，福山的态度一直摇摆不定。在《历史的
终结和最后之人》一书中，他事实上将唐纳德·川普作为一位成功的资本家单独挑选出来
。在该书的论述中，福山认为，川普可能仍在寻求超越单纯财务成就的肯定，如果他选择
从政，可能会对国家构成威胁。
Fukuyama was originally an elitist pessimist of the old neoconservative
school; he studied Western philosophy with Allan Bloom (himself a student of
Leo Strauss) in his undergraduate years at Cornell. But Fukuyama seems to
have finally made a break from the profound cultural pessimism of the
Straussian neocons. Liberalism, as Fukuyama notes, has from the beginning
presented itself as a universal creed, calling for the extension of basic
political rights to every citizen, even if those rights have not often been
evenly or justly enforced, Recently, historically excluded subgroups within
liberal political orders have organized to achieve equal status for their
groups qua groups. One prominent recent instance of this demand for identity
and recognition has been the gay community’s campaign for the right to marry
same-sex partners. Fukuyama also mentions parallel efforts from a host of
other historically marginalized subgroups, such as the disabled, African
Americans in areas where there is routine police violence, Native Americans,
immigrants, and transgender individuals. He commends their achievements, but
cautions that neither the American left, as a movement, nor the nation as a
whole can function and prosper if it functions as a congeries of disparate,
impermeable subgroups. And here is where civic republicanism comes in; where
the ambitions of liberalism as a universal-rights–based creed appear to be
succumbing to the pressures of ethno-nationalist reaction on the right and
identity-based agitations for recognition on the left, the particularist,
historically informed character of the republican tradition may prove more
adaptable to the world’s shifting and radically contingent political
landscape. Where the liberal order envisioned as the summit of political
development in The End of History and the Last Man has grown notably brittle,
hidebound, and inward-looking, the participatory and locally embedded
traditions of republicanism, aimed at cultivating virtue and self-sacrifice
as a civic bulwark against the corrosive forces of vice, luxury, and
atomistic individualism, now speak to an increasingly unmoored political age
with fresh urgency.
福山原本是旧的新保守主义学派中的精英悲观主义者；他在康奈尔大学读本科时与艾伦·
布鲁姆(师从利奥·施特劳斯)一起学习西方哲学。但福山似乎终于摆脱了施特劳斯学派新
保守派深刻的文化悲观主义。正如福山所指出的，自由主义从一开始，就作为一种普遍信
条出现，呼吁将基本政治权利扩大到每一个公民，即使这些权利往往并未得到平等或公正
的实施。最近，历史上被排斥在自由政治秩序之外的亚群体 组织起来，以实现其作为群
体的平等地位。其中的一个突出例子，便是同性恋群体要求身份和承认、争取同性伴侣婚
姻权利的运动。福山还提到了许多其他在历史上被边缘化的亚群体所做出的类似努力，如
残疾人、警察暴力地区的非洲裔美国人、美洲原住民、移民和变性者。他赞扬他们的成就
，但也告诫道，如果将美国左翼作为一个运动，或者作为一个整体，以一个不同的、不可
渗透的小团体的集合体进行日常工作，是无法运行下去、无法繁荣发展的。而这正是公民
共和主义的用武之地；自由主义作为以普遍权利为基础的信条的野心似乎屈服于右翼的种
族民族主义反应和左翼基于身份的争取承认的鼓动的压力，事实证明，共和传统的特殊、
历史渊源丰富的性质可能更能适应世界不断变化和激进的政治格局。在《历史的终结和最
后之人》中，自由秩序被设想为政治发展的顶峰，但在那里，它变得明显脆弱、守旧和内
向，而参与性和地方根深蒂固的共和主义传统——旨在培养美德和自我牺牲精神，作为对
抗邪恶、奢侈和原子式个人主义等腐蚀性力量的公民堡垒——如今正以新的紧迫感向日益
脱离的政治时代发出呼声。
In the chastened pages of Identity, Fukuyama himself concedes as much: “
Democracies require certain positive virtues on the part of citizens...,” he
writes: Alexis de Tocqueville in particular warned of the temptation of
people in democratic societies to turn inward and preoccupy themselves with
their own welfare and that of their families exclusively. Successful
democracy, according to him, requires citizens who are patriotic, informed,
active, public-spirited, and willing to participate in political matters. In
this age of polarization, one might add that they should be open-minded,
tolerant of other viewpoints and ready to compromise their own views for the
sake of a democratic consensus.
在《身份》这本书中，福山本人也坦言：“民主制度需要公民具有某些积极的美德……”
他写道: “亚历西斯·德·托克维尔特别警告说，民主社会中的人们很容易变得向内，只
关心自己和家人的福利。他认为，成功的民主需要爱国、见多识广、积极主动、热心公益
、乐于参与政治事务。在这个两极分化的时代，还可以补充一点，成功的民主还需要人们
思想开放、容忍其他观点，可为了达成民主共识而进行一定让步。”
This is a perfect description of the republican political ethic—as well as
of the public-minded virtues most lamentably absent from American politics
today.
这是对共和党政治伦理的完美描述，也是对当今美国政治中最令人遗憾地缺乏的公众意识
的美德的完美描述。
“For virtually coeval with the enunciation of Lockean Liberalism,” Francis
Fukuyama wrote in a passage in his 1992 book, The End of History and the Last
Man, “has been a persistent unease with the society thereby produced, and
with the prototypic product of that society, the bourgeois. That unease is
ultimately traceable to a single moral fact, that the bourgeois is primarily
preoccupied with his own material well-being, and is neither public-spirited,
nor virtuous, nor dedicated to the larger community around him or her. In
short, the bourgeois is selfish.”
福山在其1992年的著作《历史的终结和最后之人》的一段中写道：“实际上，与洛克自由
主义的表达是同时代的，这是对由此产生的社会以及该社会的典型产物资产阶级的持续忧
虑。这种忧虑最终可以追溯到一个道德事实，那就是资产阶级主要关心的是自己的物质福
利，既不热心公益，也不讲道德，也不献身于他或她周围更大的社会。简而言之，资产阶
级是自私的。”
These were strange sentiments coming from the author of the controversial
1989 essay “The End of History?”—a work best known for asserting that the
impending collapse of the Soviet empire and its system of communism signified
the final triumph of liberal democracy over all possible alternative systems
of government. However, even in the original exposition of his thesis, there
were clues that Fukuyama did not fully endorse the political and economic
system he was claiming was the best human civilization would ever produce. In
particular, he noted a “broad unhappiness with the impersonality and
spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist societies,” which intimated to him
“the emptiness at the core of liberalism.”
这是1989年颇具争议的论文《历史的终结?》作者提出的奇怪观点。这本著作最著名的论
断是，苏维埃帝国及其共产主义制度即将崩溃，标志着自由民主最终战胜了所有可能的替
代政府制度。然而，即使在该论文最初的阐述中，也有一些线索表明，福山并没有完全赞
同他所声称的人类文明所产生的政治和经济制度是有史以来最好的。他特别指出了“对自
由消费主义社会的客观性和精神空虚性的普遍不满”，这暗示着他“自由主义核心的空虚
”。
Fukuyama also summarized Alexandre Kojeve’s judgment of the postwar European
countries as “precisely those flabby, prosperous, self-satisfied,
inward-looking, weak-willed states whose grandest project was nothing more
heroic than the creation of the Common Market.” Kojeve was the actual
originator of the End-of-History thesis Fukuyama propounded—or, rather, he
was an idiosyncratic interpreter of G.W.F. Hegel who asserted that the
philosopher had identified Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussian army at the
battle of Jena in 1806 as the precise moment history ended. That moment,
Kojeve argued, marked the permanent triumph of the principles of the French
Revolution over the reactionary forces of European royalty. However, as
Shadia Drury has clarified, Kojeve was interpreting Hegel’s complex
philosophical ruminations through a distorting Nietzschean lens.
福山还将科耶夫对战后欧洲国家的判断概括为“恰恰是那些软弱、繁荣、自满、内向、意
志薄弱的国家，它们最宏伟的计画无非是建立共同市场。”科耶夫是福山所提出的历史终
结论的真正创始人，或者更确切地说，他是 G. W. F.黑格尔的一位独特解释者。黑格尔
断言，这位哲学家认为拿破仑在1806年耶拿战役中击败普鲁士军队的那一刻，正是历史终
结的时刻。科耶夫认为，那一刻标志着法国大革命原则对欧洲皇室反动势力的永久胜利。
然而，正如沙迪亚·德鲁里所澄清的那样，科耶夫是通过扭曲的尼采视角来解读黑格尔复
杂的哲学思想的。
Hegel posited a Master-Slave relationship that emerged at the dawn of
civilization, and identified the central dynamic of history as a mutual “
quest for recognition” of their humanity arising from both parties to this
relationship. The Slave did not receive the recognition he sought because of
his inferior status; the Master did not garner the recognition he wanted
because recognition from an inferior was meaningless; only when they
acknowledged each other as equals could they attain the recognition they both
craved. Transmogrifying this Hegelian motif, Kojeve interpreted the French
Revolution as the necessarily violent triumph of the slave class over its
masters. Like Nietzsche, he also condemned the victory of the slave class as
a reversion to the base animality of primitive society—a condition in which
people attended only to their gross physical needs and not the higher ideals
of an aristocratic order.
黑格尔提出了一种出现于文明开端的主人与奴隶的关系并将历史的核心动力定义为双方对
人性的共同“对认可的寻求”。奴隶没有得到他想要的认可，因为他的地位低下；主人没
有得到他想要的认可，因为来自下位者的认可毫无意义；只有当他们平等地认可彼此时，
他们才能得到所渴望的认可。科耶夫对黑格尔的这一主题进行了深刻的解读，他将法国大
革命解读为奴隶阶级对其主人必然的暴力胜利。和尼采一样，他也谴责奴隶阶级的胜利是
原始社会基本动物性的倒退；在原始社会里，人们只关心自己的物质需要，而不关心贵族
秩序的更高理想。
Fukuyama’s cynicism about the bourgeois order in The End of History and the
Last Man manifestly had its origin in Nietzsche’s worldview; the addition to
the title of the phrase “the Last Man,” Nietzsche’s term of derision for
the bourgeoisie—“men without chests”—gave the game away. Yet much of the
terminology Fukuyama deployed in the book—terms such as “public-spirited,”
“virtuous,” and “larger community”—is unmistakably akin to the
vocabulary of civic republicanism. In a subsequent book, The Origins of
Political Order, however, he dismissed classical republicanism as a viable
alternative, on the grounds that “it did not scale well.” As the ancient
republics of Greece and Rome grew in size, he explained, “it became
impossible to maintain the demanding communitarian values that bound them
together.”
福山在《历史的终结和最后之人》一书中对资产阶级秩序的冷嘲热讽显然源于尼采的世界
观；尼采对资产阶级的嘲讽——“没有胸膛的人”——在标题“最后之人”的基础上增加
了这个词，暴露了这场文字游戏。然而，福山在书中使用的许多术语——如“热心公益”
、“善良”和“更大的社区”——无疑类似于公民共和主义的词汇。但在随后的一本书《
政治秩序的起源》中，他驳斥了古典共和主义作为替代方案的可行性，理由是“它的规模
不够大“。他解释说，随着古希腊和古罗马共和国规模的扩大，“不可能继续维持将其绑
定在一起的苛刻的社群主义价值观了。”
That judgment is sensible enough, but Fukuyama, in his latest book, Identity,
finds value in the republican ethic as a means for fortifying liberalism
against the onslaught it now faces from identity politics. Abroad,
ethno-nationalism has already turned formerly democratic nations against
liberal democracy entirely, and the overwhelmingly white American right-wing,
crazed by America’s rapid evolution toward a multiethnic society, seems
intent on accomplishing the same feat here at home. Meanwhile, the American
Left, he surmises, believes that diversity, in and of itself, can pass for a
national identity. But Fukuyama argues that America’s national identity must
remain a credal one, founded on a strong belief in liberal and democratic
political values. He also acknowledges that simply sharing a creed is
insufficient to fully sustain a democratic order: Achieving that goal
requires an active and involved citizenry, exactly as civic republicanism
stipulates. To that end, he recommends a national service requirement for all
of America’s youth, an idea that civic republicans throughout America
heartily endorse.
这一判断是非常明智的，但福山在他的新书《身份》中发现，共和伦理作为一种加强自由
主义抵御身份政治带来的冲击的手段，具有重要的价值。在国外，民族国家主义已经让以
前的民主国家完全反对自由民主，而被美国向多民族社会的快速发展所疯狂的绝大多数美
国右翼白人似乎也想在国内实现同样的壮举。同时，他推测，美国左翼认为多样性本身就
可以被视为一种国家认同。但福山认为，美国的民族身份必须是建立在对自由和民主政治
价值观的坚定信念基础上。他还认为，仅仅分享一个信念，是不足以完全维持一个民主秩
序的：实现这一目标，需要积极参与的公民，正如公民共和主义所要求的。为此，他建议
为所有美国年轻人提供国家服务，这是全美国公民共和党人衷心赞同的观点。
“National service,” he writes, “would be a contemporary form of classical
republicanism, a form of democracy that encouraged virtue and
public-spiritedness rather than leaving citizens alone to pursue their
private lives.” To meet the challenges posed by the end of history, in other
words, we need to revivify the historic civic-republican creed.
“国民服务，”他写道，“将是一种当代形式的古典共和主义，一种鼓励美德和公共精神
而不是让公民独自追求私人生活的民主形式。”或者说，为了迎接历史终结所带来的挑战
，我们需要重振历史上的公民共和主义信条。