Why Trump vs. Warren in 2020 Would Prove America Is in Decline
为什么2020川普对华伦将証实美国的衰落
原文：Foreign Interests https://tinyurl.com/u42hxmb
By Robert D. Kaplan
译文：观察者
https://www.guancha.cn/LuoBoTe-D-KaPuLan/2019_12_17_528626_s.shtml
If a moderate cannot somehow prevail in the Democratic primaries, and
President Donald Trump faces Senator Elizabeth Warren in the November
election, then it will punctuate a process of slow and gradual American
decline that began in the middle Cold War years. For the first time in modern
memory, there would not be a candidate from the political center on any
ticket. But it is possible that we will face a choice between the vulgar,
populist right and the radical, populist left.
如果美国民主党的温和派不能以某种方式在初选中脱颖而出，明年11月的最终角逐在伊丽
莎白‧华伦参议员和唐纳德‧川普总统之间展开，那么美国自冷战中期开始的逐步衰落过
程将被暴露在世人眼前。那将是美国现代记忆里首次没有中间派政治候选人的选举，美国
民众可能将被迫在粗鄙的民粹主义右派和激进的民粹主义左派之间进行选择。
The fact that the center is having difficulty in the presidential race
represents the culmination of a tragic story with several facets.
美国中间派在总统竞选中面临困境这一事实，本身就是一个多面性的悲剧故事的高潮。
The steady adoption of a primary system to select party nominees in the 1970s
and 1980s was something that weakened the leverage of party bosses in
so-called smoke-filled rooms and played to the most partisan emotions of each
major party. For decades the bosses had selected safe, moderate candidates:
not always inspiring but usually responsible. It was the bosses who
essentially gave us Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and so on. Eisenhower
was scouted by the bosses of the Republican party while he was still in
uniform. The system we have today might never have selected him. Though an
exceptional analyst, organization man, and war hero, Ike wasn’t especially
charismatic. Neither was he an especially compelling speaker or photogenic.
上世纪七八十年代，美国总统党内初选制度逐渐稳固下来，削弱了党魁们在所谓“烟雾缭
绕的房间（译注：美国政治行话，指幕后权势者边抽雪茄边进行政治决策的秘密集会）”
里的影响力，且迎合了各党中派别情绪最浓重的人。前几十年里，党魁们选择的一向是稳
妥、温和的候选人，尽管他们不一定有鼓舞力，但通常是负责任的。可以说杜鲁门、艾森
豪威尔等总统都是党魁幕后商议的结果。艾森豪威尔还在军队的时候就被共和党党魁发掘
了。放在今天的选举制度里，他恐怕永远出不了头。尽管他是一位杰出的分析师、组织人
（译注：指一切以组织为重、失去个人身份的人）和战争英雄，但他并不是很有个人魅力
，演讲谈不上有说服力，拍照也不是很上镜。
Smoke-filled rooms may sound squalid, but they fulfilled the spirit of the
Founders of the American Revolution, specifically James Madison, who
preferred a republic; not a democracy. In a republic, the masses rule only
indirectly, through an elite that they can change every few years. Democracy
means more direct rule, given to rage and passions, nowadays amplified by
social media. Here is where the filter of the party bosses and the discipline
of the print-and-typewriter age – which encouraged complex, analytical
thinking from media organs dedicated to centrist objectivity – conveniently
merged to guide us through the Cold War and keep us a republic.
烟雾缭绕的房间”听起来有些污浊，但它最符合美国国父们的精神——特别是詹姆斯‧麦
迪逊——他更希望美国实行共和制而不是民主制。在共和制下，民众对国家的统治是间接
的，必须借助他们几年才能更换一次的精英阶层。民主制则意味着民众可以更直接地统治
国家，他们惯常受到狂热和激情的左右，而今天的社交媒体恰恰又放大了这种效应。正是
在这些烟雾缭绕的房间里，党魁的暗箱操作和媒体的行业准则（媒体机构尽量秉持中立、
追求客观，综合地考虑问题）合宜地融合的在一起，引导美国走过了冷战并保存了其共和
制。
Now think of our post–Cold War presidents chosen under different
circumstances: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump.
Compare them against Truman’s shepherding of the Marshall Plan; of Eisenhower
’s avoidance of a hot war with China and the Soviet Union, despite much of
the advice he was getting; of Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile
Crisis; of Johnson’s Civil Rights Bill; of the elder Bush’s elegant
restraint in the face of Soviet collapse and respect for limits in the case
of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and you’ll see what I mean. Of course,
President Lyndon Johnson’s tragic decisions on Vietnam were an exception –
and I’ll get to that.
回想冷战结束后在不同环境下选出的总统：克林顿、小布什、欧巴马和川普。再拿他们跟
当年引领马歇尔计画的杜鲁门、力排众议避免与中苏正面交战的艾森豪威尔、处理古巴导
弹危机的甘迺迪，签署民权法案的詹森，苏联解体后仍能在海湾战争中保持克制、把握限
度的老布什进行比较，你就会明白我的意思。当然，詹森关于越南战争的悲剧性决定是个
例外，这一点我下文会提到。
Had the party bosses been in charge of the 2016 nominating process, and were
the print-and-typewriter age still regnant, Governor Jeb Bush would likely be
president, having narrowly defeated Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate with
more negatives than himself. He would have surrounded himself with first-rate
foreign policy advisers from the Republican establishment: Richard Haass,
Robert Zoellick, Meghan O’Sullivan, and so forth. He would have governed
more like his father than his brother. Things would be so dull. So low
energy! Yet, America, its alliances, and its posture in the world would be
infinitely sturdier and wiser. Trump is where direct, mass democracy and the
wonders of the digital-video age have led us. And these same factors may yet
offer a Democratic opponent who threatens an economic and social upheaval to
match Trump’s upheaval in manners and decency. The Founders would be
horrified of how we have in spirit, stopped being a republic and have become
a democracy. Someone like Jeb Bush was meant to govern the former.
假设2016年大选提名程序仍然由党魁操控，假设我们仍然处于印刷媒体时代，那么杰布‧
布什州长可能以微弱优势击败负面新闻更多的希拉里‧克林顿参议员成为总统。这样一来
，他将被共和党建制派一流的外交政策顾问团簇：理查德‧哈斯、罗伯特‧佐利克、梅根
‧奥沙利文等（译注：以上分别是美国外交关系委员会主席、世界银行前行长、原美国总
统国家安全顾问）。他的执政方式会更像父亲老布什而不是兄长小布什。他掌权后故事将
变得乏味。他确实不是个能量很足的人，但美国社会、同盟体系以及世界地位都将比当下
牢固得多，行为比当下明智得多。川普是大众直接民主和数码视频时代新生事物共同催化
的产物。同样的因素可能会催生一个民主党选手，在经济和社会层面引发激变，“媲美”
川普在言行和作风上的失范。美国的国父们可能会震惊于我们在本质上怎么从共和制变成
了民主制。像杰布‧布什这样的人原本是要统治一个共和制国家的。
The crumbling began after World War II, a war that however ghastly was very
good for America. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was still having
difficulties mastering the solution to the Great Depression when the buildup
to war jumped-started the American economy. When the war ended in 1945, the
infrastructure of every major industrial economy in the world – save for
that of the United States – had been devastated by aerial bombardment and
ground fighting. It gave us an immeasurable advantage that would last for
decades. The economic and social dynamism created by the war led to the G. I.
Bill, the subsequent equalizing miracle of the suburbs, and consequently a
new and vast middle class. Civil Rights, the erosion of casual anti-Semitism,
and the Space program were all ultimately offshoots of the economic energy
and social changes unleashed by the war effort.
无论第二次世界大战是多么可怕，对美国来说都是非常有益的。美国政治的蜕化是从二战
之后开始的。在富兰克林‧罗斯福总统还未彻底带美国走出大萧条的时候，备战建设给美
国经济带来了快速启动作用。1945年战争结束时，空中轰炸和地面战斗摧毁了世界上除美
国之外所有工业国家的基础设施。它赋予了美国无法估量的优势，这种优势可以持续数十
年。战争带来的经济社会活力，带来了《退伍军人权利法案》，创造了郊区财富平均的奇
蹟，也产生了新的广大中产阶级。公民权利、反犹主义的式微，以及太空计画，最终都可
以视为战时奋斗释放出来的经济活力和社会变革的衍生品。
Vietnam broke the spell. Until Vietnam, Americans had implicit faith in
government and its decision-making processes. After all, the government had
led us through World War II, created prosperity, and put men in space. But
Vietnam fortified the intellectual Left and the elite media establishment as
we know them today, giving them unlimited oxygen that would last for decades;
with a second booster-injection provided by the debacle of the Iraq War,
which the media and the intellectuals ably reported and commented upon. The
country would never again be the same, and never as united as it used to be.
越南打破了这个魔咒。越战之前，美国人对政府和政府决策流程还是有一些信心的。毕竟
，政府带领我们度过了第二次世界大战，创造了繁荣，还把人类带入了太空。但越战使左
派知识分子和建制派媒体得势，给予了他们可以高谈阔论数十载的无限谈资。伊拉克战争
的重大损失更是给了这些媒体和知识分子又一波让他们可以评头品足的谈资。美国已今非
昔比，也不再会像以前那样团结了。
The Cold War, being a tailpiece of World War II, had provided a large measure
of political discipline, though, extending the period of American greatness,
however, shaken the country was because of Vietnam. Had we still been
immersed in the Cold War during the election campaign of 2000, and had we
still been a republic with party bosses choosing the nominees, the Republican
elders might have gathered to gently tell the elder Bush that his son George
W. was not quite ready for high office yet, and needed more time and
experience: as a cabinet secretary, perhaps. But with two superpowers no
longer facing off against the backdrop of nuclear Armageddon, all such
discipline and common sense were lost. Because there was less to fear, almost
anyone could now become president.
作为第二次世界大战的延续，冷战使美国政治保持了严明纪律。尽管它延长了美国的伟大
时期，但越战也动摇了其国本。如果我们在2000年大选时仍沉浸在冷战中，如果我们仍然
是由党魁提名候选人的共和制，那么共和党的长老们可能会聚首并委婉地告诉老布什，他
的儿子小布什并未完全作好出任总统的准备，他还需要更多的时间，积累更多经验，比如
先担任内阁秘书之类。但随着两个超级大国不再处于随时触发核末日的对峙状态，所有这
些纪律和常识都消失了。需要担心的因素少了，现在几乎任何人都可以当总统。
And without the vigilance demanded by the Cold War, extreme partisanship that
undermines foreign policy carried fewer consequences. Politics no longer
stopped at the water’s edge because the perception was it didn’t need to:
for the world across the oceans appeared less dangerous than before 1989.
Thus, the end of the Cold War heralded a hyper-partisan age in national
politics.
由于不再需要像冷战时期那样保持警惕，极端党争尽管不利于美国外交，但似乎也不大要
紧。美国国内政治不再“适可而止”，因为人们觉得美国不再需要一致对外了：毕竟大洋
对面的世界看上去比1989年以前危险性更低。因此，冷战的结束预示著美国国家政治进入
党派激化时代。
Of course, many of these trends overlapped and there were always exceptions:
the elder Bush made it through the primaries, a system newly strengthened by
1988, and John F. Kennedy was pitch-perfect for an electronic media age.
Jimmy Carter was not an especially good Cold War president and Barack Obama
was not an especially bad post–Cold War one. But while the details do not
all fit neatly together, the underlying trend, like the brooding rhythm of a
symphony, is clear.
当然，这些趋势中有许多是相互重叠的，而且总是有例外：老布什通过了总统初选（这种
选举度制在1988年再次得到加强）；约翰‧甘迺迪是电子媒体时代的最佳人选。吉米‧卡
特不是一个很好的冷战总统，而巴拉克‧欧巴马也不是后冷战时期特别糟糕的一任总统。
尽管所有细节不可能同时满足，但潜在的趋势如同交响曲反复徘徊的节奏一般显而易见。
Finally, we have had economic and technological changes around the world, as
the infrastructure of all the major World War II powers recovered and
globalization took root: severing American political unity and destroying the
center in the process. The American middle class was fundamentally weakened,
peoples’ lives became more precarious, even as a stylish, global elite
located on the two coasts - and much less emotionally loyal to their
compatriots in the Heartland - took root and oriented itself to other
culturally sophisticated and high-income earners in Europe and Asia. In a
crucial psychological sense, America lost its previously loyal establishment,
which now lives a global lifestyle, whether its members admit it or not.
最后，随着第二次世界大战所有大国的基础设施逐步恢复、全球化落地生根，我们见证了
全球范围内发生的经济和技术变革，它们动摇了美国的政治统一，并逐渐破坏了中间派。
美国的中产阶级从根本上被削弱，人民的生活变得更加岌岌可危。美国东西海岸那些风度
翩翩的国际化精英更倾向于靠拢文化层次、收入水平与自己相近的欧亚精英，在情感上大
大疏远本国内陆同胞。从一种至关重要的心理层面上说，美国社会的中坚力量不再像过去
那样忠诚，不管他们承不承认，他们的生活方式是全球化的。
And with the elite establishment in the process of deserting its own country,
nationalism and patriotism—which used to fit perfectly with liberalism—have
been handed over to crude populists, many of whom in spirit constitute a
lumpen proletariat. The 2020 election may yet threaten a choice between one
crude populist and another.
精英群体在逐渐抛弃自己的国家，曾经与自由主义相得益彰的民族主义和爱国主义也被移
交给了粗俗的民粹主义者，他们大多数人在精神上就是流氓无产阶级。这样一来， 2020
年的大选可能面临着在两个粗鄙的民粹主义者之间做出选择。
An age of decline constitutes a golden age for the media, which thrives and
builds careers on crises. Vietnam, Watergate, Iraq, and now the stark
weakening of the moderate center have constituted great boons to journalists’
careers. Journalists are merely doing their jobs conscientiously. But their
very fame and productivity are inversely related to the health and happiness
of the nation.
对于媒体而言，衰落时代就是黄金时代，他们就是靠危机发家致富的。越战、水门事件、
伊拉克战争，到如今中间温和派的彻底没落，成就了一批又一批记者。当然，这些记者也
只是凭著良心在做本职工作。但他们的名气和成果是和国家的繁荣程度、幸福指数呈反比
的。
World War II saved us because mass societies handle total wars well; just as
they do small expeditionary warfare. It is middle-sized wars—Korea, Vietnam,
and Iraq—which involve death on a significant scale, but do not engage the
nation beyond military families, that mass societies handle less well. Heaven
forbid there should ever again be a total war! But unless a moderate with
real credibility can carry the day for the Democrats, only something
extraordinarily fundamental can reverse our direction: on-going now for over
half a century.
如同处理小规模远征战一样，大众社会能够很好地处理全面战争，因此第二次世界大战拯
救了我们。但对于死亡人数规模较大、不牵涉美国本土的普通家庭的中等规模战争，如朝
鲜战争、越南战争和伊拉克战争，大众社会就处理得欠妥。老天保佑，千万别再打全面战
争！但除非有真正靠谱的温和派领导民主党，否则只有非常根本性的大变局才足以扭转美
国半个多世纪以来的方向。