标题: 乌克兰门风暴》美国代理国家情报总监：这次揭密者控告史无前例，他做了对的事
新闻来源: (须有正确连结)
https://www.storm.mg/article/1759612
前情提要:
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 文章代码(AID): #1TZ3BKMV (IA) [ptt.cc] [新闻] 乌克兰门．华府风暴》白宫公 │
│ 文章网址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/IA/M.1569469140.A.59F.html │
│ 这一篇文章值 25 Ptt币 │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
简恒宇 2019-09-26 23:34
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K0YZZnRhE0c
美国总统川普疑似施压乌克兰总统哲连斯基，要求调查2020年总统大选可能对手拜登的儿
子，掀起“乌克兰门”风暴，更让民主党掌控的联邦众议院启动弹劾调查。代理国家情报
总监马奎尔26日出席众议院情报委员会听证会，但对于川普是否滥权，以及利用特权隐瞒
通话内容，马奎尔均未正面回应，但坦言引发风暴的揭密者“做了对的事”，他提出的控
告“史无前例”。
众院听证会召开前 控诉内容先公布
马奎尔（Joseph Maguire）直言，出席听证会让他很不自在，“我没有要求要出席”，并
称会出席是来自川普的要求，同时否认请辞传闻，被问到川普是否想知道是谁提出控告，
马奎尔明确回答：“没有。”这场听证会在美国东岸时间26日上午9时举行，马奎尔随后
会与联邦参议院情报委员会进行闭门会谈。
https://i.imgur.com/tszLNNF.jpg
乌克兰门丑闻：美国代理国家情报总监马奎尔出席联邦众议院情报委员会听证会（AP）
而在听证会开始前，众院情报委员会释出已解密的控诉内容，直指川普私人律师、前纽约
市长朱利安尼（Rudolph W. Giuliani）是此事件的主要推手，司法部长巴尔（William
P. Barr）“显然也参与其中”。众院情报委员会主席席夫（Adam B. Schiff）说，会尽
全力保护提出控告的情报官员，避免此人遭到报复。
https://i.imgur.com/xw0RW7B.jpg
乌克兰门丑闻：美国联邦众议院情报委员会主席席夫（AP）
朱利安尼、巴尔涉案 白宫“极力妨碍”别人知
《华盛顿邮报》18日揭露，美国情报人员透过“揭密者控告”（whistleblower
complaint）管道提出控告，指出川普与“某外国领导人”通电话时，做出极不恰当的“
承诺”，而《华盛顿邮报》与《纽约时报》深入挖掘，锁定7月25日川普与哲连斯基（
Volodymyr Zelensky）的通话，川普疑似拿援助威胁，要求哲连斯基调查拜登（Joe
Biden）次子杭特（Hunter Biden）是否涉贪。
控告内容指出，白宫官员“极力妨碍”川普与哲连斯基的对话内容被别人知道，并称川普
滥用人事权，且顾虑到政治敏感资讯，川普与外国领导人通话纪录被重置“并非首次”。
此外，控诉者直言，“他（川普）对乌克兰总统（哲连斯基）施压，以达到2020年赢得连
任的目的”，此举不仅是一连串滥权行为，还把“国家安全置于风险之中”。
https://i.imgur.com/XLXvpP9.jpg
乌克兰门丑闻：美国代理国家情报总监马奎尔出席联邦众议院情报委员会听证会（AP）
否认泄露给媒体 相信情报员照规则办事
“我没有党派，也不是政客”，马奎尔宣誓后，强调自己的效忠对象是美国宪法，并坦言
这次的揭密者控告“史无前例”。对于被指没有立即处理情报人员的控诉，马奎尔回应，
白宫官员告诉他通话内容受到行政特权（executive privilege）保护，强调对督察和控
诉者“诚实办事”且“遵照规章”进行深具信心。
被问及此控诉是否意味川普滥权，马奎尔闪避不答，仅称“无法由我评断”。对于控诉者
被川普指控是“政治骇客”，马奎尔没有正面回应，但认为控诉者“做对了事”。努恩斯
则追问为何媒体得知此事，马奎尔否认情报单位把消息泄露给媒体，并微笑表示：“我领
导情报单位，我们知道如何保守秘密。”不过他证实，有10多人听过川普与哲连斯基的对
话内容，这让民主党有线索展开调查。
https://i.imgur.com/DxHffpL.jpg
乌克兰门丑闻：美国联邦众议院情报委员会副主席努恩斯（AP）
同意控诉者接受国会听证 共和党批阴谋论
马奎尔不回应是否有与川普讨论此事，表示若公开他与川普之间的对话，“会摧毁我在情
报业务上与川普的关系”。他亦称，白宫并未指示，他与川普之间的对话受制行政特权。
当被问及控诉者能否在受保护的情况下出席国会听证会，马奎尔表示正在尽量安排，而席
夫则问，若情势更加明确，控诉者能否接受听证会问话，马奎尔回道：“可以。”
https://i.imgur.com/w4E51Nj.jpg
席夫痛批，川普“背叛”就任总统的誓言，还对国家安全造成威胁，并指责8月才代理国
家情报总监（DNI）职务的马奎尔，这几个月的作为相当“令人困惑”，甚至没有立即提
交情报人员的控诉，也没有找疑似牵涉其中的巴尔问话。共和党籍的众院情报委员会副主
席努恩斯（Devin Nunes）则说，这是针对川普发动的“资讯战”。
https://i.imgur.com/dKqG90f.jpg
努恩斯还称，媒体试图利用阴谋论来罢黜川普，同党的35岁纽约州联邦众议员史蒂芬尼克
（Elise Stefanik）批评席夫，在听证会开场声明中制造川普与哲连斯基的“假对话”。
不过同是共和党籍的德州联邦众议员贺德（Will Hurd）坦言，这起控诉“令人关切”；
同党俄亥俄州联邦众议员藤诺（Mike Turner）也说：“我想告诉总统......这对话内容
不OK。”
───────────────────────────────────────
让民主党扣下弹劾调查扳机的机密文件：“乌克兰门”揭密者的9页检举函，到底说了什
么？
https://www.storm.mg/article/1762162
李忠谦 2019-09-27 15:11
https://i.imgur.com/napBcqy.jpg
美国总统川普再度陷入勾结外国、影响大选争议（美联社）
攸关美国总统川普是否会被弹劾的“乌克兰门”不断延烧，代理国家情报总监马奎尔26日
出席众院听证会，而踢爆“乌克兰门”的“揭密者检举”原件也在会前由众议院情报委员
会公布。外界终于能从这份解密文件中，一窥无法坐视川普丑行的情报人员，到底向上司
举报了什么？
这份“揭密者检举”于今年8月12日提出，共有9页内容，当时也被列为密件。众院情报委
员会将其公布在网络上，因此所有人都能轻易阅读全文。如同先前美国媒体所揭露的，这
位迄今不知姓名身份的情报人员，认为川普利用总统职权，要求外国领导人干预2020美国
总统大选，他认为这除了伤害美国国安，也构成了情节严重的总统滥权。
1.白宫试图隐匿通话纪录
吹哨者表示，在防止官员审视川普与乌克兰总统哲连斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）7月25
日的通话纪录时，白宫显然逾越了正常程序的范围—不过由于各界压力，这份纪录已在25
日由白宫公诸于世。
吹哨者在“揭密者检举”（whistleblower complaint）的检举函中表示，无法检视通话
纪录的官员们对他表示，他们被告知所有通话纪录都已经被“封锁”，尤其是逐字通话纪
录。好几位白宫官员都告诉吹哨者，由白宫战情室所制作的川普与哲连斯基的这份通话纪
录，被例外存放在直接由国家安全会议（National Security Council）高阶主管所管理
、专门用于处理高阶情报的不联网电脑里。
https://i.imgur.com/ofBqOs8.jpg
美国总统川普被爆出“乌克兰门”，疑似滥用职权向乌克兰总统施压，以便打击民主党总
统参选人、前副总统拜登。（AP）
吹哨者说，这种做法被白宫官员认为根本是滥用体制，因为把川普的对话纪录锁在这种地
方，完全只是为了保护私人政治利益，而非敏感的重要国安资讯。检举函的这一点也让25
日公布通话纪录，并且宣称“并未涉敏感国安资讯”的白宫相当难堪—既然没有不可告人
之处，为何又要将其隐匿。吹哨者还指出，官员们表示这种作法在川普政府并非新鲜事，
还有其他资料也被如此处理。
2.川普把见面机会当成奖赏
“乌克兰门”的关键之一，在于川普是否将应该交给乌克兰的美援当成施压工具，迫使乌
克兰调查拜登父子（Joe and Hunter Biden）的贪腐丑闻。不过吹哨者的检举函对于这一
点并未深谈，这名告密的情报人员认为，难以证实乌克兰总统是否知道美援被扣住。
吹哨者真正在检举函中指出的，是官员们相信川普将他与哲连斯基的会晤当成奖赏（据称
乌克兰总统非常想跟川普见面），只要对方能够跟他合作。好几位美国官员也跟这名吹哨
者说，乌克兰高层当时收到的讯息是，只要哲连斯基愿意在乌克兰前检察总长卢岑科（
Yuriy Lutsenko）与川普私人律师朱利安尼（Rudolph Giuliani）关注的事项上与美国合
作，美乌领袖会谈就可以成事。
吹哨者坦承，他不知道“谁什么时候传递了这个讯息给乌克兰高层”。但他也表示，副总
统彭斯（Mike Pence）取消了乌克兰的访问行程，就是出于相同的理由。“美国官员在5
月14日前后告诉我，川普本来要参加哲连斯基5月20日的就职典礼，但川普后来下令彭斯
全部取消，改由能源部长率团参加。”
告密者说川普取消访乌的这个决定，更让官员们认定在哲连斯基在总统职位上“做出正确
选择”之前，川普都不会跟他碰面。《华盛顿邮报》先前曾经指出，川普一直不愿意与哲
连斯基会晤，直到7月25日两人通话，哲连斯基表示他会调查川普想要他调查的事之后，
川普才表态两人将会在华府见面。
3.两名大使职司损害控管
吹哨者表示，负责对乌克兰谈判的美国特使沃尔克（Kurt Volker）与美国驻欧盟大使桑
德兰（Gordon Sondland），都试图减轻川普相关举动所造成的潜在损害。多名美国官员
对他表示，沃尔克与桑德兰都曾对乌克兰高层提出建议，如何“解决”川普总统对哲连斯
基所提出的要求。
吹哨者说，沃尔克与桑德兰等国务院官员都跟朱利安尼进行过谈话，讨论如何在美国国安
层面“控管损害”。沃尔克与桑德兰也在这段期间与乌克兰新政府的官员碰面，除了讨论
政策问题，也试图协助乌克兰领导人理解与回应他们从不同管道接受到的讯息，其中也包
括朱利安尼。
4.今年7月25日的那通电话
无论是白宫官员或者共和党籍的众议员，目前都已经开始攻击这名吹哨者的可信度。因为
他们注意到这名吹哨者的所有资讯来源，几乎都是来自美国政府官员的二手转述。但是在
白宫25日公布川普与哲连斯基的通话纪录后，若跟检举函中对这通电话的描述相比，又是
如此准确。
https://i.imgur.com/ngjS1nu.jpg
2010年1月，美国时任总统欧巴马（左）、时任副总统拜登（中）、拜登次子杭特（右）
（美联社）
吹哨者在这份8月12日（白宫公布通话纪录近6周之前）提交的检举函中表示，官员们转述
的川普施压事项包括：
＋对前副总统拜登（Joseph Biden）与其子杭特（Hunter Biden）在乌克兰的活动进行调
查—这也是白宫官员认为总统滥权、谋求私利的关键所在
＋对于俄罗斯干预2016美国总统大选的一起阴谋论，认为其实根本就是美国民主党全国委
员会（DNC）自导自演。川普希望乌克兰协助找出当年由DNC与资安公司CrowdStrike所使
用的一台服务器，因为据传当初的网络干预就是源自乌克兰
＋川普希望哲连斯基可以跟他所指定的两位个人特使—他的私人律师朱利安尼与美国司法
部长巴尔（William Barr）见面或谈话，以便讨论“合作事宜”
＋川普在通话时表达了对乌克兰前检察总长卢岑科（Yuriy Lutsenko）的支持（我听说你
有一个非常棒的检察官被撤职了，这件事真的不公平），而且当时这位彻查拜登家族贪腐
事证的检察官也参与了通话。此外，川普在电话里只提到了两次调查
5.除了川普，许多官员显然也陷入麻烦
吹哨者在8月的这份检举函中表示，过去4个月有好几位美国官员对他揭露与上述指控有关
的事实。而且这些官员所讲述的内容彼此融贯，与已经公开的各种私人陈述也相互一致。
吹哨者指出，大概有12名白宫官员听过川普与哲连斯基的通话，但他们都设法让这份通话
纪录保持秘而不宣，当然还有川普想将两人会晤当成“合作奖赏”一事。
如果这一切被认定非法，那么出问题的不只是川普，还包括这些知情又协助隐匿的官员，
都是共谋。除了直接听过电话的官员，还有那些协助控管损害、协助乌克兰理解与执行川
普要求的人。这意味着在对川普进行弹劾调查时，众院需要传唤听证的潜在证人恐怕至少
会有好几十个。
https://i.imgur.com/pgWxmBB.jpg
川普私人律师朱利安尼。（AP）
附注：揭密者检举函件原文
(下列是第一至第七页的部分，包括脚注)
UNCLASSIFIED
August 12, 2019
The Honorable Richard Burr
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
The Honorable Adam Schiff
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
United States House of Representatives
Dear Chairman Burr and Chairman Schiff:
I am reporting an "urgent concern" in accordance with the procedures outlined
in 50 U.S.C. s. 3033(k)(5)(A). This letter is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from
the attachment.
In the course of my official duties, I have received information from
multiple U.S. Government officials that the President of the United States is
using the power of his office to solicit interference from a foreign country
in the 2020 U.S. election. This interference includes, among other things,
pressuring a foreign country to investigate one of the President’s main
domestic political rivals. The President’s personal lawyer, Mr. Rudolph
Giuliani, is a central figure in this effort. Attorney General Barr appears
to be involved as well.
Over the past four months, more than half a dozen U.S. officials have
informed me of various facts related to this effort. The information provided
herein was relayed to me in the course of official interagency business. It
is routine for U.S. officials with responsibility for a particular regional
or functional portfolio to share such information with one another in order
to inform policymaking and analysis.
I was not a direct witness to most of the events described. However, I found
my colleagues' accounts of these events to be credible because, in almost all
cases, multiple officials recounted fact patterns that were consistent with
one another. In addition, a variety of information consistent with these pri-
vate accounts has been reported publicly.
I am deeply concerned that the actions described below constitute “a serious
or flagrant problem, abuse, or violation of law or Executive Order” that “
does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters,”
consistent with the definition of an "urgent concern" in 50 U.S.C. s.3033(k)
(5)(G). I am therefore fulfilling my duty to report this information, through
proper legal channels, to the relevant authorities.
I am also concerned that these actions pose risks to U.S. national security
and undermine the U.S. Government’s efforts to deter and counter foreign
interference in U.S. elections.
To the best of my knowledge, the entirety of this statement is unclassified
when separated from the classified enclosure. I have endeavored to apply the
classification standards outlined in Executive Order (EO) 13526 and to
separate out information that I know or have reason to believe is classified
for national security purposes.(1)
If a classification marking is applied retroactively, I believe it is
incumbent upon the classifying authority to explain why such a marking was
applied, and to which specific information it pertains.
I. The 25 July Presidential phone call
Early in the morning of 25 July, the President spoke by telephone with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. I do not know which side initiated
the call. This was the first publicly acknowledged call between the two
leaders since a brief congratulatory call after Mr. Zelenskyy won the
presidency on 21 April.
Multiple White House officials with direct knowledge of the call informed me
that, after an initial exchange of pleasantries, the President used the
remainder of the call to advance his personal interests. Namely, he sought to
pressure the Ukrainian leader to take actions to help the President’s 2020
reelection bid. According to the White House officials who had direct
knowledge of the call, the President pressured Mr. Zelenskyy to, inter alia:
- initiate or continue an investigation(2) into the activities of former Vice
President Joseph Biden and his son, Hunter Biden;
- assist in purportedly uncovering that allegations of Russian interference
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election originated in Ukraine, with a specific
request that the Ukrainian leader locate and turn over servers used by the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and examined by the U.S. cyber security
firm Crowdstrike(3);, which initially reported that Russian hackers had
penetrated the DNC’s networks in 2016; and
- meet or speak with two people the President named explicitly as his
personal envoys on these matters, Mr. Giuliani and Attorney General Barr, to
whom the President referred multiple times in tandem.
The President also praised Ukraine’s Prosecutor General, Mr. Yuriy Lutsenko,
and suggested that Mr. Zelenskyy might want to keep him in his position.
(Note: Starting in March 2019, Mr. Lutsenko made a series of public
allegations—many of which he later walked back-about the Biden family’s
activities in Ukraine, Ukrainian officials’ purported involvement in the
2016 U.S. election, and the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. See Part
IV for additional context.)
The White House officials who told me this information were deeply disturbed
by what had transpired in the phone call. They told me that there was already
a “discussion ongoing” with White House lawyers about how to treat the call
because of the likelihood, in the officials’ retelling, that they had
witnessed the President abuse his office for personal gain.
The Ukrainian side was the first to publicly acknowledge the phone call. On
the evening of 25 July, a readout was posted on the website of the Ukrainian
President that contained the following line (translation from original
Russian-language readout):
- “Donald Trump expressed his conviction that the new Ukrainian government
will be able to quickly improve Ukraine's image and complete the investigation
of corruption cases that have held back cooperation between Ukraine and the
United States.”
Aside from the above-mentioned “cases” purportedly dealing with the Biden
family and the 2016 U.S. election, I was told by White House officials that
no other “cases” were discussed.
Based on my understanding, there were approximately a dozen White House
officials who listened to the call — a mixture of policy officials and duty
officers in the White House Situation Room, as is customary. The officials I
spoke with told me that participation in the call had not been restricted in
advance because everyone expected it would be a “routine” call with a
foreign leader. I do not know whether anyone was physically present with the
President during the call.
- In addition to White House personnel, I was told that a State Department
official, Mr. T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, also listened in on the call.
- I was not the only non-White House official to receive a readout of the
call. Based on my understanding, multiple State Department and Intelligence
Community officials were also briefed on the contents of the call as outlined
above.
II. Efforts to restrict access to records related to the call
In the days following the phone call, I learned from multiple U.S. officials
that senior White House officials had intervened to “lock down” all records
of the phone call, especially the official word-for-word transcript of the
call that was produced—as is customary-by the White House Situation Room.
This set of actions underscored to me that White House officials understood
the gravity of what had transpired in the call.
- White House officials told me that they were “directed” by White House
lawyers to remove the electronic transcript from the computer system in which
such transcripts are typically stored for coordination, finalization, and
distribution to Cabinet-level officials.
- Instead, the transcript was loaded into a separate electronic system that
is otherwise used to store and handle classified information of an especially
sensitive nature. One White House official described this act as an abuse of
this electronic system because the call did not contain anything remotely
sensitive from a national security perspective.
I do not know whether similar measures were taken to restrict access to other
records of the call, such as contemporaneous handwritten notes taken by those
who listened in.
III. Ongoing concerns
On 26 July, a day after the call, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations Kurt Volker visited Kyiv and met with President Zelenskyy and a
variety of Ukrainian political figures. Ambassador Volker was accompanied in
his meetings by U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland. Based
on multiple readouts of these meetings recounted to me by various U.S.
officials, Ambassadors Volker and Sondland reportedly provided advice to the
Ukrainian leadership about how to “navigate” the demands that the President
had made of Mr. Zelenskyy.
I also learned from multiple U.S. officials that, on or about 2 August, Mr.
Giuliani reportedly traveled to Madrid to meet with one of President Zelen-
skyy's advisers, Andriy Yermak. The U.S. officials characterized this meeting,
which was not reported publicly at the time, as a “direct follow-up” to the
President’s call with Mr. Zelenskyy about the “cases” they had discussed.
- Separately, multiple U.S. officials told me that Mr. Giuliani had reportedly
privately reached out to a variety of other Zelenskyy advisers, including
Chief of Staff Andriy Bohdan and Acting Chairman of the Security Service of
Ukraine Ivan Bakanov.(4);
- I do not know whether those officials met or spoke with Mr. Giuliani, but I
was told separately by multiple U.S. officials that Mr. Yermak and Mr.
Bakanov intended to travel to Washington in mid-August.
On 9 August, the President told reporters: “I think [President Zelenskyy] is
going to make a deal with President Putin, and he will be invited to the
White House. And we look forward to seeing him. He’s already been invited to
the White House, and he wants to come. And I think he will. He’s a very
reasonable guy. He wants to see peace in Ukraine, and I think he will be
coming very soon, actually.”
IV. Circumstances leading up to the 25 July Presidential phone call
Beginning in late March 2019, a series of articles appeared in an online
publication called The Hill. In these articles, several Ukrainian officials
— most notably, Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko — made a series of
allegations against other Ukrainian officials and current and former U.S.
officials. Mr. Lutsenko and his colleagues alleged, inter alia:
- that they possessed evidence that Ukrainian officials — namely, Head of
the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine Artem Sytnyk and Member of
Parliament Serhiy Leshchenko — had “interfered” in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, allegedly in collaboration with the DNC and the U.S.
Embassy in Kyiv,(5)
- that the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv — specifically, U.S. Ambassador Marie
Yovanovitch, who had criticized Mr. Lutsenko’s organization for its poor
record on fighting corruption — had allegedly obstructed Ukrainian law
enforcement agencies’ pursuit of corruption cases, including by providing a
“do not prosecute” list, and had blocked Ukrainian prosecutors from
traveling to the United States expressly to prevent them from delivering
their “evidence” about the 2016 U.S. election;(6); and
- that former Vice President Biden had pressured former Ukrainian President
Petro Poroshenko in 2016 to fire then Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor
Shokin in order to quash a purported criminal probe into Burisma Holdings, a
Ukrainian energy company on whose board the former Vice President’s son,
Hunter, sat.(7)
In several public comments,(8); Mr. Lutsenko also stated that he wished to
communicate directly with Attorney General Barr on these matters.(9); The
allegations by Mr. Lutsenko came on the eve of the first round of Ukraine's
presidential election on 31 March. By that time, Mr. Lutsenko's political
patron, President Poroshenko, was trailing Mr. Zelenskyy in the polls and
appeared likely to be defeated. Mr. Zelenskyy had made known his desire to
replace Mr. Lutsenko as Prosecutor General.4 On 21 April, Mr. Poroshenko lost
the runoff to Mr. Zelenskyy by a landslide. See Enclosure for additional
information.
- It was also publicly reported that Mr. Giuliani had met on at least two
occasions with Mr. Lutsenko: once in New York in late January and again in
Warsaw in mid-February. In addition, it was publicly reported that Mr.
Giuliani had spoken in late 2018 to former Prosecutor General Shokin, in a
Skype call arranged by two associates of Mr. Giuliani.(10);
- On 25 April in an interview with Fox News, the President called Mr. Lutsen-
ko's claims "big" and "incredible" and stated that the Attorney General "would
want to see this."
On or about 29 April, I learned from U.S. officials with direct knowledge of
the situation that Ambassador Yovanovitch had been suddenly recalled to
Washington by senior State Department officials for “consultations” and
would most likely be removed from her position.
- Around the same time, I also learned from a U.S. official that "associates"
of Mr. Giuliani were trying to make contact with the incoming Zelenskyy
team.(11)
- On 6 May, the State Department announced that Ambassador Yovanovitch would
be ending her assignment in Kyiv “as planned.”
- However, several U.S. officials told me that, in fact, her tour was
curtailed because of pressure stemming from Mr. Lutsenko’s allegations. Mr.
Giuliani subsequently stated in an interview with a Ukrainian journalist
published on 14 May that Ambassador Yovanovitch was “removed…because she
was part of the efforts against the President.”
On 9 May, The New York Times reported that Mr. Giuliani planned to travel to
Ukraine to press the Ukrainian government to pursue investigations that would
help the President in his 2020 reelection bid.
- In his multitude of public statements leading up to and in the wake of the
publication of this article, Mr. Giuliani confirmed that he was focused on
encouraging Ukrainian authorities to pursue investigations into alleged
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and alleged wrongdoing by
the Biden family.(12);
- On the afternoon of 10 May, the President stated in an interview with
Politico that he planned to speak with Mr. Giuliani about the trip.
- A few hours later, Mr. Giuliani publicly canceled his trip, claiming that
Mr. Zelenskyy was “surrounded by enemies of the [U.S.] President…and of the
United States.”
On 11 May, Mr. Lutsenko met for two hours with President-elect Zelenskyy,
according to a public account given several days later by Mr. Lutsenko. Mr.
Lutsenko publicly stated that he had told Mr. Zelenskyy that he wished to
remain as Prosecutor General.
Starting in mid-May, I heard from multiple U.S. officials that they were
deeply concerned by what they viewed as Mr. Giuliani’s circumvention of
national security decisionmaking processes to engage with Ukrainian officials
and relay messages back and forth between Kyiv and the President. These
officials also told me:
- that State Department officials, including Ambassadors Volker and Sondland,
had spoken with Mr. Giuliani in an attempt to “contain the damage” to U.S.
national security; and
- that Ambassadors Volker and Sondland during this time period met with
members of the new Ukrainian administration and, in addition to discussing
policy matters, sought to help Ukrainian leaders understand and respond to
the differing messages they were receiving from official U.S. channels on the
one hand, and from Mr. Giuliani on the other.
During this same timeframe, multiple U.S. officials told me that the Ukrainian
leadership was led to believe that a meeting or phone call between the Presi-
dent and President Zelenskyy would depend on whether Zelenskyy showed willing-
ness to “play ball” on the issues that had been publicly aired by Mr. Lut-
senko and Mr. Giuliani.
(Note: This was the general understanding of the state of affairs as conveyed
to me by U.S. officials from late May into early July. I do not know who deli-
vered this message to the Ukrainian leadership, or when.)
See Enclosure for additional information.
Shortly after President Zelenskyy’s inauguration, it was publicly reported
that Mr. Giuliani met with two other Ukrainian officials: Ukraine’s Special
Anticorruption Prosecutor, Mr. Nazar Kholodnytskyy, and a former Ukrainian
diplomat named Andriy Telizhenko. Both Mr. Kholodnytskyy and Mr. Telizhenko
are allies of Mr. Lutsenko and made similar allegations in the above-mentioned
series of articles in The Hill.
On 13 June, the President told ABC’s George Stephanopoulos that he would
accept damaging information on his political rivals from a foreign government.
On 21 June, Mr. Giuliani tweeted: “New Pres of Ukraine still silent on
investigation of Ukrainian interference in 2016 and alleged Biden bribery of
Poroshenko. Time for leadership and investigate both if you want to purge how
Ukraine was abused by Hillary and Clinton people.”
In mid-July, I learned of a sudden change of policy with respect to U.S.
assistance for Ukraine. See Enclosure for additional information.
Footnotes:
1. Apart from the information in the Enclosure, it is my belief that none of
the information contained herein meets the definition of “classified
information” outlined in EO 13526, Part 1, Section 1.1. There is ample
open-source information about the efforts I describe below, including
statements by the President and Mr. Giuliani. In addition, based on my
personal observations, there is discretion with respect to the classification
of private comments by or instructions from the President, including his
communications with foreign leaders; information that is not related to U.S.
foreign policy or national security—such as the information contained in
this document, when separated from the Enclosure-is generally treated as
unclassified. I also believe that applying a classification marking to this
information would violate EO 13526, Part 1, Section 1.7, which states: “In
no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as
classified, or fail to be declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of
law, inefficiency, or administrative error; [or] (2) prevent embarrassment to
a person, organization, or agency.”
2. It is unclear whether such a Ukrainian investigation exists. See Footnote
#7 for additional information.
3. I do not know why the President associates these servers with Ukraine.
(See, for example, his comments to Fox News on 20 July: “And Ukraine. Take a
look at Ukraine. How come the FBI didn’t take this server? Podesta told them
to get out. He said, get out. So, how come the FBI didn’t take the server
from the DNC?”)
4. In a report published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting
Project (OCCRP) on 22 July, two associates of Mr. Giuliani reportedly
traveled to Kyiv in May 2019, and met with Mr. Bakanov and another close
Zelenskyy adviser, Mr. Serhiy Shefir.
5. Mr. Sytnyk and Mr. Leshchenko are two of Mr. Lutsenko’s main domestic
rivals. Mr. Lutsenko has no legal training and has been widely criticized in
Ukraine for politicizing criminal probes and using his tenure as Prosecutor
General to protect corrupt Ukrainian officials. He has publicly feuded with
Mr. Sytnyk, who heads Ukraine’s only competent anticorruption body, and with
Mr. Leshchenko, a former investigative journalist who has repeatedly
criticized Mr. Lutsenko’s record. In December 2018, a Ukrainian court upheld
a complaint by a Member of Parliament, Mr. Boryslav Rozenblat, who alleged
that Mr. Sytnyk and Mr. Leshchenko had “interfered” in the 2016 U.S.
election by publicizing a document detailing corrupt payments made by former
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych before his ouster in 2014. Mr.
Rozenblat had originally filed the motion in late 2017 after attempting to
flee Ukraine amid an investigation into his taking of a large bribe. On 16
July 2019, Mr. Leshchenko publicly stated that a Ukrainian court had
overturned the lower court’s decision.
6. Mr. Lutsenko later told Ukrainian news outlet The Babel on 17 April that
Ambassador Yovanovitch had never provided such a list, and that he was, in
fact, the one who requested such a list.
7. Mr. Lutsenko later told Bloomberg on 16 May that former Vice President
Biden and his son were not subject to any current Ukrainian investigations,
and that he had no evidence against them. Other senior Ukrainian officials
also contested his original allegations; one former senior Ukrainian
prosecutor told Bloomberg on 7 May that Mr. Shokin in fact was not
investigating Burisma at the time of his removal in 2016.
8. See, for example, Mr. Lutsenko’s comments to The Hill on 1 and 7 April
and his interview with The Babel on 17 April, in which he stated that he had
spoken with Mr. Giuliani about arranging contact with Attorney General Barr.
9. In May, Attorney General Barr announced that he was initiating a probe
into the origins” of the Russia investigation. According to the
above-referenced OCCRP report (22 July), two associates of Mr. Giuliani
claimed to be working with Ukrainian officials to uncover information that
would become part of this inquiry. In an interview with Fox News on 8 August,
Mr. Giuliani claimed that Mr. John Durham, whom Attorney General Barr
designated to lead this probe, was “spending a lot of time in Europe”
because he was “investigating Ukraine.” I do not know the extent to which,
if at all, Mr. Giuliani is directly coordinating his efforts on Ukraine with
Attorney General Barr or Mr. Durham.
10. See, for example, the above-referenced articles in Bloomberg (16 May) and
OCCRP (22 July).
11. I do not know whether these associates of Mr. Giuliani were the same
individuals named in the 22 July report by OCCRP, referenced above.
12. See, for example, Mr. Giuliani’s appearance on Fox News on 6 April and
his tweets on 23 April and 10 May. In his interview with The New York Times,
Mr. Giuliani stated that the President “basically knows what I’m doing,
sure, as his lawyer.” Mr. Giuliani also stated: “We’re not meddling in an
election, we’re meddling in an investigation, which we have a right to do…
There’s nothing illegal about it… Somebody could say it’s improper. And
this isn’t foreign policy – I’m asking them to do an investigation that
they’re doing already and that other people are telling them to stop. And I’
m going to give them reasons why they shouldn’t stop it because that
information will be very, very helpful to my client, and may turn out to be
helpful to my government.”
第八、九页部分：（含涂黑修改）
https://i.imgur.com/CtQddAg.png https://i.imgur.com/1QFx1QZ.png
※每日每人发文、上限量为十篇，超过会劣文请注意
⊕标题选用"新闻"，请确切在标题与新闻来源处填入，否则可无条件移除(本行可移除)