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kwei (光影)
2019-05-17 21:20:08America Isn’t as Powerful as It Thinks It Is
美国非它自认为的强大
原文：Foreign policy
https://tinyurl.com/y2z5s45b
译文：观察者网
https://www.guancha.cn/StephenMWalt/2019_05_17_501954.shtml
STEPHEN M. WALT
斯蒂芬‧沃尔特
哈佛国际关系学教授
Just how powerful is the United States? Is it still the unipolar power, able
to impose its will on adversaries, allies, and neutrals, and force them—
however reluctantly—to go along with policies they think are foolish,
dangerous, or simply contrary to their interests? Or are there clear and
significant limits to U.S. power, suggesting that it should be more selective
and strategic in setting goals and pursuing them?
美国到底有多强大？它是否仍然是一个有能力将其意志强加给对手、盟友和中立国，并迫
使他们无论多么不情愿都必须去执行那些尽管他们认为是愚蠢、危险或与他们自身的利益
完全相悖的政策的单极力量？还是说，美国的实力其实已经受到了明确而严重的限制，以
至于美国在设定和实现自己的目标时将变得更具选择性和战略性呢？
The Trump administration has embraced the first position, especially since
John Bolton became White House national security advisor and Mike Pompeo took
over as secretary of state. Whatever President Donald Trump’s initial
instincts may have been, their arrival marked a return to the unilateralist,
take-no-prisoners approach to foreign policy that characterized George W. Bush
’s first term as president, when Vice President Dick Cheney and the
neoconservatives held sway. A key feature of that earlier period was the
assumption that the United States was so powerful that it could go it alone
on many issues and that other states could be cowed into submission by
demonstrations of U.S. power and resolve. As a senior advisor to Bush
(reportedly Karl Rove) told the journalist Ron Suskind: “We’re an empire
now, and when we act, we create our own reality.” Compromises and
coalition-building were for wimps and appeasers; as Cheney himself reportedly
said in 2003: “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.”
川普政府接受了前一种说法，尤其是在约翰‧博尔顿（John Bolton）成为白宫国家安全
事务助理以及迈克‧蓬佩奥（Mike Pompeo）接任国务卿之后。无论川普总统最初的本意
是什么，他们的到来都标志着美国外交政策向乔治‧w‧布什第一个总统任期时的单边主
义、不妥协的外交政策回归，当时掌权的是副总统迪克‧钱尼（Dick Cheney）和新保守
主义者。那个时期的一个重要特征是，人们认为美国非常强大，美国可以在许多问题上按
照自己的意愿去行事，而其他国家都会被美国所展示的力量和决心所压倒。布什的高级顾
问（据报导是卡尔‧罗夫）就曾告诉一位名叫罗恩‧苏斯金德的记者：“我们是一个帝国
，当我们行动时，我们创造了我们自己的现实”。妥协和联盟建设是懦弱者和绥靖者的事
，正如钱尼2003年在报导中所说的那样：“我们不会与邪恶的一方谈判，我们将击败他们
”。
The Bush-Cheney approach produced a string of failures, but the same
unilateral arrogance lives on in the Trump administration. It is evident in
Trump’s decision to threaten (or in some cases, to actually begin) trade
wars not just with China but with many of America’s economic partners. It
was part and parcel of the impulsive decisions to abandon the Trans-Pacific
Partnership and leave the Paris climate accord. It is the basis of the
administration’s “take it or leave it” approach to diplomacy with North
Korea and Iran, wherein Washington announces unrealistic demands and then
ratchets up sanctions in the hope that the targets will capitulate and give
the United States everything it wants, even though this approach to both
countries has repeatedly failed in the past. It is even more obvious in the
recent decision to impose secondary sanctions on states that are still buying
Iranian oil, a move that threatens to drive up oil prices and damage U.S.
relations with China, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and others. It is
almost certainly true of the so-called peace plan that nepotist-in-chief
Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor, keeps promising to
reveal, a proposal likely to make Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
Republican donor Sheldon Adelson, and other fans of the concept of Greater
Israel happy but won’t advance the cause of peace in the slightest. A
similar faith in America’s vast ability to control outcomes can also be seen
in the premature recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president of
Venezuela and the strident U.S. demands that “Maduro must go.” However
desirable that outcome would be, it would be nice if we had some idea how to
bring it about.
布什和钱尼的做法导致美国遭遇了一系列失败，然而川普政府仍然延续著同样的单边傲慢
心态。这种傲慢明显地体现在川普对中国以及中国以外的许多美国经济伙伴做出的贸易战
威胁的决定中。放弃跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP）并退出巴黎气候协定都是这种冲动决
定的结果。这种单边傲慢心理是美国政府对朝鲜和伊朗实施“要么接受要么挨揍”外交政
策的基础。在这种外交政策下，华盛顿对这两个国家提出一些不切实际的要求，然后加大
制裁力度，希望这两个国家能够投降，给美国一切想要的东西。然而这种对待这两个国家
的做法在过去屡遭失败。这种单边傲慢心态在美国最近的一项对仍在购买伊朗石油的国家
实施制裁的决定中体现得更加明显，这一举动可能导致油价上涨，并损害美国与中国、印
度、土耳其、日本和韩国等国家之间的关系。几乎可以肯定的是，川普的女婿兼高级顾问
贾里德‧库什纳一直承诺要披露的所谓和平计画提议，也许会让以色列总理内塔尼亚胡、
共和党捐款人谢尔顿‧阿德尔森和其他“大以色列”概念的支持者们感到高兴，但是却不
会对推动和平事业的发展有丝毫用处。从美国政府对胡安‧瓜伊多（Juan Guaid）作为委
内瑞拉临时总统的过早承认以及“马杜罗必须下台”的咄咄逼人的强硬要求中，我们也可
以看到美国对自己具有控制结果的强大力量充满了信心。
The underlying assumption behind all of these policies is that U.S. pressure—
you know, what Pompeo likes to call “swagger”—will eventually force
acknowledged adversaries to do whatever it is the United States demands of
them, and that other states won’t find ways to evade, obstruct, divert,
dilute, hedge, hinder, or otherwise negate what Washington is trying to do.
It assumes we are still dwelling in the unipolar moment and that all that
matters is the will to use the power at America’s disposal.
所有这些政策背后的基本假设都是：在美国的压力下，其对手将被迫去做美国要求它做的
任何事情，而且其他国家将无法找到任何办法逃避、阻挠、妨碍、转移、稀释、对冲或以
其他方式否定华盛顿正在做的事情。它假定我们仍然生活在单极时代，按照美国的意愿来
使用权力是这个世界上唯一重要的事情。
Perhaps most important, this approach denies that there are any real
trade-offs between any of these objectives. If the United States is really
all-powerful, then sanctioning China over oil purchases from Iran won’t have
any impact on the trade talks that are now underway with Beijing, and Turkey
won’t respond to the same pressure by moving closer to Russia. It further
assumes that America’s NATO allies are so desperate to keep the U.S.
military in Europe that they will accept repeated humiliations and follow the
U.S. lead against China, despite the growing evidence that this is not the
case. It sees no downsides to going all-in with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
and the Gulf, and it sees little risk should relations with Iran or others
escalate to war.
也许最重要的一点在于，美国的这种心态否认有任何真正意义上的交易存在。如果美国果
真是全能的，那么在伊朗购买石油问题上制裁中国将不会对目前正在与北京进行的贸易谈
判产生任何影响，而且土耳其也不会采用与俄罗斯走得更近的方式来回应美国在同样问题
上的压力。持有上述心态的美国人还认为，美国的北约盟友是如此迫切地希望美国军队留
在欧洲，以至于他们愿意接受美国再三的羞辱，并跟随美国的脚步去对抗中国（尽管越来
越多的证据表明，实际情况并非如此）。他们不认为把宝压在埃及、以色列、沙特阿拉伯
和海湾地区身上会有什么坏处，也不认为与伊朗或其他国家的关系升级为战争会带来什么
风险。
To be fair, it is not hard to understand why hawks think they can get away
with this approach to foreign policy, at least in the short term. Despite
many recent missteps, the United States is still very powerful. Its active
assistance is still something that some other states want, and its “focused
enmity” is something no state can completely ignore. The United States is
still a vast and valuable market, the dollar remains the world’s main
reserve currency, and the ability to cut other states or financial
institutions off from the infrastructure of global finance gives Washington
unusual leverage. Many U.S. allies are accustomed to deferring to Washington
and are understandably reluctant to do anything that might encourage the
United States to withdraw support. Trump and company can also count on the
support of authoritarian soul mates in the European right (including the
present rulers in Poland and Hungary), as well as America’s morally
compromised allies in the Middle East. Plus, most Americans don’t care all
that much about foreign policy and are usually willing to go along with
whatever the executive branch is doing, provided that it doesn’t prove too
costly or embarrassing.
说实话，其实也不难理解为什么美国鹰派人士会认为他们可以用这种方式来处理外交政策
。因为尽管美国最近有许多失误，但美国仍然是非常强大的。它的积极援助仍然是其他一
些国家所需要的，它的“敌意”也是任何国家都不能完全忽视的。美国仍然是一个巨大而
有价值的市场，美元仍然是世界上主要的储备货币，美国切断其他国家或金融机构与全球
金融基础设施之间的联系的能力，赋予了美国非同寻常的影响力。许多美国盟友习惯于顺
从华盛顿，不愿做任何可能导致美国不再对其给予支持的事情，这些都是可以理解的。川
普和他的同路人还可以依靠欧洲右翼威权主义灵魂伴侣（包括波兰和匈牙利的现任统治者
）以及美国在中东的盟友的支持。大多数美国人对外交政策并不那么在意，他们通常愿意
接受行政部门正在做的任何事情，只要能证明这样做的代价不会太高或者不会显得太愚蠢
。
Nonetheless, there are even more potent reasons why this bullying approach
has produced no major foreign-policy successes so far and is unlikely to
yield significant success in the future. First of all, even much weaker
states are loath to succumb to blackmail, for one very good reason: Once you’
ve shown you can be coerced, there may be no end to subsequent demands.
Moreover, when the United States insists on complete capitulation (i.e., by
calling for total North Korean disarmament or regime change in Iran), it
gives the target state zero incentive to comply. And given Trump’s amply
demonstrated dishonesty and fickle approach to diplomacy, why would any
foreign leader believe any assurances he (or Pompeo) might give? Put all this
together, and you have a perfect recipe for “no deal.”
尽管如此，还有更为有力的理由能够解释为何这种具有威胁意味的外交手段迄今为止并没
有取得重大成功，而且也不太可能在未来取得成功。首先，即使是实力非常弱小的国家，
也不愿在威胁面前屈服。原因在于，一旦你表现出愿意在威胁下屈服的迹象，接下来的要
求可能就没有止境了。此外，当美国坚持一个国家应该彻底投降时，比如美国呼吁朝鲜全
面解除武装或者要求伊朗政权更迭时，这些国家实际上完全没有任何服从的动力。此外，
鉴于川普在外交上的不诚信和反复无常，外国领导人为何还要相信他（或蓬佩奥）可能给
出的任何保证呢？
Second, bullying nearly everyone makes it much harder construct powerful
coalitions whose support can enhance America’s diplomatic leverage. This
problem is perhaps most apparent in the administration’s haphazard approach
to economic diplomacy with China. By leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership
and picking trade fights with other key partners, the administration missed
an opportunity to organize a broad coalition of industrial powers united by a
desire to get China to reform its own economic practices. Trump’s trade team
may still get some sort of deal with Beijing, but it won’t be as good as
what they could have achieved with a more sophisticated and cooperative
effort.
其次，美国对几乎所有国家都进行威胁，这使美国建立强大的联盟变得更加困难，而来自
这些联盟的支持能够增强美国的外交影响力。这一问题在美国政府对华经济外交的随意性
中可能体现得最为明显。由于退出《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》，并针对其他主要伙伴挑起
贸易争端，美国政府错过了建立一个由工业大国组成的广泛联盟以迫使中国对自身经济进
行改革的机会。
Much the same lesson applies to Iran. The Trump administration deliberately
set out to kill the Iran nuclear deal, and it did it in plain sight. It is so
focused on this goal that it is even willing to punish the other signatories
in a vain attempt to get Iran to say uncle. Tehran has continued to abide by
the terms of the agreement despite Washington’s reneging on the deal, but
its patience is probably not infinite, especially when the administration has
made it clear that regime change is its real objective. Should Iran
eventually restart its nuclear weapons program—which has been in abeyance
for more than a decade—the rest of the world is not going to suddenly line
up behind the United States and support more forceful action. Why? Because
everyone knows that it was the United States—not Iran—that killed the deal,
and there won’t be a ton of sympathy for America when it starts bleating
about Iran’s response. America’s Middle East clients will no doubt be happy
if Washington decides to fight another war on their behalf, but don’t count
on a lot of help from them or from anyone else.
同样的教训也来自伊朗。川普政府有意扼杀伊朗核协议，这是显而易见的。它如此专注于
这一目标，以至于它甚至愿意惩罚其他签署国，徒劳地试图让伊朗屈服。尽管华盛顿背弃
了协议，但德黑兰仍在继续遵守协议的条款，但它的耐心不是无限的，尤其是当美国政府
明确表示政权更迭才是美国的真正目的的时候。如果伊朗最终重新启动这个已经搁置了十
多年的核武器计画，世界上其他国家将不会突然站到美国一边并支持其采取更有力的行动
。原因何在呢？因为每个国家都知道是美国而不是伊朗扼杀了这项协议，所以当美国开始
指责伊朗的反应时，也不会有很多国家对美国表示同情。对于美国的中东客户而言，如果
华盛顿决定代表他们再打一场战争，他们无疑会感到非常高兴，但不要指望他们或其他任
何国家会为此提供太多帮助。
Third, other states don’t like being beholden to the whims of others, and
especially when others behave selfishly, erratically, and with ill-disguised
contempt for others’ interests. Not surprisingly, therefore, other states
are starting to develop workarounds designed to limit U.S. leverage, most
notably by designing financial arrangements outside the network of
institutions that Washington has been using to coerce allies and adversaries
into compliance. As Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman recently wrote in FP, “
instead of leading states and businesses to minimize contact with the targets
of U.S. sanctions,” the Trump administration’s strong-arm tactics “may
lead states and businesses to minimize their contact with the U.S.-led global
financial system and to start to construct their own workarounds. Over time,
those workarounds might even begin to accumulate into an effective
alternative system.”
第三，所有的国家都不愿意接受他国的摆布，尤其是当这个试图摆布别国的国家表现得自
私、反复无常，并且毫不掩饰地蔑视他国利益的时候。因此，其他国家开始制定旨在限制
美国影响力的变通方案也就不足为奇了，他们会在华盛顿一直用来迫使盟国和对手们屈服
的金融机构网络之外设计全新的金融安排。正如亨利‧法雷尔（Henry Farrell）和亚伯
拉罕‧纽曼（Abraham Newman）最近在《外交政策》杂志中所提到的：“川普政府的强硬
策略可能并不会导致各个国家和企业与美国制裁目标国家接触的减少，反而可能导致各个
国家和企业尽量减少与美国领导的全球金融体系的接触，并逐渐推出他们自己的解决方案
。随着时间的推移，这些变通方法甚至可能开始形成一个有效的替代体系”。
Lastly, being a bully encourages adversaries to join forces out of their own
self-interest, while giving potential allies more reason to keep their
distance. It is no accident that Russia and China continue to move closer
together—even though they are not natural allies, and a smarter U.S.
approach could give Moscow reasons to distance itself from Beijing—and
America’s same bullying impulses are going to push states like Iran even
closer to them. Bolton and those of his ilk will probably come up with some
trite new moniker for this group—“Axis of Evil” and “Troika of Tyranny”
are taken, so perhaps “Triad of Troublemakers” or “Coalition of Chaos”—
ignoring the fact that their own policies have helped push these powers
together.
最后，恃强凌弱的手段只会刺激对手出于自身利益的考量而联合起来，同时也给潜在盟友
更多的理由与其保持距离。俄罗斯和中国持续走近绝非偶然。中俄两国本来并非天然的盟
友，如果美国采取更明智的做法，也许会让莫斯科有理由与北京保持距离。但如果美国采
取同样的具有威胁性的冲动做法，它将会把像伊朗这样的国家也推向中俄两国。博尔顿和
他的同僚们可能会给这个前述组织起一些比如“邪恶轴心”和“暴政三驾马车”之类的老
套的绰号，因此，或许“麻烦制造者三人组”或“混乱联盟”忽略了一个事实，是他们自
己的政策帮助推动了这些力量的结合。
What we are witnessing, therefore, is a real-world test of two competing
visions of contemporary geopolitics. One version sees U.S. power as
essentially undiminished and believes that a combination of material
capabilities, favorable geography, and entrenched institutional capabilities
will allow it to pursue an ambitious and revisionist foreign policy at little
cost and with a high probability of success. The second version—to which I
subscribe—sees the United States as very powerful and in a privileged
position (for various reasons) but also believes there are limits to U.S.
power and that it is necessary to set priorities, minimize trade-offs when
possible, and collaborate with others on many issues. It also assumes that
others cannot be browbeaten into abject capitulation and that effective and
durable international agreements require a degree of mutual compromise, even
with adversaries.
因此，我们正在目睹的是对当代地缘政治下两种相互竞争的观点的现实考验。其中一种观
点认为，美国的实力基本上没有减弱，并相信美国的物质能力、有利的地理位置和牢固的
制度能力的结合，将使它能够以很小的代价和很高的成功几率推行其野心勃勃的修正主义
外交政策。第二种（同时也是我赞同的）观点认为，美国是非常强大的，出于多种原因，
美国处于特权地位；但该观点也认为，美国的权力是有限的，美国必须设定待解决事项的
优先次序，并在许多问题上与其他国家合作。这种观点还强调，其他国家不可能因受到胁
迫就卑躬屈膝，有效和持久的国际协议需要一定程度的相互妥协，即便与敌对国家之间也
是如此。
The United States tested Version #1 from 2001 to 2004, and the results were a
near-total failure. I realize that trying to replicate past results is
important to scientific progress, but does America really need to repeat this
particular experiment again?
美国从2001年到2004年测试了第一种观点，结果几乎是完全失败。我知道，努力复制过去
的结果对于科学进步来说十分重要，但美国真地需要再次重复这个特别的实验吗？