感谢你贴了全文，
现在我把这篇文所谓的 "证据" 贴出来 ..
中文部份我直接整段贴 Google 让他翻译，未校正，仅供参考。
Facebook dominates Taiwan’s internet and social media landscape—about 19
million out of the island’s 23.5 million people have a Facebook account. Han
Kuo-yu’s official Facebook account was successful, racking up half a million
followers at the end of the campaign—double that of his DPP opponent, Chen.
But another group played a critical role in the campaign. A Facebook group
named “Han Kuo-yu Fans For Victory! Holding up a Blue Sky!” was created on
April 10, 2018, just one day after Han declared his candidacy for the
Kaohsiung mayoral race. At the time he was little more than an obscure
footnote in Taiwan’s politics; only a few dozen supporters showed up at his
first rally.
Facebook在台湾的互联网和社交媒体领域占主导地位 - 台湾2300万人中有大约1900万人
拥有Facebook账号。 韩国宇的官方Facebook账号获得成功，在竞选活动结束时吸引了50
万粉丝 - 这是他的DPP对手陈的两倍。
但是另一个团体在竞选中发挥了关键作用。 Facebook组织名为“韩国宇的粉丝为胜利！
举起一片蓝天！“创立于2018年4月10日，就在韩寒宣布参加高雄市长竞选活动的一天之
后。 那时他只不过是台湾政治中一个不起眼的脚注; 只有几十名支持者出现在他的第一
次集会上。
As the campaign gained momentum, the group soon grew to become the largest
unofficial community page for Han’s die-hard fans on Facebook, with a total
of more than 61,000 members by the election in November. (It currently has
88,000 members.) Users promoted Han through posting talking points, memes,
and very often fake news attacking Han’s opponent Chen, the DPP government,
and anyone who said a bad word about Han.
Thousands of such posts were shared through the group during the campaign,
making it a hub for Han supporters to create, disseminate, and amplify
weaponized information in their respective corner of social media, messaging
apps, friend circles, or the family dinner table. Fake news originating from
this group often made its way to Line, a WhatsApp-alike messaging app used by
most digitally connected Taiwanese.
随着竞选活动的蓬勃发展，该集团很快成长为Facebook上汉族顽固粉丝最大的非官方社区
页面，11月份的选举总数超过61,000名。 （它目前有88,000名成员。）用户通过发布谈
话点，模因以及经常假冒新闻攻击韩的对手陈，民进党政府以及任何对汉说不好的人来推
广韩。
在活动期间，通过该小组共享了数千个这样的帖子，使其成为汉族支持者在社交媒体，消
息应用程序，朋友圈或家庭餐桌的各个角落创建，传播和放大武器化信息的中心。 来自
这个群体的假新闻经常走向Line，这是一个类似WhatsApp的消息应用程序，大多数数字连
接的台湾人都使用它。
Their menacing effects did not go unnoticed by the DPP’s Chen, whose
campaign held a press conference denouncing and threatening to sue a few
specific users of the group for spreading obviously fake news. One
particularly prolific user, Chen’s campaign alleged, could be traced back to
an “overseas IP address.” A close aide to Chen confirmed to me, however,
that their campaign did not attempt to track down who created the unofficial
fan group in the first place.
As it turned out, the group was not spontaneously created by Han’s fans. It
was created, managed, and nurtured by what looks very much like a
professional cybergroup from China.
他们的威胁影响并没有被民进党陈水扁忽视，他们的竞选活动举行了新闻发布会，谴责并
威胁要起诉该组织的一些特定用户传播明显假新闻。 陈的活动据称，其中一位特别多产
的用户可以追溯到“海外知识产权地址”。然而，陈的一位亲密助手向我证实，他们的竞
选活动没有试图追查谁在第一次创建非官方粉丝团体 地点。
事实证明，这个小组并非由韩的粉丝自发创造。 它是由一个看起来非常像中国的专业网
络群体创建，管理和培育的。
The group page listed six administrators in November 2018. Two of them, under
the usernames “Fang Jianzhu” and “Yun Chi,” are listed as having joined
the group on April 10, 2018, when it was first launched by Fang. Another
admin, “Chen Geng,” joined on April 18, while all the others joined many
months later. Fang, Yun, and Chen apparently had the foresight to create a
fan group for Han months before he became a viral hit.
Except that wasn’t a coincidence. I identified three profiles on the
professional networking site LinkedIn that corresponded to the same Chinese
names as Fang’s, Yun’s, and Chen’s.
该组页面在2018年11月列出了六名管理员。其中两个用户名“方剑柱”和“云池”，于
2018年4月10日由方先生首次推出时被列为加入该组。 另一名管理员“陈庚”于4月18日
加入，而所有其他人在几个月后加入。 Fang，Yun和Chen显然有先见之明，在他成为病毒
之前为韩建立了一个粉丝团。
除了这不是巧合。 我在专业网站LinkedIn上发现了三个与Fang，Yun和Chen相同的中文名
字的个人资料。
All three LinkedIn profiles identified themselves as employees of Tencent—
China’s giant technology and social media company, which owns the world’s
largest messaging app, WeChat, and which cooperates closely with the Chinese
government in enforcing censorship and mass surveillance. The three also all
claim to be graduates of China’s Peking University, and two of them describe
themselves as having “worked in public relations for many foreign companies.
”
所有三个LinkedIn个人资料都认为自己是腾讯中国巨型技术和社交媒体公司的员工，该公
司拥有全球最大的消息应用程序微信，并与中国政府密切合作，实施审查和大规模监控。
这三人都声称自己是中国北京大学的毕业生，其中两人称他们“为许多外国公司从事公
共关系工作”。
Of course, there’s no evidence other than their own claim that the creators
of these profiles actually worked for Tencent. But a search for this very
specific Chinese phrase “worked in public relations for many foreign
companies” (在多家外企做过公关) yielded a further 249 search results on
LinkedIn—every single one sharing identical characteristics, including
mugshot-style photos cropped from decades-old graduation pictures and claims
of being Tencent employees and Peking University graduates. This particular
search phrase ceased to work on LinkedIn in late May, but many of the
profiles are still searchable through Google.
The profiles have some tell-tale signs of being fakes. Several of them use
the same photo, but a different name, and most have few and sometimes no
LinkedIn connections at all. And all of them use simplified Chinese
characters, instead of the traditional Chinese used in Taiwan.
当然，除了他们自己声称这些配置文件的创建者实际上为腾讯工作之外，没有其他证据。
但是，搜索这个非常具体的中文短语“在许多外国公司的公共关系中工作”（在多家外
企做过公关）在LinkedIn上产生了另外249个搜索结果 - 每一个都有相同的特征，包括拍
摄的照片风格的照片 从几十年前的毕业照片和声称成为腾讯员工和北京大学毕业生。 这
个特定的搜索短语在5月底停止在LinkedIn上运行，但许多配置文件仍可通过Google搜索
到。
这些简介有一些假货的迹象。 他们中的一些人使用相同的照片，但名称不同，大多数人
都很少，有时根本没有LinkedIn连接。 所有这些都使用简体中文字符，而不是台湾使用
的繁体中文。
I first discovered the connection in December 2018 and have been observing
their activities since then. All three Facebook profiles in question appear
to have gone dormant and haven’t posted anything since Nov. 24, 2018. The
fan group page on Facebook has taken on a life of its own since the election—
now, it seems to be managed by a handful of other active administrators with
uncertain connection with Fang, Yun, and Chen.
It’s unclear how the Facebook group went from a handful of members to its
current numbers. Part of it was undoubtedly Han’s own charisma driving
interest in his campaign. But it’s also likely that the administrators paid
to promote the group on Facebook, where Chinese state media has also brought
itself a considerable presence.
我在2018年12月首次发现了这种联系，并从此开始观察他们的活动。 自2018年11月24日
以来，所有三个Facebook个人资料似乎已经处于休眠状态并且没有发布任何内容。自选举
以来，Facebook上的粉丝群页面已经过了自己的生活 - 现在，它似乎是由 少数其他与
Fang，Yun和Chen有不确定关系的活跃管理员。
目前还不清楚Facebook集团如何从少数成员转向目前的数据。 其中一部分无疑是汉族自
己的魅力推动了他的竞选活动。 但也有可能是管理员付钱在Facebook上推广这个群体，
而中国的官方媒体也为自己带来了相当大的影响力。
Multiple social media and national security experts have privately examined
this finding and were dumbfounded that a professional cybergroup potentially
organized by the Chinese state would have left such relatively obvious
traces. But they were all in agreement that the three Facebook users and 249
profiles on LinkedIn are unmistakably linked.
The cybergroup’s use of simplified Chinese and the way in which the profiles
were set up provide critical clues to their origin, according to an expert
surnamed Chu, the executive director of a major social media marketing
company in Taiwan, who wishes to remain anonymous. Chu said that LinkedIn has
a very limited presence and user base in Taiwan, and the group’s extensive
presence there suggests they are unlikely to be Taiwanese. Citing his
knowledge of the industry, Chu said he does not know of any social media
marketing firm in Taiwan—even those he knew that were hired by the KMT, that
would have operated this same way this particular group did.
多家社交媒体和国家安全专家私下审查了这一发现，并且愚蠢地认为，中国政府可能组织
的专业小组会留下这种相对明显的痕迹。但他们都同意这三个Facebook用户和LinkedIn上
的249个个人资料是明确无误的。
据台湾一家大型社交媒体营销公司的执行董事Chu表示，该网站集团对简体中文的使用以
及简介的设置方式为其起源提供了重要线索，他希望保持匿名。 Chu表示，LinkedIn在台
湾的存在和用户群非常有限，该集团在那里的广泛存在表明他们不太可能是台湾人。朱先
生引用他对这个行业的了解，他说他不知道台湾的任何一家社交媒体营销公司 - 即使是
他所知道的那些被国民党雇佣的公司，也就是这个特定组织的运作方式。
LinkedIn is known to be one of Beijing’s favorite playgrounds for conducting
espionage and influence operations. Both U.S. and German intelligence
agencies have documented numerous cases of suspected Chinese spies exploiting
the networking site for intelligence purposes. Their favorite technique is to
create mass fake accounts and identities—sometimes hundreds if not thousands
of them—and use them to approach and recruit unsuspecting targets (often
Western nationals) who would then leak secrets or become assets for Chinese
intelligence handlers in the real world.
众所周知，LinkedIn是北京最受欢迎的从事间谍活动和影响行动的游乐场之一。 美国和
德国情报机构都记录了许多涉嫌中国间谍利用网络网站进行情报的案件。 他们最喜欢的
技术是创造大量假账户和身份 - 有时数百甚至数千 - 并用它们来接近和招募毫无戒心的
目标（通常是西方国民），然后泄露秘密或成为现实世界中的中国情报处理者的资产。
Ying-Yu Lin, an assistant professor at Taiwan’s National Chung Cheng
University and an expert on the Chinese military, believes the cybergroup can
be traced back to the Strategic Support Force (SSF) of China’s army.Ying-Yu
Lin, an assistant professor at Taiwan’s National Chung Cheng University and
an expert on the Chinese military, believes the cybergroup can be traced back
to the Strategic Support Force (SSF) of China’s army. The SSF was created in
December 2015 as part of a massive military reorganization initiated by
Chinese President Xi Jinping, and it was made into an independent branch of
the Chinese military that is now charged with conducting a wide range of
operations including space, cyber, and electronic warfare. Citing a report by
the U.S. cybersecurity firm FireEye last year, Lin said that Chinese
cyberespionage activities heated up in late 2018, as a number of major
Chinese hacker groups were observed to have returned to active duty after a
few years of being dormant during the army’s reorganization.
台湾国立中正大学助理教授，中国军队专家林英玉认为，这一小团体可以追溯到中国军队
的战略支持部队（SSF）.Ying-Yu Lin，助理教授台湾国立中正大学和中国军方专家认为
，小团体可以追溯到中国军队的战略支援部队（SSF）。 SSF成立于2015年12月，是中国
国家主席习近平发起的大规模军事重组的一部分，并成为中国军队的一个独立分支，现在
负责进行广泛的行动，包括太空，网络和电子战。 Lin引用美国网络安全公司FireEye去
年的一份报告称，中国的网络间谍活动在2018年末升温，因为中国的一些主要黑客组织在
军队休眠几年后被视为已经恢复现役。重组。
If Lin is correct, this would be the first confirmed case of China’s new
cyberforce attempting to influence foreign elections. U.S. experts on the
Chinese military previously warned that the reorganized SSF could become
Beijing’s favorite tool to unleash a new generation of informational and
psychological warfare against foreign adversaries, learning from Russia’s
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
But another expert has a different assessment. A psychological operations
officer serving with the Political Warfare Bureau under Taiwan’s Ministry of
National Defense who uses the pen name “Lieutenant Ho” believes this
particular cybergroup was likely a private team contracted through a Chinese
company rather than being a dedicated military or intelligence unit in itself
—albeit with the Chinese government ultimately pulling the strings.
如果林是正确的话，这将是中国新的网络力量试图影响外国选举的第一个确认案例。 美
国驻华军事专家此前曾警告称，重组后的苏格兰皇家军队可能成为北京最热门的工具，可
以对抗外国对手发动新一代信息和心理战，学习俄罗斯对2016年美国总统大选的干涉。
但另一位专家有不同的评估。 一名心理操作官员在台湾国防部的政治战局工作，使用笔
名“何昊中尉”认为这个特殊的小团体可能是一个通过中国公司签约的私人团队，而不是
一个专门的军事或情报部门。 - 与中国政府最终拉开了联系。
“They put in little effort to clean up the digital traces after the job was
done; this could suggest whoever contracted them in the first place didn’t
give out such instructions, or maybe they never saw the need for doing so,”
Ho said. “This could explain why they used Tencent as a cover on LinkedIn,
because the name of a big Chinese company can allow them to fool people
elsewhere.”
This would not be the first time that Beijing has attempted to manipulate
Taiwanese social media, Ho said. Though he cannot reveal his full name due to
being in active service in Taiwan’s military, Ho has published articles in
Taiwan’s the News Lens criticizing the passiveness and ineffectiveness of
Taiwan’s defense against information and psychological warfare waged by
China.
“在工作完成后，他们付出了很少的努力来清理数字痕迹; 这可能表明，首先与他们签约
的人没有发出这样的指示，或者他们从未看到过这样做的必要性，“何说。 “这可以解
释为什么他们使用腾讯作为LinkedIn的封面，因为一家大型中国公司的名字可以让他们欺
骗别人。”
何说，这不是北京第一次试图操纵台湾的社交媒体。 何先生虽然因为在台湾军队的现役
而无法透露自己的全名，但却在台湾的新闻镜头上发表文章批评台湾防御中国发动的信息
和心理战的被动和无效。
Ho and his colleagues tracked down a number of Facebook pages and content
farms made to look like Taiwanese ones but that were assessed to be operated
by the Chinese Communist Party’s Publicity Department. These findings were
never disclosed to the public by Taiwan’s high leadership even after they
were duly reported within the system. Mysteriously, those Facebook pages soon
changed talking points and partisan stance and looked nothing like they did
before, Ho revealed in one article.
Ho和他的同事追踪了许多Facebook页面和内容农场，看起来像台湾人，但被评估为由中国
共产党的宣传部门运作。 这些调查结果从未被台湾高层领导向公众透露，即使在系统内
正式报告之后。 Ho在一篇文章中透露，神秘地说，那些Facebook页面很快改变了谈话要
点和党派立场，看起来没有像以前那样。
On Facebook and elsewhere, Han’s zealous followers are known to be extremely
aggressive toward his opponents and critics. For example, a DPP legislator’s
Facebook page was flooded with more than a million hate comments soon after
she made a scathing remark about Han. During the 2018 campaign, whenever DPP’
s Chen attempted to livestream on Facebook, as Han sometimes did, he was
bombarded with hundreds of hate comments. Allegations abound that a number of
Han’s fans were Chinese netizens or even Beijing’s paid trolls, but proving
systematic interference beyond finding some random Chinese users has been a
difficult task—until now.
But Lin, Ho, and other experts believe these are merely the tip of the
iceberg in China’s massive interference operations in Taiwan’s local
elections last year. They say there were many other groups, pages, content
farms, and platforms out there beyond Facebook that Beijing used to propel
Han to electoral success
There is no evidence Han himself colluded with this group or any other. But
he was certainly aware that his support online was somewhat mysterious. “I
don’t know who they are, but I thank them for the support,” was Han’s
standard response to the accusations that unknown digital forces possibly
originating in China were driving his campaign and popularity.
Han Kuo-yu is officially in the race for the KMT’s presidential primary for
2020 election, where his main competitor is Terry Gou, Taiwan’s richest man
and the owner of Foxconn, which manufactures iPhones in China for Apple. If
he is successful in gaining the nomination, he will face off against DPP
President Tsai Ing-wen in the general election next January. High-level U.S.
officials have already publicly warned that China will again interfere, even
specifically citing social media as a battleground. The question is: Will
Taiwan be able to do anything about it?
在Facebook和其他地方，韩的热心追随者被认为对他的对手和批评者极具攻击性。例如，
民进党立法者的Facebook页面在她对汉族发表严厉评论后不久就被淹没了超过一百万的仇
恨评论。在2018年的竞选活动期间，每当民进党的陈某试图在Facebook上直播时，正如韩
有时所做的那样，他遭到了数百次仇恨评论的轰炸。指控比比皆是，韩国的一些粉丝是中
国网民，甚至是北京的付费巨魔，但除了找到一些随机的中国用户之外，证明系统性干扰
一直是一项艰钜的任务 - 直到现在。
但林，何和其他专家认为，这些只是中国去年在台湾地方选举中大规模干预行动的冰山一
角。他们说除了Facebook之外还有许多其他的团体，网页，内容农场和平台，北京曾用它
来推动汉族的选举成功
没有证据证明韩本人与这个团体或任何其他团体勾结。但他当然知道他在网上的支持有点
神秘。 “我不知道他们是谁，但我感谢他们的支持，”韩寒对这些指控的标准回应是，
可能源于中国的未知数字力量正在推动他的竞选活动和受欢迎程度。
韩国宇正式参加国民党2020年总统选举的竞选，他的主要竞争对手是台湾首富郭台铭和富
士康的老板，富士康在中国为苹果生产iPhone。如果他成功获得提名，他将在明年1月的
大选中面对民进党总统蔡英文。美国高层官员已经公开警告中国将再次干涉，甚至特别引
用社交媒体作为战场。问题是：台湾能否对此采取任何行动？
==
结果文章里自己写一堆 "没有明确证据" ..
然后讲的好像一堆证据，很棒。
※ 引述《howiekuohr (哈维)》之铭言：
: Q: 数据跟假帐号是不是真的？
: A: 是
: Q: 作者484曾经加入DPP
: A: 是
: Q: 这是权威杂志吗？
: A: 是
: 换句话说数据跟五毛假帐号为真。
: 但是作者唯一的疑窦就是立场是公正性。
: 而此文也经过大杂志审核通过。
: 这哪叫假新闻？！
: 看中时高潮，是我们鬼岛天真的韩粉。
: 原文：
: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/26/chinese-cyber-operatives-boosted-taiwans-in
: surgent-candidate/
: 参考范琪婓说法：
: https://www.facebook.com/264112860604956/posts/934515970231305
: 我对中国网军入侵台湾选举的说法，一直非常保留。
: 许多新闻界好友，都私下承认，中国的态度对编辑方针有绝对影响力。很多人苦笑说，每天
: 报稿像是报到北京。我当时想，台湾媒体被收拢成这样，中国干嘛花力气去做假新闻?
: 更重要的是，证据。
: 不能因为民进党政府说了算，也不能因为美国政府说了算。凭直觉的，请你站再后面一点。
: 这个证据的提供非常困难，不但要专业，而且要资金。
: 美国为了俄罗斯是否意图影响美国选举，成立了一个特别检察官，花了三年的时间，写出了
: 一个报告，才确立了“俄罗斯确有介入美国选举的意图及作为"。根据特别检察官穆勒的说
: 法，川普团队因只是”被动“配合，但不是知情参与，白话文就是太笨被人利用，所以不算
: ”共谋"。(注1)
: 但这个报告到现在还是一大堆人不相信。穆勒还是得要到国会出席说明。
: 台湾没有特别检察官也没资源，证据从那来?
: 这是为什么今天看到“外交政策"此文差点高潮。虽然不像穆勒团队能找到马其顿的网军本
: 人，但至少花了力气去做调查，搭配天下杂志之前针对PTT的数据的分析，现在再讲”中国
: 网军介入台湾选举”的说法，可信度就高了很多。
: 我今天答应陪我老公去看“寄生上流”。反应会慢一点。
: 只节一段:
: 透过对“韩国瑜粉丝后援团必胜！撑起一片蓝天”的脸书群组的检视：
: ‘本调查的发现在发表前曾由多名社群媒体和国安专家私下检验过，许多专家都很惊讶看似
: 中国政府组织的专业网军集团竟然也会留下有点明显的蛛丝马迹，但专家们的看法都一致认
: 为，那三名韩粉群脸书管理员用户与领英上的249人网军集团，是有绝对的关联。’
: https://www.thenewslens.com/article/121405
: 注1 : https://pse.is/HUD98