美方对台的政策，一直都有“连贯性”，而且绝对不分执政党是哪一党当家作主！!
国内是很多人在装傻？还是真的不知道美方的一贯态度！
http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1193869
一九七八年五月，布里辛斯基前往北京与中国两位最高领导人—邓小平和华国锋会谈。
邓、华两人强调，中国不会对“和平解放台湾”做出承诺。
邓小平表示，“你们美国可以表达自身期盼”，
但要以什么方式、在什么时候解决台湾问题，是中国人自己的事情。
国务院总理华国锋则详细解释，
“如果我们承诺不以武力解放台湾，
美国却以军事装备协助武装台湾，这会产生什么后果？
…我认为，这就是在制造‘一个中国、一个台湾’，或者‘两个中国’。”
布里辛斯基随即发电报向卡特报告：
“华国锋所言似乎暗示…美国对美中关系正常化问题有两个选择，
一是持续军售台湾，但无法获得北京对于和平解决的承诺；
二是美方停止军售，换取北京许诺和平解决台湾问题。”
卡特看过电报后，在空白处标记这项结论。
国家安全会议的中国问题专家奥森柏格则视此为突破，
“华、邓两人的说法暗示性地透露，
北京了解、也接受美方将在美中关系正常化后，继续与台湾维持军售关系。”
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2018/04/17/2003691459/3
By May 1978, Brzezinski was in Beijing for talks with China’s top leaders,
Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) and Hua Guofeng (华国锋).
Deng and Hua stressed China would give
“no pledge of peaceful liberation of Taiwan.”
Deng conceded “your side can express its hopes”
but how and when China solves the Taiwan problem is the business
of the Chinese themselves.
Premier Hua separately spelled it out:
“If we undertake a commitment that China not liberate Taiwan by arms,
then on the other hand, the US side is helping and arming Taiwan with
its military equipment, what will be the result …
I think it is the creation of one China, one Taiwan or two Chinas.”
Brzezinski promptly cabled Carter that
“seemingly implicit in Hua’s remarks ...
is that we have a choice as to the formula for normalization,
either we can continue to supply arms to Taiwan after normalization without
obtaining a Chinese statement of peaceful intent,
or we can obtain the statement while terminating arms sales.”
As Carter read his advisor’s telegram,
he drew a line in the margin to highlight this conclusion.
Michel Oksenberg, a China specialist with the National Security Council,
noted a breakthrough.
“Hua and Teng’s [Deng’s] presentations tacitly revealed that
the Chinese understand and accept that we intend to sustain an arms sales
relationship with Taiwan after normalization.”
※ 引述《coober ()》之铭言：
: 原文在这里
: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5680/text
: 节录关于第四章节
: 法案有台湾防卫评估委员会的描述
: SEC. 4. TAIWAN DEFENSE ASSESSMENT COMMISSION.
: 台湾防卫评估委员会 (应该是这样翻吧)
: (a) Establishment.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
: this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a commission, to be known
: as the “Taiwan Defense Assessment Commission”, to conduct a comprehensive
: assessment of Taiwan’s defense establishment and provide recommendations to
: improve the efficiency, effectiveness, readiness, and resilience of Taiwan’s
: self-defense capability in the following areas:
: (a)在本法颁布之日起90天内 国防部长应设立一个叫"台湾防卫评估委员会"的委员会
: 全面评估台湾的防务建立并提出建议
: 在下列范围内 改善台湾防卫能力的效率 有效性 准备程度和应变能力
: (1) Strategic planning and resource management.
: 战略计画和资源管理
: (2) Personnel management and force development.
: 人员管理和力量发展
: (3) Joint operational planning and assessment.
: 联合作战计画和评估
: (4) Military readiness measurement and assessment.
: 军事准备程度和评估
: (5) Command, control, communications, and intelligence.
: 指挥 控制 通信和情报
: (6) Technology research and development.
: 科技发展与研发
: (7) Defense article procurement and logistics.
: 国防物品采购和后勤
: (b) Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the commission is
: established under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
: Taiwan’s Defense Minister and the congressional defense committees a report
: on the recommendations of the Commission under subsection (a).
: （a）条款成立后一年内 国防部长应向台湾国防部长和国会国防委员会(美方的)
: 提交一份关于委员会建议的报告