同一本杂志，过两天有人出来打脸了
http://tinyurl.com/nroa9c8
Two Myths About Taiwan’s DPP That Need to Be Laid to Rest
The DPP will not ruin cross-strait relations, and it isn’t manipulating
popular protests from behind the scenes.
In his piece “Time to Review US Policy on Taiwan?” Dennis V. Hickey makes
several important points about the future of the United States’ relationship
with Taiwan, and there is no doubt that those should be addressed seriously
to ensure continued stability in the Taiwan Strait. Unfortunately, the author
presents a picture of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
currently the favorite in the January 2016 elections, and Taiwan’s civil
society that is highly misinformed and which risks misleading the very
American officials who will be charged with formulating a coherent
U.S.-Taiwan strategy for the future.
Dennis V. Hickey的文章点出维持台湾海峡稳定是重点大家都同意，但关于DPP
和台湾公民社会部分严重误导。
To begin with, Hickey writes that while the DPP has sought to “‘rebrand”
itself as a “responsible” alternative to the Chinese Nationalist Party
(KMT), “U.S. defense planners cannot help but wonder if the DPP will seek to
entrap the U.S. in a cross-strait crisis in an effort to achieve its dreams
of independence from China.”
首先，Hickey说，虽然DPP自称是负责任的政党，但美国防卫计画制定者们却忍不住
猜想，DPP会为了追求从中国独立而将美国卷入海峡危机。
Hickey doesn’t seem to realize that the DPP under chairperson and
presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen is no longer the party that caused the
U.S. administration headaches when Chen Shui-bian was president. Not only did
it learn its lessons from the past, DPP officials are also well aware that
returning to the contentious practices of the past would cost it the
confidence and support that it has earned back over the years. Academics have
no problem assuming that Beijing learned its lessons from the 1995-96 Missile
Crisis and that it would not return to the path of belligerence, and yet they
seem incapable of acknowledging that the DPP—a party that, unlike its
counterpart in Beijing, must actually abide by democratic rules—can also
have learned from the past, a bias that often clouds judgment.
Additionally, the DPP has had close, sustained, and highly constructive
dialogue with U.S. officials based in Taipei, ensuring that the two sides are
on the same page on the important issues.
Hickey可能不了解，现在民进党已经是蔡英文而不是阿扁当家，而民进党高层们也认知到
再做些引起争议的动作，会把过去几年好不容易赢得的支持和信任花光光。美国学界
也认为北京从95-96飞弹危机中学到教训，不会再摆出不惜一战的狰狞面孔，但北京
似乎还无法了解，民进党也已经学到教训了，偏见总是遮蔽正确判断。
此外，民进党一直与美国在台官方单位有紧密、持续和高度建设性的对话。确保两方
在关键议题上保持一致。
Despite Hickey’s contention that she “has done little to assuage such fears
” and that her positions “on many of the most important issues of the day
remain opaque and unclear, especially her plans for handling relations with
Beijing,” Tsai has been rather clear on the point that her cross-strait
platform is based on maintaining the “status quo” under the current
constitutional framework (i.e., the Republic of China) and “accumulated
outcomes” (i.e., not undoing what has been achieved in cross-strait
rapprochement by previous administrations). In other words, Tsai promises
continuity under a policy that is strikingly similar to that of her
predecessor, President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT—so much so, in fact, that the
deep “green” elements within Taiwanese society have repeatedly accused her
of engineering a KMT-ization of her party. Two pro-independence parties were
established recently in reaction to that perceived shift toward the center.
尽管Hickey质疑蔡英文"抚平美方陷入海峡危机的疑虑"做的太少，以及"在许多重要议题
，尤其是处理与北京关系的计划，依旧模糊"。蔡英文的主张"在当今宪法架构下维持现状"
、"accumulated outcome"(不会撤除上一任政府签的任何海峡两岸协议)已经讲的
相当清楚。换句话说，蔡表明政策的延续性，与国民党的马英九相当近似，事实上深绿
一直在质疑民进党的国民党化，最近两个追求独立的政党先后成立，以回应民进党
往中间靠拢。
Moreover, Tsai has engaged in dialogue with her counterparts in China and has
actively sought to establish a workable modus vivendi for the two sides. The
only line that Ms. Tsai will not cross—and she has also been clear on that
point—is adherence to the “1992 consensus” and its attendant “one China”
framework. There is no secret plan to drag the U.S. into a war with China to
realize the dream of de jure independence, for in Tsai’s mind, Taiwan (or
the ROC) is already independent; her biggest task if and once she is elected
would be to revive a still-stagnant economy and modernize the social safety
net, among other issues.
Relations between Taiwan and China exist in the grey area between two
extremes, one of which (“unification”) is unacceptable to the Taiwanese.
Therefore no policy will ever be completely clear, and politicians in Taipei
and Beijing must navigate between those two extremes (knowing that Taiwanese
won’t accept unification forces Beijing to also adopt a
less-than-perfectly-clear cross-strait policy).
更进一步，蔡英文一直参与和对岸的对话，并积极的寻求建立可运作的双方
暂定协定(modus vivendi)，唯一蔡不会跨过的线