※ 引述《godivan (加藤家的惠是我的!)》之铭言：
: → q622622: 想太多，共军ㄧ来一开始对台湾没兴趣，二来渡台是要跟美 02/19 23:20
: → q622622: 军干上 02/19 23:21
: 美国介入两岸是在1950.6以后 也就是韩战之时
: 意思就是说在这时间点以前美国的态度是不介入两岸
: (史实是 1950.1美国宣布不介入两岸)
: 所以根本没有所谓跟美军开战的问题
: 再说了,中共对台湾没兴趣? 你确定? 中共在战后还战前就有派人来台湾来了....
: 按照上面的假设 国府军没有撤退来台湾
: 这台湾共军会拿不下..颗颗
直接引用美国国务次卿 1949年1月14日 致杜鲁门总统的备忘录：
893.50 Recovery/1–1449
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman
Washington, January 14, 1949.
Subject: U.S. Armed Forces at Tsingtao; Problem of Formosa
Should the Chinese Communists attempt to gain control of the island by
forceful means contrary to the wishes of the Formosan people, or if the
Formosans themselves should revolt against their Chinese rulers,
justification would exist for action by the United Nations both on the
grounds that the situation represented a threat to peace and on the basis of
the de facto status of Formosa. The Indonesian case would afford some useful
parallels from the United Nations point of view. Intervention by the United
Nations might be requested by the Australian or the Philippine Governments
with a view to arranging for a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the
Formosan people.
如果中国共产党试图以武力违反福尔摩沙人民意愿控制该岛，或是福尔摩沙人
起而反抗其中国领导群，联合国的行动以危及和平状况及福尔摩沙事实地位这
两种理由都站得住脚。从联合国的观点观之，印尼的例子可以提供一些有用的
类比。联合国可以应澳洲或菲律宾政府要求，安排公民投票以决定福尔摩沙人民
的意愿。
The Department of State fully recognizes that it may be necessary at some
stage for the United States to take military action if Formosa is to be
denied to the communists. It strongly believes that for political reasons,
internally in Formosa and internationally, the United States should go to
great lengths to avoid crude unilateral intervention. But that time is not
yet upon us. The United States has not exhausted all of the political
possibilities. It may still be able to foster a Chinese non-communist local
government which will itself successfully deny Formosa to the communists.
国务院全然了解在某些阶段，倘欲使福尔摩沙不落入共党之手，美国可能有必要采取
军事行动。一般认为为了福尔摩沙内部或国际上的政治理由，美国应该戮力避免粗暴
的单方介入。但这个时点还没到来。美国尚未用尽政治手段。在地的中国非共产政府
本身仍有可能成功的保住福尔摩沙不落入共党之手。
Meanwhile, the United States should, as it is now doing, prepare for the
failure of the above contingency and put itself in a position to intervene
with force if necessary. Such intervention should be publicly based not on
obvious American strategic interests but on principles which are likely to
have support in the international community, mainly the principle of
self-determination of the Formosan people.
同时，美国应该像现在所做的一样，倘前述局势失利，做好在必要时以武力介入的
准备。此等介入不该公然基于明显的美国战略利益，而是基于某些较能为国际社会
支持的原则，主要是福尔摩沙人民的自决权。
This involves the fostering of a Formosan autonomy movement which can be
called into full action should it become evident that the Chinese regime on
the island is unlikely to be able to deny the island to the communists.
这涉及强化福尔摩沙自主运动，一旦岛上的中国政权显然无法避免该岛落入共党
之手，该自主运动就能全面接手。

嗯啊，所以如同建议，师枢安来台尝试接洽自主运动成员了

美国说穿了还是以自身利益为优先，台湾自决只是一个争取大义名份的借口，蒋政府稳住台湾后自然美国也不提了

美苏之间 二战还没打完其实已经开始刺探竞争了所以共产势力不希望过度扩张 连日本分割四国占领都否决了"不希望共产势力扩张" 修正

涉及事件的文件在引用时﹐需要“参考结果来分析”而不是“用单一文件来决定结论”。举例来说﹐1945年8月9﹐日本阿南惟几陆相在御前提出的“投降三条件”（自主撤兵、自主处罚战犯）是不是正式提出﹖有没有同样政府高官支持这一观点﹖有﹐但是结果是天皇否决。所以不成为事实。同样﹐战后审判时澳洲提交的正式文件将天皇列为战犯名单﹐最终天皇有没有被作为战犯受审﹖没有。所以此类文件揭示的是“曾有此观点”﹐但即使此观点很多人赞﹐不等于此观点就是历史事件的最终真实﹐因为这样的观点、文件很可能被更高一级否定或置之不理﹐此时更有趣的研究点是“为何会这样”。