https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/ASR1901.pdf
P.12
Recommendations
To the Federal Aviation Administration
Require that Boeing (1) ensure that system safety assessments for the 737 MAX
in which it assumed immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in
response to uncommanded flight control inputs, from systems such as the
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, consider the effect of all
possible flight deck alerts and indications on pilot recognition and response;
and (2) incorporate design enhancements (including flight deck alerts and
indications), pilot procedures,and/or training requirements, where needed, to
minimize the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are
inconsistent with manufacturer assumptions.(A-19-10)
Require that for all other US type-certificated transport-category airplanes,
manufacturers (1) ensure that system safety assessments for which they assumed
immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in response to uncommanded
flight control inputs consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts
and indications on pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design
enhancements (including flight deck alerts and indications), pilot procedures,
and/or training requirements, where needed, to minimize the potential for and
safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with manufacturer
assumptions.(A-19-11)
Notify other international regulators that certify transport-category
airplane type designs (for example, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency,
Transport Canada, the National Civil Aviation Agency-Brazil, the Civil
Aviation Administration of China, and the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency)
of Recommendation A-19-11 and encourage them to evaluate its relevance to
their processes and address any changes, if applicable. (A-19-12)
Develop robust tools and methods, with the input of industry and human factors
experts, for use in validating assumptions about pilot recognition and response
to safety-significant failure conditions as part of the design certification
process.(A-19-13)
Once the tools and methods have been developed as recommended in
Recommendation A-19-13, revise existing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
regulations and guidance to incorporate their use and documentation as part
of the design certification process, including re-examining the validity of
pilot recognition and response assumptions permitted in existing FAA guidance.
(A-19-14)
Develop design standards, with the input of industry and human factors experts,
for aircraft system diagnostic tools that improve the prioritization and
clarity of failure indications (direct and indirect) presented to pilots to
improve the timeliness and effectiveness of their response. (A-19-15)
Once the design standards have been developed as recommended in
Recommendation A-19-15, require implementation of system diagnostic tools on
transport-category aircraft to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of
pilots’response when multiple flight deck alerts and indications are present.
(A-19-16)
1.要求波音改进设计，在737 MAX系统安全评估中，确保飞行员在出现非指令性输入
（例如机动特性增强系统，即MCAS）时，提供一切有效的驾驶舱警告，让驾驶员可以当即
做出适当的判断和操作。（A-19-10）
2.要求对其他美国认证的运输飞机，在系统安全评估中，确保飞机的设计可以提供一切有
效的驾驶舱警告，让飞行员可以当即作出适当的判断及操作处理系统失控问题。另外，改
进飞行员程序或必要的训练要求，减低因飞行员作出与制造商评估不一致的操作而构成的
安全风险。（A-19-11）
3.通知多国负责飞机认证的航空安全当局（例如中国民用航空总局CAAC，欧洲航空安全局
EASA等）有关A-19-11建议（即上述第二项），同时鼓励当局作出参考和改进。（
A-19-12）
4.与业界和人为因素专家合作，研究可靠工具和方法，以供设计认证过程中对严重影响安
全的失效情况下飞行员的认知作出准确假设。（A-19-13）
5.在A-19-13建议的工具和方法推出后，FAA需现有对飞行员认知及反应的指导文件和相关
法规有效性作出重新检讨。（A-19-14）
6.与发展中国家和人为因素专家合作，制定设计标准，提高相关飞机系统诊断工具的优先
等级，以及更加清晰的提示，使飞行员做出更合时和有效的反应。（A-19-15）
7.在A-19-15建议的设计标准推出后，对有关运输飞机约会系统诊断工具，让飞行员在驾
驶舱出现各种警告时做出更合时和有效的反应。（A-19-16）
以上内容以原文为准