模拟机那段 下面还有 我补充进来
另外Handling SBs那段我也打上来
4. When the F/O underwent simulator training in October through November,
1992 in the Aeroformaiton simulator, a item of "GO-AROUND DEMONSTRATE AP MI-
SUSE IN GO-AROUND"was included in its check sheet which the instructor used.
A mark "+" was placed in the box indicating completion of the item.
Airbus Industrie said that the item was added after the incident which had
occurred in Moscow airport in February 1991.
However a check sheed, which the F/O was previously given as a part of trai-
ning materials by Aeroformaiton before training, was not yet revised and did
not contain the above item.
But how the F/O underwent training for the item could not be clarified,
Whe the CAP underwent the training in June through July, 1992 in the Thai
Internaitonal Airways' simulator, the check sheet, which China Airlines had
obtained, was used. But this check sheet was not revised and did not contain
the above item.
5. Concerning that Airbus Indstrie did not provide China Airline with up-to-dat-
e training materials, it is considered that the agreement on dealing with up
-to-date training materials was not made clearly between the two companies
which had contracted the crew training.
6. According to French and Taiwanese persons concerned, the Thai Interanaitonal
Airways' simulator does not simulate the AP overiding function in GO AROUND
mode for the A300-600R aircraft's AP, but whether this had any bearing on t-
he accident could not be determined.
(3) AFS Training
1 The descriptions in FCOM for the AFS are not easy for crews to understand.
2 The crew was not given sufficient technical informaiton with regard to si-
milar incidents.
3 Up-to-date training materials were not properly obtained.
4 CVR transcripts show that crew understanding of the AFS was probably not
sufficient.
From the above items it is concluded that the training required to understand
the sophisticated and complicated AFS was insufficient.
3.1.10.3 Handling of Services Bulletins
Services Bulletins (hereinafter referred to as"SBs") are issued by the
manufacturers to notify each operator of the inspection and modification to a-
ircraft and their equipment.
SBs are generally divided into four compliance categories:
Mandatory
Recommended
Desirable
Optional
Upon receipt of an SB, operators, referring to the compliance category
described on the SB, determine whether or not it applies ot their airplanes and
, if so, how they should implement it.
Mandatory SBs are usually implemented on earliest possible occasion.
If the SB is "Recommended" or any of the remaining categories, operators plan
to implement it on the most suitable occasion, taking into consideration their
their operational experience, maintenance schedules, and type of operation.
In China Airlines, the Maintenance Headquartrers first receive SBs, an-
d then the engineers belonging to the Chief Engineer Office determine the way
to implement each of teh SBs as well as the applicable airplane numbers after
evaluating and examining it. The determined results are entered in a form call-
edTIPS(Technical Instruction Processing Sheet) which is then forwarded to the
Department of Maintenance Control after being examined by the Department of Ma-
intanance Control.
SB A300-22-6021 issued by Airbus Industrie dated June 24, 1993 with
compliance "Recommended" specified, conerned a modification to teh AFS, which
disengages the AP when a force in excess of 15kgf is applied ot the control wh-
eel in pitch axis during a flight in the GO AROUND mode above ratio altitude
400ft (see appendix 2).
To implement this SB, it was necessary to modify the two FCCs on each
aircraft to which it applied.
SB A300-22-6021 issued by Airbus Industrie dated June 24, 1993 with compliance
"Recommended" specified, concerned a modificaiotn to the AFS, which
disengages the AP when a force in excess of 15kgf is applied to the control wh-
eel in pitch axis during a flight in the Go Around mode above radio altitude
400 ft (See Appendix2).
To implement this SB, it was necessary to modify the two FCCs on each aircraft
to which it applied.
According to China Airlines, the actions they took after receipt of the SB were
as follows.
China Airlines received this SB on July 29, 1993. The SB B479AAM-22-007 of Sex-
tant Avionique, the manufacturer of FCCs, which is specified in the Airbus SB,
was issued on July 12, 1993. China Airlines, after receving the Sextant's SB,
issued on September 1, 1993, a TIPS(A300-6153) which contained instruction on
handing of the Airbus SB.
Since the compliance category of the SB A300-22-6021 was "Recommended", China
Airlines/ judged its implementation not urgent, and decided to carry out the
modification at the time when FCCs needed repair.
As of August 1993, China Airlines possessed six (6) Airbus airplanes of the sa-
me type and the number of spare FCCs in stock was six. The number of the FCCs
removed from the company as a result of failure, and sent for repair to Sextant
Avionique Asia PTE Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Sextant Singapore"),
was four in 1991 eight in 1992, and one as of this time in 1993.
Since the maintenance facility of China Airlines was not sufficiently equipped
for implementing the modification specified in the SB, China Airlines had to
send thier FCCs to Sextant Singapore which can carryout the modification. Con-
sequently, China Airlines planned to carry out the modificaiotn at the same ti-
me as the repair of those FCCs removed iwing to failure, while talking into co-
nsideration the time required for the modificaiton as well as keeping spare FC-
CS neccessary to maintain operations.
However, no FCCs were remove from CHina Airlines' aircraft as a result of fail-
ure, and sent to Sextant Singapore for repair in the period bbetween June 24,
1993 when the SB ws issued and April 26, 1994 when the accident occurred at
Nagoya Airport.
According to Sextant Avionique, the implementation of the modificaiotn of FCCs
had been arranged as follows:
The repair facilities of Sextant Avionique were located in France, America and
Singapore.
The SB A300-22-6021 was not "Mandatory" when it was issued. The syst-
em to made an acceptance of the modifcaiton avialable was established in Sep-
tember, 1993, But it was in December, 1993 that Sextant Singapore started the
modfication job at the request of airlines.
Like wise, the Sxtant's repair facilities in France and America started the
modificaiton of the FCC in April, 1994.
At the begining as stated before, China Airlines adopted the SB A300-22-6021,
but planned to accomplish the modifcations at the time when FCCs need repair
(because the modificaiton was not considered urgent). Since no FCCs had been
sent to Sextan Singapore for repair before the Nagoya accidet, the modifcations
in accordance with ethe SB A300-22-6021 were not made.
好 讲了那么多 不要说你们 我也觉得是无字天书
懒人包
SB 分四等级
Mandatory
Recommended
Desirable
Optional
A300-22-6021 当时是Recommended
加上要做更新得把FCCs送去新加坡更换
所以华航决定等到有需要维修时再一并处理
希望我没搞错 这段全部按报告打 我已头昏眼花......