原文非常的长也写得很详细 有兴趣的自己看，这边只节录重点
信用评等机构惠誉将美国
“AAA”评级展望从“稳定”调降至“负向”
1.
所有AAA强者国家 美国债务第一名 ，预计2021年政府债务将超过GDP的130%
2.2020年到目前为止财政赤字3.7兆美金 ，最新纾困方案如果8月通过 会再增加一兆美金
3.这次的FED的无限QE破坏了美元的储备货币地位（不是我说的 是惠誉说的）
连结：
https://bit.ly/33BWSmD
原文如下
Fitch Revises United States' Outlook to Negative; Affirms at 'AAA'
Fitch Ratings - New York - 31 Jul 2020: Fitch Ratings has affirmed United States
' Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LTFC) and Local-Currency (LC) Issuer Default Ratin
gs (IDRs) at 'AAA' and revised the Outlooks to Negative from Stable.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
The U.S. sovereign rating is supported by structural strengths that include the
size of the economy, high per capita income and a dynamic business environment.
The U.S. benefits from issuing the U.S. dollar, the world's preeminent reserve c
urrency, and from the associated extraordinary financing flexibility, which has
been highlighted once again by developments since March 2020. Fitch considers U.
S. debt tolerance to be higher than that of other 'AAA' sovereigns.
However, the Outlook has been revised to Negative to reflect the ongoing deterio
ration in the U.S. public finances and the absence of a credible fiscal consolid
ation plan, issues that were highlighted in the agency's last rating review on M
arch 26, 2020. High fiscal deficits and debt were already on a rising medium-ter
m path even before the onset of the huge economic shock precipitated by the coro
navirus. They have started to erode the traditional credit strengths of the US.
Financing flexibility, assisted by Federal Reserve intervention to restore liqui
dity to financial markets, does not entirely dispel risks to medium-term debt su
stainability, and there is a growing risk that U.S. policymakers will not consol
idate public finances sufficiently to stabilize public debt after the pandemic s
hock has passed. Although a massive policy response has prevented a deeper downt
urn - such that Fitch expects a less severe contraction in the U.S. in 2020 than
in many other advanced economies - the agency has revised down our macroeconomi
c projections since March and downside risks persist.
The U.S. had the highest government debt of any 'AAA'-rated sovereign heading in
to the crisis, and Fitch expects general government debt to exceed 130% of GDP b
y 2021. Fitch's debt dynamics analysis indicates that debt/GDP could stabilize t
emporarily from 2023 if fiscal balances return to pre-pandemic levels, but only
assuming that interest rates stay very low. Health and social security costs are
still set to rise over the medium-term while federal revenue in FY19 was close
to its long-term average as a share of GDP.
Fitch expects the general government calendar year deficit to widen to over 20%
of GDP in 2020. The agency expects the deficit to narrow to 11% of GDP in 2021 a
s economic support measures are rolled back. The cumulative federal deficit in t
he first nine months of FY20 (starting in October 2019) reached USD2.7 trillion,
compared with USD747 billion in the same period of FY19. Spending rose by USD1.
6 trillion, or by 49%. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in April
that the federal deficit would reach USD3.7 trillion in FY20. In the three month
s since this CBO estimate was published, Congress has made no major addition to
the support packages. However, with Congress considering a further round of fisc
al stimulus (Senate Republicans' draft Health, Economic Assistance, Liability Pr
otection, and Schools (HEALS) Act would provide further transfers to households
and extend supplementary federal unemployment benefits at a reduced level), Fitc
h assumes that a further USD1 trillion in measures will be passed in August to b
e spread over FY20 and FY21.
The U.S. government has once again demonstrated exceptional financing flexibilit
y, borrowing just under $3 trillion between the end of February and the end of J
une, of which USD2.5 trillion was in the form of treasury bills, while the Fed h
as intervened to backstop financial markets (expanding its balance sheet by USD2
.6 trillion since mid-March) and boost global dollar liquidity. Amid a borrowing
surge, borrowing costs have fallen, with the 10-year treasury bond yielding 0.6
%. Marginal government borrowing costs currently average below 1% for up to 20 y
ears. The effective interest rate on the federal government debt stock fell (by
0.75 percentage points (pp) compared with a year ago) to 1.75% by June 2020, and
should continue to fall.
In line with our assumption that the Federal Reserve will hold its policy rate a
t 0.25%, Fitch expects negative real interest rates to provide some support to p
ublic debt dynamics. If real growth also reverted to 2%, a debt stabilizing prim
ary deficit for the general government by 2024 could be around 3%-4% of GDP, com
parable with 2019 levels. But it is uncertain whether very low market rates will
persist once growth and inflation pick up. At current levels of indebtedness, a
1% rise in the effective rate on the debt would add 1.2% of GDP to the interest
bill in a single year.
The future direction of fiscal policy depends partly on November's presidential
and congressional elections. The odds of Democrats overturning the Republican ma
jority in the Senate have shifted in their favor over the past quarter, but it i
s unlikely that either party will achieve a 60-seat majority. A continuation of
policy gridlock is a risk. Political polarization may weaken institutions and re
duces the scope for bipartisan cooperation, hindering attempts to address struct
ural issues (including some highlighted by the pandemic and protests) but also l
onger-term fiscal challenges. The economic crisis has likely brought forward the
point at which social security and healthcare trust funds are exhausted, demand
ing bipartisan legislative action to sustainably fund or reform these programs.
Fitch expects the economy to contract by 5.6% in 2020 and recover by 4% in 2021,
with the massive fiscal policy response averting a deeper downturn. Personal in
come rose in 2Q20, despite this marking the trough of the recession, marked by a
historic fall in employment and hours worked. Real GDP nevertheless contracted
at a 33% annualized rate, in line with Fitch's expectations, and there are downs
ide risks to Fitch's growth forecast, with high-frequency data starting to show
a greater impact from the pandemic in parts of the country where the public heal
th response has been deficient and fading fiscal policy stimulus. Unemployment,
spiked to 14.7% in April as firms shuttered and laid off staff, but declined to
11.1% in June as some of those on furlough returned to work. The prolongation of
this stressful economic period will weigh on human capital, financial stability
and future growth potential. The deepest post-war recession will not only open
up a large output gap, but also take a permanent toll on potential GDP. As the o
utput gap closes, Fitch expects growth to average 2.2% in 2023-25, above our rev
ised estimate of potential growth.
Fitch expects inflation to remain low, averaging below 1% in 2020-2022. Personal
consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation was 0.5% in May and CPI was 0.6% in Ju
ne); the crisis has disrupted both supply and demand. However it may have accele
rated a number of trends that could bring about higher inflation over the medium
to long-term. Market expectations of inflation as derived from yields on inflat
ion-linked bonds have bottomed out and are rising. Having laid bare inequalities
in the provision of health care and exacerbated widening wealth inequality (alt
hough government assistance to households focused substantial resources towards
those on lower incomes), the crisis could also lead to pressure for higher publi
c spending, greater state involvement in the economy, redistribution of incomes
and moves to strengthen workers' bargaining power.
The aims and policies of the Fed and Treasury have so far complemented each othe
r. Longer-term, a resurgence of inflation might call for a rise in interest rate
s, potentially even bringing the goals of the Fed and the government into confli
ct, and adversely affecting debt dynamics, although this is not Fitch's core for
ecast. It is a truism that the U.S. government cannot run out of money to servic
e its debts. However, there is a potential (albeit remote) risk of fiscal domina
nce if debt/GDP spirals, posing risks to U.S. economic dynamism and reserve curr
ency status.
ESG
ESG - Governance: United States has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of 5 for both Po
litical Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law, Institutional and Regulato
ry Quality and Control of Corruption, as is the case for all sovereigns. Theses
scores reflect the high weight that the WBGI have in our proprietary Sovereign R
ating Model. United States has a high WBGI, ranking at the 84th percentile, refl
ecting its long track record of stable and peaceful political transitions, well
established rights for participation in the political process, strong institutio
nal capacity, effective rule of law and a low level of corruption.
SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)
Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns United States a score equivalent to a rating of
'AA+' on the LT FC IDR scale.
Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM to arrive at
the final LTFC IDR by applying its QO, relative to rated peers, as follows:
Macroeconomic performance and policies: The addition of a +1 notch adjustment to
reflect the swift and effective monetary and fiscal policy response to countera
ct the economic shock of the coronavirus pandemic, which Fitch views as having m
itigated the impact of a rise in growth volatility on Fitch's model-based indica
tive rating, and which Fitch expects would adapt to take into account both the e
conomic outlook and the long-term outlook for the public finances.
Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating model that em
ploys 18 variables based on three-year centered averages, including one year of
forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a LTFC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-
looking qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output
to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our criteria that are not
fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a negative ra
ting action/downgrade: