1.原文连结(必须检附)：
2.原文内容：
A Primer on the Greek Crisis: the things you need to know from the start
until now
Anil Kashyap
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
June 29th, 2015
1) How did Greece get into such trouble?
Greece from the mid-1990s until last year was constantly spending more than
it was collecting in tax revenues. For most of this time, the country's
initially reported numbers showed small differences that were subsequently
found to have been much larger. The revisions tended to be most substantial
right after elections when a new government would find that its predecessor
was much more profligate than had been reported. Because of these deficits,
the country borrowed to cover the shortfalls and its debt burden was steadily
rising. In the fall of 2009, a then newly elected government reported that
the deficit for that year was going to be 13.6 percent of economic output
and that the deficits in 2007 and 2006 were also larger than had been reported.
From that point onward, the world began to wonder if Greece really could pay
the debt that it had issued or needed to default. Its borrowing costs rose
sharply and the country began looking for ways to reduce its required debt
payments and end its borrowing addiction.
1）希腊是如何深陷泥潭的？
自1990年代中期一直到去年，希腊每年都处于入不敷出状态，即花出去的钱超过其税收
收入。大多数时候，希腊最开始公布的赤字金额都很小，但随后却 被证实很大。每届新
政府上台后，都会指责前一任政府的"铺张浪费"，戳穿他们的"谎言"，大幅上调赤字。
由于赤字缺口越来越大，希腊不得不通过举债度日， 债务压力也就越来越大。
2009年秋天，希腊新政府宣布，当年的财政赤字和公共债务将高达GDP的12.7%和113%，
远超欧盟《稳定与增长公约》规定的3%和60%的上限。自那时起，国际社会开始担心希腊
是否有能力偿还债务，是否有违约风险。该国的融资成本（国债收益率）也开始飙升。
2) Wasn't Greece already bailed out in 2010?
By the spring of 2010 the excessive debt problem became unbearable and there
was open speculation that Greece would default. The country had done this on
four occasions previously since 1800. Much of the government debt was owed to
banks outside of Greece, with the largest amounts in France and Germany. So if
Greece had stopped paying, the French and German banks would have suffered
substantial losses. Greece was lent new money in 2010, but as Karl Otto Pohl
former head of the German central bank observed at the time much of that
money was used to repay the obligations owned by the French and German banks.
The new lending was advertised by the politicians across Europe as a rescue
for Greece. But it was at least as much a deal to buy time for the banks and
other owners of Greek debt to avoid a default. Greece did avoid default, but
the support came with requirements designed to make sure that the country end
its chronic deficit spending.
2）希腊2010年不是获得过援助了么？
事情发展到2010年春，希腊的债务问题已经一发不可收拾，市场已经开始公开押注希腊
违约。事实上，自1800年以来，这个国家已经违约过四次。这 一次，希腊政府主要是欠
国外银行的钱，其中对法国、德国银行的欠款尤其巨大。所以，如果希腊选择赖帐，法、
德的银行将会承受巨额损失。
2010年5月，希腊获得第一轮援助。希腊成功避免了违约，但援助不是无条件的，希腊必
须满足国际援助者一系列条件，以确保将来能够还得起钱。据前德国央行行长、欧元区
奠基人之一卡尔·奥托观察，希腊大多数钱都用来偿还了法国和德国银行欠款。
3) Why did that rescue fail?
To justify the new lending, the lenders had to be assured that the deficits
would end and that the country would grow enough to be able to service its
debt. In May of 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), led at the time
by Dominique Strauss Kahn, who had ambitions of running for the presidency of
France, conducted an analysis to see if such a scenario was realistic. The
report at the time concluded that if Greece undertook drastic reforms it
could close its deficits and begin growing so that over time the debt
(including the new lending that was being provided) would be manageable. This
analysis was later shown to be deeply flawed by the IMF itself. The Greeks did
actually cut their deficits substantially, but many of the reforms that were
supposed to support growth did not occur and the economy contracted
substantially. So the debt, relative to the size of the economy, did not
improve. Importantly, no debt was written off in 2010, even though many
analysts, including some on the executive Board of the IMF, at the time
believed that it was necessary and that the banks and other private sector
owners of the debt should have taken some losses.
3）第一轮援助为什么会失败？
为了确保自己资金安全，出资人需要确信希腊的赤字会不断缩小，且其经济增长也足以偿
还债务。2010年5月，时任IMF总裁的卡恩主持的研究报告认为，这是有可能实现的。报告
称，如果希腊进行了改革，就有可能结束财政赤字，使得债务规模可控。
但IMF很快就被打脸了。希腊人确实大幅降低了财政赤字，但许多改革措施并未能如预期
那样推动经济增长。相反，希腊经济出现了大幅萎缩。
值得一提的是，虽然包括IMF董事会成员在内的不少分析师认为，有必要让银行等私人部
门承担部分损失，但2010年的援助并没有涉及债务减记。
4) What is the troika (or the institutions) and what do they have to do with
this?
The new lending in 2010 came from two sources, a fund that was raised from
European governments and the IMF. The bailout fund was overseen by the
finance ministers of these governments. The European Central Bank also provided
support to Greece in two ways. First, it allowed banks in Greece (and
everywhere else) to borrow from it by posting bonds guaranteed by Greece as
the collateral. Second, it bought some Greek government bonds in the open
market. So all three of these organizations were now exposed to losses in the
event that Greece ever defaulted. As such, they had representatives that met
regularly with the Greek government to make sure that the reforms were on
track. Initially the three were called the troika. Subsequently, they have
also been referred to as "the institutions".
4）三驾马车和援助有什么关系？
2010年的援助来自两部分，欧元区各国政府和IMF。
欧洲央行也在两个方面对希腊提供支援。第一，它允许欧元区的银行用希腊债券作抵押向
其融资。第二，它在公开市场上买入了一些希腊政府债券。所以，希腊一旦违约，三驾马
车都将承受损失。也正因为如此，他们都派代表定期与希腊政府会面，确保改革按计划实
施。
5) Wasn't Greece also bailed out in 2012?
By late 2010 it was already clear that the debt burden might prove to be
unsustainable. So discussions began over reducing the debt. The Greek
government was supposed to sell some assets to retire some of the debt.
That never happened and as the recession continued it was clear that the 2010
plan was not going to be adequate. So in March 2012 a second bailout program
with revised terms was undertaken. The IMF lent additional money, but the main
conditions that accompanied the funding were largely the same. Once again,
the cornerstones of the plan continued to be steps to make tax collection
more efficient, to reduce spending promises, and to undertake reforms to
encourage hiring and business expansion that would support growth.
It was not clear why this plan would be more successful than the first one.
The European Central Bank meanwhile became more deeply committed to stabilizing
financial markets. ECB President Mario Draghi famously said in July 2012 that
"within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the
euro. And believe me, it will be enough." Draghi's statement immediately led
to a drop in borrowing costs for governments across Europe and the pressure on
Greece temporarily subsided. By continuing to allow banks everywhere to use
Greek debt as collateral, the ECB also created conditions that supported the
trading of Greek debt. By this time the French and German banks had shed
their exposure to Greece so that they would no longer be directly harmed if
there was a default. So the stealth rescue of the non-Greek banks was completed
with little public attention and the narrative that all the problems were
self-inflicted by the Greeks became more pronounced.
5）希腊2012年不是又一次接受过援助吗？
2010年底，希腊债务不可持续的事实已经非常明显。所以希腊再次被推上风口浪尖，有人
认为希腊政府应该出售资产来还债，但希腊从来没有这么做过。随着希腊局势的不断恶化
，人们意识到2010年的援助还远远不够。于是，2012年3月债权人又对希腊进行了第二轮
救援。
IMF在提供更多资金的同时，并没有对援助条款做太多修订。希腊所要做的依然是提高征
税效率，削减开支，推动改革，发展经济等等。没人说得清，为什么这样的援助协议就会
比第一次更有效。
市场似乎并不买帐。因为担心希腊违约，包括希腊在内的欧猪五国债券收益率飙涨，欧元
一泻千里，欧债危机进入高潮。欧洲央行不得不挺身而出。2012 年7月，欧洲央行主席德
拉吉发表讲话："欧洲央行将在自己的使命范围内，不惜一切代价保卫欧元区稳定。"他的
讲话被市场理解为欧洲央行将对市场托底的承 诺，很快平息了市场的恐慌，希腊问题也
暂时缓解。同时，欧洲央行继续允许银行业使用希腊国债作抵押，为希腊国债提供了良好
的流动性支撑。
6) Why is Greece in trouble again now?
In the time since Draghi's statement three important things happened in Greece.
First, Greece made further substantial progress on closing its deficits. By
late 2014, Greece was finally spending less than it was collecting, although
the interest payments on debt meant there was still an overall deficit. So for
the first time since Greece adopted the euro it had budget position that was
solid. Second, the economy contracted for two more years as the reforms failed
to deliver higher growth. Certainly the higher tax collections and reduced
government spending contributed to the weak performance, but the degree to
which the planned reforms, if fully implemented, could have offset that remains
controversial. It is important to also recognize the massive collapse was
preceded by a very large debt-fueled boom. Austerity notwithstanding, the
economy seemed to have reached bottom and was finally beginning to recover
in late 2014. A very interesting counterfactual scenario is to contemplate
what would have happened if the political situation had allowed this progress
to continue. The third major development, however, was that the public lost
confidence in the incumbent government and its lenders. Unemployment in Greece
has remained above 25% for years and was much higher for young people. So the
citizens were fed up. Hence, in 2015 the public voted for a new government that
insisted on deviating from the past playbook. The major party in the new
coalition, Syriza, is often referred to a coalition of the radical left. In
January 2015, newly elected Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras sought to reopen
negotiations with Greece's creditors.
6）如今希腊为什么又陷入危机了？
自从德拉吉的讲话之后，希腊的状况发生了三个比较重大的变化。第一，希腊政府在控制
赤字上取得了很大进展。到了2014年末，希腊终于实现了收支平衡（当然，如果算上债务
利息希腊依然是入不敷出）。
第二，希腊经济继续萎缩了两年，改革未能带来增长。显然，高税收和低开支的政策导致
了经济的疲软表现。
第三，公众对政府和债权人丧失了信心。希腊失业率已经连续多年高于25%，年轻人的失
业率更是高的吓人。不堪忍受的希腊人终于将极左联盟Syriza选上台，希望新政府能将一
切束缚推倒重来。于是就有了齐普拉斯政府上台之后重开谈判的一幕。
7) What is the Greek government asking for?
The Tsipras government wanted three types of changes. First, it wanted to
restore some of the spending cuts that had been enacted. Second, it wanted to
reverse some of the revenue hikes that the past governments had instituted.
These first two requests would have widened the deficit and also reorganized
priorities within the budget. (In fact, once it became clear that Syriza was
going to win the election, tax revenues began shrinking as the public stopped
paying some unpopular taxes).
Finally, it wanted outright forgiveness of some of the debt that had
accumulated.Since taking office, Tsipras has been negotiating with the
creditors over for a new set of agreements. The creditors have made some
modest concessions but are largely insisting on a continuation of similar plans.
When he failed to secure these changes, Tsipras announced that he would have
the Greek people vote on a referendum on July 6th over whether Greece would
vote yes to accept the creditors latest offer or vote no to reject it.
7）希腊政府想要什么？
大致来说，希腊政府有三大诉求。第一，它希望增加现在已经降得很低的政府开支。第二
，它希望降低减税额度。前两项要求将会增加政府的财政赤字，并重 新分配预算的优先权
。（事实上，在Syriza赢得了大选之后，希腊政府的税收就开始缩水，因为民众开始自发
停止缴纳一些不常见的税种）。
最后，希腊政府希望获得更多债务减记（直白地说就是赖掉一部分债务不还）。
自上台以来，齐普拉斯政府就不断与债权人讨价还价。债权人也做出了适当让步，但总体
依然坚持原有计划不变。由于未能争取到更多有利条件，齐普拉斯公开宣布将于7月5日举
行全民公投，由希腊人民来决定是否接受债权人的要求。
8) Why do the institutions disagree with the government?
There are two sources of objections that the creditors have with Tsipras'
requests. First, and probably most importantly, countries such as Italy,
Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, had all had to undertake similar types of
adjustment as in Greece. None of them saw their economies collapse to the
extent of Greece, but unemployment especially among the young is also high in
all these countries. Hence, if there are substantial concessions to Greece,
then these countries will insist upon getting similar treatment. The existing
governments in these countries all realize that if electing a radical
government in Greece is seen as being rewarded, then voters elsewhere will do
the same. The money needed to save Greece could easily be found. Greece is a
small economy, so even though their debt is large when judged relative to
Greece's economy, it is small relative to the overall capacity in Europe.
In contrast, the money needed to forgive debt in the other countries,
especially Italy and Spain, is not affordable for Germany (and all the other
Northern European countries that would have to foot the bill). Second, even
if there was some way that Greece could be helped without setting a precedent,
the officials do not trust the Greeks to carry through with any plans. The
fact that Prime Minister Tsipras is asking for a public referendum to accept
a continuation of prior policies was the straw that broke the camel's back.
Tsipras is arguing that the public should reject the plans, but he says that
if the public prefers to accept them, then he will go along with that. The
institutions doubt that he could reverse his position and suddenly begin taking
steps which he has campaigned against for years. They also are infuriated that
he believes his mandate to get better terms supersedes the ones that other
elected governments had from their citizens that wanted no more bailouts.
Another consideration is that IMF, the ECB and the other European leaders
believe that unlike before if Greece defaults the spillovers can be managed.
8）债权人为什么不肯妥协？
两点原因促使债权人不可能同意希腊的要求：
首先也是最重要的，意大利、葡萄牙、西班牙等国和希腊一样接受援助。虽然他们的经济
没有像希腊那样崩溃，但失业率高企的情况是一样的。因此，一旦债 权人对希腊做出答
覆让步，那么这些国家也会跳出来要求同样的待遇。而且，这些国家的现政府都意识到，
如果像希腊一样选出一个激进的政府就能解决问题，那么 他们的选民也会依葫芦画瓢。
事实上，钱并不是问题。希腊的经济总量不大，救助希腊的钱欧洲完全拿得出来。可怕的
是纵容希腊可能会引发示范效应。其次，即便不发生示范效应，债权人现在也不再相信希
腊的改革能够真的执行，前两次的援助失败就是活生生的教训。齐普拉斯发起的公投可能
成为压死骆驼 的最后一根稻草。齐普拉斯呼吁民众否决债权人的方案，不过他表示如果人
民同意该方案，他也会接受并服从。但债权人却很怀疑，他是否能够推动和自己最初施政
理念截然相反的政策改革。
此外，和前两次不同的是，IMF、欧洲央行和其他欧洲国家领导人相信，如今欧洲已经能
够控制希腊违约造成的连锁反应。
9) Why is the IMF loan that is coming due so important?
The IMF made loans in 2010 to Greece that no private lender would have been
willing to make. It did so with the presumption that it would be first in line
to be repaid subsequently. For failing businesses in many countries, there is
analogous arrangement where in a bankruptcy situation a judge can decide that
a business is worth more if it can continue to operate with some new funding,
than if it was closed and sold off immediately. In that case, the new funding
gets highest priority for repayment (otherwise no one will lend) and a judge
will make sure that is the case. For countries, enforcing this priority is a
problem since there is no court or other authority that can compel a country
to pay. Greece has now announced that it will not pay the IMF the €1.55
billion that it is owed on Tuesday (June 30); once it has defaulted, Greece
becomes an international pariah. To preserve its own ability to operate in
future crises, the IMF must insist on being repaid. If it ever accepts the
idea that a country can default if things go south, then it will never get
repaid in the future. So the IMF will continue to seek repayment, no matter
how flawed the analysis that led to the lending in the first place.
Interestingly, Greece did make a small payment to the European bailout fund,
so it will not be in default to that lender even if it does fall behind with
the IMF.
9）为什么偿还6月30日IMF的贷款非常重要？
如果一个公司破产了，那么法院可以强制将其资产出售，债权人获得优先赔偿权。但如果
一个国家破产，没有机构能迫使其这么做。
2010年，IMF之所以愿意在危难之际为希腊贷款，就是基于希腊会按时还款的假设。如果
希腊违约，那么它就变成了一个国际"无赖"。为了保证其可 持续发展，IMF必须要求还钱
。否则，如果一个国家一旦处境困难就可以违约，那么IMF今后永远也不要指望能收回贷
款了。所以，即便最开始的判断有 误，IMF依然会锲而不舍地追款。
10) What did the ECB decide this weekend and why is Greece closing its banks?
The ECB decided it could no longer keep accepting additional collateral from
the Greek banks that was guaranteed by the Greek government. This means no more
extraordinary lending will be extended. The ECB was worried that Greece might
not honor the obligations and hence it could be left with collateral that would
be insufficient to cover the loans it extended already. This is in keeping with
Draghi's promise of staying within the ECB mandate; lending when losses are
expected would be clearly illegal.
However, the ECB has not completely cut off its support to Greece. The ECB
could have recalled all of its loans, or demanded even more collateral for
the existing loans. But for the Greek banks this removed the only viable
option for obtaining more cash. They do not have assets that they can sell
to come up with more cash. So without the ECB's full support, they are in
serious trouble. Greece has closed the banks so that depositors cannot take
out all of their money. There are now limits on how much depositors can get
from ATMs and limits on wire transfers. So depositors are nervous and scared
about what is going to happen.
10）欧洲央行本周做了什么，希腊银行为什么要关门？
欧洲央行决定，不再接受额外的希腊国债作为抵押品，这意味着其不会再增加对希腊银行
的流动性。不过，央行并没有完全切断对希腊的支持，它本可以要求希腊偿还所有债务，
甚至要求增加现有债务的抵押。
但对希腊银行来说，央行此举无疑关上了他们最后的融资大门。他们如今已经无力筹措到
更多资金。所以，失去流动性的银行只能关门大吉。这样储户就无法取出他们所有的钱。
如今，希腊人每人每天最多只能取60欧元。
11) What can Greece do to save its economy now?
Greece must either find a new lender, which seems very unlikely, or survive
with very little credit for a while; Russia will not step in to offer support,
since doing so would likely wind up with some of the resources transferred to
other creditors and Russia has its own big fiscal problems. If there is a no
vote, Greece will likely stop payments on all debt. Being cut off from credit
markets, it will now be forced to match its spending to the revenue it is
receiving. To ease the burden, the government will likely distribute IOUs of
some form to government employees, vendors and pensioners. It may even have
to use IOUs to fund the referendum. These IOUs will likely circulate as a
form of money alongside the euro. People will strongly prefer euros to the
IOUs, so the IOUs will trade at a discount. Some people and businesses may
resort to bartering.
11）希腊人现在要怎么做才能拯救经济？
希腊要么找到一个新的债主（看起来可能性极小），要么暂时在没有流动性支援的情况下
生存下去。俄罗斯不会成为它的救世主，因为普京这么做只会便宜了其他债权人，而且俄
罗斯自己也很缺钱。如果公投最终否决了救助方案，那么希腊在停止支付所有债务的同时
，也失去了所有国际援助。希腊将不得不努力减少开支，做到收支平衡。为了减轻负担，
政府可能会向公务员、发放某种形式的欠条，最后可能连公投的资金也需要用欠条支付。
这些欠条可能会像欧元一样成为某种形式的流通货币。当然，人们还是会倾向于使用欧元
，所以政府的欠条可能会有所折价。
12) Why not just bring back the drachma?
The public will have little confidence in the IOUs that the government issues.
Probably even less confidence if Greece opts to officially introduce a new
currency. Reintroducing the drachma would be totally illegal under European
law and form the basis for a law suit to force Greece out of the European Union
(EU). As part of the EU, Greek citizens can travel freely and work anywhere
within Europe. Greek goods are also allowed to be sold without being subject
to tariffs. Expulsion from the EU would be devastating. Issuing IOUs which
are not officially touted as a currency is a better option for Greece for
now.
12）希腊会回到德拉克马吗？
不会。可以预计，公众对于政府发行的欠条将不会太有信心。如果发行新货币，信心大概
就更弱了。而重新启用德拉克马将完全违背欧元区现有法规，希腊距彻底被逐出欧元区乃
至欧盟又近了一步。
作为欧盟的成员国，希腊人民可以在欧盟国家自由旅行和工作，希腊的商品也无需担心关
税的问题。退出欧盟后，这些福利都将失去。希腊人准备好了么？所以，发行欠条这种非
正式货币应该是希腊最好的选择。
13) Will the Greek crisis spread?
It depends largely on what citizens make of the impending chaos in Greece.
If people believe that their governments also might default on debt, they
could also try to get money out of the banks. Likewise, investors could
refuse to buy newly issued debt. The ECB is likely to be able to head off
both these problems. It is already buying debt and can do more of that. It
also can lend against the collateral guaranteed by these governments. The
ECB can probably contain the immediate fallout. The political contagion is
much harder to assess. Perhaps if Greece emerges in better shape in the
medium term, then other countries will follow. Tsipras was betting that this
concern would be so powerful that Europe would never take this risk.
13）希腊危机会蔓延吗？
这主要取决于其他国家人民如何看待希腊的危机。如果人们认为他们的政府也可能债务
违约，那么他们也可以去银行把钱都取出来，投资者也可以拒绝购买该国国债。
不过欧洲央行有能力化解这些问题。它现在已经在购买这些国家的债券，今后可以买的更
多。它还可以允许这些国家的国债用来抵押融资。政治上的传染也很难。也许一段时间后
，人们发现希腊违约后依然过得很好，那么其他国家也可能效仿。齐普拉斯正是在豪赌欧
元区经不起希腊退欧的风险。
14) What is likely to happen next in Greece?
The outcome of the referendum now becomes critical. If the public votes "yes",
then perhaps the existing government (likely reorganized) will be able to
reopen the banks and conclude a deal. But, if the public sides with Tsipras
government, then there will be a very sharp recession over the next few months.
Tax collection is likely to collapse. The Tsipras government is unlikely to
survive the economic collapse. If the post-Tsipras government opts to proceed
with the default, then the next big unknown is how long before the economy
stabilizes. At some point Greece will be a very attractive tourist destination,
and its goods that are no longer priced in euros will be more competitive,
so at some point the economy will begin to turn around. Whether this takes
months or quarters will depend on many decisions that are difficult to forecast
now.
14）希腊危机下一步可能怎么发展？
如今， 公投结果变得非常关键。如果希腊人民投下赞成票，那么希腊政府（可能会重组）
就会接受债权人的援助协议，银行业就可以恢复正常。但如果希腊人民投反对票，与齐普
拉斯政府站在一边，那么希腊未来几个月势必迎来剧烈的衰退。政府税收可能会崩溃，
齐普拉斯政府难以幸存。如果齐普拉斯之后的新政府继续选择违约，那么没有人知道希腊
经济再过多久才能稳定。届时，希腊的旅游业将会很有吸引力，因为其很多商品不再使用
欧元 定价，所以，在之后的某个时点，希腊经济会开始复苏。至于这个过程要经历几个月
还是几个季度，中间未知因素太多，我们很难作出预测。
15) What happens to the IMF if its loan is not repaid?
It will continue to pursue its claim against Greece. Greece will not be able
to borrow internationally until it makes peace with the IMF. So the IMF will
eventually be repaid. This could take years. The IMF is likely to be
criticized further for the recommendations it made, particularly in 2010.
Perhaps it will be reformed to limit its discretion in lending. Traditionally
the head of the IMF has been a European. That is very likely to change since
many countries believe that Greece was treated preferentially because it was
a European country.
15）如果希腊违约，IMF怎么办？
IMF会继续追讨希腊的债务。在其向IMF还钱之前，希腊不可能在国际市场上借到钱。所以
，IMF最终会拿到钱，但这可能需要几年时间。IMF可能会因为2010年最初借钱给希腊的那
个决定而备受指责，但它很快会进行改进，未来的借款会更加谨慎。
一直以来，IMF的首脑都由欧洲人担任。未来这一状况可能会有改变，因为大家会指责IMF
因为希腊是欧洲国家而有所偏袒，从而导致坏账。
16) What happens to the ECB if Greece defaults?
The loans made to Greece are extended by the Greek central bank, which in turn
borrows from the ECB. So the ECB will have a large claim against the Greek
central bank that is likely to turn into a significant loss.
16）如果希腊违约，欧洲央行怎么办？
欧洲央行通过金及流动性援助（ELA），借希腊央行之手为希腊银行业提供了大量的贷款。
所以它当然会向希腊央行讨债，否则将会遭受巨大损失。
17) Can the ECB survive if Greece defaults?
The ECB can definitely continue even if Greece defaults. The ECB has provisions
set aside to cover some losses. It also is making lots of profits on the bonds
it owns (that it pays for with money that pays no interest). So the Greek losses
per se are not a problem. A default by a larger country such as Italy or Spain
would be very different.
17）欧洲央行会因此倒闭吗？
欧洲央行当然会继续运作下去。欧洲央行有专门应对损失的准备金，而且通过买债券赚了
很多利润。所以希腊违约的损失不是问题。但是，如果意大利、西班牙等大国违约，情况
就不一样了。
18) What should have been done to avert this crisis?
Greece should have defaulted in 2010. Its debt burden then was unsustainable
and nothing since then has changed this. It is true that financial markets
were much more jittery at that time, but the money that was raised to pay off
the creditors in that bailout could have been diverted to support Greece and
other weak countries. Once the bad rescue of 2010 was undertaken, it was
inevitable that some form of debt relief was going to be necessary.
Imagine how different the political dynamics in Europe would have been if the
German and French banks had been explicitly bailed out.
18）如果历史可以重来，应该怎样处理这次危机？
希腊2010年时就应该违约。那时其债务就已经不可持续，五年来这一状况没有任何改变。
那时的市场确实比现在更加担忧，但希腊还给债权人的这笔钱本来可以用来支持国内建设
。2010年的援助一旦开始，就不可避免地要对希腊进行债务减免。
试想，如果希腊违约，需要救助的不是希腊而是德国和法国的银行，那么欧洲各国的重视
程度和动员力量该有多么不同。
3.心得/评论(必需填写)：
写的真好,又浅显易懂
(翻译是26的翻译我懒自己翻..)

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