by buffett
HOW TO BECOME A BETTER INVESTOR
如何成为一位优秀的投资人
General
总论
If we were to do it over again, we’d do it pretty much the same way. The
world hasn’t changed that much. We’d read everything in sight about
businesses and industries we think we’d understand. And, working with far
less capital, our investment universe would be far broader than it is
currently.
如果我们可以重头再来一次，我们可能还是会这样做，世界并没有多大的改变，我们会大
量阅读那些我们能够了解的企业与产业资讯，而如果可运用的资金规模较小的话，我们可
以投资的世界将比现在宽广许多。
There’s nothing different, in my view, about analyzing securities today vs.
50 years ago.
我个人认为现在的我在分析股票的看法，与50年前没有任何改变。
Ongoing Learning
持续学习
I haven’t been continually learning the basic principles [of sound
investing], which are still Ben Graham’s. They were affected in a
significant way by Charlie and Phil Fisher in terms of looking at better
businesses. And I’ve learned more about how businesses operate over time.
基本的投资原则数十年如一日，还是葛拉罕那一套，后来受到查理跟费雪的影响，在看待
优质企业的方面做了一些修正，当然这些年来我也学习到许多企业经营管理之道。
You need an intellectual framework, which you can get mostly from The
Intelligent Investor. Then, think about businesses you can get your mind
around if you really work at it. Then, you will do well if you have the right
temperament.
你必须拥有一套健全的知识网络，这部份的观念你绝对可以从智慧型投资人一书中获得，
然而看看周遭那些你可以接触到的任何企业，我相信如果有正确的心态，你一定可以表现
的很好。
Munger: I’ve watched Warren for decades. Warren has learned a lot. He can
pooh pooh investing in PetroChina, but he’s learned, which has allowed him
to [expand his circle of competence so he could invest in something like
PetroChina].
曼格：我观察巴菲特已经有好几十年了，他确实学到很多，过去他可能不会投资中国石油
，但他确实做了改变，使得他能够跨越原先的能力范围投资像中国石油这样的公司。
If you don’t keep learning, other people will pass you by.
如果你不能持续的学习，别人很可能就会赶上你。
Temperament alone won’t do it – you need a lot of curiosity for a long,
long time.
光是气质还无法做到，你还必须一直保好奇心，我说的是一直。
Filter Out the Noise
过滤杂音
Munger: Part of [having uncommon sense] is being about to tune out folly, as
opposed to recognizing wisdom. If you bat away many things, you don’t
clutter yourself.
曼格：拥有不凡的见识必须避免愚昧的行为，唯有摒除繁杂事物，你才不会把自己搞得太
复杂。
Buffett: People get frustrated because they start to pitch something to us
and when they get halfway through the first sentence, we say we’re not
interested. We don’t waste a lot of time on bad ideas.
巴菲特：有些人可能会觉得很沮丧，因为当他们准备跟我们讲一些事时，话才说到一半，
我们马上表明没有兴趣，对于那些没意思的想法，我们不愿浪费任何的时间。
When humans compete against computers in chess, how can human compete? The
human eliminates 99% of possibilities without even thinking about it – they
get right down to few possibilities that have any chance of success. They get
rid of the nonsense.
人类如何能够与电脑比赛下棋呢?? 人类会直接消去99%的情况，只考虑那些有可能成功的
情况，他们不会去理那些不可能的机会。
When people call you with bad idea, don’t be polite and waste 10 minutes.
当别人打电话告诉你一些有的没有的，别客气，不要跟他浪费一分一秒的时间。
Thinking About Risk
论风险
We think the best way to minimize risk is to think. Our default is [to have
our capital] in short-term instruments and only do something when it makes
sense.
我们认为降低风险最好的方式就是思考，若没有其他用途，我们资金设定的去处就是短期
票券，除非谋定，否则我们不轻举妄动。
The Importance of the Right Temperament
心态正确的重要性
Munger: We read a lot. I don’t know anyone who’s wise who doesn’t read a
lot. But that’s not enough: You have to have a temperament to grab ideas and
do sensible things. Most people don’t grab the right ideas or don’t know
what to do with them.
曼格：我们经营阅读，我没有听过有那位智者不经营阅读的，当然光这样还不够，你必须
能够抓住想法然而做出有意义的事，大部分的人都无法找到正确的想法或是不知道如何去
执行。
Buffett: The key is to have a “money mind,” which is not IQ, and then you
have to have the right temperament. If you can’t control yourself, you’re
going to have disasters. Charlie and I have seen it. The whole world in the
late 1990s went a little mad in terms of investments. How could that happen?
Don’t people learn? What we learn from history is that people don’t learn
from history.
巴菲特：主要的关键是赚钱的头脑而不是IQ，然后你还要拥有正确的心态，如果你无法控
制自己，麻烦就会上门，查理跟我都曾目睹，1990年代全球都曾陷入投资的狂热，它到底
是如何发生的? 难道人们不能记取教训，我们从历史学到的教训就是人们从来不能从历史
记取教训。
Diversification
多角化分散风险
You’ll occasionally see something that so obvious that you’ll load up on
it, like junk bonds in 2002 or Berkshire Hathaway many years ago. If you
think you’ll see an opportunity every week, you’re going to lose a lot of
money.
有时你会发现一些好东西，那时你就会一口气买个够，就像是2002年的垃圾债券或是许多
年以前的Berkshire，如果你发现每个礼拜都有好机会出现，那你可能马上就会有大麻烦
出现。
Munger: The idea of excessive diversification is madness.
曼格：过度地强调多角化实在是很荒谬。
Asset Allocation
资产配置
We don’t hold any committee meetings. The business of saying you should have
50% in stocks, 30% in bonds…it’s nonsense.
我们没有什么投资委员会，有些企业要求资产配置必须有50%的股票、30%的债券等等，实
在是有够无聊。
The idea of recommending that assets should be split 60/40 [between stocks
and bonds], and then have a big announcement that you’re moving to 65/35 is
pure nonsense. It just doesn’t make any sense.
至于建议资产应该分成60/40(股票及债券)，然后又大举宣称比例要调整为65/35的做法更
是无聊透顶，这实在是没有什么意义。
Valuation Matters
评价
If you pay way too much for a business, you’ll get a poor return on what you
paid, even if the return on tangible equity is very good.
如果你买贵了，那么你的投资报酬率将会因此大受影响，即使这家企业本身的资产报酬率
极高也没有用。
Avoid Leverage
避免举债
The most dramatic way we protect ourselves is we don’t use leverage. We
believe almost anything can happen in financial markets. The only way smart
people can get clobbered is [if they use] leverage. If you can hold them [the
positions you own during a crisis], then you’re OK. But even smart people
can get clobbered with leverage – it’s the one thing that can prevent you
from playing out your hand.
保护我们自己最好的方式就是不使用财务杠杆，我们认为金融市场什么事都可能发生，而
聪明人被逮到的唯一可能就是使用杠杆，如果你在危机发生时可以控制住，那么你就过关
，但即使是最聪明的家伙也有可能因为使用杠杆而突锤，避免举债是让事情失控的最好方
式。
Weathering Financial Cataclysms
渡过金融危机
Absent leverage or just going crazy on valuation, the financial cataclysms won
’t do you in. And if you have any more money, you buy.
没有使用杠杆或是评价发生重大失误，金融危机都拿你没有办法，而如果你手上有多余的
闲钱，就可多买一些。
Berkshire is in an extraordinary position to weather any financial cataclysm.
While we don’t go around like an undertaker, hoping for a plague, we would
benefit [in such a situation] and have done so in the past. We’ve never
gotten hurt in the past 30-40 years by what’s going on in the world around
us.
Berkshire早已做好准备以渡过任何金融危机，虽然我们不是殡葬业者，整天期盼瘟疫发
生，但不可否认过去我们确实因此受惠，过去的3、40年间，我们从来没有因为周遭的巨
变而受到伤害。
Spotting Crooked Managements
辨别不正派的经营阶层
Munger: Bernie Ebbers and Ken Lay were caricatures – they were easy to spot.
They were almost psychopaths. But it’s much harder to spot problems at
companies like Royal Dutch [Shell].
曼格：Bernie Ebbers及Ken Lay都是跳梁小丑，他们很容易被发现，他们近乎是变态，相
较之下，人们就很难发觉像荷兰皇家(壳牌)这类公司的问题。
Buffett: [Throwing up his hands] Charlie and I would not have spotted the
problems at Royal Dutch.
巴菲特：(举起他的手)查理跟我还没有发现荷兰皇家的问题。
Munger: But we don’t learn because I’d still expect that Exxon’s figures
are fair.
曼格：但我们之所以没学到是因为我还是认为艾克森的数字尚称公允。
Buffett: In the late 1990s, one business leader after another was cutting
corners. They sink faster to a lower prevailing morality than rise to a
higher prevailing morality, but they still generally follow the crowd.
巴菲特：在1990年代后期，企业领袖相继走捷径，他们向下沈沦的速度相当惊人，但他们
还不致于脱轨太多。
Munger: I want to make an apology. Last night, referring to some of our
modern business tycoons – specifically, Armand Hammer – I said that when
they’re talking, they’re lying, and when they’re quiet, they’re stealing.
This wasn’t my witticism; it was used [long ago] to describe the robber
barons.
曼格：我想先向各位倒个歉，昨天晚上 (他指的是某些有名的企业大亨，特别是Armand
Hammer) ，我说他们不但睁眼说瞎话，又五鬼搬运，我并不是在开玩笑，古时候人们称这
种行为叫做贵族强盗。
Forecasts
预测
Munger: People have always had this craving to have someone tell them the
future. Long ago, kings would hire people to read sheep guts. There’s always
been a market for people who pretend to know the future. Listening to today’
s forecasters is just as crazy as when the king hired the guy to look at the
sheep guts. It happens over and over and over.
曼格：人们总是渴望有人可以告诉他们未来，古时候，国王会请专人来判读动物内脏，总
是会有人跳出来自称知道未来，听信今天的股票分析师分析未来，就好像古代的君王聘请
专人判读动物内脏一样荒谬，历史总是一再地重演。
Thinking About Growth Rates When Estimating Valuation
在估算价值时，想到成长率
When the [long-term] growth rate is higher than the discount rate, then
[mathematically] the value is infinity. This is the St. Petersburg Paradox,
written about by Durant 30 years ago.
当长期成长率高过折现率，则理论上价值将无限大，这是著名的圣彼得堡诡论，由Durant
在30年前所提出。
Some managements think this [that the value of their company is infinite]. It
gets very dangerous to assume high growth rates to infinity – that’s where
people get into a lot of trouble. The idea of projecting extremely high
growth rates for a long period of time has cost investors an awful lot of
money. Go look at top companies 50 years ago: how many have grown at 10% for
a long time? And [those that have grown] 15% is very rarified.
某些经营阶层真的认为自己所经营的公司其价值无限大，事实上这样的举动相当危险，人
们往往因此惹上不小的麻烦，预期公司将可以一直以很高的成长率的这种想法，一再让股
东与投资人损失大笔的金钱，看看50年前全美最顶尖的那些公司，有哪一家到现在还可以
稳定地维持10%的成长，更不要说15%了。
Charlie and I are rarely willing to project high growth rates. Maybe we’re
wrong sometimes and that costs us, but we like to be conservative.
查理跟我很少会用高成长率来预估一家公司，或许有时我们真的看走眼而失去一些机会，
但我们宁愿选择保守一点。
Munger: If your growth rate is so high that you conclude the business has an
infinite valuation, you have to use more realistic numbers. What else could
anyone do?
曼格：如果你因为设定过高的成长率而使得企业评估的价值变成无限大时，我想你必须换
一个更实际的数字，否则别人也无能为力?
Avoid Bad Businesses
规避不良的企业
In the textile industry, we always had new machinery that held the promise of
increasing our profit, but it never did because everyone else bought the same
machinery. It was sort of like being in a crowd, and everyone stands on
tip-toes – your view doesn’t improve, but your legs hurt.
在纺织业界，我们总是能找到一些号称能够增加我们获利的新机器，但结果往往令人大失
所望，原因在于别人也同样买了这些新机器，这就好像是在拥挤的人群中，每个人颠脚的
结果，不但大家看不到更远，反而是全部脚酸。
Thinking About Regulatory Risk
谈到法规管制风险
In some businesses, regulatory changes have a big impact, others none. We
just try to think intelligently about any business that we’re in. What
regulatory changes might there be? What might the impact be? If we’re in
furniture retailing, we’re not going to think about it. It’s up to Charlie
and me to think about this and weigh it in our evaluation of a company.
对某些产业来说，法规的改变影响很大，但有些产业则没有太大的差别，我们只是试着了
解所处的这些产业，会受到哪些法规的影响，如果是家具零售业，那我们就不必太费心，
这部份的判断必须仰赖查理跟我本人，将之纳入到评估企业价值的因素之中。
Munger: In our early days, we tended to overestimate the difficulties of
regulation. We refrained by buying the stocks of television stations because
we thought it was peculiar that someone could ask to have the government pull
your license any year – and the government could do it.
曼格：在Berkshire早期，我们时常过度高估法规的困难性，我们之所以没有投资电视台
的股票便是觉得电视台的执照随时都可能被地方政府所撤销。
Buffett: Tom Murphy [the former head of Capital Cities and Cap Cities/ABC;
click here to read a 2000 interview with him] was way ahead of us on this one.
巴菲特：Tom Murphy(资本城/ABC的前领导人)在这方面比我们懂得太多。
Index Funds
指数型基金
[When asked whether one should buy Berkshire, invest in an index fund, or
hire a broker, Buffett replied:]
[当被问到投资人应该买Berkshire，还是买指数型基金，或是直接找投资顾问，巴菲特回
答到：]
We never recommend buying or selling Berkshire. Among the various
propositions offered to you, if you invested in a very low cost index fund –
where you don’t put the money in at one time, but average in over 10 years
–you’ll do better than 90% of people who start investing at the same time.
我们从来不建议大家买进或卖出Berkshire，在各种投资机会当中，如果你投资手续费很
低的指数型基金，且不是一次而是分十年慢慢投入，那么你的绩效可能超过其他90%的投
资人。
Munger: It’s hard to sit here at this annual meeting, surrounded by smart,
honorable stock brokers who do well for their clients, and criticize them.
But stock brokers, in toto, will do so poorly that the index fund will do
better.
曼格：要我在年度股东会中批评，周遭坐满了非常聪明且受人尊敬的股票经纪人，实在是
难以启口，但我还是必须说股票经纪人，总的来说还是比不上指数型基金。
==
BUSINESS AND INVESTING TOPICS
企业与投资
Outlook for the Market
股票市场的前景
[In response to a shareholder laying outexpressing all of his the many
reasons why he is concerned s about the future outlook for the economy and
the market, Buffett replied:]
[当股东问到他在判断未来经济与股票市场的前景时，会考量哪些因素，巴菲特回答到：]
I would say that at any given point in history, including when stocks were
the cheapest, you could find have found an equally impressive list of
negatives. In ‘74, you could have written down all kinds of things that
would show the future would be terrible.
我认为不论是什么时候，即便是股票价格便宜到不行，你都可以找到一大串负面的因素，
就像1974年，在那个时候，你可以列举出一堆未来前景极其悲观的理由。
We don’t pay any attention to this kind of thing. Our underlying premise is
that this country will do very well and that businesses will do very well. We
used nuclear bombs, endured the cold war, etc., but over time the
opportunities have won out over the problems.
我们不理会这类事物，我们背后的前提是这个国家不会有问题，企业也不会有问题，我们
动用核子弹、渡过冷战时期，事后证明机会一再凌驾问题之上。
I expect this will continue, barring use [against us of] weapons of mass
destruction – it would be hard for businesses to win out over this.
而我预期这样的情势将继续维持下去，除非有人运用大规模的毁灭武器来伤害我们，我想
这是一般企业所无法独立对抗的。
Going back to ‘59, I can’t think of any discussions Charlie and I have had
in which we’ve passed on something because of a view on macro conditions. It
won’t be the economy that will do in investors; it will be investors
themselves. If you’d just owned stocks over time, you’d do fine. We’re
unaffected by the variables that you mentioned. Show us a good business
tomorrow and we’ll jump.
时光回到1959年，我记不起来任何一次查理跟我因为总经情势的关系而错过什么投资机会
的，经济情势对投资人不会有什么影响，会影响的是投资人本身，如果你打定主意长期投
资股票，那么你就不会有问题，我们并不会受到你所提的那些因为所影响，只要有好的企
业出现，我们就会大举买进。
Munger: We wouldn’t be surprised if professionally managed money in the US
will have unimpressive returns relative to the high returns we had until
three years ago.
曼格：如果过去三年美国专业管理的基金绩效表现远低于我们，我们一点都不会感到讶异
。
Buffett: Our expectations were more modest than most three years ago [see
Buffett’s Fortune article, Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market, 11/99]. We didn’
t project the end of the world, but said anyone who thought they could sit at
home and day trade to double digit returns was living in a fool’s paradise.
It’s hard to understand how people could believe such things. To some
extent, they’re sold these beliefs.
巴菲特：目前我们的预期比起三年前稍微乐观一点[参见巴菲特在1999年11月在财富杂志
发表关于股市的看法]，我们并不是预期世界末日要到了，只是要提醒哪些整天坐在家里
买卖股票就妄想每年有两位数以上投资报酬率的人不要再傻了，实在很难想像怎么会有那
么多人会相信这样的事，就某种程度而言，他们被这些想法给卖掉了。
Impact of Inflation
通货膨胀的冲击
The best thing to combat the threat of inflation is to have a lot of earnings
power of your own. If you’re the only surgeon in town, you’ll be OK
[because you can simply raise your prices to keep up with inflation and
people will pay it]. Charlie and I think it’s best to own fine businesses
that can price in inflationary terms and don’t require big capital
investments. See’s Candies can handle an inflationary world and maintain
value.
对抗通膨最好的武器就是自己拥有赚钱的能力，如果你是镇上唯一的一位医生，你就可以
安心，[因为你大可随心所欲地提高你的收费]，查理跟我都认为面临通膨最好的方式就是
拥有可以随时反应售价又不必再投入大量资本的优质企业，像喜斯糖果都能安度高通膨以
维持既有价值。
Unfortunately, most businesses will not come out well in real terms. Earnings
might be up, but the business will be compelled to invest more and more
dollars into the business to stay in place. The worst businesses compel you
to put more and more in, without any rise in profits.
不幸的是，大部分的企业处境都不那么好过，盈余或许会提高，但企业却必须被迫投入更
多的资金才能继续生存下去，更惨的企业是一再又一再投入的结果是获利不增反减。
TIPS [Treasury Inflation Protected Securities] are not a bad investment for
people worried about inflation heating up, which we’re seeing signs of.
TIPS[预防通膨的国库券]是害怕通膨高涨人士不错的投资选择，目前我们确实看到某些通
膨绩效。
Munger: Most people will see declining returns [due to inflation]. One of the
great defenses if you’re worried about inflation is not to have a lot of
silly needs in your life – if you don’t need a lot of material goods.
曼格：大部分的人会眼看投资报酬率下滑[受通膨影响]，如果你真的担心通膨的话，最好
的防卫方式就是降低生活不必要的需求，摆脱那些不必要的物质享受。
Buffett: Charlie, we’re selling a lot of material goods in the other room,
so keep quiet. [Laughter.]
巴菲特：查理，我们在隔壁房间有许多东西在出售中，所以还是少说一点，[现场一阵大
笑]。