原文来源：
Geopolitical futures
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-world-and-a-small-war/
原文摘要：
No war is small when you are living in it, but the world is large, and large w
ars are rare. At the same time, wars reverberate in unexpected ways. A small w
ar here might make another war elsewhere deadlier, or it might help prevent a
war elsewhere. No war can be understood simply in and of itself. Therefore, th
e war in Ukraine must be considered not only in its own terms but also in term
s of its reverberations. And since reverberations are by definition disorderly
, in terms of their connection to both the primary war and its ultimate import
ance, I will arbitrarily embed the reverberations into my model of the world.
生活中，没有战争是小的，但世界很大，大的战争是罕见的。与此同时，战争以意想不
到的方式回响。这里的一场小型战争可能会使其他地方的另一场战争更加致命，或者它
可能有助于防止其他地方的战争。任何战争都不能简单地理解其本身。因此，乌克兰战
争不仅要考虑其本身，还要考虑其影响。由于混响在定义上是无序的，就他们与战主要争
及
Poland has emerged, for the moment, as the leader of Europe. Geographically, i
t is closest to Ukraine, and therefore much of NATO’s force has been statione
d there. Most important, the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division is there. That means
that the 82nd is working with Polish forces, many of whom have already trained
for several years with U.S. armored forces in Poland. For the U.S., that mean
s its forces are made aware of the terrain they may be fighting on and get the
chance to develop some familiarity with Poles. Their mission is to deter or r
epel a Russian invasion of Poland or, if ordered, to move into Ukraine and eng
age and defeat Russian forces there.
目前，波兰已成为欧洲的领导者。从地理上来看，它离乌克兰最近，因此北约的大部分
部队都驻扎在那里。最重要的是，美国第 82 空降师在那里。这意味着第 82 师正在与
波兰军队合作，其中许多人已经在波兰的美国装甲部队训练了几年。对美国来说，这意
味着其部队了解他们可能正在作战的地形，并有机会熟悉波兰人。他们的任务是阻止或
击退俄罗斯对波兰的入侵，或者如果接到命令，则进入乌克兰并与那里的俄罗斯军队交战
并击败。
After World War II, to ward off Soviet domination of the Continent, the United
States had to position its forces in Europe by placing a main force in German
y. Inevitably, this wove the two previously hostile countries together politic
ally and socially. It also created necessary investments that had a role in th
e German economic miracle, a miracle that eventually made Germany the leading
power in Europe – something inconceivable in 1945. German well-being became a
strategic requirement for the United States, and being an American priority i
n a shattered Europe meant a great deal.
二战后，为了抵御苏联对欧洲大陆的统治，美国不得不通过在德国部署主力来将其部队定
位在欧洲。 不可避免地，这在政治和社会上将这两个以前敌对的国家联系在一起。它还
创造了必要的投资，这些投资在德国经济奇蹟中发挥了作用，这一奇蹟最终使德国成为欧
洲的主导力量——这在 1945 年是不可想像的。德国的福祉成为美国的战略要求，成为美
国的优先事项在一个支离破碎的欧洲意味着很多。
The situation today is not as stark as it was in 1945. The basing of U.S. forc
es in a country makes the host country’s stability and predictability a U.S.
strategic interest, and Polish geography and interests now link to American in
terests in a relationship that is blossoming from what it was. The United Stat
es has felt alienated from Europe because of Europe’s reluctance to fulfill i
ts financial commitments to NATO, and Europe felt alienated from what it saw a
s American hyper-militarism. Ukraine has generated a shift in Europe that may
or may not last. But what will likely last is the presence of American troops
in Poland. The U.S. still has troops in Germany more than 30 years after the e
nd of the Cold War. For the Americans, deployments are habit-forming.
今天的情况不像 1945 年那样严峻。美军在一个国家的基地使东道国的稳定性和可预测性
成为美国的战略利益，而波兰的地理和利益现在与美国的利益联系在一起，这种关系正在
蓬勃发展。由于欧洲不愿履行其对北约的财政承诺，美国感到与欧洲疏远，而欧洲则感到
与它所认为的美国超军国主义疏远。 乌克兰已经在欧洲产生了可能会或可能不会持续的
转变。但可能会持续下去的是美国军队在波兰的存在。冷战结束30多年后，美国仍然在
德国驻军。对于美国人来说，部署是一种习惯。
Poland’s geography and its memory of the consequences of war bond it with the
Americans. The end of the Ukraine war will imprint a model on the U.S. of fut
ure threats that aligns with Poland’s own view. Poland is under threat of de
facto expulsion from the EU for violating EU judicial standards. That is a min
or test of how the European balance of power might shift.
波兰的地理环境和对战争后果的记忆与美国人息息相关。乌克兰战争的结束将为美国树
立一个符合波兰自己观点的未来威胁模型。波兰因违反欧盟司法标准而面临事实上被欧
盟驱逐的威胁。这是对欧洲力量平衡可能如何转变的一个小考验。
Elsewhere, the Turks have done an interesting thing, sortieing a substantial p
art of their navy into the Black Sea, where the Russian ship Moskva was sunk.
Turkey has kept its distance from much of the Ukraine war, although it made so
me drones available to Ukrainian forces. Turkey is historically hostile to Rus
sia but lately regards the U.S. as unpredictable. It has balanced carefully th
ere. But the poor performance of Russian forces in Ukraine has likely caused t
he Turks to reevaluate Russia’s threat. Turkey likely no longer equates Russi
an and American strength. From Turkey’s point of view, if Russia were able to
use its navy to impose itself on the Black Sea while eliminating or forcing U
krainian forces armed with anti-ship missiles farther away from the coast, thi
s would ease Russian operations in the Black Sea. Such an outcome would also p
ose a potential threat to Turkey. Turkey is a member of NATO, and Russia may e
ventually decide Turkey’s fleet is a threat and strike its ships and ports. T
he Turks have moved into the Black Sea to preempt a Russian move by raising th
e risks beyond what Russia can incur. At the same time, this will involve a de
gree of coordination with Ukraine.
在其他地方，土耳其人做了一件有趣的事情，他们将大部分海军出动到黑海，俄罗斯船只
莫斯科号就是在黑海沉没的。 土耳其一直与乌克兰战争的大部分时间保持距离，尽管它
向乌克兰军队提供了一些无人机。土耳其历来对俄罗斯怀有敌意，但最近认为美国不可
预测。它在那里仔细平衡。但俄罗斯军队在乌克兰的糟糕表现可能导致土耳其人重新评
估俄罗斯的威胁。土耳其可能不再等同于俄罗斯和美国的实力。从土耳其的角度来看，
如果俄罗斯能够利用其海军将自己强加于黑海，同时消灭或迫使配备反舰导弹的乌克兰军
队远离海岸，这将缓解俄罗斯在黑海的行动。 这样的结果也将对土耳其构成潜在威胁。
土耳其是北约成员国，俄罗斯最终可能会认定土耳其的舰队构成威胁，并袭击其船只和港
口。 土耳其人已经进入黑海，通过提高俄罗斯所能承受的风险来抢先于俄罗斯的行动。
同时，这将涉及与乌克兰的一定程度的协调。
In challenging Russia in the Black Sea, another avenue is opened up. Turkey ha
s significant interests in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia ha
s been advancing its interests there to the concern of Turkey. Russia is in no
position to pose a military challenge to Turkey at the moment, nor is Turkey
likely to move militarily. Covert actions and diplomacy are the key. And given
Russia’s performance in Ukraine, countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan mi
ght reconsider their relations to Russia. The weakness of Russia to this point
opens the door to strategic realignments, forces Turkey to assert itself in t
he Black Sea and potentially clears a path for Turkey to pursue other interest
s.
在黑海挑战俄罗斯，开辟了另一条途径。土耳其在南高加索和中亚都有重大利益。俄罗
斯一直在推进其在土耳其的利益，从而引起土耳其的关注。俄罗斯目前无法对土耳其构
成军事挑战，土耳其也不太可能采取军事行动。秘密行动和外交是关键。鉴于俄罗斯在
乌克兰的表现，阿塞拜疆和哈萨克斯坦等国可能会重新考虑与俄罗斯的关系。俄罗斯在这一
点上的弱点为战略调整打开了大门，迫使土耳其在黑海维护自己的地位，并可能为土耳其
追求其他利益扫清道路。
Then there is China. China entered into a relationship with Russia to create a
massive counterweight to the United States. But despite their public statemen
ts, the Chinese have realized that a relationship with Russia is a liability a
nd not an asset. Russia does not have the weight to draw the U.S. away from th
reatening China. It lacks the military force to execute the Ukrainian campaign
without calling on Syrian reinforcements. China is not in a position to send
forces to aid Russia. First, saving Russia’s campaign would provide no direct
benefit to China, and a Chinese intervention could be disastrous. Second and
more important, China has seen the impact of U.S.-led economic warfare. Becomi
ng active in Ukraine or providing significant aid to Russia might trigger a si
milar economic attack on China.
然后是中国。中国与俄罗斯建立了关系，以建立对美国的巨大制衡。但尽管发表了公开
声明，但中国人已经意识到，与俄罗斯的关系是一种责任，而不是一种资产。俄罗斯没
有能力让美国远离对中国的威胁。它缺乏在不呼吁叙利亚增援的情况下执行乌克兰战役
的军事力量。中国没有能力派兵援助俄罗斯。首先，挽救俄罗斯的战役不会给中国带来
直接的好处，中国的干预可能是灾难性的。其次，更重要的是，中国已经看到了美国主
导的经济战的影响。在乌克兰变得活跃或向俄罗斯提供大量援助可能会引发对中国的类
似经济攻击。
China, like Russia, is not nearly as powerful as it appears. Its per capita gr
oss domestic product ranks 81st in the world. (Russia’s is 85th.) Its domesti
c market for sophisticated goods is limited. It must have the ability to expor
t, without which it destabilizes. The United States, even with tariffs on Chin
ese goods, is China’s largest customer. Facing both a loss of exports and an
economic war at a time when China’s economic growth rate is contracting and s
ocial tension over wealth inequality is rising would be dangerous. Invading Ta
iwan would be insane, as it would give China the only thing it has enough of
– land. It could also fail. And the U.S. economic response would be intense a
t a time when China’s economy cannot withstand it.
中国和俄罗斯一样，并没有看上去那么强大。人均国内生产总值居世界第81位。（俄罗
斯排在第 85 位）其复杂商品的国内市场有限。它必须具有出口能力，否则就会破坏稳定
。即使对中国商品征收关税，美国也是中国最大的客户。在中国经济增长放缓、财富不
平等引起的社会紧张局势加剧之际，同时面临出口损失和经济战争将是危险的。入侵台
湾将是疯狂的，因为它将给中国唯一足够的东西——土地。它也可能失败。在中国经济
无法承受的时候，美国的经济反应会很激烈。
So we see Poland and Turkey taking on greater significance as a result of the
war, and China losing significance. There are many other reverberations. I cho
se these three, if it is not already obvious, because in my book “The Next 10
0 Years” I predicted the rise of Poland and Turkey and the decline of China.
So while there are many other effects, there is no reason not to start with th
ese.
因此，我们看到波兰和土耳其因战争而变得更加重要，而中国则失去了重要性。 还有许
多其他的回响。我选择了这三个，如果不是很明显的话，因为在我的《下一个 100 年》
一书中，我预测了波兰和土耳其的崛起以及中国的衰落。因此，虽然还有许多其他影响
，但没有理由不从这些开始。
心得感想：
帮大家一段一段的翻译
简单来说俄乌战争波兰跟土耳其将会崛起
原因我就不一一赘述了
反倒作者说中国一堆问题
甚至说出侵略台湾只能拿到土地且有很高的机率失败
建议大家如果有时间可以去借下一个一百年(2016出版的)这本书
内容十分有料
如果这篇贴文不适合贴在这边等等会自删
注意事项：请注意版规内容。