Competition Without Catastrophe
How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China
美中两国该怎样在竞争中和平共存
原文：Foreign Affairs
https://tinyurl.com/yxgkczq9
By Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan
译文：观察者
https://www.guancha.cn/KeTe-KanBeiEr/2019_12_03_527132_s.shtml
The United States is in the midst of the most consequential rethinking of its
foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Although Washington remains
bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the era of
engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close. The debate now is
over what comes next.
美国正处于自冷战结束以来须对美国外交政策进行重新思考的最为关键的时刻。虽然华盛
顿在大多数议题上都出现了严重的意见分歧，不过一项共识正在逐渐形成：与中国进行战
略接触的时代应该结束了。如今辩论的焦点在于：美国今后该如何处理与中国之间的关系
呢？
Like many debates throughout the history of U.S. foreign policy, this one has
elements of both productive innovation and destructive demagoguery. Most
observers can agree that, as the Trump administration’s National Security
Strategy put it in 2018, “strategic competition” should animate the United
States’ approach to Beijing going forward. But foreign policy frameworks
beginning with the word “strategic” often raise more questions than they
answer. “Strategic patience” reflects uncertainty about what to do and
when. “Strategic ambiguity” reflects uncertainty about what to signal. And
in this case, “strategic competition” reflects uncertainty about what that
competition is over and what it means to win.
与美国外交史上发生的许多辩论一样，人们在这一辩论中的发言既包含建设性创新的内容
，也包含破坏性煽动的内容。不过多数观察家应该都会同意，今后美国对华战略所遵循的
路线将会是“战略竞争”，川普政府在2018年发布的《国家安全战略报告》中也是这样表
述的。不过，以“战略”作为修饰语的外交政策框架所制造的问题通常来说比解决的问题
还要多：“战略耐心”反映了行动时机和行动内容的不确定性；“战略模糊”则意味着该
发出什么信号是不确定的。那么“战略竞争”呢？这个表述其实反映了竞争领域的模糊性
，而且在竞争中取胜的标准也是不确定的。
The rapid coalescence of a new consensus has left these essential questions
about U.S.-Chinese competition unanswered. What, exactly, is the United
States competing for? And what might a plausible desired outcome of this
competition look like? A failure to connect competitive means to clear ends
will allow U.S. policy to drift toward competition for competition’s sake
and then fall into a dangerous cycle of confrontation.
然而，由于人们急于开启与中国进行“战略竞争”的新时代，目前还没有人为与美中竞争
有关的此类重要问题提供明确答案。美国到底为了什么与中国竞争？通过竞争，美国希望
实现怎样的具有现实意义的目标？竞争手段是为实现竞争目标服务的，如果不能明确与中
国进行“战略竞争”的最终目标，那么美国将陷入为了竞争而竞争的怪圈，与中国发生冲
突的危险也将大大增加。
U.S. policymakers and analysts have mostly, and rightly, discarded some of
the more optimistic assumptions that underpinned the four-decade-long
strategy of diplomatic and economic engagement with China (which one of us,
Kurt Campbell, detailed in these pages last year, writing with Ely Ratner).
But in the rush to embrace competition, policymakers may be substituting a
new variety of wishful thinking for the old. The basic mistake of engagement
was to assume that it could bring about fundamental changes to China’s
political system, economy, and foreign policy. Washington risks making a
similar mistake today, by assuming that competition can succeed in
transforming China where engagement failed—this time forcing capitulation or
even collapse.
美国决策者和分析人士曾乐观地奉行与中国的外交接触和经济接触战略，如今他们中的大
多数人已经放弃了这种乐观心态。不过在转向新的“战略竞争”路线时，美国的决策者们
也许只是用一套新的自以为是的观点取代了一套旧的自以为是的观点。接触战略的错误在
于，我们曾认为在与美国进行外交和经济接触的过程中，中国的政治制度、经济制度和对
外政策将发生根本性变化。如今转向“战略竞争”路线的华盛顿很可能犯了类似的错误，
他们以为中国将在与美国的战略竞争中发生另一种根本性变化——屈服或崩溃。
Despite the many divides between the two countries, each will need to be
prepared to live with the other as a major power. The starting point for the
right U.S. approach must be humility about the capacity of decisions made in
Washington to determine the direction of long-term developments in Beijing.
Rather than relying on assumptions about China’s trajectory, American
strategy should be durable whatever the future brings for the Chinese system.
It should seek to achieve not a definitive end state akin to the Cold War’s
ultimate conclusion but a steady state of clear-eyed coexistence on terms
favorable to U.S. interests and values.
虽然美中两国之间存在诸多分歧，不过双方都需要接受对方是大国这个事实并为两个大国
彼此长期和平共存的局面做好准备。美国在处理对华关系时首先应该对自己影响北京长期
发展方向的能力做出谦逊的评估。美国的对华战略不应过于依赖对中国未来发展路径的判
断，无论中国的体制如何演进，美国的对华战略应该是稳定持久的。美国的战略目标不应
是寻求实现类似苏联解体那样的终极确定状态，而应是寻求实现有利于美国利益和美国价
值观的、在清晰的战略思维作用下形成的两国稳定共存的状态。
Such coexistence would involve elements of competition and cooperation, with
the United States’ competitive efforts geared toward securing those
favorable terms. This might mean considerable friction in the near term as
U.S. policy moves beyond engagement—whereas in the past, the avoidance of
friction, in the service of positive ties, was an objective unto itself.
Going forward, China policy must be about more than the kind of relationship
the United States wants to have; it must also be about the kinds of interests
the United States wants to secure. The steady state Washington should pursue
is rightly about both: a set of conditions necessary for preventing a
dangerous escalatory spiral, even as competition continues.
在这种共存状态中既有竞争也有合作，而美国在竞争中应努力确保自己的利益和价值观得
到维护。随着美国逐渐放弃对华接触战略，这种对自身利益的维护也许意味着近期将发生
一些摩擦。在战略接触时代，为了与中国建立积极的关系，避免发生摩擦本身曾被列为一
个目标。展望未来，美国的对华政策绝不能只是着眼于美国想要何种美中关系，美国的对
华政策还应着眼于自己想要获得哪些利益。美国所寻求的稳定状态应确保两国在竞争的同
时还要避免陷入紧张关系升级的危险当中。
U.S. policymakers should not dismiss this objective as out of reach. It is
true, of course, that China will have a say in whether this outcome is
possible. Vigilance will thus need to remain a watchword in U.S.-Chinese
relations in the period ahead. Although coexistence offers the best chance to
protect U.S. interests and prevent inevitable tension from turning into
outright confrontation, it does not mean the end of competition or surrender
on issues of fundamental importance. Instead, coexistence means accepting
competition as a condition to be managed rather than a problem to be solved.
美国的决策者不应认为这个目标难以企及而不予考虑。这个目标能否实现当然不仅取决于
美国自身，中国也将扮演它的角色。因此在未来的美中互动过程中，“保持警惕”（
vigilance）将是一种长期性的要求。虽然和平共存能够让美国获得维护自身利益的最佳
机会，防止难以避免的紧张关系恶化到直接冲突的境地，不过这种和平共存并不意味着竞
争的偃旗息鼓，也不意味着我们在重大问题上向中方做出让步。相反，和平共存意味着我
们要接受“把竞争看作一种需要管控的状态而非需要解决的问题”这一观点。
COLD WAR LESSONS, NOT COLD WAR LOGIC
接受冷战教训、拒绝冷战逻辑
Given the current hazy discourse on competition, there is an understandable
temptation to reach back to the only great-power competition Americans
remember to make sense of the present one: the Cold War. The analogy has
intuitive appeal. Like the Soviet Union, China is a continent-sized
competitor with a repressive political system and big ambitions. The
challenge it poses is global and lasting, and meeting that challenge will
require the kind of domestic mobilization that the United States pursued in
the 1950s and 1960s.
由于美国在“战略竞争”问题上并没有给出清晰的表述，人们在面对当前与中国之间的竞
争时往往会倾向于参考美国历史上唯一一次大国竞争——冷战，这是可以理解的。从直觉
角度来说，人们把两场竞争做这样的类比并非没有道理。与前苏联相似，中国也是一个大
陆级别的竞争对手，施行一党执政体制，而且极具雄心。中国向我们发出的挑战具有全球
性而且这一挑战将长期存在。要应对中国的挑战，我们需要展现上世纪50年代和60年代的
国家动员能力。
But the analogy is ill fitting. China today is a peer competitor that is more
formidable economically, more sophisticated diplomatically, and more flexible
ideologically than the Soviet Union ever was. And unlike the Soviet Union,
China is deeply integrated into the world and intertwined with the U.S.
economy. The Cold War truly was an existential struggle. The U.S. strategy of
containment was built on the prediction that the Soviet Union would one day
crumble under its own weight—that it contained “the seeds of its own decay,
” as George Kennan, the diplomat who first laid out the strategy, declared
with conviction.
即便如此，把中国比作前苏联仍然是错误的。如今的中国是与美国势均力敌的对手，比起
当年的苏联，中国在经济上更加强大、外交上更加老练、意识形态上也更加灵活。此外，
与前苏联不同的是，中国已经深深融入世界，中国经济已经与美国经济紧密交织在一起。
冷战的确是一场关乎美国生死存亡的斗争。美国当初之所以对苏联奉行遏制战略是基于一
种预判：苏联终有一天会不堪重负自行崩溃。正如提出对苏遏制战略的乔治·凯南（
George Kennan，1904-2005，美国外交家和历史学家。结束职业外交生涯后，乔治·凯南
在普林斯顿大学任教，出版了17本著作，其中两部获得普利策奖）所坚称的：苏联的体制
已经种下了“导致其自身衰败的种子”。
No such prediction holds today; it would be misguided to build a
neo-containment policy on the premise that the current Chinese state will
eventually collapse, or with that as the objective. Despite China’s many
demographic, economic, and environmental challenges, the Chinese Communist
Party has displayed a remarkable ability to adapt to circumstances, often
brutally so. Its fusion of mass surveillance and artificial intelligence,
meanwhile, is enabling a more effective digital authoritarianism—one that
makes the collective action necessary for reform or revolution hard to
contemplate, let alone organize. China may well encounter serious internal
problems, but an expectation of collapse cannot form the basis of a prudent
strategy. Even if the state does collapse, it is likely to be the result of
internal dynamics rather than U.S. pressure.
我们在今天已经无法对中国做出此类预判。我们若以为中国最终会自行崩溃或将此作为目
标来制定新的遏制战略，那么美国将误入歧途。尽管中国面临着人口、经济和环境等方面
的诸多挑战，但中共面对新形势已经表现出了非凡的与时俱进能力。中国也许会在国内问
题上陷入严重困境，然而一项严谨的战略不应建立在对竞争对手自行崩溃的期待之上。即
便中国在某一天崩溃，那也是它未能解决国内问题所致，而非美国施压的结果。
The Cold War analogy at once exaggerates the existential threat posed by
China and discounts the strengths Beijing brings to long-term competition
with the United States. Although the risk of conflict in Asia’s hot spots is
serious, it is by no means as high, nor is the threat of nuclear escalation
as great, as it was in Cold War Europe. The kind of nuclear brinkmanship that
took place over Berlin and Cuba has no corollary in U.S.-Chinese ties. Nor
has U.S.-Chinese competition plunged the world into proxy wars or created
rival blocs of ideologically aligned states preparing for armed struggle.
把中国与前苏联进行类比，夸大了中国为我们带来的生存威胁，却低估了中国与我们进行
长期竞争的能力。虽然亚洲热点地区有爆发冲突的风险，但这种风险并没有高到冷战时期
欧洲那种程度，冲突升级为核战的威胁也没有冷战时期欧洲那么严峻。美中之间也不存在
当年发生在柏林和古巴的那种核边缘试探。此外，美中竞争既没有把世界拖入代理人战争
，也没有让各国根据意识形态分裂为两个进行军事对抗的阵营。
Despite the diminished danger, however, China represents a far more
challenging competitor. In the last century, no other U.S. adversary,
including the Soviet Union, ever reached 60 percent of U.S. GDP. China passed
that threshold in 2014; in purchasing-power terms, its GDP is already 25
percent greater than that of the United States. China is the emerging global
leader in several economic sectors, and its economy is more diversified,
flexible, and sophisticated than the Soviet Union’s ever was.
虽然爆发战争的风险较小，不过中国的确是一个非常难以对付的国家。在20世纪，美国的
竞争对手（包括前苏联在内）的GDP无一达到美国的60%，而中国已于2014年跨过了这个关
口。如果按照购买力平价计算，中国的GDP如今已经是美国的125%。中国已经在若干经济
领域成为全球领军者。与前苏联相比，中国经济更多元、更成熟而且更具韧性。
Beijing is also better at converting its country’s economic heft into
strategic influence. Whereas the Soviet Union was hamstrung by a closed
economy, China has embraced globalization to become the top trading partner
for more than two-thirds of the world’s nations. The kinds of economic,
people-to-people, and technological linkages that were lacking in the
militarized U.S.-Soviet conflict define China’s relationship with the United
States and the wider world. As a global economic actor, China is central to
the prosperity of American allies and partners; its students and tourists
flow through global universities and cities; its factories are the forge for
much of the world’s advanced technology. This thick web of ties makes it
difficult to even start to determine which countries are aligned with the
United States and which are aligned with China. Ecuador and Ethiopia might
look to Beijing for investment or for surveillance technologies, but they
hardly see these purchases as part of a conscious turn away from the United
States.
此外，北京还更善于把自己的经济实力转化为战略影响力。与前苏联封闭而虚弱的经济不
同，中国积极拥抱全球化，如今中国已经是超过全球三分之二国家的最大贸易伙伴。经济
活动、人员往来和技术联系定义了中国与美国甚至与全世界之间的关系，而这些元素在军
事色彩浓厚的美苏关系中是缺乏的。作为全球经济的重要参与者，中国对我们的盟国和伙
伴国家的繁荣发挥着重要作用——中国留学生已遍布全球各所大学的校园，中国游客已充
斥全球各大城市的景点，中国工厂已成为全世界大量高科技产品的制造中心。在各国与中
国进行如此密切交往的情况下，哪些国家与美国站在一起、哪些国家与中国站在一起已经
难以确定。厄瓜多尔和埃塞俄比亚也许期待来自中国的投资或希望获得中国的技术，然而
这两个国家不太可能将疏远美国视为一个严肃的选项。
Even as China emerges as a more formidable competitor than the Soviet Union,
it has also become an essential U.S. partner. Global problems that are
difficult enough to solve even when the United States and China work together
will be impossible to solve if they fail to do so—climate change foremost
among them, given that the United States and China are the two biggest
polluters. A host of other transnational challenges—economic crises, nuclear
proliferation, global pandemics—also demand some degree of joint effort.
This imperative for cooperation has little parallel in the Cold War.
虽然中国是比前苏联更难对付的竞争对手，但中国同时也是美国重要的合作伙伴。一些全
球性问题即便在美中联手的情况下解决起来也非常困难，如果美中无法实现合作，问题获
得解决的可能性便不存在了。鉴于美中两国是全球最大的温室气体排放国，气候变化是其
中最典型的一个例子。此外，经济危机、核扩散、流行性疾病等大量跨国问题也需要美中
两国展开合作才有望获得解决。然而在冷战时期，并不存在像今天这么多的问题需要美苏
之间展开合作。
While the notion of a new Cold War has brought calls for an updated version
of containment, resistance to such thinking has come from advocates of an
accommodative “grand bargain” with China. Such a bargain would go well
beyond the terms of U.S.-Soviet détente: in this scenario, the United States
would effectively concede to China a sphere of influence in Asia. Proponents
defend this concession as necessary given the United States’ domestic
headwinds and relative decline. This position is sold as realistic, but it is
no more tenable than containment. Ceding the world’s most dynamic region to
China would do long-term harm to American workers and businesses. It would
damage American allies and values by turning sovereign partners into
bargaining chips. A grand bargain would also require stark and permanent U.S.
concessions, such as the abrogation of U.S. alliances or even of the right to
operate in the western Pacific, for speculative promises. Not only are these
costs unacceptable; a grand bargain would also be unenforceable. A rising
China would likely violate the agreement when its preferences and power
changed.
一些人提出了“新冷战”的概念，这一概念意味着美国须对中国进行遏制；而另一些反对
遏制战略的人提出了“大交易”（grand bargain）的概念，他们认为美国应与时俱进并
与中国达成交易。这里所说的“交易”不仅意味着我们与中国之间会实现美苏之间曾出现
的那种关系缓和，它还有更进一步的含义：在达成“大交易”之后，美国将在亚洲向中国
做出让步，承认中国在该地区的影响力。持这种态度的人认为让步是必要的，因为美国国
内问题重重而且美国已陷入相对衰落的状态。他们认为“大交易”是一种务实的选择，不
过在我看来，“大交易”并不比遏制战略更加可行。亚洲是当今全球最具活力的地区，将
这一地区的主导权让给中国会对美国工人和商界造成长期损害。此外，这样做还将伤害我
们的盟友和价值观，我们在亚洲主权独立的伙伴将沦为交易筹码。当我们与中国达成“大
交易”之后，我们还可能做出根本的永久性让步，美国在亚洲的联盟体系将走向终结，我
们在西太平洋地区行动的权利也将被放弃。这一切对美国来说都是不可接受的，而且“大
交易”也是无法真正落实的：中国是一个崛起中的国家，当中国的实力进一步增强或想法
发生改变时，它可能违反与美国所达成的“大交易”条款。
Advocates of neo-containment tend to see any call for managed coexistence as
an argument for a version of the grand bargain; advocates of a grand bargain
tend to see any suggestion of sustained competition as a case for a version
of containment. That divide obscures a course between these extremes—one
that is not premised on Chinese capitulation or on U.S.-Chinese condominium.
遏制战略的支持者们倾向于把那些主张“管控竞争以实现美中和平共存”的人视为“大交
易”概念的支持者，而“大交易”概念的支持者们则倾向于把那些主张“美中可持续竞争
”的人视为遏制战略的支持者。这意味着，人们并没有意识到在遏制战略和“大交易”两
种极端观点之间其实还存在一条中间路线，这条路线并不是建立在中国向美国屈服（遏制
战略希望收获的结果）或美中共治世界（“大交易”所主张的观点）的基础之上的。
Instead, the goal should be to establish favorable terms of coexistence with
Beijing in four key competitive domains—military, economic, political, and
global governance—thereby securing U.S. interests without triggering the
kind of threat perceptions that characterized the U.S.-Soviet rivalry.
Washington should heed the lessons of the Cold War while rejecting the idea
that its logic still applies.
与上述两种极端观点不同，中间路线的目标是：华盛顿在军事、经济、政治和全球治理四
个领域实现与北京的和平共存，并致力于确保和平共存的规则框架有利于维护美方利益、
确保美中两国不会在和平共存状态中感受到冷战时期美苏两国曾感受到的那种威胁。华盛
顿应该汲取冷战教训，不要误以为美苏冷战逻辑在当今的美中关系中仍然有效。
TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DETERRENCE
打造可持续威慑能力
In contrast to the military competition of the Cold War, which was a truly
global struggle, the dangers for Washington and Beijing are likely to be
confined to the Indo-Pacific. Even so, the region features at least four
potential hot spots: the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan
Strait, and the Korean Peninsula. Neither side wishes for conflict, but
tensions are rising as both invest in offensive capabilities, boost their
military presence in the region, and operate in ever-closer proximity.
Washington fears that China is trying to push U.S. forces out of the western
Pacific, and Beijing fears that the United States is trying to hem it in.
Given China’s harassment of U.S. aircraft and naval vessels, minor incidents
risk escalating into major military confrontations; Admiral Wu Shengli, the
former naval commander of the People’s Liberation Army, has warned that any
such incident “could spark war.”
与冷战时期美苏之间全球性的军事对抗相比，华盛顿与北京之间仅在印太地区有发生冲突
的风险，其中有四个热点：南海、东海、台湾海峡和朝鲜半岛。美中都不希望发生冲突，
不过随着双方增加在该地区的军事存在，随着双方在攻击性军事力量方面大笔投资以及两
军近距离相遇事件的不断发生，该地区的局势正日趋紧张。华盛顿担心北京会把美军的势
力从西太平洋地区驱逐出去，而北京则担心华盛顿正在试图包围自己。考虑到美国海军和
空军在南海行使航行自由权利时曾多次遭到中国军队的干扰，一些程度较低的摩擦升级为
大规模军事冲突的风险是存在的。中国人民解放军海军前司令员吴胜利上将曾发出警告称
，任何此类事件都“可能引发战争”。
But coexistence in the Indo-Pacific by both militaries should not be
dismissed as impossible. The United States must accept that military primacy
will be difficult to restore, given the reach of China’s weapons, and
instead focus on deterring China from interfering with its freedom of
maneuver and from physically coercing U.S. allies and partners. Beijing will
have to accept that the United States will remain a resident power in the
region, with a major military presence, naval operations in its major
waterways, and a network of alliances and partnerships.
然而，美中两军在印太地区实现和平共存并非没有可能。美国必须接受一个事实：考虑到
中国军事力量投射的范围，美国已经无法恢复此前在该地区军事上的绝对主导地位。美国
应该集中力量实现以下目标：对中国形成威慑，使其不能压缩美国在该地区的回旋空间，
使其不能用军事手段胁迫美国盟友和伙伴国家。中国也必须接受一个事实：美国作为一个
大国将继续维持自己在该地区的军事存在，美国海军将继续在该地区的主要水道执行任务
，美国将继续在该地区维持自己的联盟体系和伙伴关系。
Taiwan and the South China Sea are likely to present the most significant
challenges to this overall approach. A military provocation or
misunderstanding in either case could easily trigger a larger conflagration,
with devastating consequences, and this risk must increasingly animate the
thinking of senior leaders in both Washington and Beijing.
台湾问题和南海问题很可能对上述设想构成严重的挑战。无论在台湾还是在南海，军事挑
衅或误判很可能引发大规模冲突并造成毁灭性影响，华盛顿和北京的决策者们应对此予以
更高的关注。
On Taiwan, a tacit commitment not to unilaterally alter the status quo is
perhaps the best that can be hoped for given the historical complexities
involved. Yet Taiwan is not only a potential flash point; it is also the
greatest unclaimed success in the history of U.S.-Chinese relations. The
island has grown, prospered, and democratized in the ambiguous space between
the United States and China as a result of the flexible and nuanced approach
generally adopted by both sides. In this way, the diplomacy surrounding
Taiwan could serve as a model for the increasingly challenging diplomacy
between Washington and Beijing on a variety of other issues, which are
similarly likely to include intense engagement, mutual vigilance and a degree
of distrust, and a measure of patience and necessary restraint. Meanwhile, in
the South China Sea, Beijing’s understanding that threats to freedom of
navigation could have devastating consequences for China’s own economy might
help—when combined with U.S. deterrence—modulate its more nationalist
sentiments.
在台湾问题上，考虑到其复杂的历史背景，各方都默契地不单方面改变现状也许是我们能
想到的最好结果。台湾不仅是一个潜在的冲突点，它还可以被看作是美国和中国在两国关
系历史上所取得的最大成就。美中双方以细腻而有弹性的手段在台湾问题上制造了一个模
糊的空间，这座小岛就在这一模糊空间里实现了发展和民主化。华盛顿和北京之间仍然存
在很多问题，双方在那些问题上难免互相警惕和不信任，但也需要进行密切的接触、保持
必要的克制和耐心，而双方在处理台湾问题时所展现的外交技巧能够为那些问题的解决提
供参考。在南海问题上，若北京能意识到航行自由受到威胁会对其自身的经济造成毁灭性
影响，再辅以美国的威慑，那么中国国内民族主义情绪高涨的势头便能够得到控制。
To achieve such coexistence, Washington will need to enhance both
U.S.-Chinese crisis management and its own capacity for deterrence. Even as
Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union worked
concertedly to reduce the risk that an accidental collision would escalate to
nuclear war; they set up military hot lines, established codes of conduct,
and signed arms control agreements. The United States and China lack similar
instruments to manage crises at a time when new domains of potential
conflict, such as space and cyber- space, have increased the risk of
escalation.
为了实现美中和平共存的局面，华盛顿需要加强美中危机管理机制并增强自身对中国的威
慑能力。作为冷战对手，美国和前苏联曾为了避免偶发冲突升级为核战争采取了很多措施
，双方建立了军事热线、制定了两军行动守则并签署了军控协议。在潜在冲突点已经扩展
到外太空和网络空间的今天，美中之间却缺乏类似的危机管理机制。
In every military domain, the two countries need agreements that are at least
as formal and detailed as the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, a 1972
deal that established a set of specific rules aimed at avoiding maritime
misunderstandings. The United States and China also need more communication
channels and mechanisms to avoid conflict—especially in the South China Sea—
to allow each side to quickly clarify the other’s intentions during an
incident. The bilateral military relationship should no longer be held
hostage to political disagreements, and senior military officials on both
sides should engage in more frequent and substantive discussions to build
personal ties as well as understandings of each side’s operations.
Historically, progress on some of these efforts, especially crisis
communication, has proved difficult: Chinese leaders fear that crisis
communication could embolden the United States to act with impunity and would
require devolving too much authority to senior military officers in the
field. But these worries may be easing, given China’s growing power and
military reforms.
美苏两国1972年签署的《防止海上事件协定》为避免两国海军发生误判制定了详细的行为
准则，如今美中两国在每一个军事领域都有必要签署那样的一份正式而详细的协定。为避
免冲突（尤其是发生在南海地区的冲突），美中两国还需要建立更多的沟通管道和沟通机
制，以便让其中一方能够在相遇事件中快速知晓对方的动机。美中两国在政治上的分歧不
应再继续绑架两军关系。双方的高级将领应该进行更密切的实质性接触，以便双方建立个
人关系并对对方的行动有更多了解。从历史上来看，在危机沟通方面取得进展并非易事：
中方也许担心危机沟通机制的存在会让美军因不必担心承担后果而在行动时变得更加无所
忌惮，不过随着中国实力的增长和军事改革的推进，中方的忧虑将有所缓解。
Effective U.S. strategy in this domain requires not just reducing the risk of
unintentional conflict but also deterring intentional conflict. Beijing
cannot be allowed to use the threat of force to pursue a fait accompli in
territorial disputes. Yet managing this risk does not require U.S. military
primacy within the region. As the former Trump administration defense
official Elbridge Colby has argued, “deterrence without dominance—even
against a very great and fearsome opponent—is possible.”
一项有效的对华战略不仅要求美国降低爆发非故意冲突的风险，而且还要求美国对故意冲
突的爆发形成威慑。华盛顿不应允许北京在领土争端中通过对他国进行武力威胁来制造既
成事实。然而，对风险进行管控并不需要美军在该地区掌握主导地位。正如川普政府前防
务官员柯伯吉（Elbridge Colby）所言：“即便我们面对的是一个非常强大、令人惧怕的
对手，在不占据军事主导地位的情况下对其形成威慑仍然是可能的”。
To ensure deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reorient its
investments away from expensive and vulnerable platforms, such as aircraft
carriers, and toward cheaper asymmetric capabilities designed to discourage
Chinese adventurism without spending vast sums. This calls for taking a page
from Beijing’s own playbook. Just as China has relied on relatively cheap
antiship cruise and ballistic missiles, the United States should embrace
long-range unmanned carrier-based strike aircraft, unmanned underwater
vehicles, guided missile submarines, and high-speed strike weapons. All these
weapons could protect U.S. and allied interests, even as they dent China’s
confidence that its offensive operations will succeed and reduce the risk of
collision and miscalculation. The United States should also diversify some
of its military presence toward Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, making
use of access agreements rather than permanent basing when necessary. This
would place some U.S. forces beyond China’s precision-strike complex,
preserving their ability to promptly address crises. It would also
preposition them to address a wide range of contingencies beyond conflicts
involving China, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and
antipiracy missions.
若要美军成为一支在印太地区有威慑力的军队，华盛顿应该调整在军事装备方面的开支，
把资金从那些昂贵的、易受攻击的作战平台（如航母）转移到更加便宜的不对称战力的打
造上，用较低的成本来挫败中国人的冒险主义。这意味着我们要向北京的一些做法学习。
正如中国通过相对廉价的反舰巡航导弹和弹道导弹来应对美军一样，美国应该更重视远程
无人舰载机、无人潜航器、导弹潜艇以及高速攻击武器的作用。所有上述武器都能够保护
美国及盟友的利益，这些武器在打击中国人认为自己必胜的自信心的同时，还能够降低发
生误判的风险和爆发冲突的风险。此外，美国还应该使自己在东南亚和印度洋地区的军事
存在更加多元化，在必要时用基于协议的军事介入来取代永久性驻军。这将让部分美国军
事力量摆脱中国的精确打击魔咒，让他们能够保存快速处理危机的能力。而且除了应对与
中国之间的冲突之外，他们还可以遂行更大范围的军事任务，包括人道主义救援、救灾和
反海盗行动等。
ESTABLISHING RECIPROCITY
构建对等的美中关系
Unlike the Soviet Union, which focused its resources on military power, China
views geoeconomics as the primary arena of competition. With an eye toward
the future, it has invested heavily in emerging industries and technologies,
including artificial intelligence, robotics, advanced manufacturing, and
biotechnology. China seeks dominance in these fields in part by denying
Western companies reciprocal treatment. The United States granted China
permanent normal trade relations, supported its entry into the World Trade
Organization, and has generally maintained one of the world’s most open
markets. But through a combination of industrial policy, protectionism, and
outright theft, China has put in place a range of formal and informal
barriers to its markets and has exploited American openness.
与把资源集中于军力建设的前苏联不同，中国把经济视为国家竞争的主战场。颇有前瞻性
的中国政府已经在人工智能、机器人、先进制造技术和生物技术等新兴技术领域进行了大
量投资。不过，中国在寻求获得上述技术领域主导地位的过程中并不希望给予西方公司对
等待遇。中国已经通过产业政策、保护主义等方式构筑了一系列正式和非正式的市场壁垒
并利用了美国市场的开放性。
This structural imbalance has eroded support for stable U.S.-Chinese economic
ties, and the relationship faces a heightened risk of rupture even if Xi and
U.S. President Donald Trump are able to reach a near-term trade truce. Many
in the American business community are no longer willing to tolerate China’s
unfair practices, which include employing state hackers to steal intellectual
property, forcing foreign companies to localize their operations and engage
in joint ventures, subsidizing state champions, and otherwise discriminating
against foreign companies.
这种结构性失衡已经对美中经济关系的稳定造成了侵蚀，即便两国领导人能够在近期达成
贸易战停战协定，两国经济关系仍然面临很高的破裂风险。美国工商界中的许多人不愿意
再容忍中国的不公平做法，包括雇用国家黑客窃取知识产权，迫使外国公司将其业务本地
化并从事合资经营，补贴国家拥护者，以及以其他方式歧视外国公司。
Alleviating these growing frictions while protecting American workers and
innovation will require making China’s full access to major markets around
the world contingent on its willingness to adopt economic reforms at home.
Washington, for its part, will have to invest in the core sources of American
economic strength, build a united front of like-minded partners to help
establish reciprocity, and safeguard its technological leadership while
avoiding self-inflicted wounds.
若希望缓解日益紧张的局势、保护美国工人和创新成果，我们就需要让北京知道，只有北
京愿意在国内进行经济改革，中国产品才能进入全球其他主要市场。而华盛顿自身也需要
对构成美国经济优势的那些核心产业进行投资，与具有相似价值观的伙伴国家构建联合战
线并在避免伤害到自身的前提下捍卫美国在科技领域的全球领导地位。
The most decisive factor in the economic competition with China is U.S.
domestic policy. The notion of a new “Sputnik moment”—one that galvanizes
public research as powerfully as seeing the Soviet Union launch the world’s
first satellite did—may be overstating the point, but government does have a
role to play in advancing American economic and technological leadership. Yet
the United States has turned away from precisely the kinds of ambitious
public investments it made during that period—such as the Interstate Highway
System championed by President Dwight Eisenhower and the basic research
initiatives pushed by the scientist Vannevar Bush—even as it faces a more
challenging economic competitor. Washington must dramatically increase funds
for basic science research and invest in clean energy, biotechnology,
artificial intelligence, and computing power. At the same time, the federal
government should scale up its investments in education at all levels and in
infrastructure, and it should adopt immigration policies that continue to
enhance the United States’ demographic and skills advantage. Calling for a
tougher line on China while starving public investments is self-defeating;
describing these investments as “socialist,” given the competition, is
especially ironic. Indeed, such strange ideological bedfellows as Senator
Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Marco Rubio,
Republican of Florida, are making a convincing case for a new U.S. industrial
policy.
在与中国竞争的过程中，对美国取胜最具决定意义的因素是我们在国内所采取的政策。用
“斯普特尼克时刻”对当下的情况进行描述也许显得过于夸张，不过政府的确需要为捍卫
美国在全球的经济和科技主导地位发挥作用。上世纪50年代，艾森豪威尔总统曾倡导修建
州际高速公路系统；范内瓦·布什（Vannevar Bush）作为一位科学家也提出了诸多基础
科学研究倡议，然而如今面临强大经济竞争对手的美国却已经不再进行雄心勃勃的公共投
资。华盛顿必须在清洁能源、生物技术、人工智能和超级计算机等基础科学领域大幅增加
投资。与此同时，联邦政府还应该在各级教育领域增加拨款并翻新基础设施，我们的移民
政策应有利于美国继续巩固自身的人口优势和由此带来的知识技能优势。在对中国展现更
加强硬立场的同时，美国不应减少对公共领域的投资。我们正面临来自中国的竞争，一些
人认为对公共领域的投资具有“社会主义”色彩，这是非常荒唐的。来自马萨诸塞州的民
主党参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）和来自佛罗里达州的共和党参议员马尔
科·卢比奥（Marco Rubio）是一对怪异的意识形态伙伴，他们的存在告诉我们：美国需
要新的产业政策。
On top of this domestic foundation, Washington should work with like-minded
nations to define a new set of standards on issues that the World Trade
Organization does not currently address, from state-owned enterprises to
indigenous innovation policies to digital trade. Ideally, these standards
would connect Asia and Europe. To this end, the United States should consider
starting a rules-setting initiative of market democracies layered over the
WTO system, which would fill these gaps. The logic is straightforward. If
China hopes to enjoy equal access to this new economic community, its own
economic and regulatory frameworks must meet the same standards. The combined
gravitational pull of this community would present China with a choice:
either curb its free-riding and start complying with trade rules, or accept
less favorable terms from more than half of the global economy. If Beijing
chooses to hold to the line that the necessary reforms amount to economic
regime change, it can certainly do so, but the world would be well within its
rights to offer China reciprocal treatment. In some cases, Washington may
still need to impose reciprocal measures on China unilaterally, by treating
its exports and investments the same way Beijing handles U.S. exports and
investments. These efforts will be challenging and costly, which is precisely
why the Trump administration’s decision to pick trade fights with U.S.
allies rather than rally them to a common position vis-à-vis China is such a
waste of American leverage.
在稳固国内基础的同时，华盛顿还应与具有相似价值观的伙伴国家展开合作，共同为国有
企业、本土创新政策以及数字贸易等WTO规则目前尚未触及的领域制定标准。在理想的情
况下，我们所制定的标准将通行于亚洲和欧洲。为了实现这个目标，美国应该在WTO体系
内部向奉行市场经济的民主国家就标准制定发起一项倡议，这样我们就可以填补上述标准
空缺。美国这样做的逻辑是非常清晰的：如果中国今后希望享有进入该经济体系的平等权
利，那么中国就必须让自己的经济和监管框架符合我们所制定的标准。美国与各伙伴国家
所构筑的经济体系将具有强大能量，中国将在其作用下不得不做出选择：要么对搭便车的
行为进行自我约束并遵守各国所制定的贸易规则，要么直接面对占全球近半经济总量的各
国给出的不那么优惠的贸易条件。北京当然有权利坚持“进行经济改革将变更其经济制度
”的观点，可是其他国家也有权利对北京采取相应措施。在一些情况下，华盛顿有必要在
贸易和投资领域对中国采取对等措施，然而美国这样做是有代价的，这也是我一直以来坚
持以下观点的原因：川普政府挑起与盟友的贸易摩擦却没有与盟友们联合起来共同对付中
国的做法是在浪费美国手中的牌。
The United States will also have to safeguard its technological advantages in
the face of China’s intellectual property theft, targeted industrial
policies, and commingling of its economic and security sectors. Doing so will
require some enhanced restrictions on the flow of technology investment and
trade in both directions, but these efforts should be pursued selectively
rather than wholesale, imposing curbs on technologies that are critical to
national security and human rights and allowing regular trade and investment
to continue for those that are not. Even these targeted restrictions must be
undertaken in consultation with industry and other governments; failing to do
so could Balkanize the global technology ecosystem by impeding flows of
knowledge and talent. Such a development would neutralize a key U.S.
competitive advantage relative to China: an open economy that can source the
best global talent and synthesize the biggest breakthroughs from around the
world. Meanwhile, overreach on technology restrictions could drive other
countries toward China, especially since China is already the largest trading
partner for most.
中国公司在从美国的知识产权中获利，中国制定了目标明确的产业政策，中国在推进军地
融合，在这种情况下，美国必须在中国面前确保自己的技术优势。这就要求美国对两国在
科技领域的双向投资和贸易活动加强控制，这种控制不应是全面的，而应是有选择性的。
美国应该对那些与国家安全和人权有关的技术加强控制，而与这两者无关的贸易和投资活
动不应受到影响。即便这种控制是有选择性的，在实施前，美方也必须与产业界和其他国
家的政府进行充分的沟通，否则全球技术生态将因知识和人才流动受阻而变得碎片化。如
此一来，美国相对于中国的一项关键竞争优势——开放——将被削弱。长期以来，美国开
放的经济体系能够吸引来自全球各地的人才并能够把全世界的科技创新为美国所用。此外
，对技术领域的过度控制还将把其他国家推向中国的怀抱，考虑到中国已经是全球大多数
国家最大的贸易伙伴这一事实，美国更应该把握好施加控制的范围。
In this respect, the Trump administration’s loud and largely unilateral
campaign against the participation of the Chinese company Huawei in the
development of 5G infrastructure may provide a cautionary lesson. Had the
administration coordinated with allies and partners in advance and tried some
creative policymaking—for example, establishing a multilateral lending
initiative to subsidize the purchase of alternatives to Huawei’s equipment—
it might have had more success in convincing states to consider other
vendors. It then might have been able to make the most of the two-year delay
Huawei now faces in rolling out 5G following its placement on the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s list of entities that cannot be supplied with
American technology. Future efforts to restrict trade with China in the
technology sector will require careful deliberation, advance planning, and
multilateral support if they are to be successful; otherwise, they will risk
undermining U.S. innovation.
从这一角度来看，川普政府针对参与各国5G网络建设的中国华为公司展开的过于高调的单
方面攻击为我们提供了值得汲取的教训。如果川普政府能够事先与各盟友和伙伴国家协调
立场并制定一些有创造性的政策（如提出多边借贷倡议帮助各国为通信运营商购买华为设
备的替代品提供补贴），那么美国在说服各国购买其他通信设备制造商的产品时就会有更
高胜算。如今华为已被列入美国商务部的实体清单，禁止华为设备将导致欧洲5G服务的推
出被推迟两年，若川普政府能够做到上面所提到的事情，那么美国就可以对这两年时间加
以充分利用。若要对美中在科技领域的贸易和投资活动加强控制并取得成功，川普政府就
必须仔细权衡、制定有前瞻性的计画并在多边框架内获得支持，否则美国自身的创新能力
将很可能受到伤害。
PRO-DEMOCRACY, NOT ANTI-CHINA
推进民主而不是反华
U.S.-Chinese economic and technological competition suggests an emerging
contest of models. But unlike the Cold War, with its sharp ideological divide
between two rival blocs, the lines of demarcation are fuzzier here. Although
neither Washington nor Beijing is engaging in the kind of proselytizing
characteristic of the Cold War, China may ultimately present a stronger
ideological challenge than the Soviet Union did, even if it does not
explicitly seek to export its system. If the international order is a
reflection of its most powerful states, then China’s rise to superpower
status will exert a pull toward autocracy. China’s fusion of authoritarian
capitalism and digital surveillance may prove more durable and attractive
than Marxism, and its support for autocrats and democratic backsliders will
challenge American values and provide China cover for its own egregious
practices, including the detention of more than one million ethnic Uighurs in
northwestern China. Some may question whether the erosion of democratic
governance across the world matters for U.S. interests; it does. Democratic
governments are more likely to align with American values, pursue good
governance, treat their people well, and respect other open societies, and
all of this tends to make them more trustworthy and transparent and, in turn,
better economic and security partners.
美中在经济和科技领域的竞争意味着两国正陷入一场模式之争。不过与冷战时代美苏两国
之间激烈的意识形态对抗不同，如今美中之间在意识形态领域的界限却是相对模糊的。无
论华盛顿还是北京都无意像冷战中的美苏那样在与对方接触的过程中试图改变对方。即便
中国并不寻求输出自己的模式，这个国家最终还是会成为一个比前苏联更难对付的意识形
态对手。如果说国际秩序在某种程度上可以反映这个世界上最为强大的国家的制度特征的
话，那么中国崛起为超级大国必将给国际秩序笼罩上一层其自身的色彩。一些人也许会有
疑问，西方民主制度在全世界受到侵蚀是否会对美国自身的利益造成损害呢？答案是肯定
的。民主国家更有可能与接受美国的价值观，更有可能追求良好的国家治理，更有可能善
待自己的人民，也更有可能尊重其他开放的社会，所有这一切都会让他们更透明、更值得
信赖，他们会成为美国更好的经济合作伙伴和安全合作伙伴。
Washington can best establish favorable terms of coexistence with China in
the political realm by focusing on advancing the appeal of these values for
their own sake, not to score points in the context of U.S.-Chinese
competition. As China’s presence around the world grows, the United States
should avoid a tendency that was all too common during the Cold War: to see
third countries only in terms of their relationship to a rival government.
Some of the Trump administration’s policies—such as invoking the Monroe
Doctrine in Latin America and delivering an address on Africa that is largely
about countering China—echo this old approach. A tack that intentionally
engages states on their own terms would do more to advance American interests
and values than knee-jerk responses to Chinese initiatives that leave states
feeling that Washington cares about them only as battlegrounds in its
competition with Beijing.
为了在与中国实现和平共存的过程中建立有利于美方的规则框架，华盛顿不应仅仅关注自
己在美中竞争中得分多少，而是更应关注上面提到的价值观本身。随着中国在全球影响力
的增长，美国应避免冷战时期的惯常做法（即根据一个国家与苏联的关系来制定对该国的
政策）。然而，川普政府的一些做法（诸如在拉美地区推行门罗主义或者在非洲发表针对
中国的言论）正是反映了美国的上述冷战旧习。美国应根据每个国家的不同情况与其打交
道，这将更有利于维护美国的国家利益和价值观；美国不应根据一个国家对中国倡议的反
应来制定对该国的政策，这将给各国留下一个印象：华盛顿仅仅把他们视为自己与北京竞
争时使用的战场。
China’s Belt and Road Initiative offers the most obvious opportunity to
apply this principle in practice. Rather than fight China at every turn—on
every port, bridge, and rail line—the United States and its partners should
make their own affirmative pitch to countries about the kinds of
high-quality, high-standard investments that will best serve progress.
Supporting investments not because they are anti-Chinese but because they are
pro-growth, pro-sustainability, and pro-freedom will be much more effective
over the long term—especially because China’s state-led investments have
provoked a degree of backlash in countries over cost overruns, no-bid
contracts, corruption, environmental degradation, and poor working conditions.
中国提出了“一带一路”倡议，很显然这是美国实践上述原则的好机会。美国不应在每一
个港口项目、每一个桥梁项目或每一个铁路项目上与中国博弈，美国及其伙伴国家应该向
各国阐明：只有高品质、高标准的投资才能更好地促进各国的发展。我们不应只因某项投
资对中国不利就对其提供支持，我们之所以对一项投资提供支持应该是因为它有利于维护
自由、促进经济增长和社会的可持续发展，这样做更具长远眼光-尤其是因为中国的国家
主导投资激起了一些国家的强烈反对成本超支，无报价合同，腐败，环境恶化和恶劣的工
作条件。
In this light, the best defense of democracy is to stress the values that are
essential to good governance, especially transparency and accountability, and
to support civil society, independent media, and the free flow of
information. Together, these steps could lower the risk of democratic
backsliding, improve lives in the developing world, and reduce Chinese
influence. This course of action will require an injection of multilateral
funding from the United States and its allies and partners that can give
countries genuine alternatives. But it will require something more
fundamental, too: the United States needs to have greater confidence in the
belief that investing in human capital and good governance will work out
better over the long run than China’s extractive approach.
从这一角度来看，良好的国家治理（尤其是政府问责机制和施政透明度）、公民社会、独
立媒体以及信息的自由传播是我们应该着重坚持的价值观，这是对民主制度最好的维护。
这将降低民主倒退的风险、改善发展中国家民众的生活并削弱中国的影响力。美国及其盟
国和伙伴国家应为此建立一个多边的基金，世界各国将因此获得中国倡议之外一个真正的
替代方案。不过，我们还需要从更根本的层面做出改变：美国应该对良好的国家治理和投
资人力资本有更坚定的信心，坚信这一路径从长远来看会比中国方案更有利于各国的发展
。
Focusing on principles rather than scorekeeping will also be essential for
setting norms for new technologies that raise hard questions about human
ethics. From artificial intelligence to biotechnology, autonomous weapons to
gene-edited humans, there will be a crucial struggle in the years ahead to
define appropriate conduct and then pressure laggards to get in line.
Washington should start shaping the parameters of these debates without
further delay. Finally, coexistence with China does not, and cannot, preclude
the United States from speaking out against China’s egregious and inhumane
treatment of its own citizens and the arbitrary detention of foreign
nongovernmental organization workers. The West’s relative silence on Beijing
’s internment of Uighurs has left a moral stain, and so the United States
and its partners should mobilize international pressure to demand neutral
third-party access to those who are detained and the sanctioning of the
individuals and companies that are complicit in the detention. China may well
threaten that such pressure will destabilize ties. Yet Washington should make
speaking out on human rights abuses a predictable and routine part of the
relationship.
新技术已经在人类伦理方面向我们提出了严峻课题。我们应坚持原则而不是仅在意一时的
得分多少，这对美国在新技术领域制定规则至关重要。从人工智能到生物技术，从自主武
器到人类基因编辑，在为上述新技术领域制定行为规则时，我们将在未来几年里面临激烈
的斗争，而且在取胜后我们还需要对不遵守规则的参与方施加压力以进行规管。华盛顿不
应再浪费时间，我们必须尽快启动规则的制定工作。最后，与中国共存不会也不能阻止美
国大声疾呼反对中国对本国公民的残酷和不人道待遇以及对外国非政府组织工人的任意拘
留。西方对北京维吾尔人被拘禁的相对沉默已经留下了道德上的污点，因此美国及其伙伴
应动员国际压力，要求中立的第三方进入被拘留者的行列，并要求制裁同谋的个人和公司
。中国很可能警告施压将破坏两国关系的稳定。但是华盛顿应该使对侵犯人权的批评成为
双边关系中常规可预测一部分。
SEQUENCING COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
竞争与合作
It is often taken as an article of faith that as the U.S.-Chinese
relationship becomes more competitive, the space for cooperation will shrink,
if not disappear. But even as adversaries, the United States and the Soviet
Union found ways to cooperate on a number of issues, including space
exploration, contagious diseases, the environment, and the global commons.
The need for cooperation between Washington and Beijing is far more acute,
given the nature of contemporary challenges. Leaders in both countries should
consider cooperation on such transnational challenges not as a concession by
one party but as an essential need for both.
人们一般认为，随着美中关系中竞争的火药味越来越浓，合作的空间即便不消失也将受到
严重挤压。然而冷战时期的美苏两国即便作为宿敌也曾在太空探索、传染性疾病防治、环
境保护等很多领域里展开合作。鉴于当今人类所面临的严峻挑战，与冷战时代相比，如今
华盛顿和北京更加迫切地需要合作。两国领导人应该将诸多跨国性问题纳入合作框架，这
不是其中一方让步与否的问题，合作是双方的共同需要。
To get the balance between cooperation and competition right, Washington has
to consider the sequencing of each. The United States has historically sought
to cooperate first and compete second with China. Beijing, meanwhile, has
become quite comfortable competing first and cooperating second, linking—
either explicitly or implicitly—offers of cooperation to U.S. concessions in
areas of strategic interest.
若要在合作与竞争中间找到合适的平衡点，华盛顿必须为何者为主、何者为辅作出安排。
从历史上看，美国一直力求与中国合作，其次才是竞争。同时，北京已经变得相当习惯于
首先竞争，然后进行合作，将合作提议与战略利益领域的美国特许权（无论是明示还是暗
含的）联系起来。
Going forward, Washington should avoid becoming an eager suitor on
transnational challenges. Eagerness can actually limit the scope for
cooperation by making it a bargaining chip. Although it may seem
counterintuitive, competition is likely essential to effective cooperation
with Beijing. In the zero-sum strategic mindset of many Chinese officials,
perceptions of U.S. power and resolve matter enormously, and the Chinese
bureaucracy has long focused on shifts in both. Given this sensitivity, it
can be as important for Washington to demonstrate an ability to stand firm,
and even to impose costs, as it is for it to speak earnestly about finding
common cause. The best approach, then, will be to lead with competition,
follow with offers of cooperation, and refuse to negotiate any linkages
between Chinese assistance on global challenges and concessions on U.S.
interests.
展望未来，华盛顿应避免在解决诸多跨国性问题时过于主动地向中方寻求合作。美方态度
过于主动将给予中方讨价还价的筹码，事实上这反而会给双方的合作范围造成限制。虽然
听起来有些与直觉不符，竞争却是实现与北京合作的必要之举。许多信奉零和战略思维的
中国人一直很重视研究美国的实力和决心，而中国一直以来也很关注如何对这两者施加影
响。鉴于这个问题的敏感性，华盛顿应该在北京面前展现自己坚定的立场，甚至让北京付
出一定代价。这样做非常重要，甚至与以恳切的态度寻求与北京展开合作同样重要。因此
，最佳的战略是以竞争为主导，辅之以合作意愿。美国不应为了争取中国在一些全球性问
题上的协作而在国家利益上作出让步。
BEYOND THE BILATERAL
超越美中双边关系的更大视野
There is one other lesson of the Cold War that U.S. policymakers should keep
top of mind: that one of the United States’ greatest strengths in its
competition with China has less to do with the two countries than with
everyone else. The combined weight of U.S. allies and partners can shape China
’s choices across all domains—but only if Washington deepens all those
relationships and works to tie them together. Although much of the discussion
on U.S.-Chinese competition focuses on its bilateral dimension, the United
States will ultimately need to embed its China strategy in a dense network of
relationships and institutions in Asia and the rest of the world.
美国决策者可以从冷战中汲取许多经验教训，应该被牢记的一点是：美国在与中国竞争时
的一项最大优势并非限于美中双边范畴，而是超越了这个范畴。美国与盟友和伙伴国家所
形成的合力能够在所有领域对中国的行为施加影响，这意味着华盛顿必须深化与盟友和伙
伴国家之间的关系并把所有这些关系编织在一起。虽然涉及美中竞争的许多讨论都落入双
边范畴，然而美国最终还是需要将对华战略融入到自己在亚洲及全世界打造的绵密的关系
网络和机制网络中。
This is a lesson that the Trump administration would do well to remember.
Instead of harnessing these enduring advantages, it has alienated many of the
United States’ traditional friends—with tariffs, demands of payment for
military bases, and much more—and abandoned or undermined key institutions
and agreements. Many international organizations, from the UN and the World
Bank to the World Trade Organization, are institutions that the United States
helped design and lead and that have established widely accepted rules of the
road on such issues as freedom of navigation, transparency, dispute
resolution, and trade. Retreating from these institutions provides short-term
leeway and flexibility at the cost of long-term U.S. influence and allows
Beijing to reshape norms and expand its own influence within those
organizations.
川普政府最好能记住这一点。川普并未充分利用美国的上述长期优势，他反而通过军事基
地经费分担比例、关税等问题让很多传统盟友越来越疏远美国，更加恶劣的是，他还放弃
或削弱了许多美国参与其中的国际机制和国际协议。从联合国到世界银行再到世界贸易组
织，许多国际机构都是美国参与设计并主导的，这些国际机构在航行自由、军事透明、争
端解决、贸易政策等领域制定了广为世界各国所接受的原则。从上述机构中抽身离开也许
能让美国获得短期的回旋空间和政策灵活性，但代价是美国的长期影响力将遭到削弱，而
北京也将借机在上述机构中重塑各种原则和规范并扩张自己的影响力。
The United States needs to get back to seeing alliances as assets to be
invested in rather than costs to be cut. In the absence of any meaningful
capacity to build its own network of capable allies, Beijing would like
nothing more than for the United States to squander this long-term advantage.
Establishing clear-eyed coexistence wit