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kwei (光影)
2019-12-02 10:18:29America’s War on Chinese Technology
美国的反中国科技战
原文：Project Syndicat - https://tinyurl.com/umjqsh8
作者：Jeffrey Sachs
哥伦比亚大学管理学教授
译文：联合早报 - http://www.uzbcn.com/mon/keji/20191130/64519.html
The worst foreign-policy decision by the United States of the last generation
– and perhaps longer – was the “war of choice” that it launched in Iraq
in 2003 for the stated purpose of eliminating weapons of mass destruction
that did not, in fact, exist. Understanding the illogic behind that
disastrous decision has never been more relevant, because it is being used to
justify a similarly misguided US policy today.
美国上一代人，甚至包括更前几代人所做出的最糟糕外交政策决定，是2003年对伊拉克发
动的“选择之战”（war of choice），其所宣称的目的是消除实际上并不存在的大规模
杀伤性武器。理解这一灾难性决策背后的错误逻辑，从未像现在这样重要，因为同样的逻
辑正被用来为美国当下类似的误导性政策辩护。
The decision to invade Iraq followed the illogic of then-US Vice President
Richard Cheney, who declared that even if the risk of WMDs falling into
terrorist hands was tiny – say, 1% – we should act as if that scenario
would certainly occur.
入侵伊拉克的决定是在时任美国副总统钱尼（Richard Cheney）的错误逻辑下做出的。他
声称，即便大规模杀伤性武器落入恐怖分子之手的风险很小（比如1%），我们也应该将这
种情况当作肯定会发生，并据此采取行动。
Such reasoning is guaranteed to lead to wrong decisions more often than not.
Yet the US and some of its allies are now using the Cheney Doctrine to attack
Chinese technology. The US government argues that because we can’t know with
certainty that Chinese technologies are safe, we should act as if they are
certainly dangerous and bar them.
这种推理方式往往会导致错误的决策。然而，美国及其一些盟国现正利用“钱尼主义”（
Cheney Doctrine）来攻击中国科技。按照美国政府的说法，既然我们无法确切地知道中
国科技是安全的，我们应该把它们当作必然有害那样去应对，并予以封杀。
Proper decision-making applies probability estimates to alternative actions.
A generation ago, US policymakers should have considered not only the
(alleged) 1% risk of WMDs falling into terrorist hands, but also the 99% risk
of a war based on flawed premises. By focusing only on the 1% risk, Cheney
(and many others) distracted the public’s attention from the much greater
likelihood that the Iraq War lacked justification and that it would gravely
destabilize the Middle East and global politics.
正确的决策会将概率估计应用于各项替代的行动。一代人以前，美国的政策制定者不仅应
该考虑大规模杀伤性武器落入恐怖分子之手的所谓1%风险，还应考虑基于多个有缺陷的前
提发动一场战争的99%风险。钱尼以及其他许多人只关注1%的风险，从而分散了公众的注
意力，使人们忽略了一个更大的可能性：伊拉克战争缺乏正当理由，而且会严重破坏中东
和全球政治的稳定。
The problem with the Cheney Doctrine is not only that it dictates taking
actions predicated on small risks without considering the potentially very
high costs. Politicians are tempted to whip up fears for ulterior purposes.
钱尼主义的问题不仅在于它单凭微小的风险就决定采取行动，却未考虑极高的潜在成本，
还在于政客会为了不可告人的目的而想要煽动恐惧。
That is what US leaders are doing again: creating a panic over Chinese
technology companies by raising, and exaggerating, tiny risks. The most
pertinent case (but not the only one) is the US government attack on the
wireless broadband company Huawei. The US is closing its markets to the
company and trying hard to shut down its business around the world. As with
Iraq, the US could end up creating a geopolitical disaster for no reason.
这就是美国领导人又一次在做的事情：通过指出和夸大一些微小风险，来激起对中国科技
企业的恐慌。与此最为相关（但不是唯一）的案例，是美国政府对通信科技企业华为的攻
击。美国正在逐步对该公司关闭其国内市场，并努力扼杀其全球业务。与伊拉克一样，美
国可能最终会造成一场毫无来由的地缘政治灾难。
I have followed Huawei’s technological advances and work in developing
countries, as I believe that 5G and other digital technologies offer a huge
boost to ending poverty and other SDGs. I have similarly interacted with
other telecoms companies and encouraged the industry to step up actions for
the SDGs. When I wrote a short foreword (without compensation) for a Huawei
report on the topic, and was criticized by foes of China, I asked top
industry and government officials for evidence of wayward activities by
Huawei. I heard repeatedly that Huawei behaves no differently than trusted
industry leaders.
我在发展中国家工作过，也一直在关注华为所取得的技术进步，因为我相信5G以及其他数
码科技能为消除贫困，以及其他联合国可持续发展目标的实现提供巨大推动力。我也与其
他电信企业进行了类似的互动，并鼓励业界加强针对可持续发展目标的行动。当我无偿地
为华为围绕该主题所做的一份报告撰写了一篇简短前言，而遭到敌视中国者的批评时，我
向行业高层和政府官员询问，是否有证据证明华为有任何出格行为，而反复得到的答案是
华为的操行，与其他值得信赖的行业领导者别无二致。
The US government nonetheless argues that Huawei’s 5G equipment could
undermine global security. A “backdoor” in Huawei’s software or hardware,
US officials claim, could enable the Chinese government to engage in
surveillance around the world. After all, US officials note, China’s laws
require Chinese companies to cooperate with the government for purposes of
national security.
尽管如此，美国政府仍认为华为的5G设备可能损害全球安全。美国官员声称，华为软件或
硬件所保留的“后门”，可能使中国政府能够在全球范围内进行监视。他们指出，毕竟中
国的法律要求中国企业出于国家安全理由与政府合作。
Now, the facts are these. Huawei’s 5G equipment is low cost and high
quality, currently ahead of many competitors, and already rolling out. Its
high performance results from years of substantial spending on research and
development, scale economies, and learning by doing in the Chinese digital
marketplace. Given the technology’s importance for their sustainable
development, low-income economies around the world would be foolhardy to
reject an early 5G rollout.
但是，事实摆在眼前。华为的5G设备价格低廉，品质优良，目前领先于许多竞争对手并且
已经开始推广。它的高性能源自多年来在研发上的巨额投入、规模经济效应，以及在中国
数码市场上的摸爬滚打。考虑到该技术对其可持续发展的重要性，世界各地的低收入经济
体如果拒绝早日推出5G，就显然太过不智了。
Yet, despite providing no evidence of backdoors, the US is telling the world
to stay away from Huawei. The US claims are generic. As a US Federal
Communications Commissioner put it, “The country that owns 5G will own
innovations and set the standards for the rest of the world and that country
is currently not likely to be the United States.” Other countries, most
notably the United Kingdom, have found no backdoors in Huawei’s hardware and
software. Even if backdoors were discovered later, they could almost surely
be closed at that point.
然而，尽管拿不出任何后门存在的证据，但美国仍在游说世界远离华为。美国的说法是普
适性的。正如一名美国联邦通信委员会官员所言：“拥有5G的国家，将拥有相关创新并为
世界其他地区设定标准，而这个国家目前不太可能是美国。”其他国家，尤其是英国尚未
在华为的软硬件中找到任何后门。即便将来发现后门，也几乎肯定可以在那时将其关闭。
The debate over Huawei rages in Germany, where the US government threatens to
curtail intelligence cooperation unless the authorities exclude Huawei’s 5G
technology. Perhaps as a result of the US pressure, Germany’s spy chief
recently made a claim tantamount to the Cheney Doctrine: “Infrastructure is
not a suitable area for a group that cannot be trusted fully.” He offered no
evidence of specific misdeeds. Chancellor Angela Merkel, by contrast, is
fighting behind the scenes to leave the market open for Huawei.
关于华为的辩论在德国也甚嚣尘上，因为美国政府威胁，除非当局将华为的5G技术挡在门
外，否则要减少情报合作。或许是迫于美国的压力，德国联邦情报局局长卡尔最近发表了
一个类似钱尼主义的声明：“基础设施不是一个适合让一个无法被完全信任的群体涉足的
领域。”而他也没能拿出任何具体罪行的证据。相比之下，总理默克尔则在幕后争取为华
为开放市场。
Ironically, though predictably, the US complaints partly reflect America’s
own surveillance activities at home and abroad. Chinese equipment might make
secret surveillance by the US government more difficult. But unwarranted
surveillance by any government should be ended. Independent United Nations
monitoring to curtail such activities should become part of the global
telecoms system. In short, we should choose diplomacy and institutional
safeguards, not a technology war.
然而，讽刺的是，美国的抱怨其实部分反映了美国自己在国内外的监视活动，虽然这早已
不是新闻。中国设备可能会使美国政府更加难以进行秘密监视。但是，任何政府的非正当
监视行为都应该停止。联合国为减少此类活动而进行的独立监督，应成为全球电信体系的
一部分。简而言之，我们应该选择外交和体制保障，而不是去打科技战。
The threat of US demands to blockade Huawei concerns more than the early
rollout of the 5G network. The risks to the rules-based trading system are
profound. Now that the US is no longer the world’s undisputed technology
leader, US President Donald Trump and his advisers don’t want to compete
according to a rules-based system. Their goal is to contain China’s
technological rise. Their simultaneous attempt to neutralize the World Trade
Organization by disabling its dispute settlement system shows the same
disdain for global rules.
美国要求封杀华为的威胁，并不仅仅关系到5G网络的早日推出，也对基于规则的交易系统
造成巨大的风险。如今美国已不再是全球无可争议的技术领导者，美国总统川普和他的顾
问都不想按照基于规则的体系去展开竞争，他们的目标是遏制中国的技术性崛起。他们同
时还试图通过瘫痪世界贸易组织的争端解决机制来抹杀该组织，而此举同样体现出他们对
全球规则的漠视。
If the Trump administration “succeeds” in dividing the world into separate
technology camps, the risks of future conflicts will multiply. The US
championed open trade after World War II not only to boost global efficiency
and expand markets for American technology, but also to reverse the collapse
of international trade in the 1930s. That collapse stemmed in part from
protectionist tariffs imposed by the US under the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act,
which amplified the Great Depression, in turn contributing to the rise of
Hitler and, ultimately, the outbreak of World War II.
如果川普政府能“成功”将世界分割为不同的技术阵营，则未来爆发冲突的风险将成倍增
加。二战后美国推崇开放贸易，不仅是为了提高全球效率，扩大美国技术市场，也为了扭
转1930年代国际贸易的崩溃状态。该次崩溃的部分原因则是美国根据1930年《斯姆特－霍
利法案》（Smoot-Hawley Act）征收的保护主义关税，该关税加剧了大萧条，进而促成了
希特勒的崛起，并最终推动了第二次世界大战的爆发。
In international affairs, no less than in other domains, stoking fears and
acting on them, rather than on the evidence, is the path to ruin. Let’s
stick to rationality, evidence, and rules as the safest course of action. And
let us create independent monitors to curtail the threat of any country using
global networks for surveillance of or cyberwarfare on others. That way, the
world can get on with the urgent task of harnessing breakthrough digital
technologies for the global good.
正如其他领域一样，在国际事务领域激发恐惧并藉以采取行动，而不是遵循证据行事，是
条迈向毁灭之路。让我们坚持理性、证据和规则，这是最安全的做法。让我们设立独立监
控机构，以减少任何国家利用全球网络监视其他国家或发动网络战的威胁。这样一来，世
界就可以赶紧利用突破性数码科技来促进全球福祉。