Donald Trump should know, the world cannot afford another Thirty Years' War
(川普须知世界无法承受另一个30年战争)
原文网址：https://tinyurl.com/y3lav93s
中译：https://www.guancha.cn/NiEr-FuGeSen/2019_06_14_505078.shtml
Niall Ferguson
哈佛大学历史讲座教授
History suggests the US-China conflict will need a Westphalian resolution
(历史显示美中冲突将需要一个威斯特伐利亚和约)
Regular readers of this column will not have been surprised by the outbreak
of the Second Cold War. Ever since Donald Trump imposed the first tariffs on
Chinese imports last year, I have argued that the trade war between the
United States and China would last longer than most people expected and that
it would escalate into other forms of warfare.
(本专栏的老读者们并不会对第二次冷战的爆发感到意外。自从唐纳德·川普去年首次对
中国进口商品加征关税以来，我一直认为，美国和中国之间的贸易战将比大多数人预期的
持续时间更长，并且冲突会进一步升级并在其他领域表现出来。)
The tech war — exemplified by last week’s US measures against the Chinese
telecoms company Huawei — is now in full swing. The passage of the destroyer
USS Preble through the Taiwan Strait was a reminder that shows of military
force are also part and parcel of a cold war. And the propaganda war is now
well under way, too, with Chinese state television digging out old Korean War
films in which the Americans are the bad guys.
(以5月美国对中国电信设备制造商华为公司所采取的措施为例，这场科技战争目前正在全
面展开。美国驱逐舰USS Preble通过台湾海峡的举动提醒人们，展示军事力量也是冷战的
重要组成部分。随着中国国家电视台重新播放抗美援朝老电影并展现其中扮演坏人角色的
美国人形象，宣传战也在如火如荼地进行。)
If you still think peace will break out when Trump meets Xi Jinping at the
G20 summit in Osaka next month, you’re in for a disappointment. Zhang
Yansheng, chief researcher at the China Centre for International Economic
Exchanges in Beijing, predicted last week that the friction could continue at
this level until 2025.
(如果你仍然认为下个月在大阪举行的G20峰会上，川普与习近平会面时会实现和平，那你
一定会失望。位于北京的中国国际经济交流中心的首席研究员张燕生上周预测，中美之间
的摩擦可能会持续到2025年。)
Historical analogies are powerful. More than any formal model from the social
sciences, they help us make sense of contemporary events. As the former US
defence secretary Ash Carter said at the recent applied-history conference at
Harvard, in the corridors of power “real people talk history, not economics,
political science or IR [international relations]”. The first question they
ask is: what is this like? And, yes, this sudden escalation of Sino-American
antagonism is a lot like the early phase of the Cold War.
(历史类比是强有力的，它们比任何来自社会科学的形式模型都更能帮助我们理解当代事
件。正如美国前国防部长Ash Carter最近在哈佛大学召开的应用历史学会议上所提到的：
在权力的舞台上，“真正的人物喜欢谈论历史，而不是政治、经济或国际关系”。是的，
这种美中对抗的突然升级很像冷战的早期症状。)
But the next question the applied historian asks is: what are the
differences? Before the idea of the Second Cold War gets so well established
that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, it’s time to take a step back
and acknowledge that 2019 isn’t 1949, not least because of the profound
economic, social and cultural entanglement of America and China, which is
quite unlike the almost total separation of the United States from the Soviet
Union 70 years ago.
(但应用历史学家提出的下一个问题是：它们之间有什么区别？之前第二次冷战的想法变
得根深蒂固，以至于在它成为一个自我实现的预言之前，是时候后退一步，承认2019年不
是1949年，尤其是因为现在美中两国深陷在政治、经济、社会和文化的摩擦之中，这与70
年前苏联与美国几乎完全分离的情况是非常不同的。)
The networked world forged by decades of commercial aviation, globally
integrated markets for commodities, manufactures, labour and capital and —
above all — the internet is radically different from the segmented and
half-ruined world that Harry Truman and Joseph Stalin carved up between them.
In the late 1940s it was possible for Soviet Russia to bring down Winston
Churchill’s metaphorical Iron Curtain because the limited channels of
communication between eastern and western Europe were so easy to shut down.
Although the phrase “digital Iron Curtain” is doing the rounds, I am
frankly doubtful that such a severance of ties is possible today.
(几十年来，商业飞行、大宗商品贸易、制造业、劳动力和资本的全球一体化，以及最重
要的互联网，这些为我们造就了一个网络化的世界，与杜鲁门和斯大林瓜分的那个四分五
裂、几近毁灭的世界截然不同。上世纪40年代末，有可能打造丘吉尔所比喻的铁幕，因为
东欧和西欧之间有限的沟通渠道很容易被关闭。尽管“数字铁幕”一词正在流传，但坦率
地说，我很怀疑如今美中之间这种关系的中断是否有任何可能性。)
Because the internet and the smartphone have enlarged, accelerated and
empowered social networks in the same way as the printing press did in the
16th and 17th centuries, today’s strategic rivalry is being played out in a
near-borderless world, altogether different from the world of early John le
Carré.
(由于互联网和智能手机已经获得了广泛应用，像16、17世纪的印刷媒体一样加速和增强
了社会网络，今天的战略竞争正在一个近乎无国界的世界中展开，这与昔日的世界完全不
同。)
The 17th century had it all: climate change (the Little Ice Age that often
froze the Thames), refugee crises (as Protestant zealots crossed the
Atlantic), extreme views (as Catholics and Protestants sought to smear one
another) and fake news (as witch-finders condemned thousands of innocent
people to death). But its most familiar feature to our eyes is the erosion of
state sovereignty.
(17世纪发生了很多事情：气候变化(使泰晤士河经常结冰的小冰河期)、难民危机(如新教
徒狂热分子横渡大西洋)、极端观点(如天主教徒和新教徒试图互相诋毁)和假新闻(如女巫
发现者造成成千上万无辜的人被处死)。但在我们看来，它最熟悉的特征是对国家主权的
侵蚀。)
Catholics and Lutherans had been given a certain amount of clarity by the
Peace of Augsburg of 1555, which left it to each individual prince to decide
the denomination of his realm without fear of outside interference. But that
principle seemed under threat by the early 1600s. In any case, it had created
an incentive for the proponents of the Counter-Reformation to replace
Protestant rulers with Catholic ones. The war of religion had no respect for
borders: Jesuits infiltrated Protestant England just as Russian trolls now
meddle in western democracies.
(1555年的《奥格斯堡和约》为天主教徒和路德宗新教徒明确了一点，即每个诸侯有决定其
领地内宗教教派的权力，无需担心受到外来干涉。但到了17世纪初，这一原则似乎受到了
威胁，它变相鼓励反宗教改革势力拥立信仰天主教的统治者，来取代信仰新教的统治者。
宗教战争根本不管什么边界不边界：天主教的耶稣会渗透了信奉新教的英格兰，跟今天俄
罗斯网络水军干涉西方民主国家没什么两样。)
The Thirty Years’ War was as much about power as it was about religion,
however. Unlike the Cold War, which was waged by two superpowers, it was a
multiplayer game. The Holy Roman Emperor sought to reimpose Catholicism on
Bohemia. Spain wanted to bring the rebellious Dutch back under Habsburg rule.
Despite being Catholic, France sought to challenge the power of both Spain
and Austria. Sweden seized the moment to thrust boldly southwards. Although
also Lutheran, Denmark ended up as Sweden’s foe. Although also Catholic,
Portugal threw off Spanish rule.
(然而，三十年战争既是一场宗教战争，也是一场权力战争。它与由美苏两个超级大国发动
的冷战不同，它是一场多人游戏。神圣罗马帝国皇帝试图强迫波希米亚重新尊奉天主教。
西班牙想让叛逆的荷兰人回归哈布斯堡王朝的统治。法国尽管是天主教国家，却试图挑战
西班牙和奥地利的权力。瑞典抓住时机大胆地向南推进。丹麦虽与瑞典同属新教路德宗，
却成了瑞典的敌人。尽管葡萄牙和西班牙一样也信天主教，它却摆脱了后者的统治。)
In the same way, today’s world is not bipolar. America may tell others to
boycott Huawei, but not all Europeans will comply. China is the biggest
economy in Asia, but it does not control India.
(同样，当今世界也不是两极的——美国可能会告诉自己的盟友抵制华为，但不是所有欧
洲国家都会遵从美国的旨意；中国的确是亚洲最大的经济体，但它也无法支配印度。)
The Cold War created vast tank armies and nuclear arsenals, pointed at each
other but never used. The Thirty Years’ War was a time of terrorism and
gruesome violence, with no clear distinction between soldiers and civilians.
(Think Syria today.) Then, as now, the worst-affected areas suffered death
and depopulation. There was no deterrence then, just as there is none now in
cyber-warfare. Indeed, states tended to underestimate the costs of getting
involved in the conflict. Both Britain and France did so — only to slide
into civil war.
(冷战创造了庞大的坦克部队和核武库，它们相互瞄准，但从未使用过。30年战争是一个
充满恐怖主义和可怕暴力的时代，士兵和平民之间没有明显的区别(想想今天的叙利亚)。
当时和现在一样，受影响最严重的地区遭受了死亡和人口减少。当时没有威慑，就像网络
战现在没有威慑一样。事实上，各国往往低估了卷入冲突的成本。英国和法国都这样做了
，结果却陷入了内战。)
The implications of this analogy are not cheering. The sole consolation I can
offer is that, thanks to technology, most things nowadays happen roughly 10
times faster than they did 400 years ago. So we may be heading for a Three
Years’ War, rather than a Thirty Years’ War. Either way, we need to learn
how to end such a conflict.
(这个类比的含义并不令人高兴。唯一能让我感到安慰的是，多亏了科技，如今大多数事
情的发生速度比400年前快了大约10倍。因此，我们可能正在走向一场持续3年的战争，而
不是30年的战争。无论哪种方式，我们都需要学习如何结束这样的冲突。)
The end of the Thirty Years’ War was not brought about by one treaty, but by
several, of which the most important were signed at Münster and Osnabrück
in October 1648. It is these treaties that historians refer to as the Peace
of Westphalia. Contrary to legend, they did not make peace, as France and
Spain kept fighting for 11 more years. And they certainly did not establish a
world order based on modern states.
(30年战争的结束不是由一个条约带来的，而是由几个条约带来的，其中最重要的是1648
年10月在明斯特和奥斯纳布吕克签署的《明斯特和约》与《奥斯纳布吕克条约》。正是这
些条约被历史学家称为《威斯特伐利亚和约》。与传说相反的是，它们没有缔造和平，因
为法国和西班牙又打了11年的仗。他们当然没有建立一个以现代国家为基础的世界秩序。
)
What the Westphalian settlement did was to establish power-sharing
arrangements between the emperor and the German princes, as well as between
the rival religious groups, on the basis of limited and conditional rights.
The peace as a whole was underpinned by mutual guarantees, as opposed to the
third-party guarantees that had been the norm before.
(威斯特伐利亚协议所做的是在有限和有条件的权利的基础上，在皇帝和德国诸侯之间以
及敌对的宗教团体之间建立权力分享安排。和平作为一个整体是以相互保证为基础的，而
不是以之前作为规范的第三方保证为基础。)
The Cold War ended when one side folded. That will not happen in our time.
The democratic and authoritarian powers can fight for three or 30 years;
neither side will win a definitive victory. Sooner or later there will have
to be a compromise — in particular, a self-restraining commitment not to
take full advantage of modern technology to hollow out each other’s
sovereignty.
(美苏冷战是以一方屈服而告终的。这样的结局不会出现在我们的时代。民主国家和威权国
家之间可能较量三年或三十年，仍然没有哪一方赢得决定性胜利。迟早有一天，双方不得
不达成妥协——具体而言，就是要恪守自我约束的承诺，不充分利用现代技术来挖空对方
的主权。)
Our destination is 1648, not 1989 — a Cyber-Westphalia, not the fall of the
Great Firewall of China. If we have the option to get there in three years,
rather than in 30, we should take it.
(我们要去的未来应该是1648年，而不是1989年。我们要争取的是网络版的《威斯特伐利亚
和约》，而不是拆掉所谓的防火长城。如果可以选择的话，我们当然应该在三年内，而不
是三十年内，实现这一目标。)