标题: Blanket bans on Chinese tech companies like Huawei make no sense
Technical judgments should be made on a clear-eyed view of the potential
threat
(对中国科技公司如华为的全面禁令毫无意义
技术判断应该基于对潜在威胁的清晰认识)
新闻来源: 原文 https://goo.gl/isZ6iG
(原网址有时会要求订阅，试着由google搜索进 https://goo.gl/ygb3Rz )
(括号内为我的翻译)
The chorus of voices calling for Chinese companies to be frozen out of
telecoms in western countries, especially future 5G networks, seems to grow
daily. They cite a variety of concerns from cyber espionage to the dominance
of the Chinese technology sector, underpinned by fears about the direction of
China’s foreign policy.
(冻结中国企业在西方国家的通信业务，特别是有关未来5G网络的呼声似乎每天都在增长
。人们引证了各种担忧，从网络间谍活动到中国科技行业的主导地位，以及对中国外交政
策方向的恐惧。)
All this is lumped together into a perceived cyber threat, which can only be
met by a blanket ban. But these arguments are short on technical
understanding of cyber security and the complexities of 5G architecture.
(所有这一切都被归为一种感觉有这么回事的网络威胁，而且只有全面禁止它一途。但这
些论点缺乏对网络安全和5G架构复杂性的技术理解。)
The allegations of sanctions evasion levelled against Huawei are not trivial.
If proven, no doubt the company will face the penalties for sanctions-busting
that others have in recent years, including some household names in UK
banking. It may leave the company with work to do to restore its corporate
reputation, but it has nothing to do with telephony or cyber attacks.
(针对华为违反禁令的指控并非微不足道。如果得到证实，毫无疑问地，该公司将面临对
近年来其他违反禁令的公司同样的处罚，像一些家喻户晓的英国银行。它可能会使公司得
做一些事以恢复其企业声誉，但这与电话或网络攻击无关。)
US President Donald Trump’s disarmingly open statement that he might make
the extradition of Huawei’s chief financial officer from Canada part of a
trade deal, has reinforced the view that there is a wider geopolitical
campaign in play. That will certainly have been the impression in Beijing,
and possibly in Ottawa. Whether or not we sympathise with the Trump
administration’s ambitions on trade, this again has nothing to do with
telephony or cyber.
( 美国总统唐纳德川普公开声明，他可能会将自加拿大引渡华为首席财务官作为贸易谈判
的一部分，这加强了这样一种观点，即有更广泛的地缘政治竞争在起作用。那肯定会给北
京和渥太华带来这种印象。而无论我们是否对川普政府在贸易上的企图心有所共鸣，这依
然与电话或网络无关。 )
In assessing what the actual risk from Chinese tech may be, the UK has a
unique advantage. The GCHQ-vetted facility, which has been evaluating Huawei’
s presence in UK telecom networks for some years, has given us a detailed
insight into the company’s hardware, code, processes and policies. No other
western government has this. Based on this expert analysis, the National
Cyber Security Centre has been blunt about Huawei’s shortcomings in security
engineering and in its general attitude to cyber security. It is right to
confront Huawei on this, even though its failures are not unique, as those
who experienced the O2 mobile network outage in the UK last December will
appreciate. Huawei has reportedly promised to address the criticisms and to
spend huge sums doing so. The NCSC should wait and see how well it delivers.
( 在评估中国科技的实际风险时，英国具有独特的优势。政府通讯总部 (GCHQ)审查机构
多年来一直在评估华为产品在英国电信网络中的存在，这使我们能够详细了解该公司的硬
体，代码，流程和政策。没有其他西方政府有这个机会。根据这一专业分析，国家网络安
全中心(NCSC)一直对华为在安全工程方面的缺陷以及对网络安全的态度直言不讳。对华为
直来直往是正确的。尽管如此，华为仍不止一次出差错，去年12月在英国经历过O2移动网
络中断的人会了解这一点。据报导，华为承诺解决这些批评并花费巨额资金。 NCSC应该
等待，看看它的表现如何。 )
The key point here, obscured by the growing hysteria over Chinese tech, is
that the NCSC has never found evidence of malicious Chinese state cyber
activity through Huawei. It is not naive: it has, for example, pointed to the
scale of Chinese state-linked cyber espionage through attacks on IT-managed
service providers around the world. But the fact that these attacks did not
require the manipulation of Chinese sovereign companies such as Huawei merely
underlines how ineffective a blanket security ban based on company national
flags is likely to be.
( 尽管被对中国科技日益增长的歇斯底里情绪所掩盖，但真正关键点是，NCSC从未发现中
国国家网络通过华为进行恶意活动的证据。NCSC并不天真：例如，NCSC经由对世界各地IT
管理服务提供商的攻击行为中，指出了中国与国家相关的网络间谍活动的规模。但事实上
，实施这些攻击不需要操纵像华为等的中国主权公司。这个事实强调了基于公司的国旗而
全面禁止该公司的安全措施很可能无效。)
Instead we should make technical judgments based on a clear-eyed view of the
potential threat. Those who are now running for cover from Chinese companies,
having welcomed their inward investment in recent years, behave as if we had
only just discovered that China was governed by a Communist party that has
reach, if it wishes, into every part of the Chinese private sector. But most
of us had priced that into our threat calculations long ago; I expect China
does the same in reverse.
( 相反，我们应该清楚看见潜在威胁并据此做出技术上的判断。那些正在保护自己，以避
免中国公司对其内部投资的人，表现得好像我们才刚刚发现，中国的统治者是一个可以将
手伸入私企内部每个角落的共产党一样。其实我们大多数人早就将其代价纳入我们对威胁
的考量，而我预期中国也同样将我们的考量纳入算计。)
If we are clear about the potential for a Chinese government to use this
reach at some stage in the future to exert leverage in telecoms, we need to
take that possibility into account in allowing access, and, when we construct
our networks, to make sure it does not matter. That is what happened with 3G
and 4G and explains why there were restrictions on Huawei access to the “core
” of the UK networks.
( 如果我们清楚中国政府有可能在未来的某个阶段利用这种通信技术的影响力，我们需要
在允许存取时考虑到这种可能性，并且当我们建立网络时，要确保这种影响力的无效。这
就是在3G和4G时的情况，这也说明了为什么华为被限制访问英国网络的“核心”。)
The stakes are higher for 5G because so much could depend on these new
networks, from future healthcare services to transport, and because 5G has
very significant architectural differences that complicate security
regulation. There will need to be sensible restrictions on exactly where
foreign technology is deployed and a diversity of providers so that there is
no single point of failure or potential leverage. But assertions that any
Chinese technology in any part of a 5G network represents an unacceptable
risk are nonsense.
(5G的风险更高，因为未来从医疗保健服务到交通运输大量依赖这些新网络，并且因为5G
具有非常重要的架构差异，使安全监管复杂化。需要明确限制外国技术的部署地点和多样
化的提供商，以致没有任何的单点疏忽或潜在可供利用的手段。但断言任何中国技术在5G
网络的任何部分都是不可接受的风险，是无稽之谈。)
The UK and other European countries should hold their nerve and base
decisions on Chinese involvement in future telecoms on technical expertise
and rational assessment of risk, rather than political fashion or trade wars.
We should accept that China will be a global tech power in the future and
start managing the risk now, rather than pretending the west can sit out China
’s technological rise.
(英国和其他欧洲国家应该冷静，基于中国在未来电信业上的技术专业以及合理评估的风
险做出决定，而不是基于政治潮流或贸易战争。我们应该接受中国将来会成为一个全球性
的技术大国，现在开始管理风险，而不是假装西方可以将中国的技术进步摒弃在外。)
The writer was Director of GCHQ from 2014-17 and is a senior fellow at the
Belfer Center, Harvard
( 作者于2014至2017年担任GCHQ主任，并且是哈佛大学Belfer中心的高级研究员 )
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