本肥看到美国一个有名的智库CSIS发表文章分析2024年以及之后的台湾局势
这个研究有邀请台湾和美国两边的专家来咨询
包括大陆封锁台湾 入侵台湾等等方面
我发现比起美国的专家 台湾的专家好像都更加乐观
比如说
“与美国专家相比，台湾专家认为中国在军事上执行隔离、封锁或入侵台湾的能力较差。
”
“ 71% 的美国专家认为中国愿意维持高强度冲突至少一年，而受访的台湾专家中只有
51% 认为中国可以维持这种动态行动一年以上。”
“大约 44% 的美国专家认为，中国愿意在台湾冲突中对美国或联军引爆核武； 只有11%
的台湾专家持相同看法。”
“与美国专家相比，台湾专家认为中国在军事上执行隔离、封锁或入侵台湾的能力较差。
”
本肥有点不理解
是台湾人更懂中国 还是美国人更懂中国
台湾媒体上总是在讲中国威压 但是台湾人还觉得中国以后应该不会做的更过分
哪边的判断最后会被证实更准确一点
有挂？
下载文章的网址放在这里
https://reurl.cc/97aMGv
美国和台湾专家观点的比较也简单谷歌翻译一下放在下面
Key Takeaways
The results of this survey provide valuable insights into areas of
convergence and divergence in how U.S. and Taiwan experts evaluate China’s
approach to Taiwan. Key takeaways are summarized below.
这项调查的结果提供了宝贵的见解，让我们了解美国和台湾专家如何评价中国对台政策的
一致和分歧领域。 重点摘要如下。
QUARANTINE OR BLOCKADE MORE LIKELY THAN INVASION IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS
Most U.S. and Taiwan experts agreed that China currently has the
capabilities to execute a law enforcement-led quarantine and a People’s
Liberation Army (PLA)-led blockade of Taiwan. However, most did not think
China could effectively execute an invasion.
Nearly half of the experts from Taiwan believed a quarantine is a flexible
option (i.e., Beijing could quarantine Taiwan to increase significant
pressure on the island and to prepare for an imminent blockade or invasion).
In contrast, most U.S. experts believed Beijing would only execute a
quarantine if it wanted to increase pressure on the island but did not want a
kinetic conflict.
Most respondents believed a blockade alone would not be sufficient to
force Taiwan’s unification. A third of the experts from Taiwan worried a
blockade would likely escalate into an invasion.
Surveyed experts believed that in the next five years, if China seeks to
coerce Taiwan, Beijing’s most likely course of action would be a law
enforcement-led quarantine of Taiwan.
If China’s goal is to force immediate unification in the next five years,
a PLA-led highly kinetic joint blockade was deemed the most likely scenario,
with 80 percent of experts assessing it to be likely.
Most U.S. and Taiwan experts did not believe Taiwan could resist a PRC
blockade for more than three months if there is no or very limited U.S.
intervention.
Only 13 percent of U.S. experts and 6 percent of Taiwan experts believed
China’s 2027 military modernization goals would impact Beijing’s decision
to quarantine, blockade, or invade Taiwan.
未来五年，隔离或封锁的可能性比入侵更大
大多数美国和台湾专家一致认为，中国目前有能力对台湾实施执法主导的隔离和人民
解放军 (PLA) 主导的封锁。 然而，大多数人并不认为中国能够有效地实施入侵。
近一半的台湾专家认为隔离是一种灵活的选择（即北京可以隔离台湾，以增加对该岛
的巨大压力，并为即将到来的封锁或入侵做好准备）。 相较之下，大多数美国专家认为
，北京只有在想增加对台湾的压力但不希望发生激烈冲突时才会实施隔离。
大多数受访者认为仅靠封锁不足以迫使台湾统一。 三分之一的台湾专家担心封锁可能
会升级为入侵。
受访的专家认为，未来五年，如果中国试图胁迫台湾，北京最有可能采取的行动是执
法主导对台湾进行隔离。
如果中国的目标是在未来五年内立即统一，那么由解放军领导的高度动态联合封锁被
认为是最有可能发生的情况，80% 的专家认为这种可能性是存在的。
大多数美国和台湾专家认为，如果美国不干预或干预非常有限，台湾无法抵抗中国的
封锁超过三个月。
只有 13% 的美国专家和 6% 的台湾专家认为中国 2027 年军事现代化目标将影响北京
隔离、封锁或入侵台湾的决定。
LOWER OVERALL TAIWAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA
Compared to U.S. experts, Taiwan experts viewed China as less militarily
capable of executing a quarantine, blockade, or invasion of Taiwan.
Whereas 71 percent of U.S. experts believed China would be willing to
sustain a high-intensity conflict for at least one year, only 51 percent of
surveyed experts from Taiwan believed China could sustain such kinetic
operations for more than one year.
About 44 percent of U.S. experts believed China would be willing to
detonate nuclear weapons against U.S. or coalition forces in a Taiwan
conflict; only 11 percent of Taiwan experts thought the same.
台湾对中国整体威胁的看法较低
与美国专家相比，台湾专家认为中国在军事上执行隔离、封锁或入侵台湾的能力较差
。
71% 的美国专家认为中国愿意维持高强度冲突至少一年，而受访的台湾专家中只有
51% 认为中国可以维持这种动态行动一年以上。
大约 44% 的美国专家认为，中国愿意在台湾冲突中对美国或联军引爆核武； 只有11%
的台湾专家持相同看法。
LOWER TAIWAN CONFIDENCE IN SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES OR U.S. ALLIES AND
PARTNERS
Virtually all U.S. experts were completely confident or moderately
confident the United States would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan from
a PLA invasion. Both U.S. and Taiwan experts were confident of U.S.
intervention at the high end of conflict (e.g., a blockade or invasion) but
were not as confident of U.S. intervention in the event of a quarantine.
Compared to U.S. experts, Taiwan experts were less confident in U.S.
intervention and had even lower confidence that U.S. allies and partners
would defend Taiwan. A slim majority of Taiwan experts were confident U.S.
allies and partners would intervene militarily in only two out of seven
scenarios: if China invaded or if China blockaded Taiwan after a failed
invasion.
台湾对美国或美国盟友和伙伴支持的信心下降
几乎所有美国专家都完全相信或有一定信心美国会进行军事干预，以保卫台湾免于解
放军入侵。 美国和台湾专家都对美国在冲突最严重时进行干预（例如封锁或入侵）充满
信心，但对美国在隔离时进行干预则不那么有信心。
与美国专家相比，台湾专家对美国干预的信心较弱，对美国盟友和伙伴保卫台湾的信
心较低。 绝大多数台湾专家相信，美国的盟友和伙伴只会在七种情况中的两种进行军事
干预：如果中国入侵，或者如果中国在入侵失败后封锁台湾。
DYNAMICS AFTER TAIWAN ELECTIONS
Most respondents did not believe recent efforts to manage U.S.-China
tensions have changed the likelihood of a Taiwan Strait crisis. About 67
percent of U.S. experts and 57 percent of Taiwan experts believed a Taiwan
Strait crisis is likely in 2024.
If Chinese leaders perceive the Taiwan presidential election results to be
unfavorable, only about 40 percent of experts believed Beijing would wait to
act based on the new president’s policies. Over 50 percent of U.S. and
Taiwan experts believed China would not wait, but they disagreed over whether
China’s most escalatory actions would come before or after the president’s
inauguration in May 2024.
Nearly half of the experts from Taiwan believed if Beijing views the
election results as unfavorable, the most escalatory option China would take
against Taiwan before the end of 2024 would be coercive nonmilitary action.
In contrast, most U.S. experts worried about the potential of a large-scale
military exercise encircling Taiwan, but few thought China would quarantine,
blockade, or invade the island.
Over 80 percent of U.S. and Taiwan experts believed that if Beijing
perceives the Taiwan election results as favorable to China, Beijing would
seek to improve cross-strait ties. More Taiwan experts assessed that Beijing
would shift its approach unilaterally, whereas more U.S. experts believed
Beijing would act only after the new Taiwan leader showcases goodwill toward
Beijing.
Most U.S. and Taiwan experts believed a prolonged PRC economic downturn
would either decrease or not change the likelihood of PRC use of force
against Taiwan.
台湾选举后的动态
多数受访者认为，近期处理中美紧张局势的努力并未改变发生台海危机的可能性。 约
67%的美国专家和57%的台湾专家认为，台海危机可能在2024年爆发。
如果中国领导人认为台湾总统选举结果不利，只有约 40% 的专家认为北京会等待根据
新总统的政策采取行动。 超过 50% 的美国和台湾专家认为中国不会等待，但对于中国最
升级的行动是在 2024 年 5 月总统就职之前还是之后，他们存在分歧。
近半数的台湾专家认为，如果北京认为选举结果不利，中国在2024年底前对台湾采取
的最升级的选择将是强制非军事行动。 相较之下，大多数美国专家担心围绕台湾进行大
规模军事演习的可能性，但很少有人认为中国会隔离、封锁或入侵台湾。
超过80%的美国和台湾专家认为，如果北京认为台湾选举结果对中国有利，北京将寻求
改善两岸关系。 更多的台湾专家评估称，北京将单方面改变做法，而更多的美国专家则
认为，只有在台湾新领导人向北京展现善意后，北京才会采取行动。
大多数美国和台湾专家认为，中国经济长期低迷会降低或不会改变中国对台湾使用武
力的可能性。