首先先来看一篇外交家2016写的文章, 之前就有人假设了这个情节
直接跳到对战争的影响和对未来的影响
Effect on the War
对战争的影响
It’s best to understand the immediate impact of the atomic bomb in context
of the use of airpower in the Korean War. Atomic weapons might have had a
surprisingly small effect on the war itself. Notwithstanding the success of
the MiG-15 against U.S. bomber formations, the United States largely
controlled the sky over the Korean Peninsula, with B-29s delivering
devastating airstrikes at the time and place of their choosing. The atomic
bombs on 1950 did not yet have the power of the thermonuclear weapons
developed later in the decade. When employed for tactical purposes, these
bombs would have amounted to not much more than very large explosives.
对于使用原子弹的影响需先了解韩战中空军的脚色。原子弹其实对战争本身扮演
令人惊讶的小的影响。尽管当时米格15成功的对美轰炸机产生影响，但韩战本身
美国空军已经掌握著整个朝鲜半岛的制空权，B29轰炸机可以在任何时间、任何地点
丢下威力十足的炸弹，要知道1950年代的原子弹并不像数十年后的核弹等如此强大
因此如果使用战术性的原子弹攻击，这些就如同一个很大的爆炸而已
Employed against dispersed Chinese and North Korean forces, the limited
number of bombs available to the U.S. Air Force (which had to conserve many
weapons for use against the Soviets) might have had only a limited effect on
the ability of China to mobilize forces and move them to the front. Moreover,
the relatively primitive nature of infrastructure in North Korea and
Manchuria would have worked against the effectiveness of the bombs on staging
and logistics centers.
用在前线分散的中国志愿军和朝鲜军身上，其实产生的效益有限，尤其是美国空军又要
保留着这些大招对付真正的对手苏联。再者，对相对原始的朝鲜或中国东北的工业设施而言
相对的效果也有限
What about juicier targets, such as Beijing or Shanghai? In 1950, the USAF
remained committed to the idea that wars could be won through the destruction
of civilian industry and infrastructure, and that such targets could be most
readily found in cities. The USAF would soon demonstrate this conviction by
leveling Pyongyang in a long series of conventional raids. Even this might
not have had a decisive effect on the war. At the first sign of nuclear
escalation, the elite of the CCP would have dispersed from the capital and
the major cities. The propaganda value of the abject annihilation of hundreds
of thousands of Chinese civilians probably would have outweighed any military
advantage gained by the United States.
那如果是打击一些中国核心的城市，如上海、北京呢？ 1950年代美国空军还是秉持一套
胜利是建立在毁灭敌方民间工业与建设的思维上，因此合理的目标应是在人口密集的都会
区。美国空军应会先在平壤等地进行密集的空袭试验，尽管对战争未必会有决定性的影响。
而对中国共产党而言，一旦有最初步的蛛丝马迹显示核危机要升级，则共产党菁英们
就会逃离首都和主要的大城去避难，且这种卑贱的歼灭对方上万平民的手段造成的舆论
灾难可能会超越对战争带来的实质效益
Effect on the Future
对未来的影响
Scholars have long debated the existence of the “nuclear taboo.” Do states
refrain from using nukes because of impracticality, or do they view nuclear
weapons as fundamentally immoral? The Korean War provided an important test
case, because the United States had nukes, while North Korea and China did
not. Moreover, few American policymakers believed that the Soviets would use
any of their few primitive devices on behalf of Pyongyang or Beijing. The
United States did not shy away from using strategic weapons (B-29s) for
tactical purpose against North Korea; what message would the use of the Bomb
have sent?
学者们讨论核禁忌的话题已久，究竟限制核武是基于不切实际，还是本质上的不道德？
韩战都是一个重要的试验场，毕竟美军持有核武而当时中朝并无，除此之外，当时美国
学者也普遍认为苏联不太可能为了中朝报复使用它们仅有的核武。美国在此氛围下
若对朝鲜使用核武会传达出什么样的讯息？
We know that Truman worried about the optics of using the weapon against two
(or possibly three, depending on targeting decisions) different Asian
countries. We also know that U.S. allies in Europe were very nervous about
the prospect of having to politically defend the use of atomic weapons
against China. While it’s possible to list these reservations under either “
morality” or “practicality,” it’s also quite likely that using atomic
weapons against China would have lowered the psychological and bureaucratic
thresholds for using them in future conflicts against non-nuclear powers.
杜鲁门当时其实很担心对亚洲2-3个城市进行核打击造成的公众舆论。
美国的欧洲盟友们很担心假若美国可以用政治理由辩护使用原子武器的影响
假若可以用道德或实用性辩护对中朝使用核子武器，则未来对非核武国家
使用核子武器的门槛势必会降低
https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/what-if-the-united-states-had-used-the-bomb-in-korea/
回到推文，有推文说就会赢得韩战
但不管是效益上或道德上都说不过去
日本是因为发动二战和侵略
1945年日本的人口大量集中在都市区
因此效果明显
但朝鲜就是在打游击, 而中国当时乃二战战胜国身分, 站在正义的高点
进行核打击师出无名
因此就可能像文章说的没啥效果又被舆论逆转
如此解释杜鲁门把麦帅换了
※ 引述《Qoo2222 (Qoo2222)》之铭言：
: 当年韩战美国和中国陷入僵局时
: 麦克阿瑟建议当局直接赏中国一个痛快 一次丢30个原子弹
: 最后当然是没丢
: 如果当年直接丢中国30个原子弹
: 现在世界会怎样？