1.媒体来源:
The National Interest
（美）国家利益
2.记者署名:
Brian Clark
3.完整新闻标题:
America Needs to Rethink How It Is Handling China’s Rise
美国有必要重新考虑其如何应对中国的崛起
4.完整新闻内文:
China’s rise into a major world power has been nothing short of
extraordinary. Since adopting liberal economic reforms in the early
seventies, China’s economy has grown approximately ten percent per year, its
life expectancy has gone up by 50 percent, and nearly all war games now
predict that Beijing would win if conflict broke out in Asia.
中国崛起为主要的世界力量是非凡的事件。自上世纪70年代末改革开放以来，中国经济年均增长约10%，国民预期寿命提高了50%，而且现在几乎所有的战争推演都预测，如果亚洲爆发冲突，北京将获胜。
China’s rise was expected. America not only supported it but was also a key
participant. America supplied a stable reserve currency, invested large
amounts of capital in its economy, and provided Beijing with its largest
export market, all of which were crucial for China’s rapid transformation.
中国的崛起是意料之中的。美国不仅支持，还是一个关键的参与者。美国提供了稳定的储
备货币，大量投资于中国经济，并为北京提供了最大的出口市场，这些都对中国的快速转
型至关重要。
This arrangement was never one-sided, however, as America benefitted too; one
piece of analysis, for example, argues that approximately 2.6 million
American jobs are supported by Chinese-American trade.
然而，这种关系从来都不是单向的，因为美国也从中受益；有分析认为，中美贸易为大约
260万个美国就业机会提供支持。
Yet, while the economies of both countries benefited, China’s rapid growth
created the dilemma known as the Thucydides Trap, which is “the severe
structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one.
” This tension has historically laid the groundwork for a minor incident to
result in a major war, such as the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand
leading to World War I.
两国经济受益的同时，中国的快速增长也造成了所谓“修昔底德陷阱”的困局，也即“当
一个崛起中的力量试图挑战现有的统治力量时，会出现结构性紧张”。这种紧张往往演变
为小冲突或导致战争。例如对Franz Ferdinand大公的刺杀导致第一次世界大战的爆发。
America was always aware of this dilemma, and in response employed a strategy
of “Congagement,” which was a mixture of military containment and economic
engagement. The assumption was that China would not seek to overturn the
current order if it was allowed to become a responsible stakeholder of the
current one.
美国向来清楚这种困局，并采取了“遏制加接触”战略，即军事遏制和经济接触相结合。
这种战略的前提是，如果允许中国成为当前秩序的一个负责任的利益相关者，它就不会寻
求推翻当前的秩序。
At the time this seemed like a good policy. China was invited to join an
order that was described as rule-bound and highly cooperative, which was “
hard to overturn and easy to join.” As others have noted elsewhere, it was
arguably China that benefited the most from this order, as it allowed it to
raise eight hundred million of its citizens from poverty while also keeping
Japan, a historical rival, militarily weak and unthreatening.
当时看来，这似乎是一个好政策。中国从这个秩序中获益多多，它使中国8亿人摆脱了贫
困，同时也使日本这个历史上中国的对手在军事上保持弱势，不具威胁性。
But after thirty-plus years of bipartisan support, it is now widely
acknowledged that this strategy has failed, as Beijing not only rejected the
invitation to fully integrate but is currently pursuing an alternative order.
Included are economic institutions that rival those of the Bretton Woods
System, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, and the New Development Bank. Also included is a new
security order where China replaces America as the region’s dominant
military power.
　该战略得到了美国两党30多年的支持，而现在的共识是它已失败，因为北京正在追求另
一种秩序。其中包括与布雷顿森林体系相抗衡的经济机构，如 “一带一路”倡议、亚洲
基础设施投资银行和新开发银行。另外，中国正在取代美国成为所在区域的统治性军事力
量。
America’s response has been to blame China, arguing that an illiberal regime
would have never fully bought into a liberal system, no matter how much it
may have benefited from it in the past. The new American consensus now argues
for a more combative stance towards China’s rise, which includes decoupling
their economies, strengthening America’s regional deterrence, and shoring up
American allies.
美国的反应是指责中国。现在，美国的新共识主张对中国崛起采取更强硬的立场，其中包
括两国经济脱钩，加强美国的区域威慑力以及支持美国的盟友。
While this approach may prove popular at home, it is a poor strategy, because
it misreads why congagement failed. From the perspective of China, America
was never some benign custodian of a rule-based order but instead a
belligerent hegemon, breaking international law to spread its liberal values
abroad. Given the imperial nature of this order and America’s reluctance to
change it, Chinese ambitions for its own were largely inevitable.
这种方式可能在国内很受欢迎，但却是一个糟糕的战略，因为它误读了“遏制加接触”失
败的原因。从中国的角度来看，美国从来都不是基于规则的秩序的好监护者，而是一个好
战的霸主，频频违反国际法并向外传播其价值观。
For example, accommodation has long been a Chinese complaint. By some
metrics, China is already the world’s largest economy yet its influence in
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has typically lagged. This
disproportionate power offers America the opportunity to impose its own
political values onto others. The most common example of this being
conditionality lending, where recipients must also agree to political reforms
if they wish to qualify for aid. These reforms very often include human
rights provisions. China has long objected to such practices and its creation
of alternative economic institutions is a response to America’s reluctance
to address them. If America’s objective is Chinese integration into the
existing world order, then it should offer a variety of incentives to
integrate. This can not only mean economic growth but also institutional
power.
例如，中国一直在抱怨其在国际上所受的待遇。从某些度量方式来看（PPP），中国已经
是世界最大经济体，然而他在世界银行和国际货币基金组织里的影响力远远同其经济地位
不相称。而美国拥有的不成比例的优势地位可以让其把自己的政治价值观强加到其他国家
身上。最常见的例子是条件性贷款，即受援国必须同意进行政治改革才能获得援助。中国
长期以来反对这种做法，它建立替代性经济机构是对美国的回应。如果美国的目的是让中
国融入现存世界秩序，那麽他应该提供更广泛的激励措施来吸引中国加入。这些激励不能
仅仅是经济增长，也需要是机构性或制度性的影响力。
Also motivating Chinese revisionism is the American hypocrisy regarding the
use of force. The liberal world order is alleged to have norms and
institutions discouraging conflict, where no one could extend its influence
using the force of its military. America, however, was exceptional, which
allowed it to violate these prohibitions whenever it determined there were
good reasons to do so.
促使中国改变现状的还有美国在使用武力方面的虚伪性。据说，自由主义世界秩序有劝阻
冲突的规范和制度，没有哪个国家可以利用军力扩大其影响力。但美国是个例外，总是违
反这些禁令，而且觉得自己理由充
America needs to rethink how it is handling China’s rise. Its past strategy
has clearly failed considering China is not only pursuing a new regional
order but one that does not have a role for America. But instead of a
strategy of confrontation, America’s new approach should be centered around
accommodation and restraint.
美国需要反思如何应对中国的崛起。考虑到中国不仅在追求新的区域秩序，而且是一个没
有美国角色的区域秩序，美国过去的战略显然已经破产。但是，美国的新路线不应该是对
抗，而应该是以接纳和约束为中心。
This would mean ensuring international institutions reflect the current
distribution of world power. The Bretton Woods Institutions are not mere
instruments of the United States, but America’s outsized influence in these
institutions offers it unique opportunities to reform foreign politics in
liberal ways. It was the American reluctance to share power over these
organizations that incentivized China to create alternative ones.
这意味着确保国际机构反映当前世界权力的分配。正是美国不愿分享权力，才促使中国建
立替代性组织。
America should also get serious about respecting the international law
prohibiting the use of force. China has rebuilt its military in large part
because it does not trust America to practice self-restraint. Considering how
often America has used its military over the last three decades, China would
be foolish not to. If America wants to be the leader of a world governed by
rules and not power, then it should lead by example, and only use its
military when it abides by the same rules it expects others to follow. This
would mean that if America uses force, it must have a United Nations mandate
or be acting in self-defense.
美国也应认真尊重禁止使用武力的国际法。中国重建其军队，很大程度上是因为不相信美
国会自我克制。考虑到美国过去30年频频动武，中国不这样做将是愚蠢的。如果美国想成
为由规则而不是权力支配的世界的领导者，那麽就应该以身作则，遵守它期望别人遵守的
规则。这将意味着，如果美国使用武力，必须有联合国的授权或出于自卫。
To acknowledge American abuses does not absolve China, however. America
demonstrated a great deal of tolerance for China’s long history of illiberal
economic policies and despite Beijing’s stringent defense of state
sovereignty, it has meddled in the politics of foreign countries from time to
time. But the point is for America to develop a new strategy by viewing its
own behavior through the eyes of its competitor. From Beijing’s perspective,
the liberal world order was merely a vehicle for America to impose its own
values on the rest of the world. Considering China has never shared those
values, and probably never will, it should not be surprising that it had
little interest in becoming a supporting member. America should therefore
work with China to reform the current order, appreciating that a new power
distribution exists as well as an awareness of how America’s own illiberal
behavior contributed to the previous order’s breakdown.
承认美国的一些错误并不意味着认同中国所做的一切。美国对中国长期的狭隘的经济政策
一直展现著宽容。但是重点在于美国应该了解一下竞争者眼中的自己是什么样子，然后制
定出新的战略。在北京看来，自由世界的秩序只是方便美国把自己的价值观强加到其他国
家头上。考虑到中国从来没有把价值观强加到其他国家头上，可能以后也不会这样做，中
国不想支持这种自由世界的秩序是情有可原的。美国因此应该同中国一起重新塑造现行秩
序。
Brian Clark is a foreign policy analyst with a research interest in American
grand strategy. His work has been published in The American Conservative.
Image: Reuters.
5.完整新闻连结 (或短网址):
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/america-needs-rethink-how-it-handling-china%E2%80%99s-rise-193513
缩网址： https://reurl.cc/emEG0x
6.备注:
中国大陆已经基本脱离了贫困，目前有希望通过第三次收入调节，实现降低贫富差距，迈
向共同富裕。中国大陆这40年的成功，深深鼓舞了大陆人民对自己的信心，也让中共在大
陆获得极高支持率。美国不要在一厢情愿地认定大陆人民需要他们推销的所谓“民主”。
民主就是以民为主，首要的是照顾人民的生命。自武汉的新冠疫情爆发以来，大陆有力控
制疫情，全民免费医治新冠，让大陆至今的死亡人数非常之少。这才是真正的以人民为本
。