1.媒体来源:
The Christian Science Monitor
(美)基督教科学箴言报
2.记者署名:
By Ann Scott Tyson Staff writer
3.完整新闻标题:
Vilified abroad, popular at home: China's Communist Party at 100
在国内受到拥护 在国外受到指责 ：中共的建党100周年
4.完整新闻内文:
A year ago Feb. 7, China’s brave coronavirus whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang
died after treating patients in Wuhan, triggering an unprecedented online
torrent of grief and anti-government rage along with calls for freedom of
speech.
一年以前的2月7日，中国勇敢的新冠疫情吹哨者李文亮医生在照顾病人后去世，在中国网
络上触发了空前的哀悼和反政府怒火，要求言论自由。
The widespread public outrage over the government’s initial mishandling of
the virus outbreak and suppression of Dr. Li’s warnings amounted to what
longtime observers called an existential crisis for China’s Communist Party
and Xi Jinping, its leader since 2012.
一些长期的中国观察家说，公众对政府起始对疫情的处理不当以及对李医生发出警告的压
制的愤怒的蔓延，给中国共产党和其领导-习近平带来了自2012年以来最大的危机。
Angry residents brazenly heckled a visiting party Politburo member. Some
yelled “it’s all fake” from their apartment windows during the draconian
lockdown in Wuhan, the city of 11 million people that is now estimated to
have suffered half a million cases and at least 3,800 deaths.
愤怒的居民诘问一位来访的政治局成员。在武汉封城期间，有一些人从公寓的窗户内大喊
，“这都是假的”。武汉这座一千一百万的城市现在预测有50万人被感染（血清测试推算
），至少3800人死亡。
But only five months later in August, with the virus under control, a
jam-packed pool party in Wuhan with DJs and dancers in neon tutus was
captured in a viral video – a testimony to China’s success in largely
quashing the outbreak at home. By January, China’s rapid economic recovery
saw the country emerge in many ways stronger from the pandemic year. Its
economic output grew by 2.3% in 2020 to become the only major world economy
to expand.
https://i.imgur.com/avpMVip.jpg
但是，仅仅五个月后的8月份，随着武汉的疫情被控制住，武汉泳池派对的热闹景象在网
上疯传——它证明中国基本成功平息了国内疫情。到今年1月，中国经济迅速复苏，该国
在许多方面都比疫情肆虐之年要强。中国的经济在2020年增长了2.3%，是唯一实现增长的
世界主要经济体。
This stark turnaround has shored up popular support for the party inside
China, bolstering the belief of Mr. Xi and other leaders that China’s
authoritarian system is resilient and on the rise, despite a sharply negative
turn in attitudes toward Beijing in Western democracies. “The best criteria
” for judging a country’s system, said Mr. Xi, sitting with folded hands
before a huge mural of the Great Wall in a virtual address to the World
Economic Forum Jan. 25, is whether it delivers “political stability, social
progress, and better lives.”
这一鲜明转变增强了民众对中共的支持，使习近平和其他中国领导人愈发相信，中国的体
制仍富有活力且蒸蒸日上，尽管西方民主国家对中国的态度变得负面。1月25日，习近平
以视讯方式在世界经济论坛上致辞时说，各国历史文化和社会制度各有千秋，没有高低优
劣之分，关键在于是否符合本国国情，能否获得人民拥护和支持，能否带来政治稳定、社
会进步、民生改善，能否为人类进步事业作出贡献。
Indeed, as the Communist Party prepares to celebrate its 100th anniversary
this summer, experts in China and abroad are delving into why the country’s
increasingly autocratic regime enjoys such domestic popular support,
especially as Mr. Xi tightens party controls and his own personal grip on
power.
事实上，在中共准备今夏庆祝建党100周年之际，中国国内和国外的专家都在探究中国日
益专制的政体何以在国内如此深得人心，尤其是在习近平收紧了党的控制力和他自己对大
权的掌控的时候。
“How do you now explain the fact the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] at least
appears to be fairly resilient?” says Edward Cunningham, director of Ash
Center China Programs at the Harvard Kennedy School.
你现在如何解释中国共产党看起来相当富有活力这一事实？”哈佛大学肯尼迪学院阿什民
主治理和创新中心中国项目主任爱德华·坎宁安说。
Overall, popular satisfaction with China’s government has grown stronger
over the past 20 years, according to Dr. Cunningham and other Harvard
researchers who led an independent, multiyear survey of Chinese public
opinion. The 2003 to 2016 study drew on face-to-face interviews with more
than 31,000 people in urban and rural China, but did not include most ethnic
minorities or migrant workers. In 2016, fully 93% of those surveyed expressed
satisfaction with the central government, with 32% saying they were “very
satisfied.” That same year, 70% of respondents voiced approval for their
local governments, which deliver most public goods and services, marking a
significant increase from 44% in 2003.
坎宁安和哈佛大学其他研究人员牵头开展了一项历时多年的中国民意调查。他们说，总体
而言，民众对中国政府的满意度在过去20年里提高了。
在2003年至2016年进行的这项研究当面采访了中国城乡各地的超过3.1万人。2016年，93%
的受访者对中央政府表示满意，32%的人表示“非常满意”。同一年，70%的受访者对地方
政府表示认可。地方政府向民众交付了大部分的公共产品和服务。在2003年，中国人对地
方政府的满意度只有44%。
These trends are likely continuing today, says Dr. Cunningham, pointing to
anecdotal evidence. “The recent COVID case is a useful example,” he says. “
At the outset, citizens were unhappy with the local government response, but
as the central government engaged in lockdowns and the situation improved,
satisfaction with central government actions rose, eventually spreading to
views of local government as well.”
坎宁安援引各种传闻指出，这些趋势在今天可能会持续下去。他说：“最近的新冠疫情是
一个很好的例子。开始时，民众对地方政府对疫情的响应抱有怨言，但随着中央政府实施
封城、形势好转，人们对中央政府行动的满意度上升，最终扩大到对地方政府也感到满意
。”
China’s swift curbing of the virus contrasted sharply with bungled responses
in the United States and other developed countries, swelling domestic support
for the regime, experts say.
专家们说，中国的抗疫果断行动与美国等发达国家的一团糟局面形成鲜明对比，进一步提
振了国内民众对中国政府的支持。
“Within China itself, when they apply the lens of China’s response to the
virus, both in public health and economic terms and political terms, versus
the American management of the virus domestically and many other Western
countries, it has further consolidated Xi’s hold on the Chinese leadership,
” says China scholar Kevin Rudd, president of the Asia Society.
在中国内部，当人们聚焦政府是如何处理病毒时，会在公共卫生、经济增长以及政治方面
，自然地同美国和其他西方国家国内对疫情的管理进行对比，这种对比更加强化了习近平
对中国的领导力。中国学者Kevin Rudd说到，他是“亚洲社会”的总裁。
Popular satisfaction in China should not be underestimated, says Elizabeth
Economy, author of “The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese
State.” “The vast majority of Chinese feel a lot of pride in how their
country has developed economically, and in the greater role China now plays
on the global stage,” says Dr. Economy, senior fellow at the Hoover
Institution at Stanford University in California.
斯坦福大学胡佛研究所高级研究员伊丽莎白·伊科诺米说，中国的民众满意度不容忽视。
她说：“绝大多数中国人对于国家经济的发展以及中国如今在全球舞台上发挥的更大作用
感到非常自豪。”
Still, the latest developments also shed light on how the country’s
authoritarian leadership, even while amassing greater power and control with
a high-tech surveillance state, must continue to respond to popular needs,
complaints, and pressure. With a population of 1.4 billion, China faces
serious demographic, environmental, and economic problems going forward. The
party’s often-obscured quest to retain legitimacy drives much of China’s
behavior at home and abroad – and could unravel if it doesn’t meet rising
expectations.
中国的专制政体必须持续不断地对来自公众的需求、抱怨和压力进行响应。中国有14亿人
，面临着严重的人口结构、环境和经济难题。中共为了维持自己的统治合法性，必须不断
的满足来自民众日益增长的需求。
“China has politics, too,” says David Lampton, senior fellow at the Foreign
Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
“中国也有政治。”大卫 兰普顿说。他是约翰霍普金斯高级国际研究学院外国政策学会
的高级研究员。
How this political dynamic evolves in the world’s flagship communist state
will have major geopolitical implications for the world over the next decade
and beyond.
中国这种政治动机（指中共为了维系执政正当性，需要不断满足民众增长的各项需求）的
演进，将会在未来几十年内在地缘政治上影响这个世界。
Delivering the goods
交付产品
When A Bo was growing up in a high mountain village in China’s southwestern
Yunnan province in the 1970s and ’80s, his family was so poor that they had
to eat wild fruit and herbs. One dirt road led to his village, and when heavy
summer rains turned it to mud, travel was all but impossible.
上世纪七八十年代，阿波（音）在中国云南省深山的村子里长大。因为穷，一家人不得不
吃野果野草。一条土路通往该村，雨后土路一片泥泞，村里人没法出门。
“We were always hungry,” he recalls. Today, with government help, Mr. A Bo’
s family and many others in his village have worked themselves out of
poverty. He raises ducks, pigs, and cows on a small farm and works at
construction and other odd jobs. His village has running water and paved
roads. And while his modest income “doesn’t count as very good, it’s a lot
better than before,” he says with a laugh.
他回忆说：“我们总是吃不饱肚子。”如今在政府帮助下，阿波一家以及村里的许多人都
实现了脱贫。他养了鸭子、猪和牛，还在建筑工地打零工。村里有了自来水，修通了柏油
路。他笑着说，他的收入“不算高，但比过去强多了”。
https://i.imgur.com/hZdxUmd.jpg
Courtesy of Matthew Chitwood/File
Local villager A Bo (center) joins guests during his daughter’s wedding
feast on Dec. 30, 2018, in Liming, China. Beijing’s poverty eradication
program has lifted the lives of rural poor people, bolstering support for
China’s Communist Party.
上图中间的人是阿波。这是她女儿在2018年12月份的婚宴。北京的消灭贫困计划让很多农
村的穷人改善了生活，让中共政府获得了支持。
In December, Mr. Xi announced that China had eradicated extreme poverty in
Yunnan and across the country, completing the massive task of lifting 850
million people out of destitution since 1981. The milestone offers one
powerful example of how Mr. Xi and the party continue to gain legitimacy for
their authoritarian rule in the eyes of China’s people.
2020年12月，中国宣布在云南乃至全国范围内消除极端贫困，完成了自1981年以来让8.5
亿人脱贫的艰巨任务。这一里程碑式事件强有力地说明了习近平和中共是如何在民众眼中
赢得威信的。
“The government helped us build houses ... and gave us livestock to raise,”
says Mr. A Bo. “If we didn’t have their help, we wouldn’t have paved roads
or running water, so the common people are relatively happy.”
阿波说：“政府帮我们盖房子……给我们牲畜饲养。没有他们帮忙，我们就不会有平整的
马路和自来水。所以老百姓都挺高兴。”
As a result, rural people and migrants with lower incomes, such as Mr. A Bo,
have been a key source of support for China’s central government, multiple
surveys show, constituting essentially an important political base for the
party.
多项调查显示，像阿波这样收入较低的农村人口和外出务工人员是中国中央政府的主要支
持力量，基本上构成了中共的重要政治基础。
“There is a very high degree of satisfaction in rural low-income areas for
the Chinese Communist Party,” says Matthew Chitwood, a U.S. fellow with the
Institute of Current World Affairs, who recently returned from living for two
years in Yunnan’s remote mountain village of Bangdong. There, he says, “Xi
is the poster child of the party and the poverty eradication campaign.”
当代世界事务研究所的美国研究员马修·奇特伍德最近刚刚结束了在云南偏远山村邦东乡
的两年生活，他说：“中国共产党在农村低收入地区的满意度非常高，在那些地方，习近
平是共产党和脱贫攻坚的代表人物。”
“My neighbors in Bangdong are living their best lives now,” he says. “
Their lives have dramatically improved from even five years ago, and they
attribute that directly to the party.”
他表示：“邦东的乡亲们现在过上了从未有过的好日子，生活与五年前相比显著改善，他
们把这直接归功于党。”
Indeed, satisfaction levels since the early 2000s have risen most among China
’s poorer residents like Mr. A Bo, signaling that despite growing
inequalities created by economic reforms, marginalized people are not a
swelling source of political resentment, the Harvard survey found. “There is
still little evidence of a ‘social volcano’ of bottom-up discontent,” says
Dr. Cunningham.
哈佛大学的调查发现，自21世纪初以来，像阿波这种中国较贫困居民的满意度上升幅度最
大。坎宁安说：“至今仍没有什么证据表明存在自下而上的社会不满情绪。”
The anti-poverty campaign trumpeted by Mr. Xi is one example of the party’s
overarching strategy of “performance legitimacy.” Under Chairman Mao
Zedong, the party rallied support around Marxist-Leninist ideology and waging
the 1949 revolution. But after Beijing launched market-oriented economic
reforms in 1978, the party adopted a more pragmatic strategy to maintain
public backing by achieving concrete development goals.
习近平发动的消灭贫困运动是中共“用政绩来让统治获得合法性”这一重要战略的实例之
一。在毛泽东的领导下，中共在马克思-列宁主义这种意识形态下获得民众的支持，赢得
了1949年的革命。但是当北京在1978年开始以市场为导向的改革后，中共采取了更现实主
义的战略来获取公众的支持—也就是致力于实现看得见，摸得着的发展目标。
https://i.imgur.com/wp8VJsG.jpg
The Chinese government built new houses in Ganluo County in southwestern
China for members of the Yi ethnic minority, who were relocated from their
mountain villages as part of an anti-poverty initiative.
中国政府在西南的甘洛县为少数民族彜族修建的新房子。他们从山上的小村子里搬到这里
，这是消灭贫困计划的一部分
This performance legitimacy approach is rooted in China’s ancient, dynastic
concept of the Mandate of Heaven, which emperors could retain or lose
depending on how well they governed, says Dingxin Zhao, dean of the sociology
department at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, China.
“这种用政绩来让统治获得合法性根植于古代中国的天命概念，根据皇帝把国家治理的多
好，他会维系或者失去“天命””，赵鼎鑫，浙江大学社会学系主任，如是说。
Today, the Communist Party works to secure this mandate above all through
robust economic growth and “delivering the goods” – from roads to jobs,
Dr. Cunningham says.
如今，中共通过强健的经济增长和向民众“交付产品”-从修建公路到提供就业机会-来确
保这个所谓的“天命”。坎宁安博士如是说。
The party has also bolstered its rule though social policies aimed at
reducing inequalities unleashed by economic reforms. These include rural
health care, free education, agricultural subsidies, and poverty alleviation.
“Social policy ... has contributed decisively to the regime’s stability and
general support of the regime,” says Dr. Zhao.
中共还推行社会政策来减少经济改革造成的不平等，这其中包括农村医疗、免费教育、农
业补贴和扶贫。赵博士说，这些社会政策对政体的稳定性和政府获取的支持度有决定性地
贡献。
Another popular policy has been Mr. Xi’s anti-corruption drive, launched
soon after he took charge in 2012. “From the minute he became general
secretary of the Communist Party, [Mr. Xi] talked about the need to root out
corruption,” which he said “could mean the death of the Communist Party and
the death of the Chinese state,” says Dr. Economy.
另一项深得人心的政策是习近平在2012年执政后立即发动的反腐行动。坎宁安博士说，习
近平刚刚成为中共总书记的时候提到，一定要根治腐败，否则会亡党亡国。
Rampant official corruption unleashed along with China’s market-oriented
economic reforms has stirred deep public discontent. More than half of
Chinese surveyed in 2011 described local government officials as “unclean”
or “very unclean,” ineffective, and favoring the wealthy, the Harvard
survey shows, dismaying villagers such as Mr. A Bo.
随着中国的市场经济改革而来的猖獗的腐败让公众极为不满。在2011年，哈佛大学民调显
示超过一半的中国人认为地方政府不干净，或者非常不干净，低效并且偏袒有钱人。
“It was chaotic,” says Mr. A Bo, who recalls corrupt local officials
setting up roadblocks and charging tolls, or restricting the water supply.
阿波先生说，那时候很混乱，地方官员设置路障，收取过路费，或者限制水的供应。
Mr. Xi responded with the most sweeping anti-corruption campaign in modern
China – arresting thousands of party and government officials of all ranks.
Although the campaign was also viewed as part of Mr. Xi’s efforts to purge
opponents and consolidate power in his own hands, it sharply curbed official
abuses encountered by the public, surveys show.
习近平在现代中国开启了规模巨大的反腐运动-逮捕了几千名各种级别的政府官员。尽管
这项运动被一些人认为是为了打击政治对手和为了自己掌控权利，民调显示习近平的反腐
运动深得公众欢迎。
Today, local thugs no longer control roads around Mr. A Bo’s village. “Now
those people don’t dare do that ‘underworld’ activity, or they will be
arrested,” says Mr. A Bo. “Now it’s peaceful ... and everyone can use the
roads.”
如今，地方恶霸不再控制阿波村子周围的道路。“现在那些人不敢再做哪些黑社会行为，
他们会被抓起来”，阿波说，“现在非常安宁，每个人都可以使用那些道路”
Double-edged sword
双刃剑
Such concrete gains in prosperity and well-being, and progress on problems
ranging from corruption to environmental pollution, have boosted the party’s
performance legitimacy nationwide – including among China’s new middle
class.
这样的繁荣与民生切实成果以及在从反腐到治污各方面的进展，增强了共产党在全国范围
内的拥护度。包括在中国新的中产阶层中的拥护度。
Mr. Zhang, a retired private entrepreneur who was born and raised the son of
a factory worker in Beijing, is on the lower rung of this emerging tier.
Among the fastest growing in the world, China’s middle class swelled from
about 3% of the population in 2000 to more than half, or 700 million people,
in 2018.
退休的民营企业家张（音）先生是一名北京工人子弟，它属于中产阶层中比较低阶的。中
国拥有世界上最快的经济增长，中国的中产阶级从2000年时的占人口3%，增加到2018年的
占人口一半，也就是7亿人。
Mr. Zhang (who asked to withhold his first name to protect his privacy) has
benefited not only from China’s economic boom, but from housing security and
government spending on his health care and pension. He sums up popular
attitudes with a simple story typical of his generation. “When I was small,
all we wanted was to be able to fill our stomachs. ... Then, gradually, you
could eat well. If you wanted to eat an apple, you could buy an apple. If you
wanted to eat meat, you could buy meat,” he says.
张先生不仅受益于中国的经济增长，而且还受益于住房保障以及政府对他健康保险和退休
金的开支。张先生用他那一代人的典型小故事来概括民众的态度：“我小的时候，大家只
想着能吃饱肚子……然后，慢慢地，伙食改善了。想吃苹果就能买苹果，想吃肉就能买肉
。”
In Mr. Zhang’s eyes, steadily rising living standards equate to Beijing
doing a good job. “If my life is better day by day, if year by year it’s
going in a good direction, then what do I have to be upset about?” he says.
在张先生看来，生活水平的稳步提高等同于中央政府治国有方。他说：“如果我的日子一
天比一天好，一年比一年兴旺，那我还有什么好抱怨的呢？”
“Of course,” he adds, Chinese people still complain about things around the
dinner table. “Above all, we curse about Chinese officials’ corruption. But
what country doesn’t have ‘bad eggs?’” he asks, using Chinese slang for “
scoundrel.”
张先生补充道，“当然，中国人仍然在饭桌上抱怨一些事情。尤其是我们会痛骂中国官员
的腐败。但哪个国家不会有坏鸡蛋呢”
Today, such sentiment buoys Mr. Xi politically as the Communist Party nears
its July centennial. “By the end of 2020, Xi Jinping had recovered his
political position comprehensively,” says Mr. Rudd, the former prime
minister of Australia. Mr. Xi is further entrenching his power with the aim
of effectively becoming China’s “leader for life” at the next party
congress in 2022, he says.
当下，在7月的中共建党纪念日就要到来时，这样的情绪算是对习近平在政治上的一个支
持。“在2020年的年尾，习近平彻底恢复了他的政治地位”，澳大利亚前总理陆克文说。
习近平正在进一步巩固他的权力，为的是在2022年的中共代表大会上，成为终生制的领导
人。
Yet despite the current strength of Mr. Xi and the party, experts point out
that performance legitimacy is inherently fragile. It depends upon a
continuous, tangible improvement in people’s material well-being. Ever
rising expectations create both positive energy and risky tensions – a
double-edged sword for the party and its limited resources. “Performance
legitimacy relies too much on performance,” says Dr. Zhao. “Your
relationship with the people is ... transactional. People judge you ... day
by day, case by case.”
尽管习近平和中共目前比较得志，但专家指出这种“政绩带来的执政合法性”有其脆弱的
一面。它依赖于对人民物质方面的幸福感持续且实实在在的改善。一直增长的期望值创造
了正能量也带来了风险张力-对中共和它的有限资源来说，这是一把双刃剑。“政绩带来
的执政合法性”太依赖政绩了，赵博士说。“你同人民之间的关系是交易型的，人民一天
天地，一件事情一件事情地来评判你”
One major obstacle to raising living standards is the sheer size of the
low-income population: 600 million of China’s 1.4 billion people have a per
person income of only about $150 a month, according to official data.
Although the party has achieved its poverty alleviation target – a very low
bar – it now faces the harder task of shrinking the income gap between urban
and rural China, and between the coast and hinterland.
一个提高生活水准的主要障碍是规模庞大的低收入人口：6亿中国人的人均个人可支配性
收入仅有150美元/月。尽管中共实现了脱贫的目标-这是一个很低的标准-现在它面临着更
艰巨的任务，也就是缩小中国城乡间，沿海和内陆之间的收入差距。
“You basically have two different Chinas and two different economies
operating,” says Dr. Economy. “So when do you begin to take care of the
people who have been left behind?”
伊科诺米说，你基本上有两个不同的中国和两个不同的经济体同时在运作，所以，你何时
开始照顾那些被经济发展落下的民众？
Beijing knows it will face increased difficulty retaining this
performance-based mandate as the population rapidly ages, economic growth
continues to slow, and stimulus financing dramatically increases debt.
Moreover, China faces rising opposition overseas, where unfavorable public
opinion toward Beijing has reached its highest level in 12 years and the lack
of confidence in Mr. Xi has surged, according to a Pew Research Center poll
of 14 countries with advanced economies in North America, Western Europe,
East Asia, and Australia.
北京明白，随着人口老化，经济增长放缓和刺激财政政策会增加债务，坚持这种基于政绩
的统治合法性会愈加困难。另外依据皮尤调查中心对14个发达国家的民调，这些国家的民
众对北京的不满意度达到了12年来的新高，且对习近平的不信任感也上升。
“The party’s leaders believe they have a narrow window of strategic
opportunity to strengthen their rule ... before China’s economy sours,
before the population grows old, before other countries realize that the
party is pursuing national rejuvenation at their expense,” says retired Lt.
Gen. H.R. McMaster, former U.S. national security adviser and senior fellow
at the Hoover Institution.
中共领导层相信他们有一个很短的战略机遇期来加强他们的治理…在中国经济增长放缓之
前，在人口老化之前，在其他国家意识到中共正在以这些国家的利益为代价来追逐自己的
国家复兴之前。Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster如是说。他是美国前国安顾问和胡佛中心的高级
研究员。
Rolling back reform
改革倒退
On a sunny October morning in Shanghai, Jack Ma, co-founder of e-commerce
giant Alibaba and one of the richest men in China, took to the podium at a
global finance summit and made a bold call for innovation of China’s
financial system.
在十月上海的某个阳光明媚的上午，阿里巴巴共同创办人，也是中国首富的马云，在一个
全球金融峰会上大胆地呼吁中国金融系统的创新。
China’s banks exhibit a “severe pawnshop mentality” that hurts
entrepreneurship, he said, criticizing the nation’s financial regulators as
anachronistic. “We shouldn’t use the way to manage a train station to
regulate an airport,” Mr. Ma said. “We cannot regulate the future with
yesterday’s means.”
马云说，中国的银行展现了当铺思想，这伤害了企业家精神。他批评中国的金融监管政策
是过时的。“我们不应该用管理火车站的方法来管理机场”，马云说，“我们不能用昨天
的手段来规范明天”。
Soon after, Mr. Ma was reportedly dressed down by regulators and then
disappeared mysteriously from public. The highly anticipated initial public
offering of Alibaba’s financial technology arm, Ant Group Co., was halted
and the firm placed under investigation, reportedly on the orders of China’s
top leader Mr. Xi. In January, after missing major appearances, Mr. Ma
resurfaced in public for the first time in months in an online video of a
small local ceremony.
不久，据报道，马云被金融监管机构斥责并且在公众场合神秘消失了一段时间。蚂蚁集团
的IPO被暂停，公司目前被审查，据报道这是习近平的指示。一月份，马云在一个视讯会
议中重新回到公众视线。
The incident demonstrated how, in Mr. Xi’s China, Beijing will not tolerate
constructive criticism – even from a top entrepreneur such as Mr. Ma. The
imperative of party power and control means subordinating everyone and
everything, including top business magnates and their firms.
这个事件证明习近平的中国不会容忍建设性的批评，即便你是一个像马云这样的顶级企业
家。党的绝对权力和控制意味着所有人和事都要服从，包含哪些顶级企业家和他们的公司
。
Facing uncertain economic growth, China’s post-Mao leaders have looked for
alternative ways to secure Communist Party rule into the future. After
launching market-oriented economic reforms in 1978, leader Deng Xiaoping and
his followers moved to bolster legal sources of legitimacy by strengthening
government institutions, promoting a meritocracy, setting standards for a
smooth leadership succession, and allowing new avenues for political
participation.
面对着不确定的经济增长，毛泽东之后的领导人寻找一些替代方案来确保中共的统治可以
持续到未来。1978年开始市场经济导向的改革后，邓小平和其追随者通过增强政府制度，
推动菁英管理，设置领导人无缝接班的标准和允许一些新的政治参与途径来巩固中共的执
政合法性。
In a 2009 paper, Dr. Zhao warned that moves toward “legal-electoral
legitimacy” were vital. Otherwise, Beijing would “face a major crisis when
the Chinese economy cools off.”
在2009年的论文里，赵博士警告说朝着合法选举的执政正当性走下去是至关重要的。否则
，当经济增长慢下来时，北京将会面对很大的危机。
But since 2012, Mr. Xi has moved in the opposite direction. “You had a very
dynamic, vibrant political birthing process underway, and for Xi, that was
very threatening,” says Dr. Economy.
但是自从2012年，习近平走向了相反的方向。“你有一个有活力的，充满生机的政治萌芽
过程正在进行中，但是对于习近平来说，那是非常具有威胁性的” ，伊科诺米博士如是
说。
Mr. Xi has rolled back political reforms, strengthened ideological
indoctrination and censorship, and tightened party controls. He has
concentrated power in his own hands to a degree not seen since Mao – ending
term limits and paving the way for his lifelong rule.
习近平让政治改革倒退，增强了意识形态上的教化和审查，强化了党的控制力。他现在拥
有了自毛泽东之后最大的权力-结束了任期限制，为自己成为终生领导人铺平了道路。
Under Mr. Xi, the party has also reined in big companies and curtailed civil
society by shuttering nongovernmental organizations. He has jailed activists,
from feminists to human rights lawyers, and imposed broad population control
measures such as facial recognition surveillance and a social credit system
that rates citizens’ behavior. Harsh crackdowns have arbitrarily detained an
estimated 1 million Uyghurs and members of other predominantly Muslim ethnic
groups in the western region of Xinjiang, while curtailing basic freedoms and
purging pro-democracy elected officials, students, and others in Hong Kong.
在习近平的统治下，中共也统治了大公司并通过关闭非政府组织来削弱了公民社会。他把
一些社会活动份子关了起来，通过天网人脸识别系统和社会信用等级系统对广大的人口进
行控制。在新疆通过严厉措施拘禁了一百万维吾尔人和其他穆斯林少数族裔，并且在香港
剥夺了那些支持民主的民选政务官、学生和其他人的基本的自由。（ilyj2012:这一段完
全是胡说八道）
Yet by monopolizing power, Mr. Xi also positions himself as a singular point
of blame for any national crisis or setback that can’t be deflected onto
local officials. Indeed, Mr. Xi himself is fixated on domestic opinion,
prioritizing it over international events, says Steve Orlins, president of
the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a nonprofit that promotes
engagement between the countries. “President Xi gets up in the morning and
he ... gets briefings on Tibet, Xinjiang, Chengdu, Wuhan,” he says. “The
Chinese view the threats as internal.”
“然而因为独占了大权，习近平让自己成为任何国家危机或挫折的唯一担责人。的确，习
近平非常在意国内民众的看法，而不是国际事务。” 美中关系委员会主席史蒂夫·奥林
如是说，“习近平早上起床后，需要阅读关于新疆，西藏，程度，武汉的情资简报，中国
人认为危险来自内部”
Ultimately, the increased repression can stifle, but not destroy, pressures
from members of China’s increasingly urban, educated, middle class for a
greater say in their futures. “Even authoritarian governments have to
respond to the elites in their society,” says Mr. Orlins.
基本上，不断的压制可以遏制但是不能摧毁城市受过良好教育的中产阶级增长的对未来的
更有发言权渴望。中共也不得不响应一些社会精英的需求，奥林如是说。
Discontent over the direction Mr. Xi is moving the country runs deep among
some Chinese, from intellectuals and entrepreneurs to migrant workers and
activists. Others in China’s creative class feel broader reforms are needed
for people to realize their full potential.
从知识分子，企业家到外出打工者和社会活动家，有一些中国人对习近平的治国方向颇有
微词。另外一些中国的创造性阶层认为更广泛的改革对于让人们意识到自身的潜力有多大
来说，很有必要。
Tu Guohong lives quietly as an independent artist, writer, and art scholar in
Chongqing, a megacity neighboring China’s southwestern Sichuan province. A
graduate of an art school, Mr. Tu uses Western-style oil painting to depict
working-class Chinese in traditional urban settings. His subject matter is
varied, though. He is especially proud of a series of portraits depicting
former President Barack Obama as a Chinese peasant.
涂国宏安静地作为一个独立艺术家，作家和艺术学者住在重庆。他是艺术学院毕业的，他
用西方的油墨画来描绘一些传统乡村里的劳工阶层。他创作的主题经常变换，但是，他很
自豪自己画过的一个作品系列，这些作品把美国前总统欧巴马描绘为一个中国农民。
Asked about his views on the overall level of support for the government, Mr.
Tu, who says he doesn’t generally talk about political problems, chooses his
words carefully.
当被问及他是怎么看待社会对政府的支持度时，他说他不想谈及政治。
“I don’t know what most people think, but they seek a happy life,” he says.
我不知道大多数人是怎么想的，但是他们正在寻找一个幸福的生活，他说道。
“As for myself, I want China to follow Deng Xiaoping’s road of reform and
opening. Not only economic reform, but also cultural – a nation’s
development is not just dependent upon the economy, but also on the
humanities,” he says. “China should not go backward.”
“对于我个人来说，我希望中国能遵循邓小平的改革和开放路线。不仅仅是经济改革，还
应该是文化层面的。一个国家的发展不能仅仅依赖于经济，还应该依赖于人文”，他说到
，“中国不应该走回头路”。
5.完整新闻连结 (或短网址):
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2021/0218/Vilified-abroad-popular-at-home-China-s-Communist-Party-at-100
https://reurl.cc/WEvA6Z
6.备注:
说大陆人民同中共之间的关系是交易型的有些太消极了。实际上绝大部分大陆人已经把中
华民族复兴的希望寄托在中共身上了。并不只是为了追求好的生活才支持中共。