A：“你不给我肛，我就不跟你讲话！”
B：“别这样，我们像正常人一样的交朋友吧。”
A：“你先同意给肛，我才要跟你讲话！”
问题：‘遇到这种情况，如果B是一个正常人，他的选择会是？’
1)找其他正常人当朋友
2)两岸一家亲来吧肛我吧
※ 引述《bluwind1 (蓝天的风)》之铭言：
: 两国之间现在发展到这个情况
: 已经没有可以说得上话的管道
: 可以不要九二共识，我也反对九二共识，然后就没有了
: 两岸不讲话不沟通，可是我们还有一两百万的台湾人在中国生活
: 柯文哲在台北市议会备询时，被市议员王鸿薇以行政院长赖清德
: “务实的台独工作者”为例，要求柯说明两岸立场。
: 柯P不客气地批评：“这是不负责任的！在那个位置上（阁揆），不能这样说。”
: 柯文哲表示“墨绿是我原来的出身”，不过作为台北市长，为台湾最大利益，
: 应该要维持城市交流，这没有互相矛盾，从台湾价值到两岸一家亲，这是务实处理。
: 两岸一家亲只是场面话，和两岸一家人一样，和亲中爱台一样
: 只是为了维持两岸两国之间的对话
: 两岸两国之间假如不需要对话，两岸一家亲这个管道放弃就算了
: 但两岸两国之间必须要对话，在把两岸一家亲丢到一边以前
: 请先提出两岸两国之间对话的办法
: ※ 引述《protagoras (普罗达哥拉斯)》之铭言：
: : 卦点：林昶佐之前就说过，台北市长的职权涉国家主权以及统独！(注1)吴峥也指出两
: 岸一
: : 家亲跟九二共识是一样的意思(注2)。林亮君也说过，相当害怕柯P两岸一家亲，害
: : 怕柯P跟大陆的紧密关系(注3)。林颖孟甚至也说了，澳洲、日本、印度都在防中国
: : ，相对之下台北市长柯P确实不够谨慎！(注4)时代力量台北市参选人虽尚未决定挺
: : 柯or姚，但对柯P的危险性都不得不防。
: : 现在重量级人士留学英国林飞帆出声了！他投书《外交家》指出，柯P将让年底
: 大选
: 大选
: : 笼罩在阴险狡诈的威胁之下！他甚至批评林昶佐，根本小看了“两岸一家亲”的
: 危险
: : ！！文中暗示柯P是连战和马英九对中政策的继承人。你认为“两岸一家亲”跟
: 九二
: : 共识不一样？那你跟本就不懂！两岸一家亲根本是九二共识的平行原则！柯P靠
: 民粹
: : 崛起，他是中国的新代理人。投书后，不少粉丝在林飞帆的脸书下面推文支持，为
: : 林飞帆重返台湾政坛抬轿。
: : 以下投书为我个人翻译，若有出错请帮忙指出。
: : 注1：#1RWB4e8v
: : 注2：#1RW0AVm1
: : 注3：https://youtu.be/Ka0FUVTKwU8?t=235 影片3:55处
: : 注4：#1Rf4F-of
: : 林飞帆投书《外交家》网址：
: : https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/will-taiwan-trap-itself-into-one-china-again/
: : 标题：Will Taiwan Trap Itself Into ‘One China’ Again?
: : In Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je, China might have found a useful wedge to
: : influence Taiwan’s domestic politics.
: : 台湾会再次将自己陷入“一中”吗？在台北市长柯文哲那里，中国或许能找到一个
: : 切入点，能影响台湾的内政。
: : 内文：
: : Taiwan’s commitment to resist China’s encroaching expansionism is under
: : challenge — not only from China, but from within, thanks to its upcoming lo
: cal
: : elections. It is unlikely that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
: : administration, led by President Tsai Ing-wen, will accept Beijing’s
: : “One China” policy in the foreseeable future, given the strategic adjustme
: nts
: : of many democracies toward China and polls in Taiwan consistently showing that
: : there is little desire for “unification.” Still, the local elections in
: : Taiwan this November pose an insidious threat to its future stance. More
: : specifically, the current mayor of Taiwan’s capital of Taipei, Ko Wen-je,
: : a popular political figure campaigning for re-election and an advocate for
: : China’s core Taiwan policy doctrine that “two sides of the Taiwan Strait are
: : one family,” may inject uncertainty into Taiwan’s resolve to counter Chinese
: : aggression.
: : 台湾对中国的侵略扩张政策的拒绝，现在备受挑战：这挑战不只来自中国，也来自台湾内
: : 部，真是托那场即将到来的选举的福呢！(讽刺语气)由蔡英文领导的民进党政府，未来不
: : 太可能接受北京的一中政策，因为许多民主国家已对中国进行战略调整，以及台湾国内的
: : 民调，都显示几乎没有与中国接近的欲望。然而对于台湾未来的这种态势，将被今年11月
: : 选举当中的阴险狡诈的威胁所笼罩。具体来说，台湾首都台北市现任市长柯文哲，他可能
: : 对台湾反击中国侵略的决心的身上，注射不确定性，因为他是一位能连任的热门人选，他
: : 也是支持中国对台的核心政策：“两岸一家亲”的倡议者。
: : Much attention has been paid to Tsai’s refusal of the “1992 Consensus,” a
: : disguised “One China” policy embraced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
: : and the Kuomintang (KMT), currently the main opposition party. There are
: : likewise a wealth of reports about China’s intensifying campaign against
: : Taiwan since the DPP resumed office in 2016, including poaching Taiwan’s
: : diplomatic allies, coercing foreign companies to erase references to Taiwan,
: : restricting Taiwan’s participation in multiple international organizations,
: : and escalating military threats toward Taiwan. Yet relatively little has been
: : said about Beijing’s exploitation of — as well as its impact on — those who
: : desire to accommodate its assertiveness through adopting surrogate doctrines
: : and cultivating new proxies in Taiwan.
: : 值得注意的是蔡英文对九二共识的拒绝。九二共识是一个糟糕的一中政策，中共和当前主
: : 要的在野党国民党支持九二共识。自民进党于2016年恢复执政以来，中国加强对台湾的压
: : 迫也有许多的新闻报导，包括夺取台湾的外交盟友、强迫外国公司取消提及台湾、限制台
: : 湾参与多个国际组织、加剧对台湾军事威胁。然而只有少数的新闻报导，提及北京对于那
: : 些想要乘载北京的自信的有心人士的利用，以及这个利用之下造成的冲击。这些有心人士
: : 透过采用替代政策与培养新的在台湾的代理人的方式来承载北京的这份自信
: : [按：意指两岸一家亲是九二共识的替代，柯P是北京的新代理人]。
: : History of China’s Containment of Taiwan From Within
: : 中国从台湾内部进行封锁的历史
: : China has continually sought to penetrate Taiwan’s political system and
: : marginalize administrations which refuse to recognize Beijing’s “One China”
: : policy by aligning with pro-Beijing politicians and political forces. In 2005,
: : during the first DPP administration, Lien Chan, the former vice president and
: : former president of the KMT, visited then-Chinese president Hu Jintao in Chi
: na,
: : forming a party-to party platform for negotiations that excluded the then-DPP
: : government. Lien and Hu concluded their meeting with a historical agreement —
: : the “Five-Point Vision for Cross-Strait Peace” — aimed at pursuing a peace
: : agreement as an political end of the cross-strait issue under the “One Chin
: a”
: : framework. After the KMT returned to power in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou’s
: : administration extensively implemented those visions, signing all agreements
: : and cooperation schemes under the so-called “1992 Consensus.”
: : 中国一直在思虑如何渗透台湾的政治系统，以及将拒绝一中政策的行政单位边缘化，借由
: : 与亲中人士与亲中政治力量的密切合作。2005年，也就是民进党第一次执政的期间，前副
: : 总统也是前国民党主席的连战，拜访当时中国主席胡锦涛，造就一个党对党的协商平台，
: : 排挤当时的民进党政府。连胡会达到一个历史性的共识：两岸和平的五大愿景，旨在追求
: : 一个和平的协议，作为一个将两岸议题置于一中框架的政治目的。国民党于2008年重返执
: : 政，马英九政府扩大采用这些愿景，在所谓的九二共识下签属所有协议和合作计画。
: : Ma’s approach pushed Taiwan into an asymmetric reliance on China both
: : economically and politically, offering China overarching leverage over Taiwan,
: : benefiting a few cross-strait businesses while sacrificing the majority of
: : domestic labor, and causing Taiwan’s constitutional democracy to deteriorate
: : in pursuit of the passage of those accords. While obtaining certain space on
: : the international stage, Taiwan’s presence was perceived as an “authorized
: : autonomy” granted by China, rather than evidence of its independence. This
: : path triggered a great backlash from civil society in 2014 and eventually led
: : to the KMT’s historic defeat in both local elections in 2014 and general
: : elections in 2016.
: : 马英九的做法促使台湾在政治和经济上形成了不对称的依赖，提供了中国操控台湾的杠杆
: : ，让利给少数的两岸企业、牺牲了国内大部分的劳工。追求这些协议，导致了台湾宪政民
: : 主恶化。在国际舞台上获得一定空间的的同时，台湾的存在被视为被中国授予的“授权自
: : 治”，忽略了台湾的独立性。这条路导致了2014年民间社会的强力反弹，最终导致国民党
: : 历史性的失败，在2014年和2016年的选举中。
: : From “the 1992 Consensus” to “Both Sides of the Strait Are One Family”
: : 从九二共识到两岸一家亲
: : Against this backdrop, Ko Wen-je won a landslide victory as an independent in
: : the 2014 Taipei mayoral race. It could not, therefore, be more ironic that he
: : would then endorse the concept of China and Taiwan being “one family” and
: : “sharing a common destiny” soon after taking office, turning his success as
: : a once-breakthrough politician against the KMT’s dominance of Taipei into a
: : potential opening for Beijing’s infiltration.
: : 在此背景下，柯文哲在2014年台北市长选举中，独得压倒性的胜利。也因此，柯P上任
: 后提
: : 出两岸一家亲以及命运共同体，是多么具有讽刺性阿！他曾经突破国民党的这份成功，竟
: : 转变为北京渗透的潜在开端。
: : Ko’s recognition of this terminology satisfies Beijing’s demand that
: : cross-strait dialogues at all levels must take place under the “One China”
: : framework. It has paved Ko’s way to attend the Taipei-Shanghai Forum since
: : 2015 and ensures his ability to meet with high-ranking Chinese officials. Wh
: ile
: : some might argue Ko’s overtures are not a direct concession to “One China”
: : similar to that of the Ma administration, such claims are based on a
: : misunderstanding of Beijing’s overarching notion of “One China.”
: : 柯P对这些术语的认可，满足了北京的要求，也就是两岸在各个层面的对话，必须在一
: 中框
: : 架下。为柯P自2015年开始的双城论坛开启了道路，也确保了他与中国高官见面的门路
: 。或
: : 许有些人会说，柯P的提议并非马英九政府那种对一中政策的让步；这种说法根本是对
: 北京
: : “一个中国”概念的误解。
: : Emphasizing the “kinship” between Taiwan and China has always been an
: : essential appeal of China’s strategy to contain Taiwan. The origin of this
: : concept can be traced back to 1979 with the “Open Letter to Taiwan
: : Compatriots” in which China addressed the “kinship” of people living on b
: oth
: : sides. Former Chinese presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had extensively u
: sed
: : this phrase. Xi Jinping himself, likewise, deployed the phrase both as vice
: : president and later president of China when meeting with Taiwanese delegates
: : and leaders between 2010 and 2018. In 2017, the 19th National Congress of the
: : People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially enshrined this concept, making it
: : a parallel doctrine to the “1992 Consensus” in its outline of future Taiwan
: : policy.
: : 强调台湾与中国之间的亲属关系，一直都是中国想统一台湾的核心诉求。这个概念的起可
: : 追溯到1979年的“给台湾同胞的公开信”，信中中国提到了两岸人民的“亲属关系”。前
: : 中国国家主席江泽民与胡锦涛广泛使用这个词汇。同样地，在2010~2018年间，习近平
: 作为
: : 国家副主席乃至于国家主席，与台湾代表和领导人会晤时，都使用此词汇。在2017年，十
: : 九大将这个概念正式加载，使之成为对台纲要政策的九二共识的平行原则。
: : It is clear that “two sides of the Strait are one family” is a pivotal pil
: lar
: : of both Xi’s and China’s Taiwan policy. If the so-called “1992 Consensus”
: : embodies Beijing’s sovereign claim over Taiwan, then the “one family”
: : doctrine fulfills China’s nationalistic claim in suggesting there is only one
: : nation on either side of the Taiwan Strait. In this era of frozen relations
: : between Tsai and Beijing, China’s welcome of Ko’s overture indicates that
: : the concept of “two sides of the Strait” being “one family” has been given
: : a more critical status than it was thought to possess, arguably as the latest
: : formula for Beijing’s co-opting of Taiwan’s rising political forces.
: : 显然，“两岸一家亲”是习近平与中国对台政策的关键性支柱。若所谓的九二共识体现了
: : 北京对台的主权主张，那两岸一家亲则是满足了中国的国家主义主张，表明两岸同属一个
: : 国家。在蔡英文与北京的关系当前处于冰冻的状态下，中国对柯P的提议表示欢迎，这
: 表示
: : 柯P主张的“两岸”是“一家亲”是处于比人们所想像的更为关键的地位，可以说是北
: 京加
: : 入台湾崛起的政治力量的最新方案。
: : Given that local elections in Taiwan serve as midterm exams for the incumbent
: : central government, the importance of the role of the capital mayor in
: : cross-strait relations, as well as Ko’s high popularity — which has led to
: : him being frequently touted as a potential presidential candidate — Beijing
: ’s
: : attempt to leverage this election should be concerned.
: : 鉴于台湾的地方选举是当前中央政府的期中考试，首都市长在两岸关系中的角色的重要性
: : 、以及柯P的高人气导致他经常被捧为总统候选人、以及北京试图利用这次选举，都需
: 要被
: : 加以关注。
: : For instance, Chinese state-run media CCTV recently featured positive coverage
: : of Ko — a tactic similar to its previous propaganda for the KMT — which
: : arguably implies Beijing’s public endorsement of him. Indeed, Ko may be
: : China’s rare chance to establish a political beachhead in Taiwan by way of a
: : new political proxy, as the KMT is highly unlikely to win back power in the
: : short-term. Ko is a strong potential challenger for Taiwan’s presidency in
: the
: : coming decade, and his rise may well result from his populist leadership style
: : and nonpartisan nature, which allows him to tap into growing dissatisfaction
: : with both major parties — the DPP and the KMT,
: : 举例来说，中国官媒中央电视台最近对柯P进行了正面的报导，这种策略类似之前对国
: 民党
: : 的宣传，这可以说是北京对柯P的公开支持。确实，柯P可能是中国透过新的政治代理人在
: : 台湾抢滩建立一个政治滩头的难得机会，因为国民党短期内不可能赢回政权。柯P是未
: 来十
: : 年台湾总统的强大潜在挑战者，他的崛起可能源于他民粹的领导风格以及无党无派的性质
: : ，在人民对于国、民两大党的不满的情况下，柯P得以切入。
: : It is unlikely that the majority of voters will accept Ko’s stance on China,
: : but there is a clear tendency to downplay Ko’s cross-strait stance among his
: : supporters due to his popularity. Even members from the pro-independence camp,
: : such as New Power Party legislator Freddy Lim, misinterpret the weight of Ko
: ’s
: : “one family” phrasing in cross-strait relations.
: : 多数选民不太可能接受柯P对中的立场，然而由于他的高人气，柯粉倾向淡化柯P的两岸立
: : 场。甚至连亲独派的阵营例如时代力量立委林昶佐，都误解了“两岸一家亲”在两岸关系
: : 当中的重要性。
: : Ko has had chances to readjust his stance on China, but has chosen to defend
: : his acceptance of the “one family” concept as a pragmatic approach that he
: lps
: : Taiwan buy time. Despite such rhetoric mirroring the KMT’s in the past, Ko’s
: : accommodation of Beijing has not assuaged its assertiveness toward Taiwan in
: : any way. Rather, it has given Beijing more leverage to infiltrate Taiwan’s
: : domestic political debates and signaled a reincarnation of the KMT’s past
: : approach. In addition, the side effect of such overtures may further confuse
: : the international community’s perception of Taiwan, in which
: : misinterpretations perceiving Taiwan-China struggles as an “intra-family
: : dispute” are common.
: : 柯P曾经有机会调整他的对中立场，但是他却选择为“两岸一家亲”加以辩护，理由是
: “两
: : 岸一家亲”只是个为台湾争取时间的手段。这种想法与过去的国民党如出一辙，此外柯
: P对
: : 于北京的容纳，并没有缓和北京对于台湾的侵吞自信。相反，它给北京更多的影响力去渗
: : 透台湾的内政辩论，这根本就是国民党过去作法的新版本。此外，柯P两岸一家亲的附
: 带效
: : 果是，它可能更进一步混淆国际社会对台湾的看法，这种误解就是将台湾与中国的争端视
: : 为“国家内部的争端”。
: : Bulwark of Democracy vs. Orbit of Authoritarianism
: : 民主的堡垒与威权的势力
: : To date, Xi’s “Two Centenary Goals” for the “Chinese Great Rejuvenation”
: : have explicitly exposed China’s intention to challenge the geopolitical ord
: er,
: : with taking Taiwan as an integral part of that grand scheme. Cross-strait
: : relations, therefore, must be understood in the context of international
: : geopolitics and the global order rather than merely a cross-strait affair.
: : 迄今为止，习近平对“中国伟大复兴”的“两百年目标”明确暴露了中国挑战地缘政治秩
: : 序的意图，台湾是此一意图之下的一部分。因此两岸关系必须在国际地缘政治与全球秩序
: : 下才能被理解，而非仅仅是两岸之间的事务。
: : As a vibrant democracy standing at the forefront of this encroaching
: : revisionism, Taiwan’s determination to counter such expansion matters. Since
: : many countries are now adjusting their strategies toward China’s assertiven
: ess
: : , including a growing concern over China’s interference in other nations’
: : democratic institutions, Taiwan should continue to make overtures to potential
: : democratic allies around the world to counter China’s attempts at aggression,
: : instead of placing itself again into an authoritarian superpower’s orbit.
: : Accommodating China might be perceived as a way to bolster short-term securi
: ty,
: : but the price for Taiwan’s democracy and long-term capability to defend its
: elf
: : from authoritarian aggression will be overwhelming.
: : 作为一个站在对抗扩张侵略修正主义的前线的一个充满活力的民主国家，台湾的决心至关
: : 重要。许多国家现在都调整了它们的对中策略，包括对中国干涉其他国家的民主制度的日
: : 益关注，台湾应持续对潜在的民主盟友提出建议，对抗中国的侵略意图，而不是将自己再
: : 次投入威权强权的势力范围内。容纳中国可能被视为一种支持短期安全的方式，但台湾民
: : 主的价值，以及保护自己免受专制侵略的长期能力，才是重要的。
: : As a rising political force, Ko’s tendency to embrace “One China” has
: : introduced a complicating factor into Taiwan’s future trajectory. Yet
: : Taiwanese people might still be able to push back against such inclinations
: : through a comprehensive examination of their political leaders’ stances.
: : Neglecting the fact that “two sides of the Strait are one family” serves as
: : a core concept of Beijing which traps Taiwan in an endless cycle of
: : independence-unification debates will not help us to transcend domestic
: : divergence.
: : 柯P作为一个崛起的政治势力，他倾向去拥抱一中，将为台湾未来的发展轨迹引入复杂
: 的因
: : 素。然而台湾人民仍然可以透过全面检视他们的政治领导人的立场，来抵制这种倾向。两
: : 岸一家亲是北京核心的概念，陷台湾于无止境的统独辩论循环。忽略这个事实，无助于帮
: : 助吾等超越国内的分歧。
: : Importantly, after experiencing Ma’s eight years of pro-China policy, Tsai’s
: : turn from China, and the possibility of Ko’s rise, whether Taiwan’s
: : commitment to counter China’s expansionism should continue to be bound by the
: : personal will of political leaders in the future is indeed questionable.
: : Further institutionalizing and consolidating Taiwan’s de facto independence
: : are considerably more essential than restricting itself under the ambiguous
: : discourse of “maintaining the status quo.” As China’s mounting assertiven
: ess
: : poses the unprecedented challenge to the democratic world, it would be in the
: : international community’s best interests to support a free and independent
: : future for Taiwan.
: : 重要的是，经历了马政府八年的亲中政策、蔡英文转向中国、以及柯P的崛起，台湾对
: 中国
: : 侵略的对抗，是否应受到政治领导人的个人意志的约束，确实是一个问题。进一步制度化
: : 加强保护台湾的独立，将是一个重要的事，比在“维持现状”这种含糊不清的话语中限制
: : 自己还要重要。随着国不断增强的自信对民主世界造成前所未有的挑战，支持台湾自由独
: : 立的未来，将是国际社会的最大利益。