※ 引述《cgi0911 (胜者的迷思)》之铭言：
: 前个礼拜博士答辩完，我跟女朋友开车去上州玩了一趟。回程的时候
: 路过在Hyde Park 小罗斯福总统的故居博物馆参观。
: 我看完以后颇有感触。
: 近几年台湾一直有种理论叫“文组误国”，尤其像我这种纯纯正正理
: 工宅男血统的人，难免都会有瞧不起文组的本位主义。但是，看完小
: 罗斯福总统生平的相关展示以后，给我不小的观念冲击。
让大家看看什么叫做"文组误国"
Protectionism
保护主义
The battle of Smoot-Hawley
斯姆特-霍利之战
Dec 18th 2008| From The Economist print edition
A cautionary tale about how a protectionist measure opposed by all
right-thinking people was passed
警世恒言：一条所有思维健全的人都反对的保护主义措施是怎么在国会通过的
Library of Congress
国会图书馆
EVEN when desperate, Wall Street bankers are not given to grovelling. But in
June 1930 Thomas Lamont, a partner at J.P. Morgan, came close. “I almost
went down on my knees to beg Herbert Hoover to veto the asinine Hawley-Smoot
Tariff,” he recalled. “That Act intensified nationalism all over the world.
”
就算绝望，华尔街银行家也不会卑躬屈膝。不过摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）合伙人托马斯
‧拉蒙特（Thomas Lamont）1930年6月差点就这么做了。“我几乎要跪下来恳求赫伯特‧
胡佛（Herbert Hoover）否决其蠢无比的《斯姆特-霍利关税法案》，”他回忆道，“就
是那个法案加剧了世界范围内的民族主义。”
According to David Kennedy, an historian, Lamont was “usually an influential
economic adviser” to the American president. Not this time. Hoover signed
the bill on June 17th: “the tragic-comic finale”, said that week’s
Economist, “to one of the most amazing chapters in world tariff history…one
that Protectionist enthusiasts the world over would do well to study.”
据历史学家大卫‧甘迺迪所说，拉蒙特是对美国总统“通常具影响力的经济顾问”。这次
胡佛却不为所动，于6月17号签署了法案：“终局亦喜亦悲，”那一周的《经济学家》写
道，“世界关税史上最震惊的一页……值得全世界的保护主义分子仔细研究。”
The Tariff Act of 1930, which increased nearly 900 American import duties,
was debated, passed and signed as the world was tumbling into the Depression.
Its sponsors—Willis Hawley, a congressman from Oregon, and Reed Smoot, a
senator from Utah—have come to personify the economic isolationism of the
era. Sixty-three years later, in a television debate on the North American
Free-Trade Agreement, Al Gore, then vice-president, even presented his
unamused anti-NAFTA opponent, Ross Perot, with a framed photograph of the
pair. Now, with the world economy in perhaps its worst pickle since the
Depression, the names of Hawley and Smoot are cropping up again.
1930年的关税法案增加了近900项美国进口关税，而就在人们围绕法案展开争论、国会审
议通过、总统签署生效的过程中，世界经济一步步陷入萧条。法案提议者，俄勒冈州国会
议员威利斯‧霍利（Willis Hawley）和犹他州参议员里德‧斯穆特（Reed Smoot）成了
那个时代经济孤立主义的象征。63年之后，在一次关于北美自由贸易协定的电视辩论中，
时任副总统的戈尔（Al Gore）甚至把这两人的装裱画像展示给反北美自由贸易协定的竞
争对手罗斯‧佩罗（Ross Perot）看，当然佩罗不觉得好笑。现在，世界经济正处于大萧
条以来也许是最为困难的境地，霍利和斯姆特的名字又出现在人们嘴边。
In fact, few economists think the Smoot-Hawley tariff (as it is most often
known) was one of the principal causes of the Depression. Worse mistakes were
made, largely out of a misplaced faith in the gold standard and balanced
budgets. America’s tariffs were already high, and some other countries were
already increasing their own.
实际上，没有几个经济学家认为斯姆特-霍利关税法案是大萧条的主要原因。更大的失误
在于盲目迷信金本位制和平衡预算。要知道当时美国的关税已处于高水平，其他国家也已
着手增加本国关税水平。
Nevertheless, the act added poison to the emptying well of global trade (see
chart). The worldwide protection of the 1930s took decades to dismantle. And
bad monetary and fiscal policies were at least based on the economic
orthodoxy of the day: economists would tear each other apart over the
heresies of John Maynard Keynes. On protection, there was no such division.
More than a thousand economists petitioned Hoover not to sign the
Smoot-Hawley bill. Bankers like Lamont sided with them; so did editorialists
by the score.
尽管如此，法案的出台对世界贸易仍不啻于雪上加霜（见图）。上世纪30年代弥漫全球的
保护主义潮流历经几十年才消退。现在看来很糟糕的货币、财政政策至少反映了当时的经
济学正统观念（彼时经济学家还在为约翰‧梅纳德‧凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）的
异端学说激烈论战）。而对于贸易保护主义，经济学家是没有分歧的。一千多个经济学家
上书请求胡佛不要签署斯姆特-霍利法案。银行家诸如拉蒙特也和经济学家同一阵线；社
论亦是如此。
原文网址：https://read01.com/2GNO2n.html实际上，没有几个经济学家认为斯姆特-霍利关税法案是大萧条的主要原因。更大的失误
在于盲目迷信金本位制和平衡预算。要知道当时美国的关税已处于高水平，其他国家也已
着手增加本国关税水平。
Nevertheless, the act added poison to the emptying well of global trade (see
chart). The worldwide protection of the 1930s took decades to dismantle. And
bad monetary and fiscal policies were at least based on the economic
orthodoxy of the day: economists would tear each other apart over the
heresies of John Maynard Keynes. On protection, there was no such division.
More than a thousand economists petitioned Hoover not to sign the
Smoot-Hawley bill. Bankers like Lamont sided with them; so did editorialists
by the score.
尽管如此，法案的出台对世界贸易仍不啻于雪上加霜（见图）。上世纪30年代弥漫全球的
保护主义潮流历经几十年才消退。现在看来很糟糕的货币、财政政策至少反映了当时的经
济学正统观念（彼时经济学家还在为约翰‧梅纳德‧凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）的
异端学说激烈论战）。而对于贸易保护主义，经济学家是没有分歧的。一千多个经济学家
上书请求胡佛不要签署斯姆特-霍利法案。银行家诸如拉蒙特也和经济学家同一阵线；社
论亦是如此。
The “asinine” bill began as a much smaller beast: the plan was to help
American agriculture, which had slumped in the early 1920s. Congress passed
several bills to support prices and subsidise exports, but all were vetoed by
Calvin Coolidge, Hoover’s predecessor. With no obvious logic—most American
farmers faced little competition from imports—attention shifted to securing
for agriculture the same sort of protection as for manufacturing, where
tariffs were on average twice as high. To many of its supporters, “tariff
equality” meant reducing industrial duties as well as raising those on farm
goods. “But so soon as ever the tariff schedules were cast into the
melting-pot of revision,” this newspaper wrote, “logrollers and politicians
set to work stirring with all their might.”
这桩“其蠢无比”的法案的前身是为了扶助上世纪20年代早期日益下滑的美国农业而制定
的类似法案。当时国会通过了若干法案，意在维持价格、补贴出口，但是全被胡佛的前任
卡尔文‧科立芝（Calvin Coolidge）否决了。尽管多数美国农场主很少面临来自进口品
的竞争，但毫无道理的，焦点突然转移到给予美国农业同制造业类似的保护力度上（当时
工业品关税平均是农产品关税的两倍）。很多支持者认为，“关税平等”意味着在降低工
业品关税的同时提高农产品关税。“但是，和以往一样，很快关税计划又开始被重新修订
”，报纸写道，“代表各方利益的政客开始讨价还价，商量怎么交换选票。”
Start rolling
开始启动
In the 1928 election campaign Hoover and his fellow Republicans promised to
revise the tariff. The Democrats, then the freer-trading party, were
unusually acquiescent. After comfortable Republican wins in November, Hawley,
the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, set to work. By the time
Hoover was inaugurated in March 1929 and called a special session of Congress
to tackle the tariff, his committee had gathered 43 days’, five nights’ and
11,000 pages’ worth of testimony. The door was open to more than just
farmers; Hawley’s committee heard mainly from small and medium-sized
industrial businesses.
胡佛及以其为首的共和党在1928年的大选中承诺修改关税。彼时支持自由贸易的民主党人
，却反常地沉默。共和党11月轻松取胜后，众议院筹款委员会（House Ways and Means
Committee）主席霍利开始行动。到了1929年5月胡佛宣誓就职并专门召集国会商讨关税问
题的时候，霍利领导下的筹款委员会已经花43天连5个晚上搜集了11,000页证词。不光是
农场主， 委员会还访问并听取了中小型工业企业的意见。
The House bill, passed in May, raised 845 tariff rates and cut 82. Douglas
Irwin, an economist at Dartmouth and author of a forthcoming book (“The
Battle over Protection: A History of US Trade Policy”) on which this article
draws heavily, says it “tilted the tariff nearly as much toward higher
duties on manufactured goods as it increased duties on agricultural imports.”
法案的众院版本于5月通过，该版本提高了845种产品的关税，降低了82种产品的关税。达
特茅斯学院（Dartmouth）经济学家道格拉斯‧厄文（Douglas Irwin）认为，该法案“确
立了工业品高关税政策，农业品进口关税也遭到了几乎同等幅度的提高”。道格拉斯‧厄
文的新书《贸易保护之战：美国贸易政策史》（”The Battle over Protection: A
History of US Trade Policy”） 即将出版，本文亦从中借鉴良多。
The bill then went to the Senate, where Smoot chaired the Finance Committee.
Senators who thought their constituents had lost out in the House—from
farming and mining states—were spoiling for a fight. Smoot’s committee
increased 177 rates from the House version and cut 254. In the next committee
stage—which lasted from the autumn of 1929 until March 1930—the whole
Senate could take part. Farming- and mining-state senators pruned Hawley’s
increases in industrial tariffs.
法案随即递交参院讨论，斯姆特时任参院金融委员会（the Finance Committee）主席。
那些觉得本州选民在法案的众院版本中未获好处的参议员（来自农业州和采矿州），已在
迫切等待这一轮参院厮杀的到来。斯姆特领导下的参院金融委员会把众院版本改成提高
177项关税，降低254项关税。下一阶段的金融委员会审议从1929年秋到1930年3月结束，
整个参议院都参与了。农业州和采矿州的参议员删除了霍利提高的工业品关税。
In the last Senate stage, senators from industrial states regrouped,
fortified by the gathering economic gloom. “A different voting coalition
emerged,” says Mr Irwin, “not one based on agricultural versus industrial
interests but on classic vote-trading among unrelated goods.” Some senators
disapproved: Robert LaFollette, a Republican from Wisconsin, called the bill
“the product of a series of deals, conceived in secret, but executed in
public with a brazen effrontery that is without parallel in the annals of the
Senate.”
在最后的参院审议阶段，日渐惨澹的经济形势帮了工业州的参议员的忙，他们重振旗鼓。
“一个新的投票联盟出现了，”厄文说，“联盟不是根据农业利益v.s.工业利益划分的，
而是依据传统的选票交换方式形成的。”一些参议员对此不以为然：威斯康辛州参议员共
和党人Robert LaFollette把法案称作“一系列交易的产物，这些交易于私下里偷偷达成
，却在光天化日之下操作，其厚颜无耻之甚在参院历史上绝无仅有。”
Others saw nothing wrong. Charles Waterman, a Republican from Colorado,
declared: “I have stated…that, by the eternal, I will not vote for a tariff
upon the products of another state if the senators from that state vote
against protecting the industries of my state.” The tariff’s critics—
including Franklin Roosevelt, in his presidential campaign in 1932—dubbed
the bill the “Grundy tariff”, after Joseph Grundy, a Republican senator
from Pennsylvania and president of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers’
Association. Grundy had said that anyone who made campaign contributions was
entitled to higher tariffs in return.
其他人并不觉得这么做有什么问题。科罗拉多州参议员共和党人Charles Waterman宣称：
“我已经说得很明白了……如果某州参议员投票反对保护我州的工业，我就不会投票赞成
对该州的产品征关税。”反关税人士，包括1932年大选中的富兰克林‧罗斯福（
Franklin Roosevelt），把这项法案称为“Grundy关税法（Grundy tariff）”。“
Grundy”是宾夕法尼亚州参议员兼宾夕法尼亚制造者协会（Pennsylvania Manufacturers
’ Association）主席、共和党人Joseph Grundy的姓。Grundy曾经说过，只要为竞选捐
过钱，就有权得到高关税作为回报。
The Senate’s final bill contained no fewer than 1,253 changes from the House
’s version. The two houses compromised, broadly by moving the Senate’s
rates up rather than the House’s down. In all, 890 tariffs were increased,
compared with the previous Tariff Act, of 1922, which had itself raised
duties dramatically (for examples, see table); 235 were cut. The bill
squeezed through the Senate, by 44 votes to 42, and breezed through the House.
参院通过的最终法案与众院版本相比修改之处达1,253处之多。最终两院能妥协一致，更
多是靠参院妥协、同意提高征税产品的种类，而不是众院减少征税产品的种类。总之，与
1922年的关税法案（该法案大幅提高了当时的关税水平，详见下表）相比，本次法案增加
了890项关税，减少了235项关税。法案以44票对42票勉强在参院通过，在众院通过则不费
吹灰之力。
Of all the calls on Hoover not to sign the bill, perhaps the weightiest was a
petition signed by 1,028 American economists. A dozen years later Frank
Fetter, one of the organisers, recalled their unanimity. “Economic faculties
that within a few years were to be split wide open on monetary policy,
deficit finance, and the problem of big business, were practically at one in
their belief that the Hawley-Smoot bill was an iniquitous piece of
legislation.”
Some of the names are familiar even now. One was Frank Taussig, a former head
of the Tariff Commission (which advised on whether duties should be raised or
lowered). Another was Paul Douglas, later a senator (undergraduates are still
introduced to the Cobb-Douglas production function). And a third was Irving
Fisher.
在众多敦促胡佛不要签署该法案的声音中，最有分量的可能就属1,028名经济学家的联名
上书了。12年之后，当年的组织者之一Frank Fetter，回忆起经济学家的意见是如何统一
。“短短几年后这些经济界人士就会因货币政策、赤字财政、大企业垄断的问题各持己见
、争论不休，但是对斯姆特-霍利法案，所有人的意见无比统一，这是一桩不公平的立法
。”这当中，有些人的名字今天听起来还很耳熟。前关税委员会（the Tariff
Commission）（负责向国会建议关税应增加或减少）主管弗兰克‧陶辛格（Frank
Taussig），后来成为参议员的保罗‧道格拉斯（Paul Douglas）（本科生今天还会学习
柯布—道格拉斯生产函数），还有欧文‧费雪（Irving Fisher）。
Fisher is still a giant of economics, best known for his work on monetary
theory and index numbers. (He was fallible, though. Shortly before the 1929
stockmarket crash, he declared, “Stock prices have reached what looks like a
permanently high plateau.”) According to Fetter, Fisher suggested that the
petition refer explicitly to the importance of trade to America as a huge
creditor nation: if other countries could not sell to the United States, how
could they repay their debts? It was also thanks to Fisher that so many
economists signed it. He proposed that it be sent to the entire membership of
the American Economic Association, rather than to one member of each
university’s faculty, and offered to meet the extra expense. The total cost
was $137, of which Fisher paid $105.
费雪今天仍是经济学的大家，他最为出名的是在货币理论和物价指数方面做出的贡献。（
费雪并非没犯过错。1929年股市大崩溃前不久，他还声称，“看起来股价已经上升到一个
永久性的高水平”）据Fetter说，费雪建议上书着重提到贸易对于美国这样一个大债权国
的重要性：如果其他国家不能卖东西给美国，他们怎么有钱还债？也因为费雪，才有如此
众多的经济学家联名签署。是他提议将请愿书寄给美国经济学会（American Economic
Association）的每个会员，而不是每所大学寄一个教员；他还主动承担了由此产生的额
外费用。邮费总共花了$137，费雪付了$105。
Expensive ink
沉重的签名
Hoover’s signature cost rather more—even though the direct effect on
American trade was limited. The average rate on dutiable goods rose from 40%
to 48%, implying a price increase of only 6%. And most trade, Mr Irwin points
out, was free of duty (partly because high tariffs discouraged imports). He
estimates that the new tariff reduced dutiable imports by 17-20% and the
total by 4-6%. Yet the volume of American imports had already dropped by 15%
in the year before the act was passed. It would fall by a further 40% in a
little more than two years.
法案经胡佛签署，给美国贸易带来了不小的冲击—但其直接影响有限。应税品平均税率从
40%上升到48%，即进口物品价格仅上涨6%。厄文指出，大多数贸易品是无需缴纳关税的（
部分原因在于高关税扼制了进口）。他估计新增的关税使得应纳税之进口下降了17%-20%
，使得总进口下降了4%-6%。但是在法案通过的前一年，美国进口量已经下降了15%。随后
的两年多，进口量进一步下降了40%。
Other, bigger forces were at work. Chief among these was the fall in American
GDP, the causes of which went far beyond protection. The other was deflation,
which amplified the effects of the existing tariff and the Smoot-Hawley
increases. In those days most tariffs were levied on the volume of imports
(so many cents per pound, say) rather than value. So as deflation took hold
after 1929, effective tariff rates climbed, discouraging imports. By 1932,
the average American tariff on dutiable imports was 59.1%; only once before,
in 1830, had it been higher. Mr Irwin reckons that the Tariff Act raised
duties by 20%; deflation accounted for half as much again.
其他更重要的因素在起作用。首先是美国GDP的下降，GDP下降的原因远远不止保护主义作
祟。另一个因素是通货紧缩，通缩放大了现行关税及斯姆特-霍利法案所增加之关税对经
济产生的影响。当时，多数关税是根据物品数量征税（例如每磅多少美分），而不是根据
价值征税。1929年美国经济出现通缩之后，实际关税税率上升，从而阻碍了进口。1932年
，美国应税品的平均关税税率为59.1%；这个数字仅次于1830年的历史最高水平。厄文估
计关税法案使得关税升高了20%；其中通缩的因素占了一半。
Smoot-Hawley did most harm by souring trade relations with other countries.
The League of Nations, of which America was not a member, had talked of a “
tariff truce”; the Tariff Act helped to undermine that idea. By September
1929 the Hoover administration had already noted protests from 23 trading
partners at the prospect of higher tariffs. But the threat of retaliation was
ignored: America’s tariffs were America’s business. The Congressional
Record, notes Mr Irwin, contains 20 pages of debate on the duty on tomatoes
but very little on the reaction from abroad.
斯姆特-霍利法案最严重的后果是造成了美国对外贸易关系的恶化。国际联盟（The
League of Nations）—美国不是成员国，曾提议各国达成“关税休战协议”（tariff
truce）；关税法案的出台使这个希望破灭了。至1929年9月为止，胡佛政府已收到来自23
个贸易伙伴国的抗议，反对高关税。但美国政府无视可能的报复性措施的威胁：美国政府
觉得关税多高是自己的事，别人管不著。厄文注意到，国会历史记录中有20多页是关于番
茄关税的辩论，却几乎没有涉及外国的反应。
A study by Judith McDonald, Anthony Patrick O’Brien and Colleen Callahan*
examines the response of Canada, America’s biggest trading partner. When
Hoover was elected president, the Canadian prime minister, Mackenzie King,
wrote in his diary that his victory would lead to “border warfare”. King,
who had cut tariffs in the early 1920s, warned the Americans that retaliation
might follow. In May 1930, with higher American tariffs all but certain, he
imposed extra duties on some American goods—and cut tariffs on imports from
the rest of the British empire.
Judith McDonald，Anthony Patrick O’Brien和 Colleen Callahan*研究了美国最大的
贸易伙伴—加拿大的反应。胡佛当选为美国总统之际，加拿大总理麦肯齐‧金（
Mackenzie King）在日记中写道，胡佛的当选将导致美加两国的“边界战争”。金在20世
纪20年代曾削减过关税，他警告美国政府可能会采取报复行动。1930年5月，眼见美国提
高关税已成定局，金对某些美国货物开征特税，对大英帝国其他领地的进口货物降低关税
。
He promptly called a general election, believing he had done enough to
satisfy Canadians’ resentment. America, wrote the New York Times, was “
consciously giving Canada inducements to turn to England for the goods which
she has been buying from the United States.” Canadians agreed. King’s
Liberals were crushed by the Conservatives, who favoured and enacted even
higher tariffs.
金认为这些行动已够平息加拿大人的不满情绪，不久他解散议会、举行大选。纽约时报（
the New York Times）写道，美国“有意在刺激加拿大，使其转而向英国购买本从美国进
口的货物”。加拿大人显然也这么认为。大选中，金领导的自由党被主张高关税的保守党
击败，保守党执政后奉行的关税政策是比美国更高。
All this, of course, is history. There are plenty of reasons to think that
the terrible lesson of the 1930s will not have to be learnt again.
Governments have reaffirmed their commitment to open trade and the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). The complex patterns of cross-border commerce, with
myriad stages of production spread over so many countries, would be
enormously costly to pull apart.
所有这些，当然已成为过去。我们有很多理由相信世人已经获得了教训，上世纪30年代的
历史不会重演。各国政府已重申支持贸易开放和世界贸易组织（WTO）的立场。跨国商业
活动已经发展到如此复杂的程度—生产链的各个环节分布在不同国家，破坏这种商业模式
必定付出高昂的代价。
And yet. Tariffs can be increased, even under the WTO. The use of
anti-dumping is on the rise. Favours offered to one industry (farming then;
cars now?) can be hard to refuse to others. And the fact that politicians
know something to be madness does not stop them doing it. They were told in
1930: 1,028 times over.
可是，即使在WTO的规范下，增加关税仍是可能的。目前各国反倾销诉讼的增多就是一个
例证。一旦实施对某个产业的保护（曾今的农业，如今的汽车工业？），政府就很难拒绝
对其他行业采取类似的保护措施。更何况政客即便知道做某件事很蠢也并不妨碍他们这么
做。别忘了1930年的时候，有人就告诉了他们1028遍！
* “Trade Wars: Canada’s Reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff”. Journal of
Economic History, December 1997.
* 《贸易战：加拿大对斯姆特-霍利关税法案的反应》，《经济史》，1997年12月。
译注：
1. bill: 美国国会议员可以以四种不同的形式提出新立法， 这四种形式包括法案
(Bills)、联合决议案(Joint Resolution)、共同决议案(Concurrent Resolution)和简单
决议案(Simple Resolution)。
2. logroller: Logrolling is the trading of favors or quid pro quo, such as
vote trading by legislative members to obtain passage of actions of interest
to each legislative member. logrolling 译为滚木立法，并与“选票交换”、“互投
赞成票”这两个词与概念互换使用
3. vote-trading: Vote trading is the practice of supporting someone else's
initiative in exchange for their support of one's own initiative. It
frequently takes place in legislative bodies. An example would be Congressman
A voting for a dam in Congressman B's district in exchange for Congressman
B's support for farm subsidies in Congressman A's district.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vote_trading)
4. 美国立法程序： 得到委员会多数赞成通过的立法将被送到众议院全院，在众议院院会
中让全体议员对立法进行审议，辩论和投票。这项立法通过适当议事程序在众议院全院表
决后，将送到参议院审议。如果参议院对众议院的立法有修改，这整个修改后的立法必须
再送回众议院审议。最终，如果两院希望能制定一项新的移民法规，他们必须拟定一个两
院统一的版本。参议院和众议院必须对一个完全一样的统一版本进行投票。两院在这个过
程中必须做出很多妥协，并解决双方的分歧
原文网址：https://read01.com/2GNO2n.html
"文组误国"
"文组误国"
"文组误国"
更正一下，是：
"烂文组误国"
"烂文组误国"
"烂文组误国"
: 民主党的小罗斯福，他的前任是共和党的赫伯特．胡佛。这两个人可
: 以说是两个光谱极端的人。
: 胡佛是中西部乡下的铁匠之子，身世虽算不上贫穷但也好不到哪去；
: 他的学历是当时还名不见经传的史丹佛大学，毕业以后在加州当采矿
: 工程师。他生活俭素，讲求效率，以数字管理为本位。他在美国本土
: 公职的起点就是粮食管理局的局长，以严控产销、杜绝浪费的作风而
: 闻名。从台湾人的角度来讲，胡佛是个不折不扣的理工人，有丰富的
: 管理经验，又是老练的财经首长。
: 反过来说，小罗斯福是东岸富豪世家么子，在纽约是数一数二的银汤
: 匙少爷（罗斯福家族曾经拥有包括今天帝国大厦在内的曼哈顿大笔土
: 地）。他的学历是哈佛加哥大，虽然书唸得不怎么样，在兄弟会里面
: 倒是十分活跃。在大牌律师事务所当助理混了一两年以后就从政选州
: 参议员，自此以后就再也没有离开政治这一行。罗斯福生活阔绰，从
: 政散财毫不手软，他的对手总说他是个不知民间疾苦、光会嘴炮的公
: 子哥儿。更惨的是，他还明著在老婆眼皮底下搞外遇。
: 光是从这两个人的背景资料来看，胡佛正是台湾人求之不得的“理科
: 系领导人”，而罗斯福根本就是个靠爸误国族。
: 但我们都知道，在经济大恐慌面前灰头土脸的是胡佛，而民粹崛起的
: 小罗斯福，最终领导著美国挺过大恐慌与第二次世界大战。
: 所谓时势造英雄、英雄造时势。胡佛未必就是个无能的总统，小罗斯
: 福更谈不上是圣贤。但是，放在１９３０年代的时间点来看，小罗斯
: 福成了那个“对的人”，而胡佛只能在历史的舞台上黯然失色。
: 我不是研究历史的专家，但是总结我看到的展示资料，我必须说小罗
: 斯福作为美国最优秀的总统之一，跟他的人格特质是有关的：
: 1.他有包括外表在内的强大个人魅力，优秀的口语沟通能力与民主选
: 举必备的群众号召力，但反过来说他就是当代美国的民粹大王。
: 2.他有坚强不屈的意志，但往难听一点讲，就是他横著竖着都要照自
: 己的意思干，土豪鸭霸连自己的副总统都反目成仇。
: 3.他有闭着眼睛跳入万丈深坑的献身精神，但是有时候他勇敢到让人
: 为他的愚蠢感到瞠目结舌的地步。
: 4.他凡事抓大放小，执行面完全信赖优秀的专业阁僚，甚至在战争的
: 　期间他与马歇尔的人事布局堪称战略史上的经典。但反过来说，产
: 　业经贸、数字管理什么的他一概不懂。
: 5.他是个久经历练的民选领袖，总能在派系之间纵横捭合，获取新政
: 　所需要的政治能量。但反过来说，他新政里面丢出了一桶又一桶的
: 　牛肉，在很多人眼里他根本就是腐败到不行的政客。
: 看完了展览，我不禁省思，我常常跟人嘴炮“文组误国”，但，带领
: 美国挺过惊涛骇浪十二年的，不正是我最看不起的那种政客吗？
: 理工人其实是有理工人的思维盲点的。我们做事以前，总是会瞻前顾
: 后，想好了可行性再下手；但是在危机火烧屁股的时候，能够闭着眼
: 睛跳下去做的，往往不是我们这种人。我们自奉理性，但是在政治合
: 纵连横的场合上，往往无法跟人交心搏挪。
: 世局承平的时候，一个理性、有效率、思虑周全、清廉自奉的人往往
: 可以成为好领导。但是世局险恶的时候，往往那个我们理工人看不起
: 的愚蠢、民粹又腐败的王八蛋，才能号召老百姓一起冲出难关。很多
: 承平时期看起来是严重缺陷的人格特质，在危机之下反而成了胜负的
: 关键点。
: 所以现在我真的不相信什么“文组误国”、“理组兴国”的理论了。
: 事实上，一百个人有一百零一种性格，又有谁能界定理组出身的人就
: 会怎样怎样个性，文组出身的又会怎样怎样个性？一个时代需要的就
: 是一种人；在政治上面，真的不是理性走遍天下。
: ※ 引述《RevanKai (战文大师ChaoSole)》之铭言：
: : 文组误国
: : 长期以来已有共识
: : 文组
: : 生产力低落，思考没有逻辑，容易被新闻洗脑，几乎无常识可言
: : 没有专业技能，就算有也对人类的发展毫无帮助
: : 可以说根本就是来混分的类别
: : 现在所有对人类而言很方便的科技，可以说完全都是理组制造、发明出来的
: : 未来人类要上火星，前往新殖民地，靠的也是理组
: : 那么我们国家到底需要文组做什么呢?
: : 删除文组让更多人才释放出来，别在学校瞎混时间
: : 是不是可以让台湾国力更为强盛呢?
: : 反正台湾的文组职业，理组的去闭着眼睛考也是随便上(但是薪水太低没人愿意考QQ)
: : 没有需要特地开一个学院出来诈骗学生的钱吧?
: : 有挂吗o'_'o?