个人猜测
与其说是对台湾友好，不如说是对中国金援存有戒心。
http://tinyurl.com/hh7wbs7
China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy
中国的债务陷阱式外交
NEW DELHI – If there is one thing at which China’s leaders truly excel, it
is the use of economic tools to advance their country’s geostrategic
interests. Through its $1 trillion “one belt, one road” initiative, China
is supporting infrastructure projects in strategically located developing
countries, often by extending huge loans to their governments. As a result,
countries are becoming ensnared in a debt trap that leaves them vulnerable to
China’s influence.
中国借由一带一路计画，借大量债务给沿线地理位置重要的发展中国家来建设基础设施
，最终使这些国家陷入债务陷阱中而对中国难以说不。
Of course, extending loans for infrastructure projects is not inherently bad.
But the projects that China is supporting are often intended not to support
the local economy, but to facilitate Chinese access to natural resources, or
to open the market for low-cost and shoddy Chinese goods. In many cases,
China even sends its own construction workers, minimizing the number of local
jobs that are created.
当然，借债建设本质上并没错，但坏在中国的援助无意促进当地经济，而意在获取当地
自然资源，或打开低廉中国制产品的市场。许多案例中，中国甚至派出自己的工人
，使因建设创造的工作机会无法留在当地。
Several of the projects that have been completed are now bleeding money. For
example, Sri Lanka’s Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which opened
in 2013 near Hambantota, has been dubbed the world’s emptiest. Likewise,
Hambantota’s Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port remains largely idle, as does
the multibillion-dollar Gwadar port in Pakistan. For China, however, these
projects are operating exactly as needed: Chinese attack submarines have
twice docked at Sri Lankan ports, and two Chinese warships were recently
pressed into service for Gwadar port security.
In a sense, it is even better for China that the projects don’t do well.
After all, the heavier the debt burden on smaller countries, the greater China
’s own leverage becomes. Already, China has used its clout to push Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand to block a united ASEAN stand against China’s
aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the South China Sea.
许多建设项目完成后营运至今持续亏损，从某种意义上来说，这些项目失败对中国更有利
，债务负担越严重，中国就有更多着力点影响这些小国。
Moreover, some countries, overwhelmed by their debts to China, are being
forced to sell to it stakes in Chinese-financed projects or hand over their
management to Chinese state-owned firms. In financially risky countries,
China now demands majority ownership up front. For example, China clinched a
deal with Nepal this month to build another largely Chinese-owned dam there,
with its state-run China Three Gorges Corporation taking a 75% stake.
As if that were not enough, China is taking steps to ensure that countries
will not be able to escape their debts. In exchange for rescheduling
repayment, China is requiring countries to award it contracts for additional
projects, thereby making their debt crises interminable. Last October, China
canceled $90 million of Cambodia’s debt, only to secure major new contracts.
为了还债，被迫将原本中国金援项目中所持有的股分或管理权给予中国国营企业
，甚至以允许新的借债计画为条件允许延后还款，使这些国家益发深陷债务陷阱中
Some developing economies are regretting their decision to accept Chinese
loans. Protests have erupted over widespread joblessness, purportedly caused
by Chinese dumping of goods, which is killing off local manufacturing, and
exacerbated by China’s import of workers for its own projects.
New governments in several countries, from Nigeria to Sri Lanka, have ordered
investigations into alleged Chinese bribery of the previous leadership. Last
month, China’s acting ambassador to Pakistan, Zhao Lijian, was involved in a
Twitter spat with Pakistani journalists over accusations of project-related
corruption and the use of Chinese convicts as laborers in Pakistan (not a new
practice for China). Zhao described the accusations as “nonsense.”
一些发展中国家已经开始后悔接受中国贷款，各地爆发抗议，抗议中国倾销产品造成
当地制造业萧条以及失业，从尼日利亚到斯里兰卡，许多国家新政府开始调查前任
政府收受中国贿赂的行为
In retrospect, China’s designs might seem obvious. But the decision by many
developing countries to accept Chinese loans was, in many ways,
understandable. Neglected by institutional investors, they had major unmet
infrastructure needs. So when China showed up, promising benevolent
investment and easy credit, they were all in. It became clear only later that
China’s real objectives were commercial penetration and strategic leverage;
by then, it was too late, and countries were trapped in a vicious cycle.
以下举斯里兰卡作为例子:
Sri Lanka is Exhibit A. Though small, the country is strategically located
between China’s eastern ports and the Mediterranean. Chinese President Xi
Jinping has called it vital to the completion of the maritime Silk Road.
China began investing heavily in Sri Lanka during the quasi-autocratic
nine-year rule of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and China shielded Rajapaksa
at the United Nations from allegations of war crimes. China quickly became
Sri Lanka’s leading investor and lender, and its second-largest trading
partner, giving it substantial diplomatic leverage.
It was smooth sailing for China, until Rajapaksa was unexpectedly defeated in
the early 2015 election by Maithripala Sirisena, who had campaigned on the
promise to extricate Sri Lanka from the Chinese debt trap. True to his word,
he suspended work on major Chinese projects.
But it was too late: Sri Lanka’s government was already on the brink of
default. So, as a Chinese state mouthpiece crowed, Sri Lanka had no choice
but “to turn around and embrace China again.” Sirisena, in need of more
time to repay old loans, as well as fresh credit, acquiesced to a series of
Chinese demands, restarting suspended initiatives, like the $1.4 billion
Colombo Port City, and awarding China new projects.
Sirisena also recently agreed to sell an 80% stake in the Hambantota port to
China for about $1.1 billion. According to China’s ambassador to Sri Lanka,
Yi Xianliang, the sale of stakes in other projects is also under discussion,
in order to help Sri Lanka “solve its finance problems.” Now, Rajapaksa is
accusing Sirisena of granting China undue concessions.
By integrating its foreign, economic, and security policies, China is
advancing its goal of fashioning a hegemonic sphere of trade, communication,
transportation, and security links. If states are saddled with onerous levels
of debt as a result, their financial woes only aid China’s neocolonial
designs. Countries that are not yet ensnared in China’s debt trap should
take note – and take whatever steps they can to avoid it.